“Trust but Verify”: Confidence and Distrust from Détente To
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“Trust but Verify”: Confidence and Distrust from Détente to the End of the Cold War. Washington DC: German Historical Institute, Washington DC; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 07.11.2011-09.11.2011. Reviewed by Reinhild Kreis Published on H-Soz-u-Kult (May, 2012) This conference sought to shed new light on tional affairs during the fnal years of the Cold the years following détente by investigating the War might yield new ideas about the evolution of role trust and distrust played in foreign as well as international relations both between and within domestic politics during a time when the guiding the blocs. They maintained that the idea of the principle of foreign policy was to avoid the worst conference was not only to trace the importance case scenario – a “hot war” with the possibility of of active trust and confidence-building between nuclear annihilation between the superpowers. It the superpowers from NATO’s 1967 Harmel Re‐ drew on the role of trust both as an object of his‐ port until the end of the Cold War, but also to torical analysis and as an independent analytical show how trust and distrust impacted interna‐ category based on the wide application of notions tional relations, and to highlight the dynamic en‐ of trust in the felds of sociology, economics, me‐ tanglement between foreign and domestic affairs. dia studies, and political science. Interpreting Investigating the role that individuals played in trust as a form of political and social capital, the trust-building processes, the frst panel focused on conference explored the dynamics of trust or dis‐ the connection between trust on a personal level trust as an interplay of factors such as risk assess‐ and the control or verification mechanisms that ment, strategic self-interest, shared values and were part of these processes. goodwill, highlighting the significance of histori‐ PATRICK VAUGHAN (Krakow) analyzed the cally grown trust regimes, symbolic actions, the role of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s na‐ effective staging of trust, and trustworthiness. tional security advisor, in mediating between the Participants thus set out to reevaluate the fnal United States, Poland, and the newly formed Pol‐ decades of the Cold War by investigating the ish labor union Solidarity. In his paper, Vaughan strategies of trust and confidence-building em‐ demonstrated how the Polish-American Brzezins‐ ployed to enforce certain political aims, the com‐ ki used his unique connection to Poland to lobby munication and representation of trust, the cru‐ for the importance of a peaceful negotiation cial role of the media, as well as the complex in‐ among all parties involved. Vaughan emphasized teraction of trust, fear, risk of betrayal, and verifi‐ the importance of both sides’ trust in Brzezinski, cation mechanisms. which had a substantial impact on the success of In their introduction, REINHILD KREIS (Augs‐ his strategy of “peaceful engagement.” J. SIMON burg) and MARTIN KLIMKE (Washington) stressed ROFE (Leicester) then examined the significance that the issue of trust and confidence in interna‐ of trust and trustworthiness in the George H. W. H-Net Reviews Bush administration, emphasizing that trust was “trust” were partially “lip service” as both sides an integral element of the Bush presidency, in‐ had entered the negotiations mainly to achieve cluding interactions with advisors, allies, and the domestic political gains, and not chiefly to devel‐ Soviet Union. Rofe underscored that personal op a relationship of mutual trust. SARAH SNY‐ trust and the paradigm of “order over justice” DER’s (London) paper focused on the role of trust were the guiding principles Bush followed in Reagan’s promotion of human rights, particu‐ throughout his career and particularly drew on in larly religious freedoms. Snyder examined Rea‐ the final phase of the Cold War. gan’s efforts to secure exit visas for two Pente‐ In her keynote lecture “Emotions in History,” costal Soviet families who sought refuge in the US UTE FREVERT (Berlin) provided a comprehensive embassy in Moscow in 1982. Reagan was able to introduction to recent research on the history of personally empathize with the individuals in emotions. For Frevert, emotions play an active question and, moreover, his “quiet diplomacy” role in history not only by influencing moral judg‐ and assurances toward Gorbachev not “to crow” ment and collective behavior. They should also be over any steps taken by the Soviets on this issue seen as deeply historical, meaning that their per‐ helped establish a greater degree of trust in Sovi‐ ception, interpretation, and handling are subject et-American relations. to historical change. Frevert argued that trust is a The following two panels explored the mech‐ distinctively modern concept linked to notions of anism of trust inside the ideological blocs. Draw‐ profound uncertainty, and she particularly high‐ ing on opinion polls and on intelligence reports, lighted the personal character of bonds of trust in JENS GIESEKE (Potsdam) outlined East Germans’ modern societies. In her view, the concept of trust attitudes toward their own government and that cannot easily be applied to international relations of the Federal Republic during the 1970/80s. since these are primarily driven by national inter‐ Gieseke identified ideological, official, and bot‐ ests and thus lack the high personal investment tom-up trust regimes in the GDR and showed how characteristic of trust. Instead, she favored the the intelligence apparatus became increasingly concepts of confidence and reliance to describe worried about the positive attitude and rising these relationships. trustworthiness West German parties and politi‐ DEBORAH WELCH LARSON (Los Angeles) be‐ cians such as Willy Brandt began to enjoy among gan the second day’s proceedings with a keynote East Germans. However, in light of the NATO Dou‐ lecture on “Trust and Mistrust during the Cold ble-Track Treaty, Gieseke argued, these attitudes War.” Larson defined trust broadly as the “belief partially shifted, with East Germans experiencing that the other has benevolent intentions towards increased fear of war, alienation from Western us,” which also implies vulnerability. For her, policies, and the feeling of helplessness in the re‐ trust exists in a continuum; that is, a lack of trust newed superpower confrontation. JENS BOYSEN does not mean distrust. In the context of the Cold (Warsaw) then further complicated the notion of War, she argued, trust was an integral part of a homogeneous ideological bloc among the War‐ communication and international cooperation be‐ saw Pact countries by looking at changes in the tween the United States and the Soviet Union. relationship between East Germany and Poland MICHAEL COTEY MORGAN (Toronto) contended that showcased the fssures between these official that trust and distrust played a central role at the allies. Boysen noted that mutual dependency and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu‐ trust was a litmus test for East German leaders to rope – functioning both as a tool and an objective. determine how far allies would subordinate their At the same time, however, the proclamations of national interests to the common cause. He high‐ lighted how both countries’ officials interpreted 2 H-Net Reviews their respective turns to West Germany for eco‐ national talks. Instead, Kullaa emphasized that nomic support differently, and yet they similarly Finland’s neutralism should not be confused with viewed the Federal Republic as an external an‐ neutrality. Finland did not want to be in the chor. EMMANUEL MOURLON-DRUOL (Glasgow) “Third Bloc” of the Cold War, although its position asked whether G7 and European Council summit was similar to that of Yugoslavia and Egypt, and it meetings could be seen as efforts to institutional‐ chose to keep quiet on a number of key issues, ize trust. He explained how they served to show thus arriving at official neutralism from a point of the public unity of the member states to specific self-interest and from the government’s view of national audiences and how the informality of trust as political capital. these meetings was supposed to help foster trust The conference’s third day began with a panel among the Western leaders. NOËL BONHOMME entitled “Implementation and Verification.” (Paris), on the other hand, emphasized the impor‐ ARVID SCHORS (Freiburg) focused on the reduc‐ tance of codes and rule-making for the G7 meet‐ tion of strategic arms leading up to the SALT I ings and interpreted the meetings’ function as a treaty. Schors emphasized that the US did not nec‐ means of “socializing” Western leaders that had essarily initiate the SALT I talks out of a desire to recently come into office. Bonhomme posed the foster trust, but that trust did eventually emerge question of whether, as the G7 summits became over the course of the negotiations. Schors also institutionalized, trust helped or hindered them. underscored the significance the rhetoric of dis‐ The next panel turned its attention to the role trusting the Soviet Union had for U.S. domestic of small and neutral states. EFFIE G. H. PEDALIU politics, specifically when selling these negotia‐ (Bristol) focused on several NATO episodes in tions to the public by pointing out to the essential which Denmark and Greece dissented against the element of verification. Following up on this, LAU‐ organization’s policies. Pedaliu argued that it was RA CONSIDINE and NICHOLAS WHEELER not short-term domestic political advantages that (Aberystwyth) explored the INF Treaty as a case spurred both countries to dissent but rather a study for the relationship between trust and veri‐ growing sense of insecurity and a decline of trust fication, arguing that accepting verification – in within NATO. In Pedaliu’s view, their behavior particular in the form of on-site inspections – is al‐ was an expression of a new type of confidence, in ready an act of trust.