“Trust but Verify”: Confdence and Distrust from Détente to the End of the Cold War. Washington DC: German Historical Institute, Washington DC; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 07.11.2011-09.11.2011.
Reviewed by Reinhild Kreis
Published on H-Soz-u-Kult (May, 2012)
This conference sought to shed new light on tional afairs during the fnal years of the Cold the years following détente by investigating the War might yield new ideas about the evolution of role trust and distrust played in foreign as well as international relations both between and within domestic politics during a time when the guiding the blocs. They maintained that the idea of the principle of foreign policy was to avoid the worst conference was not only to trace the importance case scenario – a “hot war” with the possibility of of active trust and confdence-building between nuclear annihilation between the superpowers. It the superpowers from NATO’s 1967 Harmel Re‐ drew on the role of trust both as an object of his‐ port until the end of the Cold War, but also to torical analysis and as an independent analytical show how trust and distrust impacted interna‐ category based on the wide application of notions tional relations, and to highlight the dynamic en‐ of trust in the felds of sociology, economics, me‐ tanglement between foreign and domestic afairs. dia studies, and political science. Interpreting Investigating the role that individuals played in trust as a form of political and social capital, the trust-building processes, the frst panel focused on conference explored the dynamics of trust or dis‐ the connection between trust on a personal level trust as an interplay of factors such as risk assess‐ and the control or verifcation mechanisms that ment, strategic self-interest, shared values and were part of these processes. goodwill, highlighting the signifcance of histori‐ PATRICK VAUGHAN (Krakow) analyzed the cally grown trust regimes, symbolic actions, the role of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s na‐ efective staging of trust, and trustworthiness. tional security advisor, in mediating between the Participants thus set out to reevaluate the fnal United States, Poland, and the newly formed Pol‐ decades of the Cold War by investigating the ish labor union Solidarity. In his paper, Vaughan strategies of trust and confdence-building em‐ demonstrated how the Polish-American Brzezins‐ ployed to enforce certain political aims, the com‐ ki used his unique connection to Poland to lobby munication and representation of trust, the cru‐ for the importance of a peaceful negotiation cial role of the media, as well as the complex in‐ among all parties involved. Vaughan emphasized teraction of trust, fear, risk of betrayal, and verif‐ the importance of both sides’ trust in Brzezinski, cation mechanisms. which had a substantial impact on the success of In their introduction, REINHILD KREIS (Augs‐ his strategy of “peaceful engagement.” J. SIMON burg) and MARTIN KLIMKE (Washington) stressed ROFE (Leicester) then examined the signifcance that the issue of trust and confdence in interna‐ of trust and trustworthiness in the George H. W. H-Net Reviews
Bush administration, emphasizing that trust was “trust” were partially “lip service” as both sides an integral element of the Bush presidency, in‐ had entered the negotiations mainly to achieve cluding interactions with advisors, allies, and the domestic political gains, and not chiefy to devel‐ Soviet Union. Rofe underscored that personal op a relationship of mutual trust. SARAH SNY‐ trust and the paradigm of “order over justice” DER’s (London) paper focused on the role of trust were the guiding principles Bush followed in Reagan’s promotion of human rights, particu‐ throughout his career and particularly drew on in larly religious freedoms. Snyder examined Rea‐ the fnal phase of the Cold War. gan’s eforts to secure exit visas for two Pente‐ In her keynote lecture “Emotions in History,” costal Soviet families who sought refuge in the US UTE FREVERT (Berlin) provided a comprehensive embassy in Moscow in 1982. Reagan was able to introduction to recent research on the history of personally empathize with the individuals in emotions. For Frevert, emotions play an active question and, moreover, his “quiet diplomacy” role in history not only by infuencing moral judg‐ and assurances toward Gorbachev not “to crow” ment and collective behavior. They should also be over any steps taken by the Soviets on this issue seen as deeply historical, meaning that their per‐ helped establish a greater degree of trust in Sovi‐ ception, interpretation, and handling are subject et-American relations. to historical change. Frevert argued that trust is a The following two panels explored the mech‐ distinctively modern concept linked to notions of anism of trust inside the ideological blocs. Draw‐ profound uncertainty, and she particularly high‐ ing on opinion polls and on intelligence reports, lighted the personal character of bonds of trust in JENS GIESEKE (Potsdam) outlined East Germans’ modern societies. In her view, the concept of trust attitudes toward their own government and that cannot easily be applied to international relations of the Federal Republic during the 1970/80s. since these are primarily driven by national inter‐ Gieseke identifed ideological, ofcial, and bot‐ ests and thus lack the high personal investment tom-up trust regimes in the GDR and showed how characteristic of trust. Instead, she favored the the intelligence apparatus became increasingly concepts of confdence and reliance to describe worried about the positive attitude and rising these relationships. trustworthiness West German parties and politi‐ DEBORAH WELCH LARSON (Los Angeles) be‐ cians such as Willy Brandt began to enjoy among gan the second day’s proceedings with a keynote East Germans. However, in light of the NATO Dou‐ lecture on “Trust and Mistrust during the Cold ble-Track Treaty, Gieseke argued, these attitudes War.” Larson defned trust broadly as the “belief partially shifted, with East Germans experiencing that the other has benevolent intentions towards increased fear of war, alienation from Western us,” which also implies vulnerability. For her, policies, and the feeling of helplessness in the re‐ trust exists in a continuum; that is, a lack of trust newed superpower confrontation. JENS BOYSEN does not mean distrust. In the context of the Cold (Warsaw) then further complicated the notion of War, she argued, trust was an integral part of a homogeneous ideological bloc among the War‐ communication and international cooperation be‐ saw Pact countries by looking at changes in the tween the United States and the Soviet Union. relationship between East Germany and Poland MICHAEL COTEY MORGAN (Toronto) contended that showcased the fssures between these ofcial that trust and distrust played a central role at the allies. Boysen noted that mutual dependency and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Eu‐ trust was a litmus test for East German leaders to rope – functioning both as a tool and an objective. determine how far allies would subordinate their At the same time, however, the proclamations of national interests to the common cause. He high‐ lighted how both countries’ ofcials interpreted
2 H-Net Reviews their respective turns to West Germany for eco‐ national talks. Instead, Kullaa emphasized that nomic support diferently, and yet they similarly Finland’s neutralism should not be confused with viewed the Federal Republic as an external an‐ neutrality. Finland did not want to be in the chor. EMMANUEL MOURLON-DRUOL (Glasgow) “Third Bloc” of the Cold War, although its position asked whether G7 and European Council summit was similar to that of Yugoslavia and Egypt, and it meetings could be seen as eforts to institutional‐ chose to keep quiet on a number of key issues, ize trust. He explained how they served to show thus arriving at ofcial neutralism from a point of the public unity of the member states to specifc self-interest and from the government’s view of national audiences and how the informality of trust as political capital. these meetings was supposed to help foster trust The conference’s third day began with a panel among the Western leaders. NOËL BONHOMME entitled “Implementation and Verifcation.” (Paris), on the other hand, emphasized the impor‐ ARVID SCHORS (Freiburg) focused on the reduc‐ tance of codes and rule-making for the G7 meet‐ tion of strategic arms leading up to the SALT I ings and interpreted the meetings’ function as a treaty. Schors emphasized that the US did not nec‐ means of “socializing” Western leaders that had essarily initiate the SALT I talks out of a desire to recently come into ofce. Bonhomme posed the foster trust, but that trust did eventually emerge question of whether, as the G7 summits became over the course of the negotiations. Schors also institutionalized, trust helped or hindered them. underscored the signifcance the rhetoric of dis‐ The next panel turned its attention to the role trusting the Soviet Union had for U.S. domestic of small and neutral states. EFFIE G. H. PEDALIU politics, specifcally when selling these negotia‐ (Bristol) focused on several NATO episodes in tions to the public by pointing out to the essential which Denmark and Greece dissented against the element of verifcation. Following up on this, LAU‐ organization’s policies. Pedaliu argued that it was RA CONSIDINE and NICHOLAS WHEELER not short-term domestic political advantages that (Aberystwyth) explored the INF Treaty as a case spurred both countries to dissent but rather a study for the relationship between trust and veri‐ growing sense of insecurity and a decline of trust fcation, arguing that accepting verifcation – in within NATO. In Pedaliu’s view, their behavior particular in the form of on-site inspections – is al‐ was an expression of a new type of confdence, in ready an act of trust. The INF Treaty, Considine which member countries felt able to oppose their and Wheeler posited, shows that trust and verif‐ allies without fear of serious consequences. ARYO cation are inexorably linked on a conceptual lev‐ MAKKO (Oxford) then explored the nature of el. Practical actions that stimulated mutual trust‐ Swedish neutrality in the fnal decades of the Cold worthiness between Reagan and Gorbachev were War. Exploring accusations of Sweden having thus an important element of ending the Cold been the “seventeenth member of NATO,” Makko War. JOSEPH P. HARAHAN (Washington) then fo‐ looked at the mechanism of trust between Sweden cused on the technical implementation of the INF and the international community as well as how Treaty, namely, on the perspective of US and Sovi‐ trust (particularly the lack thereof and the levels et/Russian weapons inspectors. Harahan argued of secrecy among a small political elite) operated that the trust between Reagan and Gorbachev was between the Swedish government and its popula‐ not sufcient to explain the success of the treaty tion, leading the latter to feel profoundly betrayed but that the military and technical personnel exe‐ after the end of the Cold War. RINNA ELINA KUL‐ cuting the treaty provisions also have to be taken LAA (Jyvaskyla) examined the role of Finland dur‐ into account. Trust was achieved through person‐ ing the 1970/80s, challenging the notion that Fin‐ al relations between the military on both sides land was merely a convenient location for inter‐ that eventually yielded a method for implementa‐
3 H-Net Reviews tion. Advanced technology such as satellite-based J. Simon Rofe (Leicester): Trust between Ad‐ techniques always served as a fallback option in versaries and Allies: President George H.W. Bush, these negotiations. Trust and the End of the Cold War The concluding discussion chaired by Martin Keynote Address Klimke brought together a multitude of method‐ Ute Frevert (Berlin): Emotions in History ological issues related to the introduction of the Keynote Address notion of trust in the history of the Cold War. It Deborah Welch Larson (Los Angeles): Trust and explored, for example, the fne analytical line be‐ Mistrust during the Cold War tween confdence and trust, its domestic, transna‐ Panel 2: Framing Trust: The Blocs at the Ne‐ tional, and international dimensions, as well as its gotiation Table performative, rhetorical, and ritualistic nature. Chair: Reinhild Kreis (Augsburg) Both Klimke and Kreis stressed the need for a dif‐ ferentiated perspective within the ideological Michael Cotey Morgan (Toronto): The Closed blocs of the Cold War, taking into account the sig‐ Society and Its Enemies: Confdence and Distrust nifcance of historical relationships, tensions, and at the CSCE, 1969-1975 asymmetries with regard to political and military Sarah Snyder (London): No Crowing: Reagan, power. On a domestic level, they pled for a Trust, and Human Rights greater contextualization of trust and its cultural Panel 3: Inside the Blocs: East and West I representations by looking at the political deci‐ Chair: Sonya Michel (Washington, DC) sion-making process as a whole, including the Jens Gieseke (Potsdam): Whom Did East Ger‐ role of various branches of government, political mans Trust? Popular Opinion on Threats of War, advisors, and expert cultures. Along those lines, Confrontation, and Détente in the GDR, 1968-1989 they also underscored the importance of broaden‐ ing the source base to transcend a focus on per‐ Jens Boysen (Warsaw): “Brothers in Arms,” sonal testimony and to incorporate gender per‐ But Not Quite: East Germany and People’s Poland spectives when investigating trust in internation‐ between Mutual Dependency and Mutual Dis‐ al relations. Concluding remarks also pointed out trust, 1975-1990 the linguistic bias when it comes to trust that ren‐ Panel 4: Inside the Blocs: East and West II dered the discussion potentially very Anglo-spe‐ Chair: Christian Ostermann (Washington, DC) cifc. In French and German, for example, the con‐ Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol (Glasgow): Institu‐ cepts of “trust” and “confdence” can be expressed tionalizing Trust? Regular Summitry (G7s and Eu‐ with a single word, making fner diferentiation ropean Councils) from the Mid-1970s until the difcult. It was also suggested that scholars pay Late 1980s closer attention to the mechanisms that create Noel Bonhomme (Paris): Summitry and trust, such as transparency, promise-keeping, and (Mis)trust: The Case of the G7 Summits, 1975-1990 small-step agreements. Panel 5: On the sidelines or in the Middle? Conference Overview: Small and Neutral states Panel 1: The Personal Factor Chair: Bernd Schäfer (Washington, DC) Chair: Andreas Daum (Bufalo) Efe G. H. Pedaliu (Bristol): “Footnotes” as an Patrick Vaughan (Krakow): Zbigniew Brzezin‐ Expression of Distrust? The U.S. and the NATO ski as Mediator between the U.S., Poland, and Soli‐ “Flanks” in the Last Two Decades of the Cold War darity in the 1980s Soviet-Chinese Dimension
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Aryo Makko (Stockholm): A Neutral Trust Regime? Sweden and the Cold War, 1969-1991 Rinna Elina Kullaa (Jyväskylä): Foreign Policy of Neutralism as a Trust-Building Mechanism: Fin‐ land, the Soviet Union, and the United States, 1961-1975 Panel 6: Implementation and Verifcation Chair: Martin Klimke (Washington, DC) Arvid Schors (Freiburg): Substituting Trust to Convince Doubting Thomases’: Trust and Mistrust and the Verifcation of the Strategic Arms Limita‐ tion Talks (SALT) in the 1970s Laura Considine, Nicholas Wheeler (Aberyst‐ wyth): Reagan may have had Trust in Gorbachev, but the United States demanded Verifcation of the Soviet Union: Lessons from the Making of the INF Treaty Joseph P. Harahan (Washington, DC): Building Confdence and Trust between the United States and the Soviet Union during Implementation of the INF Treaty
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Citation: Reinhild Kreis. Review of “Trust but Verify”: Confdence and Distrust from Détente to the End of the Cold War. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. May, 2012.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=36177
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