Turkey's Entry Into the European Union
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Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 381 (Black plate) “As long as Turkey’s desire for EU membership represented an abstract ideal . , Turkey’s military and civilian elite could avoid acknowledging the potential polit- ical costs of membership in the EU. And as long as the Europeans kept Turkey at arm’s length, that elite’s willingness to implement the domestic reforms necessary for EU membership was never put to the test. All this changed . with the EU’s decision to accept Turkey’s candidacy for membership.” A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey’s Entry into the European Union ERSEL AYDINLI AND DOV WAXMAN ngulfed in yet another economic crisis, and To the surprise of many, in December 1999 at the with a coalition government once again EU summit meeting in Helsinki, the Europeans Eappearing decidedly shaky, little remains finally declared Turkey a suitable candidate for EU constant in the volatile world of Turkish politics. membership. European leaders gathered at the Turkey’s desire to become a member of the Euro- summit proudly described their decision to accept pean Union—a consistent goal of Turkey’s political Turkey as a candidate for membership as “historic” and military rulers and a driving force of Turkish and “monumental.” It was hailed as opening a new foreign policy—has long remained an exception to chapter in EU-Turkish relations, ending the growing this. Enjoying broad popular support (with the antagonism that had marked the period since the exception of small circles of radical nationalists and 1997 EU summit in Luxembourg, when Turkey’s bid Islamists) and political consensus, the goal of EU for membership was flatly rejected. membership has been pursued by successive gov- If they were expecting outpourings of warmth and ernments despite their differing ideological com- gratitude from the Turks, however, European leaders positions. It would perhaps be no exaggeration to were quickly disappointed. This time it was the Turks describe integration into the EU as one of the cor- who were playing hard to get. Reacting to what they nerstones of Turkish politics, influencing both its perceived had been the EU’s discriminatory approach domestic and foreign policies. toward their application for membership, they The main obstacle to Turkish membership in the demanded equal treatment and strongly objected to EU long appeared to be the Europeans themselves. the attachment of any special conditions. When, at Whether out of political, economic, or security con- the insistence of Greece, such conditions were siderations, or as some argued, religious bias, the attached, it seemed for a moment that the unthink- Europeans obstinately rebuffed Turkey’s advances. able might happen: the Turks might actually reject Although the rejection was rarely stated outright the Europeans. The Europeans, clearly sensing that and was delivered with the delicacies of diplomatic this was indeed a possibility, quickly dispatched their language, it was keenly felt by the Turks. Like a foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to Ankara to meet scorned suitor, the Turks reacted to each European with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. At the rejection with bitterness and wounded pride, only end of their meeting, Ecevit emerged, declaring that to ruefully return later pleading to be taken in; thus, Turkey would accept the offer of candidacy, and Turkey’s unrequited love affair with Europe contin- Solana beamed with satisfaction, having averted a ued. Until recently, that is. potentially awkward and embarrassing situation. The Turkish reaction to the announcement that ERSEL AYDINLI is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at McGill Turkey had been accepted as a candidate for EU University and a researcher for Eurasian Strategic Studies in membership initially appears quite perplexing. Was Ankara. DOV WAXMAN is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations and Middle East studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of it simply a display of national pride—an attempt Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. not to seem too eager or too desperate? Develop- 381 Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 382 (Black plate) 382 • CURRENT HISTORY • November 2001 ments within Turkey since the Helsinki summit acterized Turkish foreign policy. The policy of Euro- indicate that something deeper and more serious peanization, first launched in the Ottoman Empire was behind the lukewarm Turkish response. These in the late eighteenth century and continued and developments suggest that the long-standing intensified in its successor, the Turkish republic, in domestic political consensus over EU membership the twentieth century, was drawn up and imple- has begun to collapse and in its place new and mented by the state elite, at times in the face of pop- competing political coalitions have arisen, coali- ular resistance. As one Turkish writer put it, “the tions that have the potential to dramatically recon- conflicting interests and aspirations within Turkish figure Turkey’s domestic political map. society have been constrained by the almighty Turk- ish state, with the army as its iron fist.”1 No doubt, WAKING FROM THE DREAM the bureaucrats and generals sincerely believed that For centuries the Turks have dreamed of Europe. the interests of the man on the street could only be Ever since the first Ottoman ambassador was sent to furthered by making him a European. But it was the Paris in 1719 with the instruction to “make a thor- interests of the state that they were naturally pre- ough study of the means of civilization and educa- occupied with since, unlike their political counter- tion, and report on those capable of application” in parts, their boss was the state, not the electorate. the Ottoman Empire, the idea of “civilization,” in For the past two centuries, Europeanization the guise of Europe, has acted as a powerful magnet undeniably was good for the state. In their nine- for Ottoman and later Turkish elites. Just under 200 teenth-century heyday with their empires spanning years later, in 1913, a Turkish journalist wrote: the globe, the European nations appeared invinci- “There is no second civilization. Civilization ble, both economically and militarily. Although means European civiliza- weakened and humbled tion, and it must be by two world wars, the imported with both its European policymakers should understand European nations still roses and its thorns.” Sim- that they cannot extend one hand to Turkey emerged prosperous and ilarly, Mustafa Kemal, the while pushing it away with the other. powerful, albeit in the founder of the Turkish shadow of the new super- Republic and its first pres- powers, the United States ident, declared in 1924: “The Turks are the friends and the Soviet Union. For the Turkish state elite, of all civilized nations. Countries vary, but civiliza- the attraction of Europe remained undiminished. tion is one, and for a nation to progress it must take As Europe began reorganizing itself into a common part in this single civilization.” Insofar as Europe market, the Turkish state elite translated their goal was identified with “civilization,” this desire for of Europeanization into the policy of integrating progress and modernization effectively entailed Turkey into this new European structure. “Europeanization.” In 1959, two years after the establishment of the Few countries can claim to have pursued a goal European Economic Community, Turkey applied for with such single-minded purpose and dedication as membership, becoming an associate member with Turkey has with its desire to become European. the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Despite numerous ups and downs in its relations According to the agreement, Turkey was scheduled with Europe, and a turbulent domestic politics to become a full member in 1995 after completing a involving four coups in as many decades (the latest preparatory stage followed by a lengthy transition coming in 1997 with the “soft coup” against the period during which tariff barriers were to be sig- allegedly Islamist-led government), the ship of state nificantly reduced on both sides. This agreement has continued to sail in the direction of Europe. At provided the Turks with the apparently solid expec- its helm has been Turkey’s state elite, the self- tation that full membership would eventually occur appointed captain, ensuring that nobody grabs the and laid out what they needed to do to become a wheel and lurches the country off course. These member. Essentially, it involved continued develop- bureaucrats and generals are largely responsible for ment of the economy so it could withstand open the stability in the midst of instability that has char- competition with the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe. Ever since, Turkey’s approach to Europe has been shaped according to this under- 1Berdal Aral, “Turkey’s Insecure Identity from the Per- spective of Nationalism,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter standing. As far as Turkey’s state elite was concerned, 1997, p. 80. continued economic development would pave the Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 383 (Black plate) Turkey’s Entry into the European Union • 383 way into Europe. Although it might take time and longer ignore the political implications of integration involve some painful adjustments along the way, into the EU. As they are forced to come to terms with European riches beckoned. these implications, Turkey’s European dream is fast The bureaucrats and generals, however, failed to becoming a nightmare for some within the Turkish appreciate the inherent dynamism of the European civilian and military elite. integration project. The European Economic Com- munity became the European Community and was MANAGING MODERNIZATION then transformed again into its present configura- As long as Turkey’s desire for EU membership rep- tion, the European Union. These changes were not resented an abstract ideal rather than a concrete just semantic.