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“As long as Turkey’s desire for EU membership represented an abstract ideal . . . , Turkey’s military and civilian elite could avoid acknowledging the potential polit- ical costs of membership in the EU. And as long as the Europeans kept Turkey at arm’s length, that elite’s willingness to implement the domestic reforms necessary for EU membership was never put to the test. All this changed . . . with the EU’s decision to accept Turkey’s candidacy for membership.”

A Dream Become Nightmare? Turkey’s Entry into the European Union ERSEL AYDINLI AND DOV WAXMAN

ngulfed in yet another economic crisis, and To the surprise of many, in December 1999 at the with a coalition government once again EU summit meeting in Helsinki, the Europeans Eappearing decidedly shaky, little remains finally declared Turkey a suitable candidate for EU constant in the volatile world of Turkish politics. membership. European leaders gathered at the Turkey’s desire to become a member of the Euro- summit proudly described their decision to accept pean Union—a consistent goal of Turkey’s political Turkey as a candidate for membership as “historic” and military rulers and a driving force of Turkish and “monumental.” It was hailed as opening a new foreign policy—has long remained an exception to chapter in EU-Turkish relations, ending the growing this. Enjoying broad popular support (with the antagonism that had marked the period since the exception of small circles of radical nationalists and 1997 EU summit in Luxembourg, when Turkey’s bid Islamists) and political consensus, the goal of EU for membership was flatly rejected. membership has been pursued by successive gov- If they were expecting outpourings of warmth and ernments despite their differing ideological com- gratitude from the Turks, however, European leaders positions. It would perhaps be no exaggeration to were quickly disappointed. This time it was the Turks describe integration into the EU as one of the cor- who were playing hard to get. Reacting to what they nerstones of Turkish politics, influencing both its perceived had been the EU’s discriminatory approach domestic and foreign policies. toward their application for membership, they The main obstacle to Turkish membership in the demanded equal treatment and strongly objected to EU long appeared to be the Europeans themselves. the attachment of any special conditions. When, at Whether out of political, economic, or security con- the insistence of Greece, such conditions were siderations, or as some argued, religious bias, the attached, it seemed for a moment that the unthink- Europeans obstinately rebuffed Turkey’s advances. able might happen: the Turks might actually reject Although the rejection was rarely stated outright the Europeans. The Europeans, clearly sensing that and was delivered with the delicacies of diplomatic this was indeed a possibility, quickly dispatched their language, it was keenly felt by the Turks. Like a foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to Ankara to meet scorned suitor, the Turks reacted to each European with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. At the rejection with bitterness and wounded pride, only end of their meeting, Ecevit emerged, declaring that to ruefully return later pleading to be taken in; thus, Turkey would accept the offer of candidacy, and Turkey’s unrequited love affair with Europe contin- Solana beamed with satisfaction, having averted a ued. Until recently, that is. potentially awkward and embarrassing situation. The Turkish reaction to the announcement that ERSEL AYDINLI is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at McGill Turkey had been accepted as a candidate for EU University and a researcher for Eurasian Strategic Studies in membership initially appears quite perplexing. Was Ankara. DOV WAXMAN is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations and Middle East studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of it simply a display of national pride—an attempt Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. not to seem too eager or too desperate? Develop-

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ments within Turkey since the Helsinki summit acterized Turkish foreign policy. The policy of Euro- indicate that something deeper and more serious peanization, first launched in the Ottoman Empire was behind the lukewarm Turkish response. These in the late eighteenth century and continued and developments suggest that the long-standing intensified in its successor, the Turkish republic, in domestic political consensus over EU membership the twentieth century, was drawn up and imple- has begun to collapse and in its place new and mented by the state elite, at times in the face of pop- competing political coalitions have arisen, coali- ular resistance. As one Turkish writer put it, “the tions that have the potential to dramatically recon- conflicting interests and aspirations within Turkish figure Turkey’s domestic political map. society have been constrained by the almighty Turk- ish state, with the army as its iron fist.”1 No doubt, WAKING FROM THE DREAM the bureaucrats and generals sincerely believed that For centuries the Turks have dreamed of Europe. the interests of the man on the street could only be Ever since the first Ottoman ambassador was sent to furthered by making him a European. But it was the Paris in 1719 with the instruction to “make a thor- interests of the state that they were naturally pre- ough study of the means of civilization and educa- occupied with since, unlike their political counter- tion, and report on those capable of application” in parts, their boss was the state, not the electorate. the Ottoman Empire, the idea of “civilization,” in For the past two centuries, Europeanization the guise of Europe, has acted as a powerful magnet undeniably was good for the state. In their nine- for Ottoman and later Turkish elites. Just under 200 teenth-century heyday with their empires spanning years later, in 1913, a Turkish journalist wrote: the globe, the European nations appeared invinci- “There is no second civilization. . . . Civilization ble, both economically and militarily. Although means European civiliza- weakened and humbled tion, and it must be by two world wars, the imported with both its European policymakers should understand European nations still roses and its thorns.” Sim- that they cannot extend one hand to Turkey emerged prosperous and ilarly, Mustafa Kemal, the while pushing it away with the other. powerful, albeit in the founder of the Turkish shadow of the new super- Republic and its first pres- powers, the United States ident, declared in 1924: “The Turks are the friends and the Soviet Union. For the Turkish state elite, of all civilized nations. Countries vary, but civiliza- the attraction of Europe remained undiminished. tion is one, and for a nation to progress it must take As Europe began reorganizing itself into a common part in this single civilization.” Insofar as Europe market, the Turkish state elite translated their goal was identified with “civilization,” this desire for of Europeanization into the policy of integrating progress and modernization effectively entailed Turkey into this new European structure. “Europeanization.” In 1959, two years after the establishment of the Few countries can claim to have pursued a goal European Economic Community, Turkey applied for with such single-minded purpose and dedication as membership, becoming an associate member with Turkey has with its desire to become European. the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963. Despite numerous ups and downs in its relations According to the agreement, Turkey was scheduled with Europe, and a turbulent domestic politics to become a full member in 1995 after completing a involving four coups in as many decades (the latest preparatory stage followed by a lengthy transition coming in 1997 with the “soft coup” against the period during which tariff barriers were to be sig- allegedly Islamist-led government), the ship of state nificantly reduced on both sides. This agreement has continued to sail in the direction of Europe. At provided the Turks with the apparently solid expec- its helm has been Turkey’s state elite, the self- tation that full membership would eventually occur appointed captain, ensuring that nobody grabs the and laid out what they needed to do to become a wheel and lurches the country off course. These member. Essentially, it involved continued develop- bureaucrats and generals are largely responsible for ment of the economy so it could withstand open the stability in the midst of instability that has char- competition with the advanced industrial economies of Western Europe. Ever since, Turkey’s approach to Europe has been shaped according to this under- 1Berdal Aral, “Turkey’s Insecure Identity from the Per- spective of Nationalism,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter standing. As far as Turkey’s state elite was concerned, 1997, p. 80. continued economic development would pave the Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 383 (Black plate)

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way into Europe. Although it might take time and longer ignore the political implications of integration involve some painful adjustments along the way, into the EU. As they are forced to come to terms with European riches beckoned. these implications, Turkey’s European dream is fast The bureaucrats and generals, however, failed to becoming a nightmare for some within the Turkish appreciate the inherent dynamism of the European civilian and military elite. integration project. The European Economic Com- munity became the European Community and was MANAGING MODERNIZATION then transformed again into its present configura- As long as Turkey’s desire for EU membership rep- tion, the European Union. These changes were not resented an abstract ideal rather than a concrete just semantic. They indicated the changing agenda political program, Turkey’s military and civilian elite and rationale of the European integration project as could avoid acknowledging the potential political politics increasingly came to rival, if not supersede, costs of membership in the EU. And as long as the economics. Since the 1980s, European integration Europeans kept Turkey at arm’s length, their will- steadily shifted from being a primarily economic to ingness to implement the domestic reforms neces- a political project. Turkey’s state elite were largely sary for EU membership was never put to the test. All blind to this dramatic change, a blindness that has this changed in December 1999 with the EU’s deci- cost Turkey dearly. Members of the elite continued sion to accept Turkey’s candidacy for membership. to insist on the implementation of the provisions of Suddenly the ball was in Turkey’s court. For the first the Ankara Agreement, and emphasized the eco- time, the opportunity to become a member of the EU nomic progress Turkey had made. When the was presented before Turkey’s politicians and gener- bureaucrats in Brussels pointed out Turkey’s defi- als, albeit with strings attached. The conditions that ciencies in democracy and human rights, the elite Turkey had to meet to attain EU membership were took offense and regarded it as illegitimate interfer- later spelled out in the Accession Partnership Doc- ence in Turkey’s domestic affairs. They failed to real- ument that was finally agreed upon in December ize that if they aspired to become members of the 2000 by the European Council of Ministers in Nice EU, Turkey’s domestic affairs were of legitimate after much haggling both in Brussels and between interest to a Europe whose identity was coming to Brussels and Ankara. The EU’s Accession Partnership be defined in terms of democracy and respect for Document contains three areas in which reforms are human rights and minority rights. to be implemented. The first aligns Turkish and EU Many of the harsh exchanges between Turkey and laws and practices, the Acquis Communautaire in the EU over the past two decades stemmed from this Brussels jargon. The second comprises a list of eco- misunderstanding on the part of Turkish policy- nomic reforms, basically a continuation and consol- makers (coupled with no small amount of insensi- idation of the neoliberal economic reforms first tivity on the part of European policymakers). Until introduced in Turkey by President Turgut Özal’s gov- recently, Turkish policymakers have viewed integra- ernment in the 1980s. The third set of criteria for EU tion into the EU mainly in economic terms, without membership, and the most problematic for Turkey, fully recognizing its profound political implications. is the political conditions. The political component This evasion—willful or otherwise—of the extensive of the Accession Partnership Document is by far the domestic political repercussions of EU membership most controversial, since it involves the rights of enabled the consensus about the desirability of EU Turkey’s Kurdish minority and the Cyprus issue, membership to prevail for so long among Turkish both highly sensitive concerns within Turkey. Turkey officials. The Turkish goal of EU membership became has to further democratize, improve its human something of a dogma, and the pursuit of it almost rights record, allow greater autonomy and cultural a ritual. As if entranced, members of the Turkish civil rights for the Kurds, resolve its territorial disputes and military elite repeated ad nauseam the mantra with Greece, and find an internationally acceptable that Turkey rightfully belonged in the European fam- settlement to Cyprus (which remains divided ily of nations. They never seemed to ask themselves between the Greek Cypriot south and the Turkish whether they were prepared to pay the price for Cypriot north since the Turkish army occupied the admission into this exclusive club. To be sure, since north in 1974 in the name of defending the rights of the prospect of admission appeared remote for so the Turkish minority there). These demands amount long, such a question would have been premature, if to nothing less than a complete upheaval of Turkish not presumptuous. This is no longer the case, and foreign and domestic policies. They also challenge thus for the first time, Turkish policymakers can no some fundamental principles of Kemalism, the ide- Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 384 (Black plate)

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ology named after the founder of the Turkish Repub- membership (this group is sometimes joined by lic that continues to guide Turkish modernization to various Islamist and Kurdish groups seeking EU this day. Given the scope of the EU’s demands, it is integration to strengthen their own positions no surprise that a heated debate quickly erupted in against the military-political elites, who are as yet Turkey over the contents of the EU’s Accession Part- unwilling to totally share power). Two main points nership Document. In this ongoing debate, two must be made concerning these “integralists”: first, opposing camps have emerged: the “integralists” they tend to see external pressure on Turkey as the and the “gradualists.”2 The former advocate a rapid only way to accelerate the democratization and implementation of the EU’s required reforms in their modernization process. Second, they seem to dif- entirety, while the latter, although supporting EU fer from the gradualists in thinking that Turkey, accession, oppose some conditions attached to EU with the overall experience of 70 years since its membership and favor a lengthier process of adap- inception as a republic and with 55 years’ experi- tation to EU norms and standards. ence of multiparty politics—albeit with four mili- Faced with the concrete offer of future EU mem- tary interventions—has sufficiently matured to face bership, the various actors in Turkish politics have the ultimate challenges of modernization, that is, been forced to articulate their positions on the issue. the democratic reconfiguration of political power These stances are ultimately shaped by differing within a liberal democracy. To them, the young views concerning the modernization process in girl, who has been protected all these years by an Turkey. Until now, the traditional military-civilian iron fist, is now grown and not only can but must elite instigating Turkey’s modernization and devel- experience life on her own if she is to learn to sur- opmental project have vive and be successful. adopted a gradualist strat- The split between egy, aimed at avoiding the The EU’s offer of membership is largely viewed Turkey’s elite regarding destabilization that they as a clever ploy designed to disguise the speed and manage- fear could result from too Europe’s continued rejection of Turkey. ment of the country’s quickly reducing strong modernization process central state control. The is also evident in the general idea behind the gradualist strategy is to wait recent debate between Turkey’s “Republicans” and until Turkish society has sufficiently matured for a “Democrats.” Republicans represent the long-time “real” democracy. During this gradual, strictly state- supporters of the Kemalist modernization project controlled process—which could last for an and its state-led, top-down management style. They unknown period of time—society will learn to cope tend to stress Turkey’s unique security concerns, and with democracy without falling to pieces. (One find the Democrats’ antistate rhetoric both danger- prominent Turkish observer asked a member of the ous and subversive to state security—if not trea- Turkish General Staff when Turks would be allowed sonous. Democrats argue that the elitist and statist the full rights of a liberal democracy and received as nature of Kemalist modernization has become the a response the following question: “If you had a 13- major obstacle to the final phase of modernization: year-old daughter, would you comfortably send her liberal democratization. In the words of the outspo- out alone at night?”) Following this line of thinking, ken chief justice of Turkey’s High Appeals Court, the gradualists have staunchly opposed numerous Sami Selcuk: “The Turkish state has become a taboo proposed legal changes designed to restrict the mili- and sacred subject. . . . I want a republic in which tary’s political power. democracy administers free thoughts and beliefs, not Other Turkish political elites and intellectuals, the state. I want a democratic republic.” Similar sen- however, have increasingly begun advocating a timents have also been expressed by more conser- more rapid and complete modernization process vative thinkers, such as the prominent Turkish through integration with the EU. These groups gen- columnist Mehmet Ali Birand: “We must finally erally seek rapid and total democratization, accept that the methods used to govern Turkey are inspired by the momentum and stimulus of EU outdated. The world has changed and Turkey has changed right along with it. We no longer have a 2Other labels, such as pro- or anti-Europeans, or reformists society that impassively obeys every order. On the and traditionalists, are misleading since both camps contrary, we have a community that voices its accept the need for further integration into the EU and both portray themselves as supporters of Turkey’s contin- demands openly and gets its way. In contrast to this ued modernization. we are still faced with a state system that sees the Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 385 (Black plate)

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people as sheep. Those that run the state do not look nessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) and even the more as if they have been able to accept that they can no conservative, Islamically oriented Individual Indus- longer simply issue orders like they used to.” trialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD). The conflict is also one between management On closer examination, however, we find that the styles. The Republicans urge modernization under fault lines actually run much deeper—perhaps to the direction of a strong centralized power source, the individual level. Thus, for example, while the while the Democrats appear to want a more decen- mainstream media is largely integralist, some tralized state apparatus supported by a societal con- prominent columnists promote a more gradualist sensus, and incorporating previously excluded stance. The Turkish judiciary, while largely inte- segments of society. gralist, includes such diverse figures as the strongly How, then, do these gradualists and integralists integralist chief justice, Sami Selcuk, and the wage their battles? Gradualists do not, at least pub- equally strong gradualist, Vural Savas, who, as the licly, emphasize the argument that Turks are not yet former chief prosecutor of the same court, equates mature enough for democracy; instead, they make liberalization rhetoric and its supporters with use of a security rationale. This involves the claim traitors to the country. Even the armed forces are that Turkey’s security needs justify certain limita- not unified in their stance. While the Turkish Gen- tions to the country’s democratic reforms. Conse- eral Staff is obviously gradualist in its approach to quently, security becomes the primary criterion the question of EU membership, some individual when assessing the feasibility of any major political members hold integralist positions. project, and any speedy reshuffling of domestic power is considered extremely risky since the coun- THE KURDISH QUESTION try is besieged by internal and external enemies.3 The split among the Turkish elite can perhaps be Thus, gradualist and anti-EU circles alike were able most clearly delineated by looking at the domestic to single out from the EU’s Accession Partnership political treatment of the Kurds within the EU mem- Document those articles concerning the Kurdish bership process. In general, Turkey has traditionally issue, thereby overshadowing many more important mistrusted European goals regarding the Kurdish issues concerning political reforms. Due to this over- issue. When Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of concentration on Kurdish rights, the Turkish public the Kurdish guerrilla organization, the Kurdistan debate was locked for a lengthy period into a dis- Workers’ Party (PKK), makes proposals for a “demo- cussion over Europe’s sincerity concerning Turkey’s cratic struggle strategy” concentrating on cultural territorial integrity, rather than debating the mechan- rights that seem to be directly in line with what the ics of the required internal political changes as set Europeans are currently demanding, immediate forth in the document. Conversely, integralists, rec- suspicions arise that this synchronization may not ognizing the inherent appeal of the security argu- be coincidental. Some Turkish analyses have in fact ment, stress the nonsecurity-related benefits of EU suggested that the roadmap for full EU membership membership, such as the economic jump-start and might actually point toward a political solution to democratic standards it would provide, while simul- the Kurdish question, and that Europe is using the taneously issuing subtle criticisms of an overly EU membership “carrot” to facilitate such a move. exclusive reliance on the security argument. Now that the Europeans have made clear their Exactly who are the integralists and gradualists? demands for minority (presumed Kurdish) language At first glance, certain institutions and organiza- and cultural rights in the Accession Partnership tions can be seen taking sides along the divide. For Document, the divide between the integralists and example, traditional gradualists include the armed gradualists has become increasingly evident. The forces and the right-wing Nationalist Action Party, integralists, holding tight to the justification of while integralists are generally associated with more entering the EU, have declared the need to recognize centrist political parties, the media, the foreign min- at least some Kurdish rights. The gradualists, istry, and the business world as represented by although favoring EU accession, have refused to back groups such as the Turkish Industrialists’ and Busi- down from their negative position on this sensitive issue. Leading the latter, the military has declared on 3This is best expressed in Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s several occasions that it is against the recognition of response to Justice Selcuk’s passionate demands for demo- Kurdish cultural rights. The military’s opposition has cratic reforms: “These demands for further democracy are nice but Turkey’s special geopolitical conditions require a been vocal and public and has at times placed the special type of democracy.” Hurriyet, September 7, 1999. government in difficult positions. When Prime Min- Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 386 (Black plate)

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ister Ecevit was attending the EU summit in Nice last the military, however, this opposition is framed in December in an effort to convince European leaders terms of Turkey’s security needs. During last of Turkey’s determination to become a member of December’s party convention, for example, Bahceli the EU, the army leaked a report to the Turkish stated that risks were associated with democratiza- media describing the demands for television and tion because of Turkey’s “unique vulnerabilities.” education in Kurdish as the “second dimension of He advocated introducing some type of “cautious separatist terrorism” and the “revival and restruc- democracy,” thereby combining the party’s nation- turing of the separatist movement through political alist stance with support for democratization. This means.” The military chief of staff then paid a visit seems to be part of a shrewd political strategy by the to the prime minister on his return and reiterated party leadership aimed at moving the MHP to a new the army’s opposition to any Kurdish cultural rights. center-right position, allowing it to increase its elec- Subsequently, in an apparent concession to the mil- toral support as well as benefit from establishing a itary, Ecevit stated that he supported the army’s posi- positive relationship with the military. But this strat- tion that the PKK’s politicization process constituted egy is likely to encounter resistance from the party’s a genuine security concern for Turkey, particularly grassroots who, unlike the leadership, continue to in light of the support being given to the process by favor a brand of radical right-wing nationalism (the the Europeans. Three weeks later, at a National so-called Gray Wolf movement of the 1970s, which Security Council meeting, the army repeated the gave the party its radical ultra-right wing bent, still argument that Kurdish cultural rights constituted a constitutes the core of the party, and seems resistant tactic of separatist terrorism. to any change). The army’s main ally has been the right-wing The political party most identified with the inte- Nationalist Action Party (MHP), whose leader, Devlet gralists is the Motherland Party (ANAP), founded by Bahceli, has expressed his clear opposition to Kur- the late Turgut Özal. Party leader Mesut Yilmaz, dish cultural rights, for instance, made asserting that grant- headlines when he ing these rights Turkey’s European dream is fast becoming a nightmare stated that the “road would only encour- for some within the Turkish civilian and military elite. to the EU goes through age further sepa- Diyarbakir”—the ratism and conflict. largest city in the The speaker of parliament, also an MHP member, Kurdish-dominated southeastern region of Turkey. even went so far as to declare that the demands for Another staunch integralist has been Volkan Vural, Kurdish rights in the Accession Partnership Docu- director of the newly established EU General Secre- ment would be more damaging than the Sèvres tariat in Ankara, who has stressed that minority Treaty, which sought to divide Ottoman lands at the cultural rights are not something up for debate, but end of World War I. Another MHP politician curtly rather are a clear EU demand that must be met. stated that his party would not allow the use of state Outside ANAP, Prime Minister Ecevit has also resources to “artificially create a language and a implied a generally positive attitude toward allow- nation.” This emerging alliance between the mili- ing some education in Kurdish. Also within the tary and the MHP could have major domestic polit- ranks of the integralists is the chief justice of the ical repercussions if the MHP succeeds in gaining the Supreme Court, Mustafa Bumin, who has declared military’s tacit support. Having ridden the nation- that “some amount of Kurdish TV” could be alist wave—generated as a result of 15 years of allowed, and the Foreign Ministry, under the lead- bloody struggle in the southeast and the capture of ership of Ismail Cem, which has long supported Abdullah Ocalan—all the way to its surprising elec- liberal reforms in order to meet EU standards. toral success in 1999 to become the second-largest Somewhat surprisingly, at the end of 2000 the party (winning 130 seats in parliament and more director of the National Intelligence Organization than doubling its share of the vote from the 8.5 per- came out in support of the integralists when he cent obtained in the 1995 election to 18.6 percent), announced that Kurdish television and education the MHP now seems to be ensuring its political sur- might help the state better manage problems in vival by wooing the generals. In asserting its oppo- Turkey’s southeast, since more than half of all Kur- sition to the EU’s demands for minority cultural dish mothers in the region do not know Turkish. rights, the MHP also appears to be capitalizing on At the same time another surprising voice for the widespread public mistrust toward the EU. As with integralists, a former navy commander, stated pub- Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 387 (Black plate)

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licly that broadcasting in Kurdish would not create need. In the introduction to the program, for exam- a problem for Turkey. ple, following an explanation of Turkey’s long devo- tion to liberal democracy, the document states that TORN BETWEEN SECURITY AND LIBERALIZATION the country “has experienced separatist terror since During the first few months of 2001, Turkey’s 1984 and this has cost the country socially, econom- “National Program” was drawn up by the coalition ically, and politically [in terms of] democratization.” government to spell out exactly how it plans to meet The lack of an end date to this sentence suggests that the demands made in the EU’s Accession Partnership separatist terror remains a threat and therefore Document. While it was always emphasized that a implies that this threat’s limiting potential on democ- public debate would occur to make the program ratization will also continue. In the program’s politi- truly “national,” preparation of the program occurred cal criteria section, under the subtitle of “freedom of entirely behind closed doors. The secrecy surround- thought and expression,” the first sentence expresses ing the program’s preparation can be read as a clear the “priority” given by the Turkish government to indication of the continuing struggle among the improving the quality of this type of freedom as Turkish elite over the EU membership issue. based on EU standards. The very next sentence, how- On March 19, 2001, the National Program was ever, draws limits on this freedom should it affect ter- finally released. Although it was introduced as a ritorial integrity or national security. Clearly, the document based on a consensus among the coali- integralists’ ideas, represented by general statements tion parties and the security bureaucracy within the of commitment to EU requirements and demands, are National Security Council, a true consensus clearly being balanced by the security-related rhetoric of the was not achieved in terms of full commitment to gradualists among the Turkish elite. As such, the the required reforms. Regarding the most important document represents the tenuous nature of the “con- and controversial criteria of the Accession Partner- sensus” reached during its preparation. ship Document—cultural rights and rights for broadcasting and education in languages other than LEFT AT THE PLATFORM? the official language, redesigning the role of the As a statement of intent, Turkey’s National Pro- National Security Council, and abolition of capital gram is hardly unequivocal. According to Mesut Yil- punishment—the National Program responds with maz, the deputy prime minister and minister in such ambiguous phrasing that it suggests a great charge of Turkey’s relations with the EU, it can be deal of hesitation and indecisiveness. For example, revised and Turkey can take more risks.5 But for regarding the use of unofficial languages, the doc- this to happen, the gradualists need to be convinced ument states that “Turkish citizens can freely use that the risks entailed in accession to the EU are different languages, though Turkish is the official minimal and worth taking. To do this, two different language,” but this is promptly followed by a but complementary strategies must be adopted by national security reservation that, “this freedom supporters of future Turkish membership in the EU. cannot be used for separatist or divisive activities.” The first involves providing the Turkish military Similar qualifications concerning national security and other security-oriented gradualists with assur- appear alongside other significant commitments to ances that Turkey’s security and territorial integrity larger freedoms, suggesting its role as a kind of emer- will not be compromised by the political reforms gency shelter or safety net to fall back on in times of necessary for EU membership. A significant measure in this regard would be the inclusion of Turkey 5Under the shadow of an imminent EU report detailing within the formal decision-making structure of the Turkey’s progress in meeting the demands for EU member- emerging European Security and Defense Identity ship, the Turkish parliament in mid-2001 passed a major (ESDI, the body charged with realizing the EU’s aims constitutional-reform package. The package, which is still awaiting presidential confirmation, includes lifting the ban of formulating and implementing a common for- on the use of other languages (implicitly Kurdish) and abol- eign and security policy). Turkish policymakers ishes capital punishment—except in cases of war, near-war, strongly object to their exclusion from an organi- or terror (thereby implicitly reserving the right to execute Abdullah Ocalan). The parliament, however, on the grounds zation whose mandate will involve tackling prob- of defending Turkey’s sovereignty, rejected a proposal that lems in many areas in which Turkey’s national international agreements signed by Turkey should have interests are directly implicated. precedence over domestic laws. The reform package indi- cates both the strength of the stimulus of EU membership as As in Washington, the development of the ESDI well as the continuing reservations held by some within the arouses concerns in Ankara about the future role of Turkish political elite. NATO, the organization that has long formed the cen- Nov 01 Issue FINAL 10/17/01 5:32 AM Page 388 (Black plate)

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terpiece of Turkey’s pro-Western security and foreign improve their living standards is enough incentive to policy. The fact that the Europeans (led by the support the reforms necessary for EU membership. French) have so far refused to grant Turkey’s request The problem is that despite the EU’s official accep- to be included in the decision-making channels of tance of Turkey’s candidacy for membership, many the ESDI appears to many Turks as further confirma- doubt that Turkey could ever become a full member tion of Europe’s disregard for Turkish security. Given of the EU. Indeed, the EU’s offer of membership is Turkey’s invaluable contribution to European secu- largely viewed as a clever ploy designed to disguise rity throughout the cold war, the Europeans’ attitude Europe’s continued rejection of Turkey. The Euro- also strikes many Turks as ungrateful. Such percep- peans, so the argument goes, have no real intention tions stir resentment and hostility toward Europe at of ever accepting Turkey as a full member, but they a time when the EU ostensibly seeks to improve its simply can no longer say so outright. The perception relations with Turkey. European policymakers of the EU as a “Christian club” to which Turkey as a should understand that they cannot extend one Muslim country is barred continues to linger in the hand to Turkey while pushing it away with the public imagination. Thus, the second strategy that other. If the Europeans are sincere in their willing- should be adopted by supporters of future Turkish ness to admit Turkey into the EU, then including it membership in the EU is to convince the Turks that in the ESDI from the beginning would concretely EU membership is a real possibility. demonstrate this. It would certainly help alleviate Once again, the Europeans have the most impor- the prevalent sense of distrust toward European tant role. They can underline their sincerity by con- intentions in Turkey. The United States should con- sistently emphasizing their desire to include Turkey tinue to encourage the Europeans to include Turkey in the EU and by providing it with the necessary within the ESDI. financial and political support while Turkey under- Full participation in the new European security goes the difficult reform process. Withholding funds architecture will only partially reassure Turkey’s secu- due to Turkey, as the EU has done until now, does not rity-oriented gradualists. It can bolster Turkey’s sense send a positive signal to Ankara. At the same time, of external security, but internal security fears lie at Turkish policymakers must realize that the oppor- the heart of the opposition to the reforms required tunity for Turkey to become a member of the EU may by the EU. These fears are deeply rooted, a product of not last. If the balance of political power in Europe recent history and past traumas. In the case of the changes from center-left to center-right (as it did Kurdish issue, the capture of Abdullah Ocalan and previously from center-right to center-left), the Turks the Turkish armed forces’ resounding military suc- could once again find themselves left out in the cold. cess against the PKK have clearly not yet eased Turk- Similarly, once the first stage of EU enlargement is ish anxieties about “Kurdish separatism.” Short of the completed, it may become harder for Turkey to join complete cessation of Kurdish political activism, both and gain the benefits currently on offer. The EU is a in Turkey and in the Kurdish diaspora in Europe (an moving train, and the Turks had better jump on unlikely prospect), these anxieties will not disappear before they are stranded at the platform. ■ any time soon. Does this mean, then, that the inter- nal security concerns evoked by the Kurdish issue will ultimately prevent Turkey from undertaking the Teach with Current History reforms necessary for EU membership? CURRENT HISTORY’S multimedia approach to world Although this is a major obstacle to overcome, affairs is invaluable in the classroom. The intelligent Turkish membership in the EU need not be held analysis and commentary that CURRENT HISTORY has hostage to the Kurdish issue. If Turkish policymakers offered teachers and students for more than 85 years and the Turkish public generally are sufficiently is now available in a variety of forms, including: impressed by the expected gains from EU member- ● Specially priced print and ● Regional/country sets ship, fears of Kurdish separatism can be overridden. electronic subscriptions ● On-line back issues For the vast majority of Turks, the need to put bread for students ● Discounted bulk orders on the table is their most pressing concern. If they ● Topic-specific audiotapes believe that they will be materially better off with Turkey in the EU, they will continue to support the goal of future EU membership as they have done in For more information on how CURRENT HISTORY the past. The Turks are a pragmatic and industrious can be used in your classroom, please call toll-free people and the opportunity to make money and 1-800-726-4464 (215-482-4464 outside U.S.).