Quick viewing(Text Mode)

Sabre-Rattling in the Persian Gulf. Legal and Military Aspects of The

Sabre-Rattling in the Persian Gulf. Legal and Military Aspects of The

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

SWP Comments 501962–2012

Sabre-Rattling in the WP Legal and Military Aspects of the Ideological Confrontation between

Iran and the S Walter Posch and Sascha Albrecht

When Iranian generals threatened in January 2012 to avenge any attack on the Islamic Republic by blocking the , Barack Obama responded promptly and robustly. In a message addressed personally to ’s Supreme Leader, the US President cautioned that “closing the Strait of Hormuz is our red line”. To underline its serious- ness, the warning was communicated to Supreme Leader Seyyed via sev- eral channels simultaneously. The Iranian reaction was reserved: they would study the message but generally speaking Obama had said nothing new about the American- Iranian relationship. To the extent that relations have been characterised by reciprocal mistrust since 1979, that is certainly true. With a lack of functioning communication channels between the two countries, the resulting acute tensions are bound to come to a head at regular intervals.

The Strait of Hormuz is of enormous sig- move oil from production fields along the nificance for the world economy. More southern Gulf coast to the or than fourteen tankers pass through every right through to the day carrying 17 million barrels of crude have been widely discussed, only the United (2,700,000 cubic metres). This represents Arab Emirates have to date succeeded in about 35 percent of the crude transported realising such a measure. They are current- by sea and 20 percent of total global oil ly building the - . The Strait is one of the world’s to connect the Habshan oil field with a busiest shipping lanes altogether, and its terminal and refinery at Fujairah on the importance for Liquefied (LNG) Arabian Sea. is set to grow still larger, because Iran pos- Any blocking of the Strait of Hormuz sesses the world’s second-largest natural would trigger an international crisis and gas reserves. However, as yet it has no LNG cause oil prices to skyrocket, rising to more handling facilities. than $200/barrel according to some esti- Shipping has no alternative to the Strait mates. Even the mere threat to blockade the of Hormuz. Although pipeline projects to shipping lane or to turn away vessels flying

Dr. Walter Posch is a Senior Associate in SWP’s and Division SWP Comments 14 Commander Sascha Albrecht is a Senior Associate in SWP’s The Division April 2012

1

particular flags would cause prices to rise, of the ). Iran took by increasing the cost of transport and control of the whole of in 1992, insurance. causing a further deterioration in relations with the Emirates. The United States is con- cerned about Iran’s control over the islands Aspects of International Law but has not taken a position on the ques- The territorial waters of Iran and tion of legal possession. meet directly in the Strait of Hormuz, so there is no high sea beyond national jurisdiction. But the Strait connects the Transit Passage exclusive economic zones of the states Under the criteria of the United Nations bordering Persian Gulf with the high seas Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 in the . International mari- the Strait of Hormuz is a “strait used for time traffic here follows defined sea lanes. international navigation”. This status im- plies that the right of “transit passage” for ships and aircraft must not be impeded. Sea Lanes and the Tunb Islands Warships and military aircraft are expli- For purposes of safety and traffic manage- citly included. The definition of “transit ment, coastal states are permitted to pre- passage” permits vessels to travel in their scribe so-called “traffic separation schemes” usual mode: submerged, war- (TSS) whose rules must be obeyed by all ships in formation and with the right to passing vessels. The “Strait of Hormuz” TSS operate their aircrafts and helicopters. lies in the territorial waters of Oman, north Applied to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of the . As they con- of Hormuz, this international regulation tinue westwards, most vessels on the main means that submarines coming inbound route use the TSSs passing north and south from the Arabian Sea are allowed to pass of the Forur and Greater and Lesser Tunb the straits submerged and then operate in Islands in Iranian territorial waters. the international waters of the Gulf, out- Iran’s ownership of the Greater and side the territorial waters of littoral states. Lesser Tunbs and the island of Abu Musa is In its declaration on the Convention contested. Iran seized both Tunbs and part on the Law of the Sea, Iran states that it of Abu Musa after the British withdrew in accepts the right of “transit passage” only 1971. (The Tunbs belonged to the Emirate for states parties to the Convention, which of Ras al-Khaimah, Abu Musa to the Emirate excludes the United States, and only if of Sharjah, both of which are now members warships first seek and receive authorisa- tion from the Iranian authorities; sub- must surface and show their flag. This position is not recognised under inter- national law. Diverging legal interpreta- tions on questions of transit are one of the causes of the frequent Iranian-American confrontations in the Persian Gulf. Although coastal states like Iran are permitted to set up sea lanes or TSSs and monitor their observance, a blockade or closure of the Hormuz sea lane, which is crucial for international shipping, would violate international law and be regarded as a hostile act against Oman, within whose territorial waters the route lies. There can –––– + + –––– Limit of territorial waters

SWP Comments 14 April 2012

2

be no doubt that any attempt to close 1988. When the Iranians threatened to turn the Strait of Hormuz would lead to US-led away tankers from nations that backed countermeasures by the international , the US conducted Operation Earnest community. Will and . In the subsequent naval battle numerous Iranian speedboats were destroyed, one sunk US Presence in the Gulf and another disabled. It was in connection The huge energy reserves and strategic with these clashes in 1988 that the USS importance of the Gulf region explain Vincennes mistakenly shot down an Iranian the interest of the United States, which passenger aircraft. So Tehran already has been engaged in the region since the knows what it means to cross an American Second World War. It maintains close “red line”. While there has been no relevant political and military relations with all Iranian-American military incident in the Arab states in the Gulf region and has the Strait of Hormuz since then, tensions signed bilateral agreements with most of between the two states remain nonetheless. them. The military relationship with and is especially close, with both enjoying “major non-NATO ally” US-Iranian Hostility status. Bahrain is home to the headquarters American-Iranian antagonism is above all of the Fifth Fleet, while Kuwait is in dis- ideologically rooted, and only in the second cussion as a base for US rapid-response place strategic in nature. Both states are in forces. But the heart of the US military principle pursuing the same strategic goal: presence in the Gulf is Qatar, which is the unhindered supply of oil and gas from home to the regional US Central Command producers to consumers via Musandam/ (USCC) and the United States Air Forces Hormuz. To that extent a blockade of the Central Command (USAFCC). Strait would harm Iranian interests too, The United States also maintains close as Iran also depends on oil exports. Under military and security relations with the ordinary circumstances, such shared inter- states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, ests should promote political pragmatism whose thrust is directed primarily against and responsible cooperation. But that is Iran. Cooperation centres on joint prevented by ideological closure, above all – defence, which is ultimately based on bi- but not only – in Tehran. lateral rather than multilateral agreements. Two mutually amplifying forces shape the policies towards the Gulf region adopted by the leaders of the Islamic Re- The public of Iran: Iranian nationalism and The US reinforced its presence in the political Islam. Iranian nationalism is Persian Gulf after the directed first and foremost against Arab of 1979. Under the “Carter doctrine”, the neighbours. Iran sees itself as the dominant United States has two paramount political force in the “Persian” Gulf and consequent- objectives: to secure the flow of oil through ly a regional power. This stance is upheld the Strait of Hormuz and to prevent the above all by the pragmatists in Tehran, for establishment of any hostile power in the whom engagement in Lebanon is of lesser region. The United States regards any attack importance. Political Islam, which in Iran on this lifeline of the global economy as an is an anti-imperialist current, is directed attack on its vital interests. above all against the United States, and to a How seriously the Americans take the lesser extent the Arab Gulf states. Tehran’s question of free and safe passage through declared goal is to drive the Americans, the Strait of Hormuz was already demon- and especially their Fifth Fleet, out of the strated during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980– region, to be superseded by a security archi-

SWP Comments 14 April 2012

3

tecture that includes Tehran and is ideally – dition of asymmetrical warfare, the Revo- but not automatically – dominated by Iran. lutionary Guards rely on speedboats, Of course Tehran is aware that an American missile boats and submersibles of diverse withdrawal cannot be expected in the fore- provenance, while the Navy operates with seeable future and that it is in no position classical surface vessels like , cor- to drive the United States out of the region. vettes, landing craft, minelayers and mine- Conversely, the American logic that the sweepers. mere presence of US aircraft carriers should The Iranian Navy also possesses a small suffice to influence the politics of an adver- but capable fleet of submarines comprising sary does not work in the case of Iran. On three vessels of the Russian Kilo class and the contrary, Tehran acts as if it were abso- twenty midget submarines (largely of the lutely unaffected by the military threat Ghadr class), which can carry out represented by the Fifth Fleet, and remains attacks as well as mine-laying operations true to its anti-imperialist and nationalist or transporting combat divers. Each of the foreign policy. The two opposing world three Kilo class submarines can carry up views collide at close quarters in the Strait to twenty-four mines, the Ghadr class of Hormuz. Where the Iranians insist on probably eight each. On land, the Revolu- their national sovereignty, the United tionary Guards command mobile anti-ship States sees an “A2-AD” problem, a space and medium-range missile batteries. As where its influence is denied (anti-access well as being capable of attacking any and area-denial). ship passing the Strait of Hormuz, the True to its self-image as a regional range of these also extends to the power, Iran emphasises its own ability cities and US bases of the southern Gulf to serve as the “doorkeeper” of the Strait coast. of Hormuz and ensure security there in cooperation with Oman on the basis of international law. Mining Iran would certainly be in a position to block the Strait of Hormuz, for example by Iran’s Military Capabilities mining. If Tehran were to decide to do this The Iranian navy’s equipment and its – which is rather unlikely – it would have mission doctrine would not suggest any advantages of the Law of the Sea, geography special capacity to project naval power. In and hydrography on its side. Iranian sub- this regard it clearly falls short of the capa- marines and surface vessels operating out bilities and capacities of European navies of north of the Strait of like those of the United Kingdom, France Hormuz can move freely within their own or Italy. territorial waters in close proximity to The Islamic Republic divides its naval the Strait of Hormuz and along the entire forces into the Iranian Navy and the Navy coast, while foreign warships enjoy only of the Revolutionary Guards, the Pasdaran the right of peaceful passage and are barred (Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami). The by international law from movements that Iranian Navy’s principal area of operations would allow tailing or observation. lies beyond the Strait of Hormuz in the If Iran were to suddenly mine the Strait Arabian Sea, while the Revolutionary of Hormuz it would have to secure the Guards operate in the waters of the Strait mined waters and prevent any attempt by of Hormuz and along the entire Gulf coast the US navy to clear them. Tehran could as far as the Iraqi border. Here the Revolu- deploy small fighting vessels, some of them tionary Guard Navy serves typical “coast- missile-armed, to force minesweepers to guard functions” in the narrow sense and turn back. Such an operation would have maritime policing. In line with their tra- to be secured and supported by land-based

SWP Comments 14 April 2012

4

missile batteries, specifically anti-ship and by Admiral Ashkbus Danehkar in the medium-range missiles. setting out to beat superior American force Alternatively, or to support a blockade by unconventional warfare. of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran could tem- This approach applies maritime “guer- porarily suspend the right of passage in its rilla tactics” based on full exploitation of coastal waters elsewhere than the Strait, for the geographical (coastline, islands) and example in the Tunb-Forur sea lanes. But hydrographical (shallow waters) conditions this action would be permitted only “if and ideological positioning of the struggle such suspension is essential for the protec- in the national/Iranian and international/ tion of its security”, and neither legal nor Islamist contexts. actual discrimination of foreign vessels is If the Americans were to decide to enter permitted. Because the Tunb-Forur cor- Iranian territorial waters, they would have ridor, according to Tehran’s interpretation, to be prepared for the conditions there. The lies in Iranian territorial waters, the Iranian highly indented coastline with numerous Navy can move more freely here than at bays is ideal for Iranian speedboat opera- Hormuz. But under international law a tions, while the shallows of the Strait re- country may mine its own waters only if strict the manoeuvrability of the large this poses no danger to uninvolved third warships and aircraft carriers of the Fifth parties, and safe passage is still ensured or Fleet. In other words, the Iranians would alternative routes are kept open. Shipping not expect to be confronted with the full would have to be warned in good time. force of the Fifth Fleet, but only with in- Moreover, international law places the dividual vessels. Their response would strictest of conditions on the use of mines. consist in swarm attacks by missile armed Their position must be recorded precisely speedboats, under whose protection in order to allow them to be cleared safely submersibles would get close enough to after the end of the conflict. fire torpedoes or to blow themselves up. In the course of an escalation Iran could The Iranian Navy would support the attack certainly mine its own waters in order to with its submarines and the Pasdaran with place considerable obstacles in the way of its land-based missile batteries. In the hostile military operations and create a pro- course of the fighting Iran would attempt tective barrier behind which it can operate to close the Strait of Hormuz to cut the more freely. Such a minelaying operation Americans off from the high seas. would definitely have a psychological im- Estimates of Iranian military readiness pact on international shipping. and capability differ. International military experts point to their relatively outdated weapon systems and difficulties coordinat- Iranian Defence Strategy ing different naval units. The Iranian Navy’s Tehran is certainly well aware that a land-based command and communication blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would centres are likely to be eliminated by the represent a major provocation. While that United States at the outbreak of any hos- would trigger a conflict with the United tilities. Moreover, it must be assumed that States that Iran could not win militarily, the Americans know the whereabouts of this should not be taken to mean that the most important mine depots, and that Tehran would avoid a military confronta- US reconnaissance would quickly spot and tion at all costs. If the inviolability of their stop minelaying operations. territorial waters, their borders or the Other experts respond that the Iranians regime’s survival are in play, the Iranians are able to deploy their weapon systems will defend themselves. Indeed, the entire effectively, know the potential area of oper- Iranian strategy in the Gulf is designed for ations very well from exercises conducted defence, with the naval tactics formulated there, and have granted their commanders

SWP Comments 14 April 2012

5

and commanding officers greater battle- The logical conclusion would be to stay field autonomy. Indeed, in one US war calm and, at least at the professional mili- game the “Iranian” side is reported to have tary level, maintain normal military rela- repelled an attack. tions with the United States. But that is not All the same, no expert would really give how revolutionary Iran ticks. The United much credibility to the idea of Iranian vic- States must be regularly reminded of the tory over the US Fifth Fleet. Nor is that the existence of the Islamic Republic and its objective of Iranian defence doctrine, which anti-imperialist identity, especially at such focuses instead on raising the political and a symbolic place as Hormuz, and best of all moral cost of aggression to such a point as by means of calculated provocation. to persuade the United States to refrain. That is the Iranian strategy for preventing a repetition of a limited intervention like Calculated Provocation – Operation Praying Mantis, which caused Incalculable Escalation few casualties on the American side. After three decades of American presence Accordingly, Tehran has no intention in the Persian Gulf a certain level of rou- of attacking the US fleet in the Gulf. That tine has become established between the excludes from the outset the “Pearl Harbor” Iranian Navy and the US Fifth Fleet. When- scenario of peace-time attack on the Ameri- ever a change-over occurs and the United can fleet in Bahrain. Instead Iran places its States replaces vessels in the Fifth Fleet, faith in a defensive operation making a the Iranians demand that the warships respectable enough showing to underline identify themselves as they pass through. its claim to leadership in the Islamic world The United States routinely rejects this and its regional power ambitions in the request with reference to the customary Persian Gulf. Sinking or even just disabling right of “transit passage” provided by the a single US warship would represent a great Convention on the Law of the Sea (which embarrassment for the United States, boost neither the United States nor Iran have anti-American sentiment in the region and ratified). In response the Iranians send out create nervousness among the United speedboats to identify the US warships. The States’ Arab allies and . crew of one of the boats makes radio con- The Iranians would even be able to turn tact with the Americans, while the others a defeat to ideological ends. Revolutionary manoeuvre close to the US vessels and note guards killed by highly armed Americans their hull numbers and names. Although while defending their homeland in speed- the Iranian boats and crews are normally boats and small fighting vessels would unarmed, these operations are anything supply exactly the images needed to re- but harmless, as the Iranians deliberately interpret military defeat as ideological and ignore the usual safety distance and try political success. Tehran would be able to the patience of the American crews. score points both at home and across the This approach is a textbook case of region, and not only among the Shiites. In seeking maximum political impact with the best case the Iranian regime would meagre military means. By forcing the succeed in restoring the prestige it has lost Americans to respond and reminding the in recent years among ordinary Sunnis. Fifth Fleet of Iranian sovereignty, the Revo- The precondition for that course is that lutionary Guards fulfil their purpose at Tehran has international law on its side fabulously low cost. In 2008 five Iranian and the United States is clearly the aggres- speedboats faced off against three heavily sor. This is the background to regularly armed modern American warships. repeated warnings in the Iranian press There are two reasons why the United about the possibility of a US-provoked in- States cannot ignore the Iranian speed- cident being used as a pretext to attack. boats. Firstly, because the presence of the

SWP Comments 14 April 2012

6

Fifth Fleet is largely a political matter, now irresponsible both within and outside the that the establishment of a string of Ameri- region. can air bases in the region has eroded its The difficulties are worsened by the military importance. Secondly, because of lack of reliable communication channels the bitter experience of the year 2000, between the American and Iranian navies. when seventeen sailors were killed and In any crisis situation, when confusion thirty-nine seriously injured after suicide arises, or simply an accident occurs at sea, attackers linked to al-Qaeda used speed- contact has to be improvised. Although boats to attack the USS Cole in the port of American vessels have bridge-to-bridge Aden. Therefore it is only logical if Ameri- contact with the regular Iranian Navy, can commanding officers treat the Iranian which as mentioned operates outside the manoeuvres as “exercise” for possible sui- Strait of Hormuz, there is no contact at cide attacks. all to the Revolutionary Guard Navy. For the Iranians military reconnaissance The Americans have repeatedly proposed is foremost. Given that they are likely to setting up a hotline like the Cold War “hot- © Stiftung Wissenschaft und have precise information about the num- line” between the United States and the Politik, 2012 ber, type, identity and movements of US Soviet Union. Back then, despite all ideo- All rights reserved vessels (also from other sources such as logical differences, the two sides even These Comments reflect lookouts on oil rigs, informants in ports, managed to conclude an “Agreement on solely the authors’ views. etc.), an American surprise attack appears the Prevention of Incidents On and Over SWP unlikely. the High Seas”. By rescuing Iranian hos- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik It is due in the first place to the profes- tages from the hands of Somali pirates in German Institute for sionalism of the American crews that there January 2012 the US Navy has even offered International and Security Affairs has not been any serious incident to date. a humanitarian and political gesture. At Any misinterpretation of the risky Iranian least in the fight against piracy in the Gulf Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 10719 Berlin moves could have unpredictable conse- of Aden there is a convergence of interests Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 quences and lead to armed clashes. between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Fax +49 30 880 07-100 It is therefore understandable if the the West. www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] Americans respond with anger to the regu- As was to be expected, the Iranian side lar Iranian provocations, as most recently did not respond to the American proposal. ISSN 1861-1761 in January 2012. The United States regu- The reason for this is ideological in nature, Translation by Meredith Dale larly reminds Tehran that it is willing and for by establishing a direct telephone con- (English version of able to secure free passage by force if need nection Iran would be consenting ipso facto SWP-Aktuell 17/2012) be. The Iranians generally respond to Amer- to the presence of the Fifth Fleet in the Per- ican protests by pointing out that the sian Gulf. Otherwise too, the Revolutionary whole Gulf region lies within range of its Guards show scant enthusiasm for contact missiles. At the same time they know that with American authorities that keep them conflict would cause oil prices to rise and on the international terror list. Without the regard this as insurance that the United reassurances that can only be guaranteed States will take no stronger action. by a direct link, ideally in the scope of an However, the leaders of the Pasdaran agreement, the risk remains the next Navy forget that the political circumstances change-over in the Persian Gulf could see can change rapidly, as happened in 2008 the hitherto calculable provocations turn- and in January 2012. Both times Iranian ing into uncontrollable escalation. behaviour that under calmer political con- ditions would have drawn little attention was taken up by the international media and contributed decisively to a heightening of political tensions. Iran was perceived as

SWP Comments 14 April 2012

7

Top View