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Appendix 1: Kabul Forces Order of Battle

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Appendix 1: Kabul Forces Order of Battle Appendix 1: Kabul Forces Order of Battle (as at 1 January 1988) 1st (Central) Corps: HQ Kabul 2nd Corps: HQ Kandahar 3rd Corps: HQ Gardez 2nd Division: Jabal-os-Saraj, Parwan Province 1 64th Regiment: Tanbana, Panjsher lOth Brigade: Panjsher 444th Commando Battalion: Panjsher 7th Division: Moqor2 65th Brigade 8th Division: Kargha garrison, Kabul3 4th Regiment: Kabul 5th Regiment: Kabul 72nd Brigade: Kabul 9th Division: Chugha Serai (also called Asadabad), Kunar Province4 31st Mountain Brigade: Asmar 55th Brigade: Barikot 69th Brigade: Chugha Serai 46th Artillery Regiment: Chugha Serai II th Division: Jallalabad, Nangrahar Province5 32nd Brigade: Jallalabad 8lst Brigade: Hadda 71 st Brigade: Ganikhel 9lst Artillery Regiment: Jallalabad 12th Division: Gardez, Paktia Province 67th Brigade: Gardez 36th (?) Regiment: Ali Khel Qaji) 22nd Guard Brigade: Chamkani 15th Brigade: Urgun, Paktika Province 14th Division: Ghazni, Ghazni Province 3rd Brigade: Ghazni u/i regiment: Bamiyan, Bamiyan Province 40th Regiment: Paktia Province 306 Appendix I 307 15th Division: Kandahar, Kandahar Province 36th Brigade: Kandahar 43rd Mountain Regiment: Kalat, Zabol Province u/i Brigade: Girishk, Helmand Province 17th Division: Herat, Herat Province6 28th Brigade: Herat 33rd Brigade: Qala Yi-Naw, Badghis Province 2nd Regiment: Chakhcharan, Ghowr Province 18th Division: Mazar-e-Shariff, Balkh Province 62nd Mechanised Regiment: Mazar-e-Shariff 35th Regiment: Shebarghan, Fariab Province u/i Mountain Battalion: Mazar-e-Shariff 20th Division: Baghlan Province 7 23rd Brigade: Baghlan Province 75th Brigade: Eshkamish, Takhar Province 25th Division: Khost (also called Matun), Paktia Province 19th Brigade: Khost 59th Brigade: Nadershah Kot 23rd Brigade: Khost 6th Artillery Regiment: Khost Non-Divisional Units 4th Armoured Brigades: Pol-e-Charkhi garrison, Kabul 7th Armoured Brigade9: Kandahar 15th Armoured Brigades: Pol-e-Charkhi garrison, Kabul 21st Mechanised Brigade 10: Farah, Farah Province Presidential Guard Brigade 11 : Kabul 37th Commando Brigades: Rishkoor garrison, Kabul 38th Commando Brigades: Kabul u/i Paratroop Regiment 12: Bagram, Parwan Province 466th Commando Battalion 13 : Kandahar 57th Training Regiment: Pol-e-Charkhi garrison, Kabul 88th Artillery Brigade 14: Rishkoor camp, Kabul lOth Engineer Regiment: Hussein Kut, Parwan Province 5th Transport Regiment: Siah Sang garrison, Kabul !19th Transport Regiment 15 : Sherpur barracks, Kabul 52nd Independent Signals Regiment: Kabul 235th Independent Signals Battalion: Kabul 203rd Reconnaissance Battalions: Kabul 212th Reconnaissance Battalion 16 : Gardez u/i Reconnaissance Battalion9: Kandahar 308 Appendix I AIR FORCE 322nd Air Regiment: Bagram Air Base 3 Fighter squadrons (with 30 Mig-2ls) 32lst Air Regiment: Bagram Air Base 17 3 Fighter-Bomber squadrons (with 40 Su-7, Su-22) 393rd Air Regiment: Dehdadi Air Base, Balkh Province 3 Fighter-Bomber squadrons (with 30 Mig-17) 380th Air Battalion: Dehdadi Air Base, Balkh Province 18 1 Helicopter Squadron (with 10 Mil-8/17) Air Force Academy: HQ Kabul 19 At Mazar-e-Shariff airport, Balkh Province I Weapons Conversion Squadron (with 18 Mig-21) I Advanced Training Squadron (with 18 L-39 Delfin) Basic Training Squadron with Yak-18 believed to be at Dehdadi 335th Air Regiment: Shindand Air Base, Herat Province20 3 Bomber squadrons (with 50 Su-7, Su-22) I Fighter-Bomber squadron (with Mig-17) 375th Air Regiment: Shindand Air Base, Herat Province21 2 Helicopter Squadrons (with 25 Mil-8/17) 1 Helicopter Squadron (with 8 Mil-25) 377th Air Regiment: Kabul Airport22 4 Helicopters squadrons (with 6 Mil-25, 25 Mil-17) u/i Air Regiment: Kabul Airport 23 3 Transport Squadrons (with 40 An-26/32) Air Defence Forces24 99th SAM Regiment: Kabul 92nd (?) SAM Regiment: Kabul 66th AAA Battalion: Kandahar u/i Radar Regiment: Kabul Border Command25 1st Border Brigade: Jallalabad, Nagrahar Province 2nd Border Brigade: Khost, Paktia Province 3rd Border Brigade: Konduz (?) Badakhshan Province 4th Border Brigade: Nimroz Province 5th Border Brigade: Herat, Herat Province Appendix I 309 7th Border Brigade: Kandahar Province 8th Border Brigade: Paktika Province 9th Border (Training) Brigade: Kabul lOth Border Brigade: Asadabad, Kunar Province GUARD CORPS/SPECIAL GUARD As part of the 'Afghanisation' process prior to the Soviet withdrawal, a new military organisation was set up early in 1988. Three new brigades were formed, tasked with the defence of Kabul. Some units were to take up fixed positions, others to be mobile. The new units were set up with a high percentage of party members and given more pay. Initially they were known as Guard Corps units. However, late in 1988, the organisation was expanded and its name changed to the Special Guard. The Special Guard included the three guard brigades, Presidential Guard Brigade, 37th Commando Brigade, 38th Commando Brigade and some artillery units. Some Sarandoy mobile units may also have been included in the new organisation. A Special Guard headquarters and training unit was established at Balar Hissar. In all, by early 1989, about 10000 men were in the Special Guard. UNIT STRENGTHS The terms 'brigade' or 'division' need to be used with caution with the Afghan forces. During the nadir of 1979-81 average divisional strength may have been as low as 1500, with some below 1000. Since then the army has had more success in keeping men in the ranks. Some divisions remain small, probably around 1500 men- the 7th and 14th Divisions for example. Others such as the 25th and lith Divisions may number around 4500 men each. In 1985-8 some mujahadeen accounts indicate that battalions, for example the one overrun at Pechgur in the Panjsher, were up to strength at 400-500 men. The brigade which vacated a garrison in Paktia early in 1988 also seems to have been a strong formation, with about 2000 troops. Even during these later years there seems to have been a wide variation in unit strength. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR These forces are divided into gendarmerie (Sarandoy), made up of conscripts and organised along coventionallines, and Revolution Defence Group militias. By 1985 there were 20 identified Sarandoy Operational Battalions and Mountain Battalions. They were attached to provincial Sarandoy commands and include armoured vehicles and light artillery. The Kabul Security Command deployed two mobile regiments (1st and 2nd) and controlled a system of 12 security wards with observation posts, check points etc. A further four Sarandoy brigades/regiments have been identified in Badakhshan (24th Sarandoy Brigade), Kandahar, Baghlan, and Parwan. During 1988-9 Kabul 310 Appendix I Security Command was reorganised into II security wards and Sarandoy forces around the city, boosted by re-called reservists, became 4th Division. MILITIAS The term 'militia' was used by the Afghan government to describe irregular units ranging from detachments of party members to bands of mercenaries. Much of the militia force (those called Revolution Defence Groups) fell under Ministry of Interior control. In Kabul, their activities were closely integrated with the Security Command. Other militias were hired by different agencies. In 1984-6 there were at least six tribal regiments (in Kandahar, Zabol, Paktia, Kunar, Herat, and the Andarab valley), made up of locals who were basically tribal mercenaries. These elements are normally paid by the Ministry of Frontier and Tribes, and often cooperate with the border troops. Other local militias have been hired by the KHAD. Like many guerrillas these militiamen are militarily effective for intermittent short periods, and their loyalties are often questionable. One exception to this rule was the so-called Jowzjani militia which appeared in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in 1988. These men were described as fighting with the ferocity of mujahadeen but also of being ideologically committed in a way which most rural militias were not. Youth militia forces have been raised by the Democratic Youth Organisation of Afghanistan. Although there are reports of them fighting, they are a lightly armed force designed primarily to prepare men for military service. A strongly Parchami party militia called the Revolutionary Guards operates on a similar principle (although it did send men to fight in the 1982 Panjsher campaign, with poor results). The Revolutionary Guards are very much a Kabul-based youth militia. From 1988 onwards Najeebollah stepped up PDPA efforts to train members for militia service in their spare time. About 10 000 party militia men and women paraded through Kabul the day after Soviet troops completed their road evacuation from the city. TOTAL STRENGTHS At the time of the April Revolution the Ministry of Defence controlled 80- 90 000 troops, the Ministry of the Interior about 15 000 gendarmes, and there was a small frontier force of a few thousand. By 1979, shortly before the Soviet intervention, the army had dwindled drastically. The Sarandoy was heavily purged following the installation ofBabrak Karma!. By mid-1980 the Ministry of Defence may have had as few as 35 000 troops, with another 10 000 in other paramilitary bodies. During 1981-4 attempts were made to build up the army's strength. But much effort was also put into the expansion of the Border Command, Sarandoy and the recruitment of militias in rural areas. This resulted in a growth to about 75 000 soldiers and paramilitaries by 1984-5. By 1988 it is likely that N ajeebollah could call on a full time security force of about 150 000. This included about 55 000 Army and Air Force, 10 000 Border Command, 35 000 Appendix I 311 WAD (Secret Police), 30000 Sarandoy and 20000 milita mercenaries. Early in 1989 strength had been further boosted by the formation of the Special Guard, re-call of reservists and Afghans studying at Soviet academies - total security forces may have climbed from 150000 to 200000. In addition, by 1989, party part-time militias totalled about 15-20000, most of whom were in the Kabul area. Notes 1. The 2nd Division was formed in 1984 following the Panjsher 7 operation. The lOth Brigade came from the 20th Division, another from the 8th Division.
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