Interpreting Islam: Us-Indonesian Relations, 1953-1968
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INTERPRETING ISLAM: U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS, 1953-1968 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Laura M. Weis R. Scott Appleby, Director Graduate Program in Peace Studies and History Notre Dame, Indiana July 2018 © Copyright 2018 Laura M. Weis INTERPRETING ISLAM: U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS, 1953-1968 Abstract by Laura M. Weis This study of United States relations with post-colonial Indonesia sheds light on how prevalent assumptions about and interpretations of a major world religion, Islam, shaped policymakers’ attitudes and decisions concerning U.S. engagement with Muslim actors abroad. It examines not only the accuracy and nuance of U.S. officials’ knowledge about Islam in Indonesia, but also religion’s shifting salience in U.S. foreign relations during the height of the Cold War. It argues that religion mattered in the construction and implementation of U.S. policies toward Indonesia—but under specific, changing conditions, not as an overarching framework. Islam provided one lens by which U.S. officials understood the behavior and goals of the Indonesian government and, perhaps more consequentially, the character of the majority of Indonesia’s people. While interpretations of Islam in Indonesia evolved over the course of subsequent U.S. administrations—and the significance and utility of these perceptions waxed and waned over time—in general the U.S. foreign policy establishment tended to see religion as a means to an end, namely, as an instrument that at times proved useful in the struggle against global communism. For my parents. ii CONTENTS Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... iv Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. v Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: From Colony to Country: The “Religious Factor” in U.S.-Indonesian Relations .............................................................................................................. 51 Chapter 2: “Friend” or “Fanatic”? Regional Rebellion and Religion, 1957-1961 .......... 117 Chapter 3: Whither Religion? 1961-1965 ..................................................................... 181 Chapter 4: Religious Violence? 1965-1968 .................................................................. 249 Chapter 5: Conclusion ................................................................................................. 299 Archival Sources ......................................................................................................... 338 Bibliography................................................................................................................ 339 iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS As I conclude my doctoral studies, I am filled with gratitude for: my dissertation committee, Rebecca McKenna, Asher Kaufman, Mun’im Sirry, and my advisor, Scott Appleby, who provided guidance and support during my time at Notre Dame; Jackie and Dave Perez, Wendy and David Heckler, Betsy and Jim Kreisle, Aura Kanegis and Lisa Handy, Niki Akhavan, Raed Jarrar, and Clare Sullivan, who graciously opened their hearts and homes to me as I journeyed from archive to archive; Mark Chmiel, who set me on this path, and Joanie French, who taught me how to move through it; Courtney Wiersema and Craig Kinnear, who helped me see the light at the end of the tunnel—to say nothing of their trivia skills, which, along with Bry Martin, Janice Gunther, and Chris Flanagan, provided weekly laughs and camaraderie; Robert Palermo, who always said I could do it; Sarah Christensen, Sarah Rutherford, and Katie Volin, who always had my back; Heather DuBois, Janna Hunter-Bowman, and Karie Cross Riddle, for coffee dates and fireside chats and lifting my spirits during the final stretch; Kathrin Kranz, whose willingness to engage in marathon text exchanges about Very Important Things was surpassed only by her capacity to offer compassionate counsel; Niki Lee, for road trips and hour-long phone calls and steadfast friendship; Zoe and Emmy, who perfected laptop lolling and provided essential cat cuddles; and my dear parents, Jack and Alice Weis, whose love and encouragement sustained me throughout the past eight years. iv ABBREVIATIONS BPS Body to Protect Sukarnoism CAP Civic Action Program CFA Committee for a Free Asia CIA Central Intelligence Agency DCI Director of Central Intelligence DCM Deputy Chief of Mission (U.S. Embassy) FE Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State GPII Movement of Young Muslims, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia HMI Muslim Students’ Association, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff Kopkamtib Operations Command to Restore Security and Order Kostrad Army Strategic Reserve Command Nasakom Nationalism (nasionalisme), religion (agama), and communism (komunisme) MPRS Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly NIE National Intelligence Estimate NII Islamic State of Indonesia, Negara Islam Indonesia NSC National Security Council NU Revival of Religious Scholars, Nahdlatul Ulama OCB Operations Coordinating Board v PCIIA U.S. President’s Committee on International Information Activities Permesta Universal Struggle Charter, Piagam Perjuangan Semesta PKI Communist Party of Indonesia, Partai Komunis Indonesia PNI Nationalist Party of Indonesia, Partai Nasional Indonesia PRRI Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia PSB Psychological Strategy Board PSI Socialist Party of Indonesia, Partai Sosialis Indonesia PSII Party of the Indonesian Islamic Union, Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia RPI Federal Republic of Indonesia, Republik Persatuan Indonesia SDI Islamic Traders Association, Sarekat Dagang Islam SI Islamic Association, Sarekat Islam SPA Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State TII Islamic Army of Indonesia, Tentara Islam Indonesia TNI Indonesian National Armed Forces, Tentara Nasional Indonesia UN United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development USIA United States Information Agency VOA Voice of America VOC Dutch East Indies Company, Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie vi INTRODUCTION In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States government gradually lifted restrictions on security assistance to Indonesia. Initiated in no small part due to global civil society’s concerns about the human rights record of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia), limitations on military aid and training had been in place since the late 1990s. When the George W. Bush administration saw the Indonesian government as a potential partner in the “global war on terror,” however, U.S. military assistance began to flow back into the country—a trend that has continued since then.1 In November 2005, State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack characterized this “process of military reengagement” with Indonesia as of the “utmost importance” to U.S.-Indonesian relations. He cited the archipelago’s “unique strategic role in Southeast Asia” as “the world’s third largest democracy,” and noted that Indonesia, “the world’s most populous majority-Muslim nation,” acts as “a voice of 1 Breanna Heilicher, “Indonesia Requests U.S. to Reduce Limitations on U.S. Security Aid to Indonesian Special Forces Unit,” Security Assistance Monitor, January 26, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/blog/indonesia-requests-us-reduce-limitations-us-security-aid-indonesian- special-forces-unit; Rhea Myerscough, “Putting the Cart Before the Horse: United States Resumes Military Assistance to Indonesia,” Defense Monitor, Center for Defense Information, May 18, 2006; Bradley Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The Transnational Movement for East Timor and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Peace & Change 29, no. 3–4 (2004): 453–482; for a comprehensive database on U.S economic and security assistance, see “Indonesia Country Page,” Security Assistance Monitor, accessed April 16, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/Indonesia. 1 moderation in the Islamic world.”2 Five years later, during a speech at the University of Indonesia in 2010, President Barack Obama, his administration having abandoned the language (if not all the tactics) of the “war on terror,” also made reference to religion, alongside democracy and development, as “fundamental to the Indonesian story.” Highlighting a recurrent theme of U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 era, Obama emphasized that “…America is not, and never will be, at war with Islam.”3 U.S. policymakers and pundits routinely invoke Islam to understand or explain the behavior and motivations of Muslim majority societies, often appealing to ideas about the historic role of religion in states with significant Muslim populations. In this era, in which Islam appears frequently in policy formulations and public discourse as both a catalyst for violence and as a potential resource for peacebuilding, scholars and policymakers would benefit from a more thorough scrutiny of the role(s) of religion in foreign relations. An historical analysis of U.S. relations with Indonesia, a Muslim majority society living in a newly independent state during the height of the Cold War, sheds light on how prevalent assumptions