EMPOWERING THE PRESIDENCY: INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS IN INDONESIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, 1999-2002 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Blair Andrew King, B.A., M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor R. William Liddle, Adviser Professor Richard Gunther ____________________________ Adviser Professor Timothy Frye Political Science Graduate Program ABSTRACT The choice of political institutions is a critical aspect of a democratic transition. Significant amendments to the 1945 Constitution have transformed it into a more democratic framework with extensive separation of powers and checks and balances. Despite the introduction of the “difficult combination” of pure presidentialism and multipartism to Indonesia, consensual patterns of elite behavior should contribute to the further consolidation of democracy. This study examines the impact of the first four amendments on executive- legislative relations and presidential power. The use of the 1945 Constitution by two authoritarian regimes for four decades gave rise to the perception that it inevitably created a dominant presidency. Thus Indonesian political elites set out in 1999 to curtail presidential power. Paradoxically, by the end of the process three years later they created a comparatively very powerful president, primarily due to the introduction of direct election and the narrowing of the grounds for impeachment. In addition, although the president’s residual powers have been restricted, only slight reductions were made in her specific powers. This study utilizes concepts from political economy and political psychology to analyze the struggle between two broad camps in the constituent assembly (MPR): conservatives, led by Megawati Soekarnoputri and her Indonesian Democracy ii Party-Struggle (PDI-P) and progressives from most of the other major political parties. The progressives consistently supported direct election, even though this did not fit with their self-interest. Their position is explained by their perceptions of Indonesia’s history: in their view, the parliamentary system was the primary cause of political instability in the 1950s, and thus they concluded that pure presidentialism was more appropriate for Indonesia. Following the presidential crisis of 2001, Megawati and PDI-P reversed their initial position in opposition to direct election, as a means to strengthen the presidency and abolish the constitutional supremacy of the MPR. This reversal is explained by the “electoral bargaining approach,” a theory of institutional choice developed based on cases in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Latin America. This approach examines the interests of competing political forces rooted in their bargaining power and varying degrees of uncertainty over political outcomes. * * * * * iii Dedicated to my family and to all those working for democracy in Indonesia iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work is the culmination of many years of study and research. No project of this magnitude comes to fruition without the help of others. I would like to begin by recognizing the courage of the Indonesian university students who decided in 1998 that enough was enough and took to the streets across the country to bring about an end to President Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order. The professors and university administrators who quietly supported their demonstrations from behind the scenes should be commended as well. Without their efforts, the transition to democracy would not have taken place when it did and I would have written a very different dissertation. I would also like to express my gratitude to my Indonesian sources, especially MPR members, who have shared their perspectives with me over the past several years. The year I spent in Yogyakarta in 1998 conducting field research was supported by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad grant. I would like to thank the U.S. Department of Education for the financial support, and Gadjah Mada University and Professor Mohtar Mas’oed for the institutional and intellectual support, that allowed me to return to Indonesia just in time to witness history in the making. I then had the privilege to work at the Indonesia field office of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) for two years, which allowed me to observe the transition as it continued to unfold. Among the many colleagues I had the pleasure to work with at v NDI in Indonesia, Tursiana Setyohapsari and Miranti Maruto provided invaluable assistance and friendship, and Eric Bjornlund, Andrew Ellis and Sherrie Wolff were tireless intellectual soulmates and sources of frequent moral support. Since I returned to NDI in the Washington office, Peter Manikas has generously offered much-needed encouragement as well as the time off necessary to finish. I have also had the distinct pleasure of being a graduate student in a very nurturing intellectual environment, the political science department at Ohio State University. I have learned a great deal from my fellow students, of whom there are too many to name individually. Kathleen Woodward and Allyson Lowe, however, deserve special mention for their role as “comrades in arms” as we struggled together to finish our dissertations. Professors Dick Gunther and Tim Frye, and Kevin O’Brien before them, have offered many insightful comments and frequent words of encouragement over the years. I am much the richer for their intellectual and personal friendship. Bill Liddle has been much more than a dissertation adviser. He has also been a mentor, intellectual sparring partner, and friend. I have learned a great deal from him about Indonesia, about politics and about life. In addition, the group of (mostly) Indonesian students – both previous generations and my contemporaries – that Bill has mentored at OSU has been a great source of insight and companionship. In addition to those already mentioned above, Salim Said, Afan Gaffar, Bahtiar Effendy, Rizal Mallarangeng, Takeshi Kohno, Denny J. Aly and Saiful Mujani deserve special mention in this regard. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my wife Erlis, to my parents Ken and Joan, and to my brother Ken, who have suffered in silence (mostly) while I have labored to vi finish. Their love and support has sustained me through the valleys of despair and self- doubt. Finally, my two sons, Austin and Carter, have – on a daily basis – unwittingly helped me keep this project in perspective. I love them dearly for failing to understand the importance of Daddy staying in the office for one more hour. Guess what, boys, I’m done! * * * * * vii VITA December 1, 1966 . Born – Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1989 . .B.A. with Honors, International Relations, Stanford University M.A., International Policy Studies, Stanford University 1993-1994 . .University Fellowship, The Ohio State University 1997-1998 . .Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Grant 2001-2002 . .Presidential Fellowship, The Ohio State University 1994-1997, 2002 . .Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Blair A. King, “The 1992 General Election and Indonesia’s Political Landscape,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 14: 2 (September 1992), 154-173. 2. Blair A. King, “Constitutional Tinkering: The Search for Consensus is Taking Time,” Inside Indonesia 65 (January – March 2001), 25-26. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Comparative Politics International Relations viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………ii Dedication…………...……………………………………………………………………iv Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………………v Vita…………...…………………………………………………………………………viii List of Tables……...………………………………………………………………...……xi Chapters: Introduction: Constitutional Reform and the Democratic Transition in Indonesia……….1 1. Theories of Presidential Power and Institutional Choice………….……………..24 2. Constitutional Development in Indonesia, 1945-2002……………………….….52 3. Self-Interest and Institutional Choice……………………………………………92 4. Perceived Lessons of History…………………………………….……………..134 Conclusion: Constitutional Reform and the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia……………………………………………………………………..163 Appendix A: The Original 1945 Constitution, Including Official Annotations………..185 Appendix B: The Amended 1945 Constitution (Integrated Text, Through the Fourth Amendment)…………………………………………………………….206 Appendix C: Scoring the Indonesian Presidency on the Shugart-Carey and Frye-Hellman Scales…………………………………...……………………….230 Appendix D: Residual Powers of the Indonesian Presidency…………………………..236 Appendix E: MPR Blocs………………………………………………………………..240 Appendix F: Interviews…………………………………………………………………243 ix Bibliography……………………………………………………………………...…….247 * * * * * x LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1.1 Summary of hypotheses, electoral bargaining approach (reproduced from Frye 1997, 534 [Table 1])………………………….………………46 2.1 Specific powers, Indonesian presidency, 1999-2002, Shugart-Carey scale.…….64 2.2 Specific powers, Indonesian presidency, 1999-2002, Frye-Hellman scale….…..65 2.3 Presidential power in Indonesia, compared to cases in Shugart and Carey 1992, 155 (Table 8.2), arranged from most to least powerful………...…67 2.4 Presidential power in Indonesia, compared to cases in Frye 1997, 547 (Appendix A), arranged from most to least powerful……………………69 xi INTRODUCTION CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN INDONESIA