January - February 2008 Volume 68, Number 1 SITREP The Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute

ERIC MORSE

National Security Inside this Issue in a Democracy by Senator Hugh Segal National Security in a Democracy ...... 3 Pakistan, Bhutto and the U.S.–Jihadist Endgame...... 5 Back to the Balkans: Contrasting Visions in an Unclaimed World...... 7 Waiting for Defence Budget 2008-09...... 11 The Croatian Air Force Today...... 12 Letters to Sitrep...... 16 From the Editor’s Desk he assassination of Benazir Bhutto highlights both the fragile nature of democratic development in Pakistan Royal Canadian Military Institute Tand relations between India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghani- Founded 1890 stan. The reality is that military coups and power struggles are Patron endemic. Democracy as we know it does not exist in Pakistan. Her Excellency The Right Honourable The Pakistani Army runs both the government and the economy. Michaëlle Jean, CC, CMM, COM, CD Add to this regional tension caused by India and Pakistan possessing nuclear The Governor General of Canada warheads and delivery systems and Iran having a future similar capability—all Vice Patrons in close proximity to our Canadian commitment in . The Honourable David C. Onley, O.Ont So what are the implications for Canada and our commitment to that region? Lieutenant Governor of If al Qaeda or the Taliban did kill Bhutto, the stability of the region will be further The Honourable Dalton McGuinty, MPP The Premier of Ontario reduced. The clampdown to quell unrest may result in some of the 60,000 troops General R. J. Hillier, CMM, MSC, CD on the western border being reassigned internally rather than attempting to halt The Chief of Defence Staff His Worship David Miller the Taliban on the porous border with Afghanistan and permit the Taliban greater The Mayor of freedom of movement to conduct operations against . This coupled Officers & Directors with possible increased refugee movement across the border may impact on the LCol (ret’d) J. J. Dorfman, OMM, CD – President NATO mission. If Musharraf or his supporters had a hand in her killing, the West Maj Diane M. Kruger,CD – Vice President and Canada will have to reassess its association with Musharraf. The dilemma Lt(N) (ret’d) James P. McReynolds – Secretary Mr. John J. Ball – Treasurer for NATO and the West is that Musharraf is the only leader presently capable LCol (ret’d) James Breithaupt, KStJ, CD, QC – Director of maintaining stability in the region. Regional stability may have to trump the LCol (ret’d) Peter W. Hunter, CD – Director HCapt(N) Chris Korwin-Kuczynski – Director democratization of Pakistan. Michael Wm. Leahy, Ph.D – Director Senator Hugh Segal shares his views on the necessary parameters for the Maj (ret’d) David Mezzabotta, CD – Director LCol (ret’d) John A. Selkirk, CD – Director national security agendas pursued by democratic nations in the post-911 era and LCol (ret’d) Michael A. Stevenson, CD – Director specifically for Canadian democracy. He believes that democratic nations have Executive Director and Editor a primary duty to provide order—the basis of all freedoms - as well must also protect those who are not in a position to protect themselves and, where possible, Col (ret’d) Chris Corrigan, CD, MA should assist in bringing about improved stability and democratic governance, to Past President countries such as Afghanistan. HLCol Matthew Gaasenbeek III Dr. George Friedman posits that the endgame of the US–jihadist war always had to be played out in Pakistan because Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda com- Honoraries mand cells are located in Pakistan and the and NATO are engaged Col (ret’d) John Clarry, MBE, ED, CD, QC Honorary President in a war in Afghanistan. Any hope of defeating the Taliban, or of reaching some LCol (ret’d) Bruce W. Savage, CD sort of accommodation, depends on ending their sanctuary and logistical support Honorary Curator Mr. J. L. Granatstein, OC, FRSC from Pakistan. Dr. Desmond Morton, OC Brian MacDonald offers insight into the latest Canadian defence budget. Honorary Historian Mr. Arthur Manvell Steven Vasilevski and Kristian A. Kennedy provide an interesting analysis of Honorary Librarian the Balkans—how far the situation has progressed but also has not, especially in Chaplains The Rev Michael Bechard Kosovo. The Euro-Atlantic vision is at odds with the Russia-Serbia vision which Maj The Rev Gillian Federico, CD is complicated by the legacy of the Soviet Near-Abroad. The Rev Martin Keatings LCdr The Rev J. David Mulholland After a recent trip to , Peter Pigott, a frequent contributor on matters Capt The Rev Mark L. Sargent, CD aviation, describes the latest developments in the new Croatian Air Force and its General Manager operations that have a Canadian connection. Mr. Michael T. Jones The Defence Studies Committee is always receptive to new members. If you Director of Communications/Assistant Editor wish to pursue defence and security issues in greater depth, consider joining us. Mr. Eric S. Morse

Contributing Editor Sincerely, Prof. Sunil Ram

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Colonel (Ret’d) Chris Corrigan 426 University Avenue, Editor and Chair Defence Studies Committee Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9 416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072 Fax: 416-597-6919 Copyright © 2008 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic re- Editorial E-Mail: [email protected] search or institutional purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views Website: www.rcmi.org expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.

 SITREP National Security in a Democracy The Importance of Homeland Civility by the Hon. Hugh D. Segal, Senator

(This article is based on a presentation given by Senator Segal I cite a further example, in early 2005, when Prime on November 26, 2007 at the University Club, Toronto) Minister Tony Blair introduced a “Prevention of Terrorism” bill that included plans to allow police to detain terror suspects t is my belief that democratic nations, including Canada, for up to 90 days without charge, rather than the existing 14 have a primary duty to provide order – the basis of all days. MPs voted instead to extend the time limit to 28 days Ifreedoms. This involves the protection of their citizens, but what was most interesting was that 49 of Mr. Blair’s property and way of life from violent extremists and the ter- own Labour MPs voted against the government including 12 rorism they use. I believe as well that democratic nations, former ministers. The bill was meant to replace a previous including Canada, must also protect those who are not in anti-terrorism measure that had allowed foreign suspects to a position to protect themselves from these same threats be jailed indefinitely without trial and, not surprisingly, had world-wide and, where possible, should assist in bringing been ruled unlawful by the venerable British courts. The about improved stability and democratic governance, even normally sedate House of Lords, often a credit to second in its infancy to countries who would benefit therefrom. This chambers everywhere, then voted 249 to 119 in support of would be a nation like Afghanistan, where the threat persists an opposition Liberal Democrat amendment which modified but the people are willing and eager to move toward a life on the Labour government’s plan even further and threw out the their own terms. I still carry the picture in my mind’s eye of provision that the home secretary would have the singular the exuberant Afghanis who, for the first time in their memo- right to authorize “control orders” against suspects ranging ries and indeed in their lives, were afforded the opportunity from electronic tagging, curfews and bans on phone and In- to cast a ballot – especially the women who proudly raised ternet use to full house arrest. The Lords demanded that it be their “purple fingers” when exiting the voting stations. And impartial judges—not a Cabinet minister—who should have while national security is essential in this post 9-11 era, so the power to impose sweeping restrictions on suspects. And too is a core democratic caution. We must not move unwit- on October 31, 2007, a panel of five senior law lords, Britain’s tingly towards some anti-democratic means of instituting most senior judges, overturned part of the legislation that al- “national security” in the name of democracy protection lows intelligence-based evidence to be withheld from suspects itself. A Kafkaesque destruction of democracy to protect it and their lawyers, calling it a breach of human rights. is of no value. In Canada in the 1970s, the MacDonald Commission, The horrors of September 11th, 2001 have given the term when investigating RCMP wrongdoing, concluded that the “national security” a whole new significance that has con- purpose of ‘National Security” in a democracy is to protect founded some democracies and led, in my opinion, to some democracy itself. Our laws, our orderly markets, our safe rapid reactions that, while well-meaning and presented with communities, our social and economic progress are there the populace’s best interests in mind, can, if we lose our sense because of core democratic principles—like habeas corpus, of balance, place undue constraints on the democratic rights the presumption of innocence, the right of appeal. Where they are meant to protect. The Anti-terrorism Act introduced we must be resolute is this: we do not win the war against by Mr. Chretien in 2001 was rapidly and poorly drafted. It the forces of oppression and sectarian violence by imposing was seriously improved by the House and the Senate. constraints on our own freedoms of expression, association or religion—indeed our freedom to dissent. If we allow ourselves Hon. Hugh D. Segal, C.M., Senator, Kingston-Frontenac-Leeds is a former to fall victim to this particular kind of “excessive national Chief of Staff to the and Associate Secretary of the Ontario Cabinet, Hugh Segal is one of Canada’s better-known public security myopia” we could be, in some measure, pushing a policy experts. Since 1999, Hugh Segal has been President of the Institute world view that bin Laden himself and his followers could for Research on Public Policy of Canada and has taught at Queen’s Uni- gladly impose on all those under their control. This is, after versity Schools of Policy Studies and Business since 1993. all, the Al-Qaeda–Taliban aspiration: to subjugate individual rights in favour of a pernicious world view that would en-

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley

January - February 08  slave all diverse aspects of Islam and eliminate the modern threats seriously; what we must also ensure is that we have a and civil world. These are not our roots; this is not who we full contextual awareness of our communities. Our enhanced are! In fighting any proposed Al-Qaeda imposed totalitarian airport security does not obviate security at office towers, caliphate, the civil and civilized countries of the Islamic and department stores, shopping malls, railway stations, theatres non-Islamic world must not provide Al-Qaeda, the Mullahs and large crowd venues. We must, at the tactical and strategic of Iran or the Taliban with the satisfaction of watching their levels confront the threat of extremely violent networks di- “enemies” fearfully dilute the core rights and freedoms for rectly while all the while never diluting who we are and what which our forebearers fought and died. we believe. This balancing act is not unattainable. In June of 2005, the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer, We must stop assuming that terrorists will always choose former Chief Justice of Canada’s Supreme Court, when testi- our most fortified and security conscious venues. The attacks fying before the Subcommittee on Public Safety and National elsewhere on subways, buses, pizza parlours and nightclubs Security in relation to the three year review of the Anti-Ter- are evidence that airports, while needing of security, are not rorism Act stated: “I have observed that a popular approach the likeliest choices for those intent on doing harm and mak- to security and privacy these days, is to present them almost ing a barbaric statement. History has shown that the nihilist as mutually exclusive principles—as if it were a matter, in the will gravitate to places of maximum exposure with the least first instance, of assigning precedence to one over the other. protection. This tactic, however repugnant and loathsome, is …. this is a simplistic approach. Both are essential values of also quite predictable. Residents of countries where such ac- an open and democratic society and they must coexist. The tions are commonplace attempt valiantly to go on with their trick is to find the appropriate balance.” daily lives and routines but the terrorists seek to make “fear” From my perspective, Mr. Justice Lamer’s use of the ever-present and hope it eats away at trust, cooperation and the word “balance” is key in all manners of national security and common good. This is a terrorist’s short term goal and is most its effect on personal freedoms. It is the balanced architecture effective, achieved together instilling panic and mistrust. of civility and legitimacy that shape the order within which While the protection of borders is foremost on the freedoms thrive. The need for democratic governments to take agenda, the asymmetric nature of the terrorist threat is actu- special measures in the face of special threats is incumbent ally about the opposite of land, sea and air borders. It is about upon them as the guardians’ of real security for the people, first and foremost destroying the border between civility and their property and their lives lived without fear. In the same mayhem and between civil societies and sanity. Terrorism vein however, there is a need to distinguish between the ex- is at its best when it succeeds with surprise, in public and istential threats that menace the continuity of society versus in the open where we live, work and relax in our cities and threats that would not produce more than the existing number communities. It is these attacks that instill the fear so neces- of daily deaths from traffic accidents, fires, gang violence, or sary to the terrorist cause. While there is no means at our criminal and domestic violence. All are deplorable and tragic, disposal to perfectly anticipate and/or always prevent this but do not justify the suspension of “habeas corpus” or similar insanity, the core question is whether enhanced security of core rights. I do not mean to sound harsh or insensitive with borders obviates security at office towers, shopping malls or this statement; I simply mean that the full force of government large crowd venues generally? In London, England, during involvement in enacting laws that could, in effect, constrain the height of IRA terrorist activity, the police and security personal rights and freedoms must also consider the balance forces conducted random spot checks, wanding and metal required in both preventing actual threats and maintaining detecting for weapons or explosives, all over the city in all democracy. When a society is under threat, the decision by types of venues. Today, if such a tactic was put in place, it legislators to yield individual rights or freedoms in favour of may not wholly prevent damaging terrorist activity but at least the collective security must be made in a fair and balanced those intent on harm and destruction would feel the need to fashion and always in a temporary way. be more cautious themselves—not necessarily a deterrent but Canada has implemented all and sundry methods of se- most definitely a hindrance to their best laid plans. The hard curity screening: we employ a vast array of security measures, truth is that terrorists may put our civilian populations in their systems, people and technology to anticipate and prevent the cross hairs and no intensity of security infrastructure at our next attack. But the true terrorist front line is actually not one borders, airports or seaports can make up for the absence of of our government’s choosing. Those who blew up commut- infrastructure at vulnerable public gathering places, used on ers in Madrid or London, those who killed thousands in New both a random and strategic basis. York and Washington, those who blew up buses in Israel and The terrorist threat is not isolated to Americans or clubs in Bali are those who choose the front line. We may specific Europeans or even democratic or less rigid Islamic walk slowly through airports and stand in long lines ahead nations. This is a world-wide problem requiring world-wide of security but the harsh truth is that terrorists have not ex- cooperation. It is incumbent upon us to adequately interface clusively put only our airports, our borders and our sea lanes with, not only foreign allied intelligence and law enforcement in their cross hairs, perhaps because we take these security Continued on page 15

 SITREP Pakistan, Bhutto and the U.S.–Jihadist Endgame by George Friedman

he endgame of the U.S.-jihadist war always had to be lost interest in Afghanistan after the fall of the , played out in Pakistan. There are two reasons that but the Pakistanis did not have that option. Afghanistan was Tcould account for this. The first is simple: Osama bin right next door. An interesting thing happened at that point. Laden and the al Qaeda command cell are located in Paki- Having helped forge the mujahideen and its successor, the stan. The war cannot end while the command cell functions Taliban, the Pakistani army and ISI in turn were heavily or has a chance of regenerating. The second reason is more influenced by their Afghan clients’ values. Patron and cli- complicated. The United States and NATO are engaged in ent became allies. And this created a military force that was a war in Afghanistan. Where the Soviets lost with 300,000 extremely unreliable from the U.S. viewpoint. troops, the Americans and NATO are fighting with less than Third, Musharraf’s intentions were inherently unpredict- 50,000. Any hope of defeating the Taliban, or of reaching able. As a creature of the Pakistani army, Musharraf reflects some sort of accommodation, depends on isolating them from all of the ambivalences and tensions of that institution. His Pakistan. So long as the Taliban have sanctuary and logistical primary interest was in holding on to power. To do that, he support from Pakistan, transferring all coalition troops in Iraq needed to avoid American military action in Pakistan while to Afghanistan would have no effect. And withdrawing from simultaneously reassuring radical Islamists he was not a Afghanistan would return the situation to the status quo before mere tool of the United States. Given the complexity of his Sept. 11. If dealing with the Taliban and destroying al Qaeda position, no one could ever be certain of where Musharraf are part of any endgame, the key lies in Pakistan. stood. His position was entirely tactical, shifting as political U.S. strategy in Pakistan has been to support Pakistani necessity required. He was constantly placating the various President Pervez Musharraf and rely on him to purge and parties, but since the process of placation for the Americans shape his country’s army to the extent possible to gain its meant that he take action against the jihadists, constant inef- support in attacking al Qaeda in the North, contain Islamist fective action by Musharraf resulted. He took enough action radicals in the rest of the country and interdict supplies and to keep the Americans at bay, not enough to force his Islamist reinforcements flowing to the Taliban from Pakistan. It was enemies to take effective action against him. always understood that this strategy was triply flawed. Ever since Sept. 11, Musharraf has walked this tightrope, First, under the best of circumstances, a completely shifting his balance from one side to the other, with the pri- united and motivated Pakistani army’s ability to carry out this mary aim of not falling off the rope. This proved unsatisfac- mission effectively was doubtful. And second, the Pakistani tory to the United States, as well as to Musharraf’s Islamist army was—and is—not completely united and motivated. Not opponents. While he irritated everybody, the view from all only was it divided, one of its major divisions lay between factions—inside and outside Pakistan—was that, given the Taliban supporters sympathetic to al Qaeda and a mixed bag circumstances, Musharraf was better than the alternative. of factions with other competing interests. Distinguishing Indeed, that could have been his campaign slogan: “Vote for between who was on which side in a complex and shifting Musharraf: Everything Else is Worse.” constellation of relationships was just about impossible. That From the U.S. point of view, Musharraf and the Paki- meant the army the United States was relying on to support stani army might have been unreliable, but any alternative the U.S. mission was, from the American viewpoint, inher- imaginable would be even worse. Even if their actions were ently flawed. ineffective, some actions were taken. At the very least, they It must be remembered that the mujahideen’s war against were not acting openly and consistently against the United the Soviets in Afghanistan shaped the current Pakistani army. States. Were Musharraf and the Pakistani army to act con- Allied with the Americans and Saudis, the Pakistani army— sistently against U.S. interests as Russian logistical support and particularly its intelligence apparatus, the Inter-Services for U.S. operations in Afghanistan waned, the U.S./NATO Intelligence (ISI)—had as its mission the creation of a jihadist position in Afghanistan could simply crack. force in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. The United States Therefore, the U.S. policy in Pakistan was to do every- Dr. George Friedman is an American Political Scientist and author. He is thing possible to make certain Musharraf didn’t fall or, more the founder, chief intelligence officer and CEO of the private intelligence precisely, to make sure the Pakistani army didn’t fragment and corporation Stratfor. He has authored several books, including America’s its leadership didn’t move into direct and open opposition to Secret War, The Intelligence Edge, and The Future of War. Stratfor (www. the United States. The United States understood that the more stratfor.com) is a private intelligence company delivering in-depth analysis, it pressed Musharraf and the more he gave, the less likely assessments and forecasts on global geopolitical, economic, security and public policy issues. A variety of subscription-based access, free intel- he was to survive and the less certain became the Pakistani ligence reports and confidential consulting are available for individuals army’s cohesion. Thus, the U.S. strategy was to press for ac- and corporations. Copyright 2007 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights tion, but not to the point of destabilizing Pakistan beyond its reserved. January - February 08  natural instability. The priority was to maintain Musharraf in of gridlock, Musharraf’s position as the indispensable—if power, and failing that, to maintain the Pakistani army as a disliked—man would be strengthened. By early January, cohesive, non-Islamist force. Musharraf must have been looking forward to the elections. In all of this, there was one institution that, on the Elections would confirm his position, which was that the whole, had to support him. That was the Pakistani army. The civil institutions could not function and that the army, with Pakistani army was the one functioning national institution in or without him as official head, had to remain the center of Pakistan. For the senior leaders, it was a vehicle to maintain the Pakistani polity. their own power and position. For the lowest enlisted man, Then someone killed Benazir Bhutto and changed the the army was a means for upward mobility, an escape from entire dynamic of Pakistan. Though Bhutto’s Pakistan Peo- the grinding poverty of the slums and villages. The Pakistani ple’s Party probably would have gained a substantial number army obviously was factionalized, but no faction had an in- of seats, it was unlikely to sweep the election and seriously terest in seeing the army fragment. Their own futures were threaten the military’s hold on power. Bhutto was simply one at stake. And therefore, so long as Musharraf kept the army of the many forces competing for power. As a woman, rep- together, they would live with him. Even the less radical resenting an essentially secular party, she was unlikely to be Islamists took that view. a decisive winner. In many ways, she reminds us of Mikhail A single personality cannot maintain a balancing act like Gorbachev, who was much more admired by Westerners than this indefinitely; one of three things will happen. First, he can he ever was by Russians. She was highly visible and a factor fall off the rope and become the prisoner of one of the fac- in Pakistani politics, but if Musharraf were threatened, the tions. Second, he can lose credibility with all factions—with threat would not come from her. the basic political configuration remaining intact but with the Therefore, her murder is a mystery. It is actually a mys- system putting forth a new personality to preside. Third, he tery on two levels. First, it is not clear who did it. Second, it is can build up his power, crush the factions and start calling the not clear how the deed was done. The murder of a major politi- shots. This last is the hardest strategy, because in this case, it cal leader is always hard to unravel. Confusion reigns from would be converting a role held due to the lack of alternatives the first bullet fired in a crowd. The first account of events into a position of power. That is a long reach. always turns out to be wrong, as do the second through fifth Nevertheless, that is why Musharraf decided to declare accounts, too. That is how conspiracy theories are spawned. a state of emergency. No one was satisfied with him any Getting the facts straight in any murder is tough. Getting them longer, and pressure was building for him to “take off his uni- straight in a political assassination is even harder. Paradoxi- form”—in other words, to turn the army over to someone else cally, more people witnessing such incidents translates into and rule as a civilian. Musharraf understood that it was only a greater confusion, since everyone has a different perspective matter of time before his personal position collapsed and the and a different tale. Conspiracy theorists can have a field day army realized that, given the circumstances, the collapse of picking and choosing among confused reports by shocked Musharraf could mean the fragmentation of the army. Mushar- and untrained observers. raf therefore tried to get control of the situation by declaring Nevertheless, the confusion in this case appears to be a state of emergency and getting the military backing for it. way beyond the norm. Was there a bomber and a separate His goal was to convert the state of emergency—and taking shooter with a pistol next to her car? If this were indeed a pro- off his uniform—into a position from which to consolidate fessional job, why was the shooter inappropriately armed with his power. a pistol? Was Bhutto killed by the pistol-wielding shooter, It worked to an extent. The army backed the state of shrapnel from the bomb, a bullet from a third assassin on a emergency. No senior leader challenged him. There were no nearby building or even inside her car, or by falling after the mutinies among the troops. There was no general uprising. bomb detonated? How did the killer or killers know Bhutto He was condemned by everyone from the jihadists to the would stand up and expose herself through her armored ve- Americans, but no one took any significant action against hicle’s sunroof? Very few of the details so far make sense. him. The situation was precarious, but it appeared he might And that reflects the fact that nothing about the assassi- well emerge from the state of emergency in a politically en- nation makes sense. Who would want Bhutto dead? Musharraf hanced position. Enhanced was the best he could hope for. had little motivation. He had enemies, and she was one of He would not be able to get off the tightrope, but at the same them, but she was far from the most dangerous of them. And time, simply calling a state of emergency and not triggering killing her would threaten an election that did not threaten a massive response would enhance his position. him or his transition to a new status. Ordering her death thus Parliamentary elections were scheduled for Jan. 8 and would not have made a great deal of sense for Musharraf. are now delayed until Feb. 18. Given the fragmentation of Whoever ordered her death would have had one of Pakistani society, the most likely outcome was a highly two motives. First, they wanted to destabilize Pakistan, or fragmented parliament, one that would be hard-pressed to second, they wanted to kill her in such a way as to weaken legislate, let alone to serve as a powerbase. In the likely event Musharraf’s position by showing that the state of emergency Continued on page 16  SITREP Back to the Balkans: Contrasting Visions in an Unclaimed World by Steven Vasilievski and Kristian A. Kennedy

“After the first years of distrust, misunderstanding and tive Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership hesitation, when the first feeling of transience had passed, for Peace (PfP) program. , , and the town began to find its place in the new order of things.” are now members of the EU. –—Ivo Andric, ‘The Bridge on the Drina’ Consensus and cooperation were not always the rule. Western disunity was the cause of much tension in the early he thrusting of the explosive Kosovo question back 1990s. The Germans controversially went ahead with diplo- onto the international agenda has reminded many in matic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The US remained and North America that the Balkans remain T aloof, as then Secretary of State James Baker put it, because unfinished business. This time around Brussels and Washing- Washington did not have a ‘dog in that fight’. (Allin, D. H. ton face a very different in their efforts to reshape NATO’s Balkan Interventions) The EC, inspired by Jacques Southeastern Europe. That Time magazine declared Vladimir Poos’ declaration that the Balkan crisis signaled ‘the hour of Putin the “Person of the Year” for 2007 underscores the shift Europe,’ fruitlessly pursued diplomatic solutions to the situ- in mainstream opinion about Russia’s place in the world. The ation to a disintegrating Yugoslav federation. Washington’s Kremlin’s newfound confidence is on display in Europe – and belated alliance leadership at Dayton was the deus ex machina the NATO-oriented Balkans are no exception as Moscow’s not only for the embattled Balkans, but also for the hitherto firm support for its Serbian ally in recent Kosovo status talks uncoordinated Western response. illustrates. In NATO’s Image: Partnership and Accession The Euro-Atlantic Vision for the Balkans The PfP and accession have served as principle vehicles Since Dayton, security relations in the Balkans have through which the Alliance seeks to shape national political been shaped profoundly by the priorities of key Western and military institutions in the region. The PfP had its origins European multilateral institutions active in the region. In the in concerns that earlier mechanisms of security cooperation aftermath of the Balkan wars Western states sought to enhance and dialogue were inadequate in the face of the challenges European security via the integration of Southeastern Europe in the former Yugoslavia and Russian ‘assertiveness’ in the into the Euro-Atlantic security community and the EU. In Baltic and Caucasus regions. (Woodliffe, J. “The Evolution the Balkans, the goal of integration was pursued principally of a New NATO for a New Europe.”) Through the carrots of through the intensification of cooperative arrangements with PfP participation and Membership Action Plans, NATO has the region’s states and the accession of new member countries been able to wield significant influence over the character and and direct military involvement. scope of the external relations and military establishments in These modalities of integration have been remarkably the Balkans. (Edmunds, T., Defence Reform in Croatia and successful at embedding Balkan countries to the Euro-At- Serbia-Montenegro) Through these agreements, signatories lantic community. Following decisions taken at the NATO to the programs undertake to denationalize defence policies; summit in Riga, all the republics of the former Yugoslavia place armed forces under civilian control; and overhaul and the surrounding Balkan states have formal ties to NATO. defence planning, budgeting, and force structures. Across Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria are members of the Alli- the region, governments have introduced defence reform ance and the process of enlargement is set to advance with legislation aimed at these objectives, expunging the legacies the expected accession of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia of Pact, JNA, and Hoxhaist military cultures. These at the upcoming summit. At Riga, Bosnia, Serbia, programs in many instances resulted in a re-orientation in the and Montenegro were invited to join the Alliance’s consulta- military policies of regional states, with several now contrib- uting personnel not only to the peace support operations in Steven Vasilevski, BA (Hons), MA graduated with in political science from the . His Masters thesis, entitled “Diverging Paths, Bosnia and Kosovo, but to Afghanistan as well. Diverging Outcomes: A Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Tran- sition in the Successor States of Yugoslavia,” was published by the York Western ‘Protectorates’ Centre for International and Security Studies’ Post-Communist Studies War and instability in the Balkans and its consequences Programme. He has travelled throughout the Balkans, and is fluent in Mace- donian with a good working knowledge of Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian. for European security, from spill-over to refugee flows, prompted, in several instances, direct military intervention Kristian A. Kennedy, MSc in Theory and History of International Rela- in the region. Deployment empowered the Alliance to impact tions, London School of Economics, is a regular contributor to the Royal the distributions of power in ways that were favourable to Al- United Services Institute Transatlantic Commentary. He travelled to Bos- nia-Herzegovina on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Dayton liance goals. Military engagement has been limited in scope, Peace Accords. as in the case of the deployment of a small NATO group to

January - February 08  supervise the implementation of an assistance program in croachments in the Balkans has certainly not gone without Albania following the 1997-98 domestic crisis in that country, consequence in Russian foreign policy. For better or for the resolution of conflict in Serbia’s Presovo Valley in 2001, worse, certain dynamics of East-West relations in the Bal- or the 2001-03 weapons harvest operation in Macedonia. But kans appear to be fundamentally changing. This is in part in Bosnia and Kosovo NATO undertook major peace enforce- a function of contrasting assumptions about state power ment operations. These missions, and the larger international so that Russia promotes its foreign interests by employing trusteeships of which they were part, have been referred to traditional instruments of statecraft, while the West oper- by some observers as Western ‘protectorates’. (Allin and ates principally through multilateral institutions informed Glenny, The Balkans: , War and the Great Pow- by liberal internationalist assumptions about integration and ers, 1804-1999) The seemingly intractable interdependence. The second part of the Kosovo situation aside, however, Western equation is Russia’s growing preference trusteeship, despite all the concerns it to manipulate the intricacies of the global would breed donor dependency, is draw- free market to advance geopolitical goals, ing down. The region appears, in the rather than rely on nuclear threats and words of the former High Representative proxy wars. A few things are especially in Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown, to be moving noteworthy. First, Russia is no longer from Dayton to Brussels—that is, from the the political and economic “basket case” era of post-conflict settlement to integra- it once was – a status, which in the first tion into the EU fold. years after , limited its capac- ity to intervene in foreign relations with Russia and the West any teeth. Second, comparable global and Russia and NATO co-operate in regional pressures have endured in the several areas in the Balkans, from peace- post-Soviet period meaning Russia con- keeping to border policing to Bosnian tinues to have a vested interest in protect- defence reform. (NATO, “Russia: NATO ing its “southern flank” and projecting its Russia: A pragmatic partnership,”) Rela- power in the Mediterranean. (Eyal, J. The tions between the two regional actors are and the Balkans: Moscow’s institutionalized in the form of the NATO- Southern Flank.) Third, while the Balkan Russia Council, a forum for wide-ranging countries aspire to membership in NATO and the EU, their continued “up for grabs” consultation and consensus, and the PfP. –Kristian Kennedy However, the Alliance has not succeeded standing means Russia can conceivably in fully allaying Moscow’s concerns about The rebuilt Stari Most, Mostar make significant inroads in the region, membership enlargement and Western security engagement particularly as decisions are made on outstanding issues like in the region. The divergence in strategic perceptions is Kosovo. Now well versed in the new rules of the international evidenced in the case of Bulgaria, a country that, even after game, a reinvigorated Russia could compromise Western vi- the , maintained close ties to Russia. The country’s sions in the Balkans. NATO ambassador, Emil Valev, speaking in 2003, noted Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: that, for NATO, Bulgaria acts as a bulwark against Balkan Hydrocarbons and Gas Wars instability, a pillar on the Alliance’s southern flank, and an over-the-horizon ‘springboard’ for the Black Sea region, the Former novices to market , Russian authori- Caucasus, and Central Asia. was joining, as he put it, ties realize that real power in the post-Cold War world lies in ‘part of the real democratic shield, stretching from the Baltic the command of valuable resources and commodities. Blessed Sea to the Black Sea and from the Pyrenees to the Bosphorus’. with adequate reserves of oil and , including an (NATO, “NATO Speeches.”) Moscow’s reaction, inter alia, extensive Soviet-era network of pipelines that distributes to the anticipated construction of a NATO base in Bulgaria gas to all over Europe and Central Asia, Russia’s Balkan underlines just how differently the Kremlin perceives security policy is to adjust oil prices and transit routes to swing the interests on its periphery. Where Brussels sees an expanding geopolitical pendulum eastward. This policy tool, known as ‘zone of peace and stability,’ Moscow sees the expansion of a energy diplomacy, is the single most important method by provocative collective defence system in its ‘near-abroad’. which Russia has tried to reestablish a permanent presence in the region. And there is a considerable potential to do this. Contrasting Visions: The Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe Programme Toward a Russian Sphere of Influence (2003) reports that Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Russia and the West do indeed cooperate on many Macedonia are all nearly totally reliant on overland oil imports fronts, but the perceived provocative nature of Western en- from Russia, while Romania and Bulgaria increasingly import

 SITREP Russian energy supplies, to the tune of 70 percent of total pro- American troops throughout the country that same year. (Sofia visions in the latter case. Recognizing Albania’s “progressive Echo. “US bases in Bulgaria despite public disapproval.”) growing need for energy,” Russia is an active supporter of The Struggle for Markets: the Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil Pipeline (AMBO), Deepening Russo-Balkan Trade (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe. INOGATE Oil and Gas Directory 2003-2004.) while Russian gas imports There is certainly an economic dynamic to oil and gas, to Greece are set to double through to 2040. (Smolchenko, and Russia is adept at that game too. The Balkans’ energy reli- A. “Putin Says Gas To Greece Will Double.”) Russian com- ance has translated into millions for Russia’s state-controlled panies also remain leading contenders for the privatization oil conglomerates like Lukoil and the aforementioned Gaz- several entities throughout the region. prom. And as renewed gas wars get settled in the Kremlin’s The Balkans has become doubly important for Russia favour, profits will continue to grow. These occurrences as it seeks to substantially reduce, or altogether eliminate, the should not be viewed in isolation, however, and oil is not the strategic significance of Soviet-era “transit countries” through only sector in which Russia is interested. Indeed, challenging which Russian oil and gas continue to be funneled to the rest NATO to establish a sphere of influence in the Balkans also of Europe. In this vein, Kestutis Budrys argues that the goal involves engaging with the West in a struggle for markets. Ac- of Russia’s projected “North European Gas Pipeline,” which cording to Russia expert Sergei Plekhanov, this is indicative of will bypass and the by running along the a renewed focus on “achieving successful integration into the bottom of the Baltic Sea, is to form a direct energy route to global economy, and a revival of Russia’s national economy Germany without involving former Soviet allies. (Budrys, on a capitalist basis. This orientation is underpinned by the K. At the Crossroads of Pipelines and Interests: The Factors interests of Russia’s post-communist elites, determined to of Energy Security in ) New pipelines in the secure and enhance their gains of the past decade, and to seek Balkans would similarly present Russia with the opportunity business opportunities in every part of the world.” (Plekhanov, to bypass the Turkish-controlled Bosphorus Straits, thereby S. “Market Geopolitics: Continuity and Change in Russian sidestepping a valued NATO member in the region, and give Foreign Policy”) As well as securing the country’s borders Russian oil interests alternative access to the Mediterranean from external threats, Russia is keen on turning in a profit in Sea via Croatia’s Adriatic coast. Tellingly, Russia has increas- the Balkans. This is significant for both Russia and the West ingly preferred doing business with non-NATO members or since, historically, Russia expressed only a weak interest in Greece (a NATO member-state that disapproves of American developing profitable economic relationships, most visible in foreign policy as late), as Putin’s personal involvement in the USSR’s long-dormant and generally ineffective Council plans for a Thessaloniki-Skopje-Nish-Prishtina pipeline easily for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). attests. (Bugajski) Budrys concludes that the “key purpose” of Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has sought Russia’s energy incursions “is to integrate…Eastern Europe to intensify its trade relations with the Balkan countries in into Russia’s energy system; to be more clear—to keep the various sectors. Facilitating this has been a pervasive free region in post-soviet energy system.” market context that has allowed Russia to explore economic Having turned to the West since the fall of the Soviet arrangements that were once too politically costly. To il- Union, many of Moscow’s former junior partners have also lustrate, consider Soviet economic relations with Socialist felt the wrath of Russia’s so-called “gas war” strategy. Yugoslavia and the Hellenic Republic at the height of the is perhaps the best example, whose gas war with Russia drew Cold War. While Moscow sought to increase economic co- international attention when energy giant Gazprom demanded operation with Belgrade and Greece, particularly in the 1970s Ukraine pay more for Russian gas following its election of a and 1980s, (Bekich, D. “Soviet Goals in Yugoslavia and the pro-Western government in 2006. This caused gas in Balkans.”) the possibilities were limited. Yugoslavia, for Europe since Ukraine is another former Soviet satellite which one, could not afford to get too cozy with the Soviet Union pipes Russian gas to the West. The Balkans has not been im- when so much of its existence – both political and economic mune to this shrewd strategy, and Bulgaria is a case in point. – depended on Western, namely American, diplomatic and Traditionally Moscow’s most loyal subject in the Balkans, financial support. Trade prospects with Greece were similarly Sofia has since been on the receiving end of several Russian constrained due to its membership in NATO and the Marshall price increases. During the winter of 2006, Bulgaria’s Energy Plan. However, regional and international settings have since Ministry engaged in intense negotiations to get Gazprom to changed, allowing for enhanced economic cooperation and, rescind its demand that his country pay 40 percent more for indeed, integration. natural gas. (Sofia Echo. “Bulgaria’s Gazprom Saga.”) As Russian influence continues to penetrate the Balkans as with Ukraine, the Bulgarian price wars can be seen as pun- several privatization and trade efforts unfold. Croatia’s and ishment for Sofia’s cooperation with the West, particularly Slovenia’s trade relations with Russia have reached hundreds with Washington, which concluded an agreement to station of millions since the mid-and-late-1990s. Trade networks Continued on page 14

January - February 08  Waiting for Defence Budget 2008-09 by Col (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald

Background Estimates, the Supplementary Estimates can be found in the Treasury Board website. here are usually six documents which DND Budget The last document is the Departmental Performance analysts have to pore through in order to figure out the Report, which is the final accounting in detail of where the Canadian Defence Budget. T money was spent and the actual total spent. It is the defini- The first is the Budget, which details in broad the in- tive historical document. It comes even later, usually around tention of the Government spending plan over a five year November of the following year. It too can be found in the timeframe, with greater detail for the nearer years. It normally Reports and Publications area of the VCDS Executive section appears around the middle of March of the DND website The second is the “Main Estimates,” which has a one- year timeframe, covering the following Fiscal Year (FY). It The Big Picture: the Martin/Harper will normally include the current year figures for compara- Five-Year Defence Budget Plan tive purposes. In previous years the Main Estimates usually We are now coming, in Fiscal-Year 2008/09, into year appeared following the Budget speech, in many cases quite three of a five year planned expansion of the Canadian Defence closely. In 2006, and again in 2007, however, the Main Esti- Budget. The expan- mates appeared be- sion was begun un- fore the Budget Year Base- Liberal Conser- Total Total der the short-lived Speech. These can line increase vative increase Budget Liberal government be found on the increase of , Treasury Board ($ bn) ($ bn) ($ bn) ($ bn) ($ bn) and increased by website. Baseline 14.6 - - - 14.6 Stephen Harper’s The third doc- Year 2005- current Conserva- ument is the “Re- 06 tive goverenment port on Plans and FY 2006/07 14.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 15.2 as part of their Priorities” which FY 2007/08 14.6 1.2 0.7 1.9 16.5 “Canada First De- breaks out the fence Plan”. Both planned spending FY 2008/11 43.8 10.9 4.2 15.1 58.9 (3 years) are shown in Table in much finer de- One. tail and uses a three Table 1: The Canada First Defence Plan Paul Martin’s year expenditure government wasn’t forecasting. It normally appears after the publication of the in power long enough to actually implement the plan, but In Budget and the Main Estimates. This document can be found the FY 2006/07 Budget the Conservatives delivered on their on the DND website in the Reports and Publications portion promise to “top up” the Liberal plan, and the defence budget of the VCDS section. presented in the Main Estimates for that year amounted to The fourth and fifth documents are the “Supplemen- $15.2 billion dollars. tary Estimates” which provide spending authorities to cope However, during the course of the year the Tories made with items which were not included in the Main Estimates. additional allocations of $700 million dollars through the It uses the same one year timeframe as the Main Estimates, Supplementary Estimates process, with the result that the which it, in effect, amends. It will normally appear later than actual defence budget for that year amounted to $15.9 billions, the RPP. Supplementary (A) usually appears in December, rather than the originally planned $15.2 billion. and Supplementary (B), which is usually a “housekeeping” “We’ll see your $15.2 billions—and raise you $700 or “cleanup” document shifting relatively minor amounts million more!” around appears in the February timeframe. As with the Main Budget 2007-08

Col (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald, a prominent defence analyst and media The 2007 Budget announced only a few minor additions commentator, is currently the Senior Defence Analyst of the Conference to the Defence Budget for 2007/08 and moved some minor of Defence Associations/Conference of Defence Associations Institute. He sums from the future years of the Five Year Plan into the has been Acting Executive Director and Chair of Defence Studies of the RCMI, President of the Atlantic Council of Canada, the first Executive current year. Still, that was sufficient to bring up the Defence Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and Commander Budget for FY2007/08 to $16.8 billion, pretty close to the of Toronto Militia District.

10 SITREP Five Year Plan figure of $16.9 billion. As the old adage says: As the year unfolds any temporary allocations to cover “Close enough for government work.” unexpected needs which would be made by Supplementary However, the real surprise came in the Supplementary Estimates would be included in this section. Estimates (A) of 2007, which, as with the 2006 Supplementary The third, and largest, figure is really an accounting Estimates, make a significant addition to the Defence Bud- figure which captures the notional costs of unpaid services get—in this case a sum of $1.6 billion, which when added provided from other government departments. This figure is to the $16.8 billion provided in the Main Estimates, brought closest to that used for NATO reporting. the actual defence budget for 2007/8 to $18.4 billion. For most analytic purposes, however, the first two fig- Supplementary Estimates (B) for FY2007/08 proved ures are satisfactory. to be, as expected, a “housekeeping” document and made So What’s in the Cards for Defence Budget 2008-09? no significant addition to that provided in Supplementary Estimates (A) The original Five Year Plan presented by Paul Martin This second year of the Conservatives being “Defence and expanded by Stephen Harper didn’t break out specific Budget Overachievers” led the widely used “Military Ex- Defence Budget figures for Years 3, 4, and 5 of the Plan. In- penditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product” or stead it lumped them all together in a figure of $58.9 billion ME/GDP figure to rise from 1.2% to 1.3%, using the NATO over the three-year period—which would be an average of definition. $19.6 billion per year. That, in turn, meant that we were no longer subject We can find some of the missing information in to the catcalls of defence commentators that our defence the FY2007/08 which contains a four year set of finan- commitment cial numbers: was greater Main Adjustments Planned Original Five Year forecast for FY only than that Estimates Spending Plan Spending 2006/07, and o f I c e l a n d Planned planned for FY and the Grand Spending 2007/08, FY Duchy of Lux- 2006/07 $14.79 $1.12 $15.91 $15.20 2008/09, and embourg! 2007/08 $16.88 $0.96 $17.84 $16.50 FY2009/10. We could, 2008/09 $18.23 $0.63 $18.86 $58.9/3? The following table shows instead, 2009/10 $18.23 0.82 $19.05 $58.9/3? point out that those forecast that we have Table 2: Defence Budget 2008–09 and planning moved up the figures, as well table, with our ME/GDP now passing Belgium (1.1%) as the originally planned figures in the Liberal/Conservative Five Year plan. and Spain (1.2%), and drawing even with Denmark Particularly cunning and attentive readers will have (1.3) and Germany (1.3%). noticed that the Main Estimates figure for 2010/11 actually Cracking the Budget Code shows a tiny decrease from the previous year—not an en- couraging sign. Particularly cunning readers, who like crossword and The current “Best Forecast” for the upcoming budget sudoko puzzles and reading Defence Main and Supplemen- would be a Main Estimates figure of $18.233 billion plus tary Estimates documents, quickly notice that there are three “planned adjustments of 630 million for a total budget of different walnut shells in play, titled “Total Main Estimates $18.863 billion—comfortably within the Five-Year Plan Planned Spending,” “Total Planned Spending,” and “Total figure of $58.9/ billion or $19.6 billion. However, the fact Departmental Spending,” each with a different sized pea that the increase in the “Main Estimates Planned Spending” underneath it. line seems to have stalled with the 2008/9 figure leaves us When we look, for example, at the 2007/8 DND Report watching the March budget with particular suspicion. on Plans and Priorities for 2007/08, we find a three-year After all, Cinderella’s coach has turned into a pumpkin forecast. Each annual column begins with a planned Main before!” Estimates number, titled “Total Main Estimates Planned Spending,” another titled “Total Planned Spending,” and a The views expressed are emphatically those of the third titled Total Departmental Spending.” (Table Two) author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the The second, and larger, figure includes allocations which Institute or its members. are of a fixed, specific duration, such as the Strategic Capital Investments announced in Budget 2006. These were not a permanent allocation which would have been rolled into the Main Estimates on a permanent basis. January - February 08 11 The Croatian Air Force Today by Peter Pigott

emounik air base sprawls on the outskirts of the Yugoslavia. In June 1991 because the Croatians had no air Croatian resort city of Zadar. Officially called the 93rd defence against the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Air Force, they ZRudolf Peresin Air Force Base, it is set in a forest of requisitioned Piper Cubs and UTVA-75 light aircraft from beech trees, with utilitarian buildings and discarded weapons flying clubs and crop-spraying companies and pressed them of earlier wars—a Yugoslav Air Force MiG-21, a SAM into service as bombers. So desperate was the need that an battery and rusting Soviet-built vehicles. But while Zemounik old Augusta-Bell 47 was even taken from the Zagreb Techni- might look sleepy in the blazing summer sun, ever present cal Museum and restored to flying condition. Flown mainly are the tensions of conflicts old and new. In the summer of in medevac and observation roles, sometimes equipped with 2007, the enemy are raging forest improvised bombs or rockets, the fires and for Croatians, the yellow little aircraft were no match for Canadair CL-415 water bombers Yugolsav SAM batteries and suf- were the contemporary saviors of fered accordingly. their country. But by November 1994, Through the hottest summer despite the United Nations arms that the eastern Mediterranean has embargo, the Croatian Air Force seen, the chorus of chirping crickets was operating MiG -21s in combat on the base was rivaled by continu- sorties. These had been delivered ous roar of Pratt & Whitney Can- by defectors like Cdr. Rudolf ada engines as water bombers and Peresin, the first Croatian pilot to AT-802 Air Tractors continuously defect from the Yugoslav Air Force lifted off to battle the forest fires that with his MiG-21. At the same time, threatened to destroy the Croatian troop and ground support were countryside and especially the his- provided by Mi-8s and Mi-24 toric city of Dubrovnik. Canada is helicopters bought from friendly well regarded here, not only because former Soviet countries. With the of the Canadair water bombers but Dayton Peace Accord of Novem- because the Presidential aircraft is a ber 1995, the arms embargo was Canadair executive jet and also a sur- lifted and Croatia began to acquire prising number of Croatian air force modern aircraft like the Bell 206 personnel have family in Canada. helicopter and Pilatus PC-9 and The Croatian Air Force and the few surviving UTVA-75s were Defence or Hrvatsko ratno zra- –Peter Piggott disarmed and returned to pilot koplovstvo i protuzracna obrana Top: Croatia’s eight Mig-21bis were upgraded training. (shortened to HRZ,) is a branch of last year by the Romanian Aerostar Co. Today, on the threshold of the Armed Forces of the Republic of expansion and with the goal of Croatia. It is tasked with: inspection Bottom: Two of the Canadair CL-415 water joining NATO soon, the Croatian and control of Croatian air space, bombers in Croatian service Air Force has been modernized over land and sea; providing help in and made interoperable with natural, humanitarian and technological disasters; and, search Western air forces. The eight MiG-21bisD and four MiG- and rescue operations 21UMD fighters have been upgraded by the Romanian Younger than its pilots and ground crew, the HRZ Aerostar company in 2003 at a cost of 8.5 million USD. Of was born in what is called the War of Independence from the transport fleet, 10 Mi-8 MTV-1 and 2 An-32B fixed wing transports were sent to Russia and Ukraine for overhaul the Peter Pigott began writing about aviation when he was 10 years old and same year. has not stopped since. Canada’s most successful aviation author, he re- cently visited the Croatian Air Force. Surviving several postings with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Pigott has flown in an AWACS Sentry over a ­The Croatian Air Force bases are: classified location. Next year, his “Crossings: The History of the Canadian Pacific Shipping Line “ will be launched. The author wishes to thank the Divulje: 15 km (9 miles) north of Split on the Dalmatian many aircrew of escorted him around Zemounik Air Base, taking time from coast. Home of the HRZ maritime support unit. their operational duties to do so.

12 SITREP Lucko: Located just southwest of Zagreb. Used by the heli- Fire Fighting copter unit 28 ETH. Pleso: south east of Zagreb. A major HRZ base with fighter, ­As with most other countries on the Mediterranean, the transport and VIP units based here. Croatian Air Force relies on the Canadair water bombers, Pula: on the west coast of the Istrian Peninsula, Home of the both the CL-215 and CL-415 to fight fires. Once operated by second HRZ fighter Squadron. the Ministry of Interior, the water bombers were transferred Rijeka: Civil airport on the northern tip of the island of Krk to the Air Force and with the AT -802s are also based at Ze- on the northern Dalmatian coast, opposite the city of Rijeka. mounik. So well known are the Canadair water bombers for Minor base with no permanently based HRZ flying units. bringing relief that one is depicted in an advertisement for an Varazdin: located 2.1 miles (3.4 km) from the city of Varaz- antacid: “To prevent that burning feeling, try *****—soothes din in North West Croatia. Minor base with no permanently like a CL-415.” But with the forest fire season increasing in based HRZ flying units. intensity each year, water bucket equipped Mi-8s have also Zemounik:. Located just east of Zadar (Zara) on Croatia’s joined the squadron. All aircraft are detached to various lo- Dalmatian coast. Home of the HRZ cations in the country, especially flying training units and the Fire- in the summertime when detach- Fighting Squadron ments of Mi-8s are based at Pula and CL-415s and AT-802s in Current status Dubrovnik. Even before the dis- Fighter Aircraft: MIG-21 BIS (20), astrous summer of 2007 when the MIG-21 UM (4) water bombers were constantly in Fire fighting:CL-415 (3), the air, Zagreb decided to buy two CL-215 (2), AT-802 (2), more Canadair CL-415s and 3 Air PA-31P (1), Tractor AT-802s. Both types will Trainer aircraft: UTVA -75 (11), enter service by next summer to PC-9 (22) be augmented by a dozen Mi-8s Transport aircraft: AN-2 (3), AN- better equipped for firebombing 32 (2) duties. By 2008, Croatia will Training helicopters: BELL-206 (8) have the biggest firefighting fleet Combat helicopters: MI-24 V (7), in Europe. MI-24 D (2)—now Future Plans for sale. Transport helicopters: MI-8 MTV-1 Last year, the Croatian (13), MI-8 S (4), government sent a proposal to MI-8 (2) parliament concerning the de- –Peter Piggott velopment of the nation’s armed But for the public, the most vis- Top: The first of 10 new Mi-17 transport forces between 2006 and 2015, ible sights of the HRZ are its national helicopters was delivered last year. detailing procurement of more aerobatic team Krila oluje (Wings of modern aircraft and organiza- Storm) stationed at Zemounik. Mak- Bottom: Croatia still maintains two An-32s tional reform. The government ing their debut at the Knin air show but is looking to replace them soon, possibly plans to modernize the entire with the C-27J Spartan. on December 9, 2005, to celebrate the Armed Forces by 2015 at a 14th anniversary of the founding of the Croatian Air Force, the cost of 2.7 billion USD, earmarking 470 million USD to be Wings of Storm pilots fly six nimble Pilatus PC-9M turboprop spent on the Croatian Air Force in the form of new fighters, trainers. Within the team’s ranks is Captain Dijana Doboš, transport helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Zagreb wants one of only 4 female pilots in the world that are members of to field a smaller, more professional military by 2015, with a national military aerobatic group. NATO-compatible equipment and command structures of Familiar at air shows and celebrations in Croatia and up to 26,000 personnel, including civilian staff and reserves. throughout Europe, the pilots of the Wings of Storm credit This force will enable Croatia to increase its involvement much of their success to the Pilatus PC-9M. They are a “de- in international peacekeeping operations and to achieve full lightful aircraft to fly” said Lt. Ivan Lukan, “Very fast, very NATO membership. maneuverable, very forgiving.” First on the shopping list is to select by 2009 a replace- ment for the venerable MiG 21s. Lead contenders for the 12-aircraft requirement are the Gripen International-promoted Saab Gripen and refurbished Lockheed Martin F-16s, with

January - February 08 13 Croatian — Continued from page 13 Balkans — Continued from page 9 the selected type to be fully operational by 2015. Gripen between Russia and Serbia-Montenegro deepened during the International is on a role in the region with the type’s earlier tenure of Slobodan Milosevic, and have continued to deepen selection by the and and the com- since his ousting in 2000. Macedonia has enjoyed preferential pany demonstrated its fighter to Croatian officials last year. customs treatment by Moscow, which has sought to expand its To support the new fighter procurement, four basic trainers influence in the development of transport infrastructure and are to be acquired by late 2007 to replace the UTVA 75s the modernization of Macedonia’s hydro, steam, and electric basic trainers at the air force academy in Zadar. At present power facilities. Russia-Albania trade has steadily devel- to make the progression to jets, Croatian pilots train in the oped with major cooperation agreements recently initialed. Czech Republic on Zlins. (Bugajski) Russian goods constitute 8.3 percent of Romania’s Early this year, Croatia’s helicopter force began to total imports, behind only Italy and Germany respectively, receive the first of 10 new Mi-17 transport helicopters with while Moscow remains Bulgaria’s third largest import part- the planned modernization of two Mi-8MTV1s scheduled ner at 7.9 percent. (Central Intelligence Agency. “CIA World for 2008. The seven unserviceable Mi-24 assault helicopters Factbook.”) Last, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been put up for sale with one reserved for a museum. reports that trade relations between Russia and the Hellenic The second stage of an Antonov An-32B upgrade is scheduled Republic “amounted to $3.178 billion in 2004,” while “Rus- for completion in 2008 with new cargo aircraft to be bought sian records show that there are 130 registered Greek-Russian after 2010 to augment them. The type isn’t known yet but joint ventures, active mainly in trade, agriculture, industry, speculation is that it will most probably it will be either C-27J services, tourism, construction, energy, transport, and technol- or C-130J Hercules. Also shopping for aircraft is the Croatian ogy.” (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Bilateral relations Navy- Croatia has a long coastline to defend and without an between Greece and Russia.”) This is a significant departure ASW role aircraft, the Navy relies on Mi-8 helicopters which from the single Mutual Trade Agreement negotiated by Mos- are unsuited for the role. It has been approached by the Span- cow and Athens some 30 years ago. (Bekich) ish CASA to buy its aircraft. Conclusion: Will the West Prevail? An example to other former Yugoslav states, within a few short years, Croatia has modernized its air force, ready Russia’s stubbornness at the Kosovo negotiating table is to join NATO.  indeed a reflection of a newfound confidence—one backed by very real geo-strategic gains in the Balkans. The Kremlin has The views expressed are those of the author and do used other, less effective means to try to tip Balkan scales in its not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute favour, like party financing and the tacit (at times not so tacit) approval of arms to governments, such as Macedonia’s during a 2001 Albanian insurgency. The important question is to what extent the West is willing to go to foster security and prosperity in the highly strategic “Western Balkans.” Remember, while most of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Albania aspire to NATO, most of these states also share important ideological, cultural and historical linkages with Russia, and one need not go further than Putin’s ongoing efforts toward union with Be- larus to see how effectively these can be exploited in the foreign Sitrep Needs Young Writers policy realm. As it is, there are two possible outcomes for the Balkans. The first is a Balkans that is given its rightful seat in Sitrep, the journal of the Royal Canadian Military Western security structures. The second scenario involves a Institute, is looking for contributions from young Balkan region that is absorbed into a Russian security zone by Canadian scholars at graduate level in a defence, means of energy and markets, and possibly the ensuing fallout strategic studies or international relations program of Kosovo and other matters where Russia finds the ideological at home or abroad. Submissions should be 2500 - and cultural leverage to win over many friends. The stage for 3500 words in length, on themes related to defence this spring’s NATO Summit in Bucharest is set; for now, the  policy, international military involvement, or stra- Balkans and Russia wait. tegic issues. Submissions may be edited for length The views expressed are those of the author and do not or style. necessarily reflect the views of the Institute Please send submissions to C. J. Corrigan, Edi- or its members. tor, Sitrep, at [email protected].

14 SITREP Security — Continued from page 4 Canada. Its preamble asserted that the Canadian nation was founded upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of agencies, but we must take a proactive approach with our own God, the dignity and worth of the human person and the posi- protection activities and ensure that CSIS, the RCMP, mili- tion of the family in a society of free men and free institutions; tary intelligence and law enforcement cooperate and provide and that we only remain free when freedom is founded upon information to each other. This can only be accomplished respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law; with adequate and accountable oversight. We must ensure and that without discrimination by reason of race, national that there are democratic oversight mechanisms that include origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and internal checks and balances, and that they apply to all security freedoms shall and do exist – the right to life, liberty, security agencies. Where possible, these oversight mechanisms and of the person, enjoyment of property and the right not to be processes should be legislated and not be a Deputy Minister deprived thereof except by the due process of law; the right policy initiative to be implemented by an over burdened and to equality before the law and the protection of the law; the ever-changing bureaucracy. The totality of new and existing freedom of religion, of speech, of assembly and association oversight mechanisms should be coordinated and integrated and freedom of the press. This came after we learned of John at the highest levels of government. Diefenbaker’s refusal to support the banning of communism This government has proposed in the past, and should in Canada, despite what totalitarian Communists had done now consider, putting in place a joint, high level parliamentary to Eastern Europe and tried in Korea; after we had seen the oversight mechanism, with security cleared parliamentarians imprisonment of Japanese Canadians because of who they from both Houses. Multiple defence, foreign policy, special were and not what they had done. anti-terrorism committees are wasteful of time, uncoordinated Mr. bin Laden, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Mahmoud Ah- and individually understaffed. One coherent, well-led com- madinejad do not give a damn about the Bill of Rights, Magna mittee with active sub-committees should oversee CSIS, the Carta, habeas corpus or freedom of religion; they would RCMP, military intelligence, and immigration intelligence not know or care about who was or how coordination. This should parallel what we hope is coordi- ‘prairie populism’ made Canada a more open or free society. nated direction via the Privy Council Office. But we do, and we must. Because the ultimate victory against Let us keep perspective here. Terrorists are a dangerous, the totalitarian—and the most effective weapon—whether but tiny minority. There are more than one billion Muslims the forces of darkness march across Europe in jackboots by on the planet, and those who are terrorists are statistically the thousands, enslaved millions through the Red Army and insignificant. Islam is no enemy of the world we are all trying the oppressive Soviet curtain of iron or sent furtive bands of to build – Muslims, Christians, Jews, atheists, Hindus and extreme explosives and terrorist cells to gnaw at our civility the rest are part of a world reality and Canadian population or deploy trained insurgents against Afghan democracy and who must never be presumed guilty because of their faith or its Canadian and NATO defenders, is always the same. lack of faith. Bin Laden would love for essentially Christian The freedom to dissent, the will to respect minorities, or non-sectarian societies to target Muslims. We must not the courage to put the rule of law and our individual equality fall into that sinister and simplistic trap. It is not who we are. before all is at the core of our democracy. These are not ne- Instead we must confound the forces of darkness by keeping gotiable. They are who we are—these freedoms, the diversity our balance, protecting our core freedoms and using drill and tolerance they reflect—are the coiled steel responses to down competence rather than fear and over-reaction. the terrorist threat. And these are at the centre of the home- th Terrorism was not invented on September 11 and let’s land civility and decency that inspire our security forces to not forget - security is, in and of itself, a human right. Our leave no technical, intellectual, intelligence or tactical stone legislators are charged with providing security and protecting unturned or unexplored in defence of the very freedoms that human rights. As stated earlier, we must never allow ourselves protect us all. We are better, and our societies will prevail to opt for security “at all costs” when one of the costs might because we treat people with the respect that terrorists hate; be the undue infringement of human rights. Security at the we offer fairness where they offer death. We offer the security cost of inconvenience – bag checks, wanding, metal detectors of democracy where they offer the endless fear of totalitarian in airports, border crossings, and I believe in public venues excess. We cannot beat them by becoming more like them. on a random basis – is inconvenient but, in my view, neces- We will beat them by being better than them. Being better sary. But we must differentiate between inconvenience and means being more free. And the balance between freedom the violation of core constitutional rights. We must not allow and security must never lose sight of that core civility that the terrorist threats to so consume us and our national security sets us apart. agenda that we find ourselves mired in the same intolerant, Others choose “Homeland Security” to reflect these totalitarian sterility of those we wish to repel. efforts. We must choose “Homeland Civility” and defend it In August of 1960, Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II with every legal, technical, policing, intelligence and military assented to the Canadian Bill of Rights; proposed by the gov- ernment of Mr. Diefenbaker and passed by the Parliament of Continued on page 16 January - February 08 15 Pakistan — Continued from page 6 Our first suspect is al Qaeda sympathizers who would had failed. The jihadists certainly had every reason to want benefit from the confusion spawned by the killing of an im- to kill her—along with a long list of Pakistani politicians, portant political leader. The more allegations of complicity including Musharraf. They want to destabilize Pakistan, but in the killing are thrown against the regime, the more the if they can do so and implicate Musharraf at the same time, military regime is destabilized—thus expanding opportunities so much the sweeter. for jihadists to sow even more instability. Our second suspects The loser in the assassination was Musharraf. He is are elements in the army wanting to use the assassination to probably too canny a politician to have planned the killing force Musharraf out, replace him with a new personality and without anticipating this outcome. Whoever did this wanted to justify a massive crackdown. do more than kill Bhutto. They wanted to derail Musharraf’s Two parties we cannot imagine as suspects in the kill- attempt to retain his control over the government. This was ing are the United States and Musharraf; neither benefited a complex operation designed to create confusion. from the killing. Musharraf now faces the political abyss and the United States faces the destabilization of Pakistan as the Taliban is splintering and various jihadist leaders are Letters to Sitrep fragmenting. This is the last moment the United States would choose to destabilize Pakistan. Our best guess is that the kill- I applaud Eric Morse’s concern for the Afghani who are now ing was al Qaeda doing what it does best. The theory that it serving as a National Police, paid by Canada. His logic that was anti-Musharraf elements in the army comes in at a very we have entered a relationship that is, “Much more solemn, distant second. much more personal and much more lasting”, than is the cus- But the United States now faces its endgame under tom in Canada is acknowledged. With this arrangement, we far less than ideal conditions. Iraq is stabilizing. That might have accepted a social contract in perpetuity to be responsible reverse, but for now it is stabilizing. The Taliban is strong, for these hirelings which may extend as far as immigration but it is under pressure and has serious internal problems. priority, he states. The endgame always was supposed to come in Pakistan, but On the basis of having lived and worked in Afghanistan, this is far from how the Americans wanted to play it out. The shared meals, sorrow and many happy moments with these United States is not going to get an aggressive, anti-Islamist wonderful people, I suggest that Morse is guilty of the Western cultural trait of paternalism and patronization. military in Pakistan, but it badly needs more than a Pakistani The employment of an Afghani is not a social contract. military that is half-heartedly and tenuously committed to It’s a cash for services, which frequently ends with a better the fight. Salvaging Musharraf is getting harder with each offer, as has been witnessed by returning lecturers at the passing day. So that means that a new personality, such as RCMI. Money does not buy loyalty or recognition of the Pakistani military chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, must become employers’ over-arching aims, which are usually beyond the Washington’s new man in Pakistan. In this endgame, all that ken of the locals. the Americans want is the status quo in Pakistan. It is all they Morse acknowledges that this is tribal society, which has can get. And given the way U.S. luck is running, they might not developed a concept of a state which places the overall not even get that. good above the local desires. He ignores the history that these tribes have endured against the British, Russian and other The views expressed are those of the author and do not transient collosi and have been capable of establishing the necessarily reflect the views of the Institute state they desire, without any social contract. or its members.

—Charles Godfrey

Eric Morse responds: While it is true that personal relation- Security — Continued from page 15 ships are more important in traditional societies , the point of tool at our disposal. Hong Kong to Vimy, to Juno, to Dieppe, the article was not quite so Afghan-specific. When any army to Kandahar province have seen 114,000 Canadian war dead gets into a relationship with the local population, especially over the decades. They died so we can have these freedoms. where there is unresolved conflict, moral obligations follow, We must not, in face of new dangers, forget why they died on the premise that anyone who has hitched their star to a – or what we owe all of them who fought and sacrificed. foreign presence runs the very high risk of being treated as No terrorist networks tied to a chap likely hiding in a cave a collaborator. Money indeed does not buy loyalty, but hav- should dilute our commitment to protecting the freedoms of ing accepted it can become a potentially lethal stigma after Canadians as we protect Canadians themselves.  the event. The views expressed are those of the author and do not Letters from readers about Sitrep articles are welcomed. necessarily reflect the views of the Institute Authors will be invited to respond. Brevity is encouraged. or its members.

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