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George Kennan and Paul Nitze Confront the Bomb

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George Kennan and Paul Nitze Confront the Bomb Weighing Capabilities and Intentions: George Kennan and Paul Nitze Confront the Bomb A thesis presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Art Luke Griffith August 2012 © 2012 Luke Griffith. All Rights Reserved. 2 This thesis titled Weighing Capabilities and Intentions: George Kennan and Paul Nitze Confront the Bomb by LUKE GRIFFITH has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by Chester Pach Associate Professor of History Howard Dewald Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3 ABSTRACT GRIFFITH, LUKE, M.A., August 2012, History Weighing Capabilities and Intentions: George Kennan and Paul Nitze Confront the Bomb Director of Thesis: Chester Pach While countless historians have studied George Kennan and Paul Nitze, there has yet to be a comprehensive account of Kennan and Nitze’s views on nuclear weapons throughout the Truman administration. Prior to the Soviet atomic test in 1949, Kennan and Nitze worked in tandem to preserve the U.S. atomic monopoly and to build a potent retaliatory nuclear arsenal. Kennan and Nitze also rejected the notion that the Truman administration could negotiate an international atomic energy agreement. In the wake of the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb, however, Kennan and Nitze fundamentally disagreed over the bomb’s role in U.S. security policies. Contrary to his previous analysis, Kennan advocated a strategy of minimal deterrence and a “declaratory policy” of non-American first use. Nitze, though, supported efforts to retain U.S. nuclear superiority and to initiate a massive buildup of U.S. conventional strength. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates that Nitze, not Kennan, shaped the Truman administration’s approach to U.S.-Soviet atomic energy negotiations, U.S. military strategy, and U.S. nuclear policy throughout the final years of Truman’s presidency. Approved: _____________________________________________________________ Chester Pach Associate Professor of History 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter One: Maintaining America’s “Preponderance of Strength” ................................ 17 Chapter Two: “Drifting Toward a Morbid Preoccupation” with Soviet Capabilities ...... 57 Chapter Three: Frustrating the “Kremlin’s Design” ....................................................... 115 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 159 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 168 5 INTRODUCTION On September 3, 1949, an American B-29 took off from Japan and headed north toward the Kamchatka Peninsula. The U.S. Air Force had patrolled the area throughout 1949, as it was downwind of the suspected location of the Soviet Union’s atomic test site in Siberia. The plane was equipped with “sensitive instruments using specially treated filter paper to pick up any radioactive dust,” and on September 3, the pilot detected an abnormally high amount of radioactive particles.1 While initially skeptical, the Truman administration quickly determined that the Soviet Union had successfully tested its first atomic bomb during the previous week. America’s nuclear monopoly had ended. The Truman administration was shocked; it had not expected the Soviet Union to develop atomic capabilities for several more years.2 President Truman quickly approved a $319 million expansion of the existing atomic weapons program and formed a committee—consisting of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal—to determine if the United States should develop the hydrogen bomb. Instead of using fission, the H-bomb—also known as a thermonuclear weapon or “super” bomb—relied on fusion to generate its massive explosion, and it was estimated to be 1,000 times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.3 As 1949 wore on, it became apparent that Acheson’s vote would determine the committee’s recommendation, 1 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: General Publishing Company, 1989), 82. 2 Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), 306 3 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House Inc., 1988), 202. 6 as Johnson fully supported the thermonuclear project, and Lilienthal strongly opposed it.4 Acheson’s perspective on the hydrogen bomb, however, was by no means predetermined, which meant that his advisors, specifically George Kennan and Paul Nitze, would play a critical role in shaping his recommendation. Although the current director of the Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, and the deputy director of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze, had previously supported efforts to maintain the U.S. atomic monopoly and develop a potent retaliatory nuclear arsenal, the theoretical “super” bomb fundamentally altered Kennan’s policy recommendations. It should also be noted, however, that Kennan was not only morally repulsed by the prospects of thermonuclear warfare, he had also grown increasingly frustrated with his inability to influence U.S. foreign policy, specifically his failure to prevent the division of Germany and U.S. participation in NATO.5 Kennan responded to the Soviet Union’s atomic test by isolating himself throughout the final month of 1949 to write a seventy-nine page memorandum on the international control of atomic energy, which he later described as “one of the most important, if not the most important, of all the documents I ever wrote in government.”6 Kennan’s policy prescriptions, ultimately, were predicated upon Soviet intentions. In contrast to the majority of the Truman administration, Kennan argued that maintaining U.S. nuclear superiority was unnecessary, as he claimed that the Kremlin had no intention of initiating a war with the United States. Kennan, therefore, urged the Truman 4 David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 80. 5 Ibid., 71. 6 George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1967), 472. 7 administration to abandon its quest for the hydrogen bomb and to adopt a strategy of minimal deterrence, which he explained would only require the Truman administration to retain enough fission weapons to make a nuclear strike against the United States or its allies “risky, unprofitable, and irrational.”7 Kennan also implored the Truman administration to implement a “declaratory policy” of non-American first use and to reopen U.S.-Soviet atomic energy negotiations.8 Contrary to his previous analysis, however, Kennan claimed that the Soviet Union would seriously consider U.S. proposals, and that the Truman administration should not insist upon establishing a reliable means of on-site inspections to ensure Soviet compliance. Nitze, unlike Kennan, built bureaucratic support for his policy prescriptions throughout the final months of 1949. Nitze, too, believed that a Soviet preemptive nuclear strike against the United States was unlikely, but he argued that the Truman administration must retain U.S. nuclear superiority. In contrast to Kennan, Nitze also demonstrated a keen understanding of U.S.-Soviet relations and domestic politics throughout the hydrogen bomb debate. Nitze recognized the mounting domestic pressure on the Truman administration to build the hydrogen bomb, especially in the wake of “losing” China, and he realized that the American people, Congress, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would never accept a unilateral U.S. moratorium on thermonuclear research, a strategy of minimal deterrence, a “declaratory policy” of non-American first use, or an international atomic energy agreement that did not establish a reliable means of on-site 7 U .S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Vol. I: National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1977), 29-43. 8 See Paul Nitze, Paul H. Nitze on National Security and Arms Control, eds. Kenneth Thompson and Steven Rearden (New York: University Press of America, 1990), 51-62 for Nitze’s definition of a “declaratory policy” and an “action policy.” 8 inspection. Although Kennan was the State Department’s leading Soviet expert, Nitze, not Kennan, also understood that the Soviet Union would not agree to an international atomic energy treaty. Unlike Kennan, however, Nitze was also willing to compromise: while he urged the Truman administration to determine the feasibility of the fusion bomb, he also supported a total review of U.S. security policies, which he hoped would move the Truman administration away from reliance on nuclear weapons by bolstering U.S. conventional strength. Although Acheson seriously considered Kennan’s arguments, Acheson, ultimately, found Nitze much more persuasive. Nitze’s policy recommendations also meshed with the Truman administration’s growing reliance upon nuclear weapons. It should be noted that President Truman was committed to limiting military spending, which he believed could be accomplished by relying on cost-efficient nuclear weapons, rather than maintaining a large standing
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