1 Mitzvat Asei 5: Prayer by David Silverberg Maimonides Lists As The
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Mitzvat Asei 5: Prayer By David Silverberg Maimonides lists as the fifth of the affirmative commands the obligation he describes as le-ovdo – "to serve Him" or "to worship Him." He later explains that this refers to the obligation of daily prayer, and he cites two verses as the Biblical sources of this obligation: "You shall serve the Lord your God" (Shemot 23:25); "and Him shall you serve" (Devarim 10:20, 13:5). To demonstrate that the verb a.v.d. ("serve") refers to prayer, Maimonides enlists a famous comment of the Sifrei (Devarim 11:13) to this effect. He then invokes an even more explicit source from a passage in the Midrashic work Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer (12): "From where [do we extract] the essential mitzva of prayer? From here: 'The Lord your God you shall fear, and Him shall you serve'." The Biblical and Rabbinic Requirements of Prayer In introducing the laws of prayer in Mishneh Torah, Maimonides identifies more precisely the Torah obligation of prayer (Hilkhot Tefila 1:1-3): There is an affirmative command to pray each day, as it says, "You shall serve the Lord your God." It is learned from oral tradition that this "service" refers to prayer, as it says, "and to serve Him with all your heart." The Sages commented: Which is the "service of the heart"? This refers to prayer. But the number of prayers is not from the Torah, nor is the text of this prayer from the Torah. And prayer has no fixed time from the Torah… Rather, the obligation of this command is as follows: that a person plead and pray each day, and speak praise for the Almighty and then request his needs that he requires with petition and supplication, and then give praise and thanks to God for the goodness that He has bestowed upon him – each in accordance with his ability… Some pray once a day, others pray many times. And they should all pray towards the Temple, wherever one may be. And this is how it always was from Moshe Rabbenu until Ezra. Maimonides proceeds to explain that Ezra, rabbinic leader of the Jews who returned to Israel from the Babylonian exile, instituted the formal text and structure of prayer as we know it, in response to the confusion that resulted from the Jews' assimilation in exile. Thus, the Torah obligation of prayer requires just a single prayer at any point during the day, whereas the obligation established by Ezra requires the recitation of a specified text at specified times throughout the day (morning, afternoon and evening). The Kinat Sofrim commentary to Sefer Ha-mitzvot draws proof for Maimonides' position from a passage in the Tosefta (Berakhot, chapter 3), which Maimonides himself cites later in Sefer Ha-mitzvot (mitzvat asei 10). The Tosefta comments, "Just as the Torah established fixed [times] for the recitation of shema, so did the Sages establish a 1 time for prayer." This remark clearly suggests that the concept of daily prayer exists as a Torah obligation, and the Sages established the specific schedule and formal structure for the daily prayer services. This is the position of several other Medieval scholars, as well, including the Semag (mitzvat asei 19), the Semak (mitzvat asei 11) and the Ra'a (Rabbi Aharon Halevi of Barcelona, in his commentary to Masekhet Berakhot, 10b and elsewhere). This also appears to have been the position of the Rif (Rabbi Yitzchak Alfasi, Berakhot 11b). Nachmanides' Objection Nachmanides, in his critique of Sefer Ha-mitzvot, objects to the inclusion of prayer as one of the 613 Biblical commands. In Nachmanides' view, "the entire concept of prayer is not an obligation at all, but rather a measure of the Creator's kindness towards us, that He listens and responds whenever we call to Him." Prayer, according to Nachmanides, is not – on the level of Torah law – an obligation, but rather a privilege. Before the Rabbis instituted the mandatory prayer services, a Jew was under no obligation to pray to the Almighty. Should he feel the need to turn to God in prayer, God would, in His infinite kindness and graciousness, listen and respond. But no obligation was involved before the enactments of Ezra. Addressing the verses cited by Maimonides as the Biblical sources of an obligation to pray, Nachmanides contends that these verses refer to something else entirely, a broader obligation "that all our service to the Almighty, may He be exalted, be with all our heart, meaning, with proper and complete intention for His Name." Namely, the obligation to "serve God" is an overarching imperative to carry out our religious duties out of a sense of sincere devotion, rather than with skepticism or indifference. Thus, these verses describe not a specific obligation to stand before God in prayer, but rather to observe all the Torah's laws with proper concentration and emotion. As for the Midrashic passages that extract the prayer obligation from these verses, Nachmanides presents two responses. First, he suggests reading these passages as referring to an asmakhta – a subtle allusion in the Biblical text for a law enacted later by the Sages. We find many instances in the Talmud where the Gemara proposes a creative, secondary reading of a verse whereby it alludes to a halakha that clearly had not applied at the time the Torah was given. Nachmanides raises the possibility that the interpretation of the term avoda in these verses as prayer should be viewed in this vein, as but an asmakhta. But Nachmanides then proposes a second theory, conceding that praying during times of crisis may, indeed, constitute a Torah obligation. When the Midrashim understand these verses as introducing an obligation of prayer, they perhaps speak specifically of times of potential danger, such as war, famine and the like, when petitioning the Almighty indeed becomes a Biblical imperative. It should be noted that Maimonides lists as a separate mitzva (mitzva asei 59) the obligation to pray to God during times of national crisis. Nachmanides was prepared at most to concede that prayer in these contexts constitutes a Torah obligation, while insisting that daily prayer is but a privilege, and not an obligation. Evidence from Masekhet Berakhot 2 Nachmanides advances a number of proofs against Maimonides' position, granting prayer the status of a Biblical imperative. The first stems from the Talmud's discussion in Masekhet Berakhot (21a) concerning a ba'al keri (man who experienced a semenal emission), whom the Rabbis forbade from engaging in prayer or Torah study until after immersion in a mikveh. (This halakha is no longer applicable, for reasons that lie beyond the purview of our discussion.) The Gemara states explicitly that despite this general prohibition, a ba'al keri must recite the daily shema as well as birkat ha-mazon after meals, because these two recitations are required by Torah law and thus cannot be overridden by rabbinic enactment. Prayer, the Gemara comments, constitutes but a rabbinic obligation, and therefore a ba'al keri must refrain from praying until after he immerses in a mikveh. Rabbi Yosef Karo, in his Kesef Mishneh commentary to Mishneh Torah, and Rabbi Yitzchak De Leon, in his Megilat Ester commentary to Sefer Ha-mitzvot, respond to Nachmanides' challenge by claiming that the Gemara refers only to the rabbinically- prescribed liturgical text, but not to prayer altogether. A ba'al keri must refrain from the formal prayer service established by Ezra, which is rabbinic in origin, but he remains under the Biblical obligation to offer some prayer to God over the course of the day. This obligation, like shema and birkat ha-mazon, cannot be overridden by the rabbinic decree concerning a ba'al keri, and he must therefore utter some brief prayer, even if he is barred from reciting the complete liturgical text composed by the Sages. Several later writers challenged this response, most prominently among them Rabbi Aryeh Leib Ginzburg (Russia-France, 1695-1785), in his legendary work Sha'agat Aryeh (14). The Sha'agat Aryeh's primary objection is the simple fact that the Gemara would presumably have clarified this critical distinction between the Torah and rabbinic obligations of prayer in explicating the laws relevant to a ba'al keri. If, indeed, a ba'al keri is barred only from the recitation of the full text, but bears a Biblical obligation to offer a brief prayer to the Almighty, the Gemara should have given some clear indication to this effect. The Gemara's silence in this regard strongly suggests that a ba'al keri is exempt and barred from prayer altogether. The Kesef Mishneh very briefly proposes a second refutation, as well, invoking the principle known as yeish ko'ach be-yad chakhamim la-akor davar min ha-Torah, empowering the Sages to enact decrees to safeguard the Torah even by suspending a given Torah obligation. The most famous application of this rule, perhaps, is the Rabbinic decree forbidding blowing shofar if Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat, or taking the lulav when Sukkot falls on Shabbat, as a safeguard against possible Shabbat violation. Similarly, the Kesef Mishneh suggests, Chazal perhaps applied the prohibition against a ba'al keri's involvement in prayer and study even at the expense of the Torah obligation of prayer. Thus, that a ba'al keri is barred from even offering a brief prayer to fulfill the Biblical requirement does not disprove Maimonides' position ascribing to prayer the status of Torah law. But the Kesef Mishneh's contention is very difficult to understand. As Nachmanides noted, the Gemara explicitly distinguished between prayer on the one hand, and birkat ha-mazon and shema on the other, in terms of the origin of the given obligation.