24 / 2017 and Politics in after the Maidan Protests

Guest Editor Catherine Wanner

Maidan activists sleeping on the floor of St. Michael’s Cathedral, , Ukraine, 19 January 2014. Photo by Tetiana Kalenychenko. © Religious Information Service of Ukraine

Online Open Access Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe University of St. Gallen URL: www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch ISSN 2296-0708

Center for Governance and Last Update 15th January 2018 LANDIS & GYR Culture in Europe STIFTUNG Table of Contents

Editorial Editorial by Catherine Wanner 3

Mass Media, Religion, and Politics in Ukraine: The Story of the “Bloody Pastor” by Michael Cherenkov 10

Public Religion During the Maidan Protests in Ukraine by Tetiana Kalenychenko 23

Religious Rhetoric, Secular State? The Public References to Religion by Ukraine’s Top Politicians (1992–2016) by Alla Marchenko 39

Crimean Tatar Religiosity: Between Privacy and Politics by Olena Soboleva 51

Publishing Information 58

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 2 The Political Valence of Dignity and the Maidan Protests

he Maidan Square had long been the equity, the rule of law, and regime change.2 Theart of Kyiv but on November 21, 2013 a Aging dictatorships in the Middle East, bereft process was set in motion whereby this place of ideas on how to reform society, led to became an ideal, encapsulated in the concept endemic corruption, unemployment, and low of dignity. Dignity has come to symbolize the standards of living. In Tunisia the slogan of the aspirations of for change because protesters was “Dignity, Bread and Freedom!” it was on the Maidan that they congregated to The catalyst to the protests there was Mohamed

Editorial assert this very powerful social fact during the Bouazizi’s decision to set himself on fire after protests of 2013-14. The euphoria experienced local authorities confiscated his wares and during the early phase of the Maidan protests blocked him from selling fruit in the central was a manifestation of social bonds that square of Sidi Bouzid, the city where he lived connected diverse individuals to each other and worked. Most Tunisians understood in common purpose. The concept of dignity Bouazizi’s humiliation and desperation in a became a primary orienting symbol that way all too familiar to Ukrainians. In both forged feelings of unity, solidarity and resolve countries, a person who fails to pay a bribe during those winter months. These feelings of to the authorities can be punished by even a engagement in a common, righteous pursuit minor official’s ability to unleash a barrage of were one of the key dynamics that combined bureaucratic violations and infractions that to recast these protests as a “Revolution of are inevitably more costly, time-consuming Dignity,” as this event is known in Ukraine. and humiliating than senselessly handing Remarkably, a decade earlier Aleksander over hard-earned money as a bribe. Kwasniewski, the President of Poland, The sense of exasperation, of being at who mediated the roundtable talks in Kyiv wit’s end, with the capriciousness of the self- during the in 2004-05, serving nature of state power was evident in also referred to that earlier protest as “a Egypt too, and also served to spark unrest. revolution of dignity.” He understood the A popular uprising there called ever more goal of those protests to be a “triumph of civic forcefully for new political leadership. dignity and political morality over ideological Nawara Najem, a journalist who followed the , bureaucratic cynicism and police protests in Cairo on Tahrir Square, said, “Why dictatorship.”1 Why might the concept of did the people not fear death? No one knows. dignity have come to symbolize the goal of the It was not only religion, because some of those Maidan protesters? who died were not believers. It was not only Ukrainians were not the only ones to poverty, because many of those who faced make political recourse to the concept of death were from the comfortable classes. It dignity. During the Arab Spring, which began was not only despair, as the millions who earlier in 2010, dignity was also evoked during came out into the streets were full of hope for mass uprisings that demanded economic change. Perhaps the answer is human dignity. 2 Hawkins, Simon. 2014. “Teargas, Flags and the Harlem Shake: Images of and for Revolution in Tunisia 1 Peter Voitsekhovsky 2012 “In the Footsteps of 1989: and the Dialectics of the Local in the Global” In Pnina Ukraine’s Orange Revolution as a Carnival of Anti- Werbner, Martin Webb, Kathryn Spellman-Poots, eds., Politics” in Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed. The End and The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest: The Arab the Beginning, Budapest: Central European University Spring and Beyond. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Pp. 550-551. Press.

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 3 Editorial

No force, no matter how tyrannous, is able to momentous protests are known. By way deprive human beings of this.”3 of introduction to the series of articles that Indeed, uprisings over time, but especially follows, I offer an analysis of the concept in the last decade, have illustrated the of dignity, its political valence, and how it consequences of robbing individuals of their melded with religion. I argue that it was the dignity. The demands for dignity empowered political history of the concept of dignity and individuals in multiple countries to protest its religious underpinnings that allowed it to by offering a vision of how to create a more motivate and morally empower the protesters just society through individual agency. Such and their demands for immediate political demands also appealed to people from a wide reform. spectrum of political and religious persuasions and motivated them to act in unison. The Dignity as a Primary Orienting Symbol quest for dignity in Ukraine was meant to spur for Political Change political change and to steer the direction of that change by shifting the consciousness of In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argued Ukrainians from acquiescence to vigilance in that the human capacity for moral action is terms of how to relate to state power. made possible by dignity (würde) and this is Much like the eight uprisings that what gives humans their intrinsic worth.4 By were part of the Arab Spring, the Maidan virtue of the fact that all individuals possess achieved initial success by forcing a change dignity, no one should be treated as a means in government leadership only to see the to an end but rather as an end in and of hope for change dissolve as old established themselves. Treating individuals with dignity practices of crony capitalism and corruption means treating them as equal, autonomous stubbornly persisted. Still, it is important to individuals able to choose their destiny. ask why dignity emerged as such a compelling Efforts to assert human dignity implicitly rallying cry during these protests and why critique honor as a measure of virtue. Kant at this time? Given the ensuing widespread sharply criticized the feudal governing disappointment with the Maidan and the Arab practices of hierarchical, inherited ranking Spring, was this an effective orienting concept and deference to aristocratic authority, both of for reform? which he claimed were grounded in notions of The articles in this issue detail the sources inherited honor. of discontent in Ukraine and how protesters Whereas honor-based understandings during and after the Maidan responded to of virtue involve safeguarding one’s own them. They pay particular attention to the role honor by following certain prescriptions of religion, religious thinking and attitudes for action or reaction, dignity, in contrast, toward clerical and governmental leadership mandates certain modes of interaction with in an effort to better understand the victories others. This makes dignity an achieved, and defeats that the protesters experienced non-inherited status, albeit a fragile during the “winter that changed us,” as these 3 Najem, Nawara “Egyptian dignity in the face of death.” 4 Immanuel Kant, 1981 [1795] Grounding for the Meta- , 19 February 2011. https://www.thegu- physics of Morals: On a Supposed Right to Lie because ardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/19/tipping-point- of Philanthropic Concerns. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett arab-revolution. Accessed 7 December 2017. Publishing Company.

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one.5 A growing consensus for a preference moral sensibilities that would foster a sense to use dignity over honor to achieve or restore of moral duty responsive to supporting and justice is reflected in the condemnation of honor defending the dignity of others. killings, which are justified by a subjective For example, the justification for the interpretation of an obligation to maintain abolition of slavery was that it constituted one’s own chivalric honor using violence. an affront to the dignity of the slave and Honor-based codes of interaction are closely slaveholder. The capacity to feel the dignity associated with the criminal underworld of others informed the 1919 founding of the and oligarchic rule. Fallen President Viktor International Labor Organization dedicated Yanukovych and his ruling elite, for example, to creating dignified working conditions and were frequently referred to as “The Family” advancing socio-economic justice. Several to signal accusations of the mafia-like means states in the early twentieth century included they used to attain and maintain political and in the preamble of their constitutions the state’s economic power. The corrupting potential responsibility to ensure the dignity of their of honor-based forms of virtue were held citizens, Mexico (1917), Weimar Germany and in sharp contrast to the legal mechanisms of Finland (1919), Portugal (1933) Ireland (1937), regulating relationships and maintaining and Cuba (1940). order in Europe through the implementation World War II provided another of universal rights and responsibilities that formidable catalyst as the ravages of war, appeal to human dignity. and in particular the Holocaust, prompted The roots of such legal traditions run a reconsideration of the means and modes deep. Beginning most notably in the 19th of intervention to ensure human dignity. century, a series of political and legal reforms With influence from socialist thinking and were undertaken to reimagine the moral order Catholicism, the concept of dignity was to assure human dignity by beginning the incorporated into human rights proclamations process of universalizing and equalizing rights and national constitutions. Three defeated and entitlements of citizens within a particular Axis nations, Japan (1946), Italy (1948), and state.6 Although dignity was rarely defined, West Germany (1949), incorporated a mention a moralized conception of dignity was used of dignity in their new postwar constitutions. to underwrite laws, legislation, and public The German constitution was the most policy based on a respect for and desire to notable, beginning with “Human dignity is protect human dignity. State policy initiatives, inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty reinforced by religious pronouncements, of all state power.” [Die Würde des Menschen aimed to cultivate an awareness of universal ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten and zu schützen human dignity with the goal of internalizing ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt]7 The German constitution had particular import 5 Charles Taylor 1994 Multiculturalism: Examining the as it served as a model in 1989 for Eastern Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 27. European countries and post-apartheid 6 Charles Taylor 1994 Multiculturalism: Examining the South Africa as these countries drafted new Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 38 and Yechiel Michael Barilan 2012 Human constitutions. Dignity, Human Rights, and Responsibility: The New Language of Global Bioethics and Biolaw. Cambridge: 7 https://www.grundrechteschutz.de/gg/menschenwur- MIT Press, pp. 82-83. de-2-255. Accessed 7 December 2017.

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Political mechanisms to protect the Protection against Forced Disappearance universality of human rights culminated in the (2007) and the Rights of Disabled Persons UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in (2007). 1948 and the Convention on the Prevention and In short, the concept of dignity has become Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Soviet central to human rights issues. Appeals to representatives to the UN Council objected upholding dignity made Ukrainian leaders to the use of multinational organizations to answerable to multinational organizations guarantee human rights because they would responsible for protecting human rights. The supersede the rights of individual states goals of the Maidan articulated in terms of and therefore infringe on the sovereignty of dignity became part of this standoff among individual states. They countered that human international organizations, state authorities dignity could only be assured by a just social and the moral pronouncements of religious and economic order, which had to be realized institutions. There was widespread recognition on the individual state level and offered a that the EU, as an outside institution, was proposal that allowed individual states to needed to ensure dignitarian policies precisely implement their own measures to protect because the “sovereign” was human dignity. This set the stage for debates incapable of doing so. Thus, much like after between “sovereignist versus dignitarian World War II, the impetus in Ukraine in 2013- politics,” each of which trades on different 14 was to harness the power of the EU and modes of reasoning to determine who is the other multinational organizations to ensure ultimate arbiter of whether individual states the protection of individual rights, human uphold the dignity of their citizens.* dignity and the rule of law. The assertion of a universal recognition The concepts of dignity and human of human dignity and a global mandate to rights have the potential to serve the twin protect it became the first universal ideology goals of national liberation and national with broad acceptance by individual self-determination because they embody a state sovereignties and by transnational set of relationships involving governance governing structures. The key architects of as it should be affecting citizens. At this international law to promote human rights moment, this vision emerged as the primary and to criminalize genocide were Raphael alternative to the one offered by nationalist Lemkin (1900-1959) and Hersch Lauterpacht groups. Groups, such as the political party (1897-1960). Both men were born in parts of Svoboda, suggested that a nationalized path that are now in Ukraine. This mandate to reform could purportedly yield the same has since been used to inspire a variety of liberation and enhancement of well-being. political interventions, from global public A “national” revolution obviously runs the health programs to correctives to the excesses risk of rigorously managing difference by of global capitalism, to the legitimation or fortifying borders, cultural as well as political, condemnation of military force.** More amid a xenophobic atmosphere that celebrates recently, a variety of conventions to protect the the virtues of the nation, not the individual. rights of the vulnerable are all justified with Dignity, on the other hand, became an references to dignity: the Rights of Children orienting concept that began to scope out an (1989), the Rights of Migrant Workers (1990), alternative path to fortifying the nation and

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another avenue by which to achieve a truly specific feature of human life. independent state for Ukrainians. Josiah Pope Paul VI’s address to the United Ober (2012) succinctly defines dignity as Nations on October 4, 1965, Dignitatis freedom from humiliation and infantilization. Humanae, stressed the overlapping interests “Nonhumiliation,” as he calls it, translates and responsibilities of the Roman Catholic into a sense of dignity based on equal respect Church and the concerning for all as moral beings. “Noninfantilization” human dignity, one for the souls of the faithful involves recognition of each person’s choice- and the other for member states. In addition to making capabilities. He goes on to claim that encouraging political modes of intervention to the three core values of democracy are liberty, achieve dignity, the asserted equality, and dignity, with dignity informing the ethical and moral obligation of believers the other two values.8 Such political goals to actively do the same. Most importantly, the that invited democratic reform in an effort to Church reframed the legal commitment to the shed humiliation and infantilization clearly freedom of religious conscience as a matter resonated with Ukrainians on the Maidan. of human dignity, thereby giving religious institutions a powerful voice in debates over The Political Theology of Dignity human dignity.**** The 2008 Dignitas Personae, which addresses the Church’s position on a In addition, a moral justification for an appeal variety of bioethical questions, opens with, to human dignity often traded on references “The dignity of a person must be recognized to a higher power, however conceived. The in every human being from conception to Roman Catholic Church, in particular, has long natural death.”9 espoused the belief that the human individual These initiatives contributed to the was created in the image of God. The Catholic Soviet state’s antipathy to Catholicism and social teaching that developed at the end of the its wariness of the power of the Vatican. In 19th century increasingly relied on “human 1946 Stalin outlawed the Ukrainian Greek- dignity” in its doctrinal pronouncements. Catholic Church (UGCC) over fears of Vatican Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical Rerum Novarum meddling in the fate of Catholic believers (1891),*** Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Pacem in the newly annexed territories to Soviet in Terris (1963), and in a key document of the Ukraine.10 The UGCC, with its five million Second Vatican Council Gaudium et Spes (1965) believers, was the largest confession to have were especially influential pronouncements been persecuted throughout the entire Cold that evoked human dignity. This has inspired War period. Caught between empires as a the Church over time to weigh in on debates hybrid confession with a Byzantine rite that over the relationship of dignity to moral law recognizes papal authoritiy, the UGCC, unlike as well as on other debates it deemed of moral other Orthodox Christian churches, never had significance, such as reproductive rights, 9 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ end of life issues, and questions relating to cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20081208_digni- bioethics. Catholic theology claims dignity to tas-personae_en.html. Accessed 7 December 2017. 10 Bohdan Bociurkiw 1996 The Ukrainian Greek be an absolute value and independent of any Catholic Church and the Soviet State, 1939-1950. Ed- mondton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 8 Josiah Ober “Democracy’s Dignity” American Politi- Studies Press and Serhii Plokhii 2010 Yalta: The Price of cal Science Review 106(4): 827-846. Peace. New York: Viking Press.

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a collaborative, cooperative relationship with Most significant of all are other state authorities. Much like the Roman Catholic pronouncements that implore that, “citizens Church in Poland, it was a critic and foe of the of the heavenly homeland, should not forget Soviet state, whose ruling authorities confined about their earthly homeland.”12 Therefore, it the Church to a clandestine, underground is perhaps not surprising that vital forms of existence. The deep roots of dignity as a material, logistical and emotional support were guiding principle for political reform in provided by Orthodox leaders over the course Catholic theology had significant influence in of the “winter on fire” as well. For example, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church among the momentous decision by the monks of its clergy and believers, many of whom Mykhailovskii Monastery, which is under were among the most active and committed the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox participants in the Maidan protests. Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, to provide safe The Orthodox Church has also made haven for protesters after they were attacked significant pronouncements regarding human by police during the night of 30 November dignity based on the principle of Lik Bozhii 2013, and later to allow the monastery to (Imago Dei), or the belief that man was created become a hospital for wounded and shelter in the image of God. Orthodox theology for protesters, firmly situated the Ukrainian draws on the idea that the Church is a salvific Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate and some institution, whose mission is to restore a fallen clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church- world, suggesting that the Church and society Moscow Patriarchate on the side of the narod are engaged in common endeavors. Moreover, in its pursuit of dignity against the state. the 2008 ’s Basic In essence, then, the use of dignity, with Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights, its grounding in moral reasoning, involved concludes by stressing “the acknowledgement religious institutions, their clergy and of personal dignity implies the assertion of believers, every bit as much as it did political personal responsibility.”11 In this document, leaders and citizens eager for meaningful the Orthodox idea of dignity, as rooted in moral reform. Once again in this part of the world, purity and virtue and intimately connected to religion and politics fused for mutual effect. personal responsibility for individual actions, The essential difference is that this time the is spelled out in no uncertain terms, “Clearly, alliance was forged among the people, far the idea of responsibility is integral to the very from all of whom were believers, and religious notion of dignity. Therefore, In the Eastern institutions against the state as opposed to a Christian tradition, the notion of ‘dignity’ has collaborative relationship between state and first of all a moral meaning, while the ideas of clerical authorities as has been the historic what is dignified and what is not dignified are pattern. The history of theological and legal bound up with the moral or amoral actions of debate concerning dignity paved the way a person and the inner state of his soul.…God- for an alternative vision for uniting the given dignity is confirmed by a moral principle people of Ukraine into the Ukrainian people. present in every person and discerned in the Throughout out much of Ukrainian history, a voice of conscience.” nationalist vision, predicated on a particular

11 https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom- 12 https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/. rights/i/. Accessed 7 December 2017. Accessed 7 December 2017.

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language, shared religious convictions, and the responsibilities and obligations people perceptions of a common historical experience, and now the various ways in which it is in were held out as the most promising recipe power have to their citizens. The Maidan for national solidarity, a secure independent commemorated has consistently underlined state, and political stability. Indeed, this was the commitment of Ukrainians to advancing the initial message of the Svoboda political an agenda of living and dying with dignity and party and certain groups, such as UNSO, on the ability to mount a united front in protest if the Maidan. However, once the goals of the this agenda is not respected. This is certainly protests shifted to a proclaimed pursuit of the most impressive, and hopefully the most human dignity, it became clearer that shared formidable and longest lasting, legacy of the values could become shared interests. This Maidan. could lead to solidarity and even a form of unity that was capable of delivering tangible political reform. Indeed, under the banner *At the time, the American Anthropological Association agreed with the Soviet position. The of dignity, the protesters were successful in AAA reasoned that by putting limits on “cultural forcing the ouster of former President Viktor practices” such laws were effectively limiting tolerance. The AAA essentially supported a Yanukovych and ensuring a peaceful transfer position of Boasian cultural relativism to the of power to a new ruling regime. extreme, thereby denying the possibility to make political judgments. The AAA retracted such To mark this accomplishment, dignity pronouncements in 1999, which are increasingly plays a central role in the myriad ways in seen as an embarrassing moment of misjudgment. which the Maidan is now commemorated ** A direct outgrowth of the UN Declaration of Human Rights is the supranational European Court as a “Revolution of Dignity” in monument, of Human Rights, which was established in 1959, museum and memory. Such commemorative to guarantee the protection of a range of civil and political rights should individual sovereign states efforts are situated within broader efforts to fail to do so. This court makes the commitment to protect human dignity a central element in the reflect the cultural formations and religious political and legal policies that now govern the 47 idioms that are shaping new political signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights. subjectivities. The concept of dignity, *** Each of the following documents can be found with its history entangled in theology and at www.vatican.va. Accessed 7 December 2017. transnational religious organizations as well **** A commitment to dignity subsequently as global organizaitons and international underwrote a range of initiatives from the teachings of Liberation Theology to moral pronouncements law provides a means by which to reorient on the sanctity of human life, which led to the individuals to modes of power and to reaffirm condemnation of abortion, euthanasia and other practices.

By Catherine Wanner,

Pennsylvania State University

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 9 Mass Media, Religion, and Politics in Ukraine: The Story of the “Bloody Pastor

by Michael Cherenkov

Abstract has become one of the symbols of post-Maidan Ukraine. He is known in the media as the “bloody pastor.” Two phenomena of present-day Ukraine are combined here: first, the religious diversity which allows members of religious minorities to hold political power (the “pastor” became an acting president), and second, strong religious patriotism that is common even among those who were until recently called “sectarians” (it was the “pastor” who gave an order to start the anti-terrorist operation in the east of the country). The “bloody pastor” may well fit into the post-secular scenario of the social crisis as a compelling example of the possible role of a religiously- motivated leader and a possible outline of religious-political restructuring. Both Ukrainian and Russian media see him as a spokesman for , westernization, globalization, and modernization. They see in him a serious challenge to both the traditionalist forms of religiosity and traditional approaches to post-Soviet politics. In this sense, the image of the “bloody pastor” is the key to understanding several phenomena related to Russo-Ukrainian relations: the Russian- Ukrainian political-military conflict; the social and religious diversity of the two countries; the local versions of post-secularism; and to defining Ukrainian Protestantism as a distinct social category.

Key words: Ukraine, , Maidan revolution, Protestant Church, pastor, religion, media, society.

eligion in Ukraine is becoming Baptist “Pastor” Oleksandr Turchynov Rpredominantly public, both by its nature have emerged in the post-Maidan period and in terms of its public perception. The two as both religious and political leaders. Each Ukrainian Maidans (2004 and 2013-2014) had a one personifies public religiosity as being truly revolutionary impact on the relationship shaped by a particular confessional context. between religion and society. Religion was one Turchynov held the highest government post of the main factors shaping events and at the of the three and is widely – and inaccurately – same time religion itself was transformed by believed to be a member of the Baptist clergy them. While previously Ukrainian religious thanks to the way he has been portrayed in the scholars used western publications to study media. Because of his visibility, notoriety and post-secularism, in recent years they have the pivotal role he played in the “Revolution accumulated sufficient material of their own, of Dignity,” the creation of Turchynov’s image the analysis of which provides interesting deserves careful attention. insights into the nature of Ukrainian religiosity Oleksandr Turchynov is a well-known in relation to socio-political processes. The Ukrainian politician, who followed an media has played a key role in transforming interesting path from activist attitudes towards religion and its political to president, from atheist propagandist to influence. Baptist lay preacher. He entered politics in the It is noteworthy that Cardinal Lubomyr opposition as the first deputy chairman of the Husar of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Batkivshchyna (“Fatherland”) political party Church, Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian and right-hand man of party leader Yulia Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, and Tymoshenko. Turchynov also served as acting

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Prime Minister in 2010 and Chairman of the media image has taken on a life of its own—a Ukrainian Parliament in 2014. He currently very active virtual life. serves as Secretary of the National Security It is worth recalling that it was the and Defence Council of Ukraine. Ukrainian media that started calling Turchynov clearly blends his religious and Turchynov a “pastor,” when he was really political views. He is very active in promoting a lay preacher, and it was they who created a place for religion in governance and in the mysterious, yet respectable image of him promoting the idea that politicians should be as a Baptist politician. But it was the Russian believers. This is what makes Turchynov’s media who made him a “bloody” pastor. For political career significant. His confident self- the Ukrainian media a “pastor” is somewhat identification with the Baptist Church brings exotic, an unusual yet wholly acceptable him a fair share of problems. However, at the religious and political phenomenon, whereas same time it creates popularity, and makes him for the Russians the Baptist faith is definitely stand out from other politicians. Turchynov’s an evil product of sectarianism and a threat faith is not only part of his political image, but to Orthodoxy and the “Russian world.” something much more – the foundation of his As analysts noted in 2014, “If you type identity. Turchynov’s name in a Google search, ‘Pastor In the USSR and in the post-Soviet Turchynov’ will appear; if you type it in sphere were seen as a type of sect, Yandex, then the search suggestions will be dangerous to both the dominant Orthodox ‘Turchynov the Baptist’ and ‘Turchynov the faith and to government order. What made sectarian.’”1 In other words, Turchynov has them dangerous was their otherness, nothing become emblematic of the Russian media’s else. What set Soviet and post-Soviet Baptists portrayal of threatening figures emerging in apart was their pious spirituality and their Ukraine. aloofness from politics. Not even Soviet It is worth to note the difference propaganda would have called a Baptist between Turchynov’s portrait in Russian pastor “bloody.” The phrase “bloody pastor” and Ukrainian media. A summary of both is an example of how propaganda creates interpretations could point to the following enemies by combining the incompatible and points: the Ukrainian media sees the how freely and carelessly it treats facts. It is combination of patriotism and the Baptist no less interesting how the media turned him faith as interesting (you could even say exotic) into a propaganda machine for a sect – first and promising, while the Russian media sees as a “pastor” and then as a “bloody pastor” - it as impermissible and dangerous. when in reality he was just an average believer The journalists of Focus magazine participating in his faith community as a lay specifically point this out: “Turchynov isa preacher. Baptist. Being a Protestant in an Orthodox Oleksandr Turchynov has involuntarily country is like being a Jew—there is no become the image of Ukrainian Protestantism discrimination as such, but it is not the in its public mode. The mass media, both thing for politicians. It’s ridiculous to accuse Ukrainian and Russian, is largely responsible for this. Whereas Turchynov remains a reticent 1 Aleksandr Turchinov: V ozhidanii Apokalipsisa. 15.11.14 http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/aleksandr-tur- and rather closed politician and preacher, his chinov-v-oshchushchenii-apokalipsisa-15112014141000

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Turchynov of opportunism as if the former grounded in a real biography. Oleksandr Komsomol functionary changed alliegance Turchynov went from being a Komsomol for personal gain. There is not much logic in member to a preacher, then from a modest this accusation. If this were his motivation, it preacher to a “pastor” and then from a would make more sense for him to switch to political party’s behind-the-scenes leader (for Orthodoxy.”2 The attitude toward Turchynov the Batkivshchyna party) to acting president of is tied to more fundamental issues – how Ukraine; and finally, from ’s religious and political diversity are viewed assistant to an independent leader on a as well as diverse relationships between the national level. Although Turchynov’s rise to religious and the political spheres. While this power is rather remarkable, it came about pluralism is flourishing in Ukraine, in Russia it thanks to two pivotal events, which coincide is drowned out by heavy media involvement. with the two Ukrainian Maidans. The media’s image of Turchynov reflects a wider framework of societal and media The First Coming: A Baptist Reveals perceptions of religion in the post-Soviet Himself political sphere. The history of the “bloody pastor” reveals not only the religiosity Oleksandr Turchynov first attracted media of Ukrainians and Russians but also the attention during the Orange Revolution in evolution of political-religious relationships. 2004. After the success of the revolution, he I intend to show that the hidden settings of was appointed head of the Security Service social conscience on both sides were at work of Ukraine. He was already referred to in the discussions of the “bloody pastor,” and as a sectarian back then, but was not yet examine the changes in political-religious “bloody.” Ukrainian media were persistent relationships that the evolution of this image in their interest in his Baptist worldview demonstrated. In other words, if we agree that and its possible influence on politics. He the “bloody pastor” became a symbol for the was stigmatized as a sectarian, but was not media on both sides of the conflict, we need to considered dangerous. Russian and pro- try to answer the question, “How can a political Russian media considered him not just leader be turned into a religious preacher?” In interesting but dangerous. “Anti-Orange” other words, how was the media effective in websites called him a “Chekist Baptist,” a using religion to create a (frightening) cultural secret representative of the “Orange sect” icon and internet meme out of a politician who yearning for world domination. “Not only openly used his faith to pursue his country’s have the Baptists brought the USA under their interests? How did religion become a political control, but they also have a strong position tool for Turchynov and for the media? Why in Europe. For example, in the UK there is was it so easy to demonize someone for being the Baptist Keston Institute, dedicated ‘to the a Baptist? What does the media have to say study of religion in the former communist about that? bloc,’ although in reality the organization The evolution of his media image is lobbies for Baptist interests under the guise of fighting for the rights of believers. It is setting 2 Fionik D., Samsonova IU. Kak Aleksandr Turchinov up, so to speak, a ‘new world order,’ which ispolnil prezidentskie obiazannosti. Zhurnal Fokus. 21.06.14 https://focus.ua/country/308310/

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will, of course, be a Baptist one.” 3 shirt and tie, and a sports jacket. He started “Anti-Orange” journalists expressed quietly, but suddenly he raises his voice: concern that the head of the Security Service ‘Brothers and sisters, the winds are subject was a major threat to the very security of to Him. The elements are subject to Him. He Ukraine. “I wonder in what capacity Baptist fed thousands of people with a few loaves of pastor O. Turchynov—a carrier of state bread and some fish. These days, just as it was secrets—talked to his foreign equivalents. then, people also demand miracles and free Who can guarantee one hundred percent food.’ He reminds them that Jesus came not to that Oleksandr Valentynovych did not give fill stomachs but to save souls. Everyone longs away Ukrainian secrets to foreign spies who for the understandable, nobody wants to go to often disguise themselves as preachers?”4 the cross.”7 Meanwhile, the authors of the article about the As a preacher, Turchynov fits in well insidious Chekist Baptist elaborated on this with the local Baptist homiletic tradition. terrible image using contradictory elements. His preaching style can be called humble, “When Turchynov preaches from the pulpit, yet emotional. Sermons are built around his legs shake with emotion (by the way, he simple ideas, with an emphasis on practical does not hesitate to kneel in prayer in front of application to personal life. As a preacher, he others).”5 Thus, the media crafted an image does not attract attention to himself through of someone who was simultaneously ‘a God- his clothing or rhetoric. However, he is not fearing fanatic,’ ‘a humble sectarian,’ and ‘a afraid to speak openly about his faith. He does holy Chekist.’ not hide his worries, and does not adapt his In an interview for the newspaper speech to the audience. This all makes him , Turchynov emphasized not only a church preacher, but also a media his modest role in the church, “I am not a figure, a true media missionary. pastor. It’s a nickname that has stuck to me. I Turchynov was not intimidated when do preach in the church, but being a pastor is a he was called a sectarian not only in print or more serious responsibility.”6 online, but also on live television. He gladly Turchynov’s sermons were monitored, invited others to listen to his sermons. The not only by Ukrainian evangelicals (as he newspaper Livyi Bereg recounted one of these was a new religious phenomenon for the episodes: “Responding to the presenter’s stigmatized and marginalized (post) Soviet question about the importance of religion Protestant community), but also by journalists in his life Turchynov said, ‘I am a preacher. (as he was a new political phenomenon). The I preach in a Baptist church.’ ‘May I come newspaper Gazeta Po-Ukrainsky described listen to you preach?’ asked the presenter. his approachable image: “‘the right hand’ ‘Absolutely. Michurin Street. Do come; we of Yulia Tymoshenko preached ... in jeans, a will be glad to see you there. Everyone is 3 Chekist-baptist Aleksandr Turchinov 19.09.05 http:// welcome,’ Turchynov responded. Then the anti orange.com.ua/article/resident/68/27569 presenter asked whether Turchynov feared 4 Chekist-baptist Aleksandr Turchinov 19.09.05 http:// anti orange.com.ua/article/resident/68/27569 that belonging to the Protestant Church would 5 Chekist-baptist Aleksandr Turchinov 19.09.05 http:// anti orange.com.ua/article/resident/68/27569 7 Baptist Turchinov propovedoval na Verbnoe 6 Oleksandr Turchinov: Proti Poroshenka u SBU dav voskresen‘e. 29.04.2008 http://gazeta.ua/ru/articles/ svіdchennia odin іz deputatіv „Nashoї Ukraїni“ 01.11.05 politics-newspaper/_baptist-turchinov-propovedoval- http://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2005/11/1/3015079/ na-verbnoe-voskresene/224497

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work against the Batkyvshchyna party since most prominent and daring leaders of the the majority of Ukrainian citizens are either Maidan Revolution, and then served as acting Orthodox or Greek-Catholics. “I didn’t join president during the most difficult days of the Baptist church for political benefit. And the Ukrainian statehood since its independence in fact is that during the Soviet era, Protestants 1991. were very harshly persecuted. But the world Evaluating Turchynov’s role in those is changing. And Ukraine is a multi-religious events, journalists link the nature of his politics country,” Turchynov said. “I have the utmost with his religious beliefs. For them, “Oleksandr respect for all believers regardless of their Turchynov’s political intuition is intertwined denomination. The main thing is for people with Christian eschatology,”9 because he took to believe because faith makes us human. action when other politicians were at a loss Without faith a person turns into a beast that and was guided not only by common sense or rapes, kills, and believes that everyone should political expediency, but also by his faith and work for him. And by the way, one of the main morals. Hence evaluations of him are mixed: hardships this regime imposes on Ukraine is “It is very easy to assess Turchynov’s role in the destruction of the moral code.”8 since it is positive. He has proven Thus, Turchynov helped to increase himself as a negotiator and as a tribune of the religious tolerance in Ukraine, and normalize people. He was slightly wounded. During perceptions of the Baptist faith and Protestants the most critical moments of the Maidan, he in general. He became the first Baptist preacher was on the stage or somewhere nearby. But as to attract sustained media attention. Journalists acting president, the verdict on his leadership kept track of his every word. Each public is divided. Turchynov retained power sermon was followed by a media response. It legitimately (and perhaps insured Ukrainian is perhaps the only example of open mission statehood itself), but he lost the .”10 work in the public political sphere. But from Despite the fact that he gave an order a political perspective, a simple preacher was launching the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), of little interest so they were determined to he is accused of indecisiveness. Despite make Turchynov a “pastor.” It both gave him the fact that he did not allow bloodshed in authority and at the same time discredited Crimea, he is called “bloody.” This suggests, him. And he became a “pastor,” at least in the at the very least, that he is far from in favor media and in the public’s perception of him, of conformism and opportunism, and from which was shaped by the media. making choices for the sake of pleasing others. A recently disclosed transcript of a The Second Coming: The Passivist Becomes meeting of the National Security and Defense an Activist Council (NSDC) of Ukraine held on February 28, 2014 revealed that Turchynov was the only Turchynov’s second coming coincided with person who advocated declaring a state of the “Revolution of Dignity” (2013-2014) emergency. Yulia Tymoshenko commented and the subsequent war. He was one of the 9 Fionik D., Samsonova IU. Kak Aleksandr Turchinov 8 Turchinov priglasil na svoiu tserkovnuiu propoved‘. ispolnil prezidentskie obiazannosti. Zhurnal Fokus. 16.03.12 http://lb.ua/news/2012/03/16/141483_turchi- 21.06.14 // https://focus.ua/country/308310/ nov.html 10 Ibid.

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that such a decision would cause panic among demand for everything “pastor” related. The the civilian population, to which he replied, newspaper 2,000 devoted a liberal amount “There will be more panic when Russian tanks of space to describing in great detail the café are on . We must do everything “Karatel” (The Chastener) that opened in the possible to prepare to defend ourselves, even burned out building of the House of Trade if we don’t receive any military aid from the Unions and offers visitors a signature cocktail West and must do so on our own. We have to called “Bloody Pastor.”13 Thus, ‘bloody pastor’ act. Therefore, I am putting to vote the NSDC became a brand, and marketing image that resolution to declare a state of emergency. Who would sell products. “Bloody Pastor” is also is in favor? … Very well. Only Turchynov. The an online game in which Turchynov attacks resolution doesn’t pass.”11 the “vatniki” with a knife and breaks into In June 2014 Turchynov handed over Putin’s office. The game was devised by Kyiv the presidency to but he programmers. remained Speaker of Parliament. At this Meanwhile, the “pastor” has time he was the one who became known as accomplished quite a bit; among other things, “bloody,” not the newly elected president. he has written three novels: Illusion of Fear, The “pastor” ceased to be the acting president, The Last Supper and The Advent. Journalists but remained “the leader of the Kyiv junta,” point out that, “Turchynov’s personal traits according to Russian media. In reality, can easily be found in the heroes of his book “pastor” is an easier target for criticism than who are occupied with saving the planet: businessman president. the pastor of a Protestant church and his By the summer of 2014 the “bloody mentor”14. Turchynov does not hide his pastor” had become an internet meme. apocalyptic views and mysticism in his novels. According to internet headlines, the “Bloody For example, he reports that “while writing of Pastor…” “Gives Harsh Feedback to the The Advent… ‘I received so many signs that Kremlin,” “Compares Putin to Hitler,” the storyline had to change’”15. Most of all, the “Personally Inspects the Lines of Defense,” author is on the guard against the Antichrist “Inspects the ATO Zone,” “Announces an system of total control, globalism, computer Attack on ” and “Threatens Terrorists networks, the invasion of gay culture, etc. with an Assault Rifle” although he “Has That alone means he can hardly be called a Nothing to Do with the Collapse of the Ruble.” pro-Western politician. Nonetheless, it was his The name “Bloody Pastor” was even given to independence, reticence, and calm confidence, a heavily armored National Guard car and a which are grounded in his religious beliefs that brand of beer.12 (The beer is a joke: “Turchynov made him invaluable during critical moments registered a brand of beer called ‘bloody in Ukrainian history. pastor.’ It’s now being advertised on Russian After the parliamentary elections TV for free”). The jokes reflect the growing 13 Lenin v stepiakh Ukrainy. A v Karatele — krovavyi pastor i tsinichnyi bandera. Gazeta 2000. 7 aprelia 2016 11 Ctenograma zasіdannia Radi natsіonal‘noї bezpeki http://www.2000.ua/specproekty_ru/politpogoda/lenin- і oboroni Ukraїni vіd 28 liutogo 2014 roku. 23.02.16 // v-stepjah-ukrainya8-1_1460034091.htm http://www.turchynov.com/news/details/ctenograma- 14 Aleksandr Turchinov: V ozhidanii Apokalipsisa. zasidannya-rnbo-ukrayini-vid-28022014 15.11.14 http://www.dsnews.ua/politics/aleksandr-tur- 12 Pivo krovavyi pastor. 31 ianvaria 2015 http://censor. chinov-v-oshchushchenii-apokalipsisa-15112014141000 net.ua/jokes/64638 15 Ibid.

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of 2014 the hashtag #StayPastor appeared and newspapers, the “pastor” became known on immediately became popular (it was combined TV. “The ‘bloody pastor’ has conquered the with phrases such as, “Come, pastor, and internet,” said ICTV19. bring order,” “We beg you on our knees,” “We Turchynov did not become the “bloody can’t survive without your sermons,” “It’s the pastor” merely on the internet. On February first time the internet community has become 4, 2015 at a PACE (Parliamentary Assembly parishioners,” “What other speaker would of the Council of Europe) session, Deputy literally force MPs to vote?”)16. Internet users Yulia Lyovochkina accused the Ukrainian used these tactics to ask authorities to keep government of adopting the policies of the Turchynov as Speaker in the new convocation party of war, which is how the NSDC Secretary of the . received his nickname.20 Russian-controlled The internet welcomed Turchyov’s return English-language media spread the incident as secretary of the National Security and immediately. Defense Council of Ukraine with the hashtag The website Novorossia.Vision dedicated #BloodyPastorReturned. The day after his a collection of materials to the “bloody appointment on December 17, 2014, Turchynov pastor.” They claimed that Turchynov was was in a good mood and when asked whether involved with Scientology and even Satanism, he knew about his nickname “bloody pastor,” as well as, obviously, behind-the-scenes he smiled reservedly. RIA Novosti interpreted manipulators, the “Western designers of the the episode as an acknowledgement of the Ukrainian ‘revolution,’” whose goal is to name.17 “physically reduce the population of Ukraine At the same time, Komsomolskaya and turn the rest into heartless and merciless Pravda in Ukraine noted that Turchynov murderers or their silent accomplices.”21 treated his nickname very lightly but took Zvezda Broadcasting Company eagerly his faith seriously. Despite the ominous reported how the “bloody pastor” Turchynov nickname, the “bloody pastor” has a very inspires Ukrainian siloviki and how this successful branding and large social network has given rise to a new epic “about a bloody following. added pastor and the knights of Azov.”22 And here that it was the Russian media that called him the Orthodox Russia information agency “bloody” for his uncompromising stance and worriedly stated that the “insane ‘bloody harsh statements against Russia. The “pastor” pastor’ Turchynov referred to the Kuban came about because he preached in the Baptist as Ukrainian territory and is preparing to church.18 After having been recognized by the

19 Krovavyi pastor pokoril internet. 17 dekabria 2014 16 V sotsial‘nykh setiakh pol‘zovateli aktivno prizyvai- http://fakty.ictv.ua/ru/index/read-news/id/1537106 ut vlast‘ ostavit‘ spikera Verkhovnoi Rady Aleksandra 20 Ukrainian deputy from the Opposition bloc calls Turchinova na zanimaemoi dolzhnosti v novom sozyve Turchynov „the bloody pastor“ at PACE. 4.02.2015 Verkhovnoi Rady. 05 noiabria 2014 http://nbnews.com. http://www.fort-russ.com/2015/02/ukrainian-deputy- ua/ru/news/135939/ from-opposition-bloc.html 17 Turchinov znaet o svoem prozvishche „Krovavyi 21 Burya Irina. Bloody Pastor. Novorossia Vision 2015 pastor“. RIA Novosti Ukraina. 17 dekabria 2014 http:// http://novorossia.vision/en/bloody-pastor/ rian.com.ua/video/20141217/360968348.html 22 Krovavyi pastor Turchinov voodushevliaet uk- 18 Turchinov prokommentiroval svoe neofitsial‘noe rainskikh silovikov. Teleradiokompaniia „Zvezda‘. 3 prozvishche „krovavyi pastor“. 17 dekabria 2014 http:// marta 2015 http://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/ .ua/politics/482852-turchynov-prokommentyroval- content/201503030452-pcxt.htm svoe-neofytsyalnoe-prozvysche-krovavyi-pastor

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advance on Moscow.”23 loves the military and dishes out orders to The Ukrainian news channel 24 kill right and left… No doubt, Turchynov reported that the pastor has not forgotten his represents politicized extremist sectarianism. foreign brothers in faith, stating, “Oleksandr As soon as Turchynov handed power over to Turchynov, the ‘bloody pastor,’ meets with Petro Poroshenko… he went to his ‘church’ foreign chaplains.”24 “‘Pastor’ Turchynov right away and preached a sermon. The preached a sermon to NATO chaplains,” states day Turchynov was soliloquizing about Depo.ua. “Turchynov, who is a pastor himself, spirituality, his soldiers killed a five-year-old talked about the importance of faith in times girl in Slavyansk.”27 of war: ‘The only ray of light in war is a deep As if Ukraine were not enough, News of and genuine faith that gives you strength, Novorossia warned that “the ‘bloody pastor’ cleanses your soul, and heals it. Those who Turchynov is urging Turkey to join in the fight have seen the horrors of war usually become for the Crimea” and also exposed him as a peacemakers.’”25 The “pastor” also frequently “longtime agent of pro-American sects.”28 A speaks at Protestant church conferences. “people’s correspondent” clearly sees how Russia is especially concerned with these the “bloody pastor Turchynov is once again ties and the “pastor’s” spiritual influence: demonstrating his bloodthirsty nature” while “Jounalists and priests are complaining “demanding lethal weapons from the West about the expansion of overseas sects. They to drown the in blood. It was on have managed to pull off a political coup in Turchynov’s orders that artillery and missiles a neighboring country with the help of these destroyed residential areas of Slavyansk, sectarian leaders.”26 Many Russian Protestants , Yenakiyevo, , concur with this “Orthodox” concern. There and . It was on Turchynov’s orders is a selection of texts on the Ruskii Baptist that old men, women and children were website about how the “bloody pastor” killed. The dozens of people who were burned Turchynov discredits Ukrainian Baptists: alive in the House of Trade Unions “This odious figure, Oleksandr Turchynov, is and Mariupol police headquarters are on his first and foremost a Komsomol member and conscience.”29 a Ukrainian Chekist, and only then a Baptist. Despite the hysteria on the internet, it The media and the people have called him looks like the “pastor” feels he is in the right the ‘bloody pastor’… He is a monster with place heading the NSDC and will not exchange a barbaric facial expression who fanatically his position for a quieter job in the Cabinet of 23 Bezumnyi „krovavyi pastor” Turchinov nazval Kuban‘ Ministers. As his political colleagues state, “he ukrainskoi i sobralsia na Moskvu. Agenstvo analiti- personally said that he doesn’t want to be the cheskoi informatsii „Rus‘ pravoslavnaia‘. 05 marta 2015 http://rusprav.tv/bezumnyj-krovavyj-pastor-turchinov- 27 Erofeev K. Krovavyi pastor Turchinov diskreditiruet nazval-kuban-ukrainskoj-i-sobralsya-na-moskvu-20808/ ukrainskii baptizm. 22 iiunia 2015 http://rusbaptist. 24 Krovavyi Pastor Aleksandr Turchinov vstretitsia s livejournal.com/138713.html inostrannymi kapellanami. Kanal 24. 27 oktiabria 2015 28 Krovavyi pastor Turchinov prizyvaet Turtsiu vmeste http://24tv.ua/ru/krovavyj_pastor_aleksandr_turchinov_ povoevat‘ za Krym. Novosti Novorossii. 20 fevralia 2016 vstretitsja_s_inostrannymi_kapellanami_n624723 http://novorossia-novosti.com/novorossia/307351- 25 Pastor Turchinov vlashtuvav propovіd\‘ pered kape- krovavyiy-pastor-turchinov-prizyivaet-t.html lanami NATO. 28.10.15 http://www.depo.ua/ukr/life/ 29 Krovavyi Pastor Turchinov snova demonstriruet pastor-turchinov-uzhe-propovidue-pered-kapelanami- krovozhadnu^iu sushchnost\‘. Narodnyi korrespondent. nato-28102015102500 20 fevralia 2016 http://nk.org.ua/politika/krovavyiy- 26 Pastory dlia Maidana. 24.05.15 // http://anti-orange. pastor-turchinov-snova-demonstriruet-krovojadnuyu- com.ua/article/sekta/65/16028 suschnost-43433

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prime minister because he knows that he is in From the mysterious “Baptist preacher” to “Come back, pastor!”; “Thank you, pastor;” the right place.”30 and “The pastor approves” – such has been The “pastor” takes on himself the Turchynov’s path in the Ukrainian media thankless role of calling a spade a spade, “to sphere. To those within the borders of the the delight of social network users.” Some “Russian world” Turchynov remains an bloggers exclaim, “Thanks again, pastor!” insidious sectarian in politics, covered in blood and “The bloody pastor is leading us on a that he will never be able to fully wash off. crusade.”31 This not only makes him “bad,” it makes him The Russian media frequently repeat terrible, i.e. powerful, strong, and dangerous. his phrases in the form of news. For example, Not only do people hate the “pastor,” they under the heading, “The ‘Bloody Pastor’ Called also fear him. For many Russians, to fear the Russian Prime Minister Inadequate” we means to respect. find “pastoral” statements quoted openly: “I would like to remind these inadequate Kremlin The Confession of a Non-Pastor dreamers that Ukrainians had a state with Kyiv as capital long before the Despite Turchynov’s occasional attempts to settled in Moscow. Ukraine will continue to at least somehow adjust his media image to exist even after the rancor, aggression, and bring it closer to reality as he understands internal contradictions that are always part it, the distance between the virtual and the of a totalitarian regime tear apart the remains real only increases. Indeed, in the context of of the Soviet empire that bears the name of stereoptypical images of the “pastor,” few Russia.”32 journalists are interested in what the “real” In 2016 the “pastor” has become seriously Turchynov thinks of himself and how he interested in missiles. This is reflected in such wants to present himself to society. Only in eloquent headlines as, “The ‘Bloody Pastor’ rare cases when the opportunity arises for Invited NATO to Shoot Down Putin’s Bold Turchynov to talk on a confessional level, is Planes,”33 or, “The Pastor Approves! Ukraine he willing to share what he believes to be true has Successfully Tested its New Missile.”34 without getting into debates. 30 Krovavyi pastor ne promeniaet SNBO na Kabmin. His most frank interview about his 5 aprelia 2016 http://www.depo.ua/rus/politics/- life journey was published in 2001 in a krivaviy-pastor-ne-prominyae-rnbo-na-kabmin---bur- Protestant magazine, Faith and Life, which is bak-05042016155400 31 V Rossii br^iaknuli, Turchinov otvetil. So^tsset vzor- relatively unknown to secular audiences. He valo: Pastor — ty nash gero\i! 06 aprel^ia 2016 // http:// acknowledges that he had been an “ambitious newsoboz.org/politika/v-rossii-bryaknuli-turchinov- otvetil-sotsset-vzorvalo-pastor-06042016194400 social climber” since Komsomol times and was 32 Krovavyi pastor zaiavil o neadekvatnosti prem\‘era Rossii. 6 aprelia 2016 // http://inosmi.ru/poli- very surprised when educated and promising tic/20160406/236014524.html people left the Komsomol to join the Baptists. 33 Krovavyi pastor prizval NATO sbivat‘ derzkie samo- lety Putina. Ukrainski\i obshchestvenno-politicheskii His story about his first contact with the portal UKROP. 15 aprelia 2016 http://xn--j1aidcn.org/ Baptists has mystical aspects: “I decided to krovavy\i-pastor-prizval-nato-sbivat 34 Pastor odobriaet!: Ukraina uspeshno ispytala novuiu sneak into this ‘den’ to see it for myself and raketu. 26.08.14 http://www.unian.net/war/1488389- understand why young people leave ‘us’ pastor-odobryaet-ukraina-uspeshno-ispyitala-no- vuyu-raketu-foto.html to join ‘them.’ I took public transportation,

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incognito, with a tough friend. We asked lying if I said that working in politics while a neatly dressed woman at a bus stop for following the laws of God’s love is as easy as, directions to the outskirts of the city where say, operating a machine in a factory. But I am all the Baptists were banished during Soviet happy that the Lord – and He alone – kept me times. She responded, ‘Praise God! I’ve been from falling into the abyss of getting pleasure waiting here for you for quite a while. You’re from power and satisfaction from stopping at going to the house of prayer, aren’t you?’ nothing to reach a goal.”38 Seeing our bewilderment she explained, ‘I had He points to another temptation, which a dream last night that two lost souls would is to use Christian churches for political come up to me and I would show them the way purposes, when he says, “The authorities seek to salvation…”35 This testimony demonstrates support from any major social player, one of not only Turchynov’s mystic bent, but also his which - and this is no secret - is evangelical confidence that he was chosen to fulfill a big .”39According Turchynov, not only role. the authorities are guilty of this, but also the In the 1990s he was baptized on profession churches themselves that seek support and of faith. “When I was baptized that second time political influence. by full immersion, I recognized the profound What Turchynov is suggesting is not meaning of what was happening and knew a division between religion and politics or that it was the best decision of my life.”36 In church and state. On the contrary, he advocates doing so, he joined the Baptist community. for their integration, but suggests a hierarchy What was it that drew him there? “Talking to of authority and values in which God takes the Baptists I became convinced that their faith first place over state authorities and secular wasn’t excessive or superficial. I had known laws: “We don’t have to curry favor with the senior pastor, Vladimir Yakovlevich the authorities; they aren’t worthy of it. The Kunets, for a few years. I saw in him a simple, church is above politics or any authorities and approachable person who wasn’t showing it must demand from the authorities that they off. He didn’t come to God when it became act in accordance with Scripture. Of course, generally accepted but at a time when it was that doesn’t mean giving them directions. The dangerous and people had to sacrifice a great solution to the dilemma between ‘Christians deal, if not everything, for their faith.”37 and the authorities’ or ‘Christians and politics’ Imitating his spiritual mentor, Turchynov is that even in this particular sphere of human learned to live and serve everywhere “as if for activity believers should behave in a way that God.” “Until recently my social status meant is pleasing to God.”40 a great deal to me. Today I see the vanity of it The principles that Turchynov described all clearly, and I am happy that I am free from in 2001 are evident in his life, in both of his it. Something else has replaced it: you have appearances in major politics. He worked in to honestly do (as unto the Lord) whatever a party organization, in the parliament, in the you have been entrusted with… I would be Ukrainian security service, in the government, in the NSDC, and as acting president. And no 35 Strana podnimetsia s kolen, esli stanet na koleni pered Bogom. in „Vera i zhizn‘‘, 1/2001, p. 20. 38 Strana podnimetsia s kolen, esli stanet na koleni 36 Strana podnimetsia s kolen, esli stanet na koleni pered Bogom. in „Vera i zhizn‘‘, 1/2001, p. 21. pered Bogom. in „Vera i zhizn‘‘, 1/2001, p. 21. 39 Ibid., 22. 37 Ibid. 40 Ibid., 23.

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matter where he worked, it was clear that what There is one true victory and that is the victory really mattered to him was not his position but over sin. And only true faith can give us true his calling. His life is a perfect expression of power and true victory.”44 the “Protestant ethic.” Faith, in turn, should be linked to truth In his book Testimony, he writes that and so should freedom. “A person who doesn’t while his faith cost him the respect of society, it understand what freedom is cannot defend it. has helped him from within by giving him the Freedom is the daughter of truth. And truth integrity and strength to fight the temptations is God.”45 Therefore the truths of faith are the of being in power. Describing his “ministry” in foundation of his political activities. He states the state security unit, he said: “No sooner had that he starts and ends each day with prayer. the ink dried on the decree of my appointment On Sunday mornings he prepares a sermon than my opponents started screaming that and studies the Bible.46 this Baptist would destroy the secret service… His “Protestant” schedule does not They tried to use my religion as compromising ever allow for virtual reality. Turchynov material. For me compromising material is regards the media as the Antichrist’s system evidence that a person doesn’t believe in God of the propaganda of sin,47 part of a system of and therefore nothing restrains them.”41 unlimited control over society, “the one and Turchynov sees power as a temptation undivided world order,” “the human-machine and only the one who can overcome it will syndicate,” and “the ruthless e-government discover its positive possibilities. “Only the machine.”48 The main threat for him is not so person who has a spiritual core is able to resist much the “sovok,” or the neo-Soviet empire, the unseen temptations of power.”42 as it is the world government that will place That is why “God’s servant who is chosen to a mark on people’s hands and foreheads. He be in power should understand whose task writes about this in each of his books. “Then he is fulfilling, whom he is serving, and who there will be the real danger of losing the has put him in his high position. No force free will given by God; all forms of religion can withstand you if you do God’s will.”43 as attempts to know God will be dangerous So personal religious conviction qualifies to the system and therefore forbidden.”49 a political leader and makes him more Again, in this regard Turchynov does not fit trustworthy. the stereotypical image of a pro-Western agent Power must be connected to faith, of globalism and Protestantism. otherwise power turns into illusion and Turchynov’s book Testimonies, which is deceives the one who “posesses” it. As narrated in the first person, drastically alters Turchynov confesses, “Any position and any the image of him that has been created. He rank is simply an illusion of power. Any war sees himself as God’s servant in politics yet that is won, any triumph over enemies, and does not cling to his position in “the system.” any defeat of opponents is just an illusion of 44 Turchinov O. Svіdotstvo. – K.: Nadіia, 2007, p. victory. There is only one true power and that 132. is the power over personal flaws and fears. 45 Ibid., p.116. 46 Strana podnimetsia s kolen, esli stanet na koleni 41 Turchinov O. Svіdotstvo. Kyiv: Nadіia, 2007, p. 130. pered Bogom. in „Vera i zhizn‘‘, 1/2001,- p. 23. 42 Ibid., p. 131. 47 Ibid., p.264. 43 Turchinov O. Svіdotstvo. – K.: Nadіia, 2007, p. 48 Ibid., p. 262. 132. 49 Ibid., p. 268.

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Likewise, he does not aspire to a special a person who just recently was a Komsomol place in the church and is happy to preach member suddenly converts to any religion an occasional Sunday sermon. His model of but Orthodoxy, he or she has undoubtedly faith, in which everything is “simple” and been bought by the Americans (or at least “nothing excessive,” which always has room is vulnerable to charges that they have been for “sacrifice” and “service,” in which there bought by the Americans). There is a line must be “limitations” in order to “please God,” dividing the Baptists from the Orthodox, correlates with Protestant archetypes and much like there is a line dividing the West from clearly does not correspond to the stereotype “us.” Although a Baptist found himself in the of the “bloody pastor.” presidential palace in Ukraine, this is difficult to imagine in Russia, because in Russia the “Stay, Bloody Pastor”: Lessons from History rule is simple and strict: to be Russian is to be Orthodox. The “bloody pastor” is a noteworthy media The story of the “bloody pastor” is not phenomenon during a post-secular period of so much one of religion and politics, so much reconstruction of society and its relationship as their images, which are created through with religion. It is a media object, developed propaganda; and the differences which are partially from the biography of the “real” visible between Russian and Ukrainian society Oleksandr Turchynov and partially from and their relationship to propaganda. The pro- public expectations and political provocations. Kremlin media does not see propaganda as a In the post-Soviet world where, according professional and socio-political problem; they to Peter Pomerantsev, “Nothing is true and are not so much inclined to reject it as to justify everything is possible,” the image of the it as “alternative facts.” One way or another, “bloody pastor” cannot be called entirely fake. if facts are presented as uniquely alternative, At the same time it cannot be called real. it reveals the propaganda character of In spite of all of its contradictions, this informational politics. Ukrainian media do image remains in demand. The hashtag not idealize Turchynov, but leave space for #PastorStay (#ПасторЗалишайся) represents various images and interpretations. Pluralism an endorsement of a sectarian in politics. is on the side of reality, schematics on the side The media image of Turchynov expresses of propaganda. societal demand for leaders who are people Behind the image of the “pastor” there is of faith, which gives them motivation and a a complex backdrop of tangled relationships foundation, and where people are prepared to between religion and politics, in particular serve and not manipulate, where they work to the devaluation of politics because few please God rather than man. people remember the party affiliation and Ukrainians are not overly surprised political views of the “pastor.” Most interest by the rise and power of Turchynov in the is shown in his religious identity, which, in political arena since he is an example of the turn, explains his political identity. But the growing religious diversity that permeates influences work both ways. Most Protestants the political sphere. However, the same meme approve of Turchynov because he is “one of (even without the “bloody”) is an indicator for us,” i.e., they trust him without understanding Russians of something “foreign,” because if politics and despite their traditional suspicion

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 21 Michael Cherenkov

of the state and state officials. Thus, electoral a time of post-secular transformations; from politics are divided more and more according time to time it emerges from the shadows and to denominations and that is also a distinct becomes public. Even if politicians refrain phenomenon of post-secular times. The from drawing attention to their religion, the “pastor” himself does not want everyone to mass media brings it to light and makes it an like him and does not rush to be identified with object of discussion first (especially when it is a a specific party or crowd, or as ‘the voice of the minority faith), and then an influencing factor. people’. As he stated at a prayer meeting with hus, under the influence of the media, public Protestant leaders (Irpen, January 15, 2016), “I space is widened in such a way that religion made a very important decision to never think and politics can sort out their relationship in about what others will say or think of me. I the open, inviting the public to participate. just do my job and don’t want everyone to like In Ukraine, 2017 is a year of celebrating the me.” Reformation. And few will see it as a coincidence “To be liked” by some political audience that the politician and preacher Turchynov is implies “to belong to” them. The “pastor” one of the initiators and keynote speakers of wishes to remain free and extends that the large-scale R500 project celebrating the freedom to others—the freedom to think 500th anniversary of the Reformation. The anything you want about him without any project’s motto, “From Personal Reformation obligations. Therefore, when Russian Baptists to National Reformation” fully reflects the ask their Ukrainian friends, “Why didn’t you “pastor’s” views. And the personal and excommunicate Turchynov for starting a media story fully fit into the paradigm of the war?” They reply that he acted as a politician Reformation. Here the two Maidans find their and that he was free to do what he did. That spiritual justification and continuation. Here is why the Baptists of the occupied Donbas, political calling and Christian faith find their when interrogated by separatists about their reconciliation and application. The pastor and relationship with the “pastor” reply, “He is politician in one person are not only a new not one of us; he is on his own.” The long and symbol of Ukrainian Protestantism, but a real the short of it is that Turchynov is not locked challenge to the post-Soviet church and post- behind church walls and is not limited to them; Soviet society. yet he occupies a special public space between religion and politics that is still difficult to define. About the Author Thus, Turchynov as a media object has Dr. Michael Cherenkov is a professor at gone through a complex evolution. He started the Ukrainian Catholic University in . as a humble preacher, that is, an insider in Dr. Cherenkov serves as the executive field politics and part of a stigmatized religious director of Mission Eurasia Field Ministries, minority community, and then became Mission Eurasia’s national affiliate in Ukraine. the “pastor,” that is, a public religious and E-mail: [email protected] political figure. He embodies the obvious fact that religion cannot remain a private matter in

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 22 Public Religion During the Maidan Protests in Ukraine

by Tetiana Kalenychenko

Abstract A sense of public religion emerged in Ukraine during the Maidan protests at the end of 2013-2014 as religious leaders, groups and organizations played a key role in the protests and in mediating between the authorities and opposition. However, using religion as a cultural resource to shape social processes presents both opportunities and serious challenges for religious organizations. In this paper I analyze different religious manifestations during the Maidan and the consequences the protests have had for religious institutions. I focus on the different dimensions of the religious components of social change as it unfolds.

Key words: Maidan, Ukraine, religion, sociology of religion, religion and conflict, revolution.

rotests broke out in November 2013 in different religious manifestations during the Pthe heart of the capital of Ukraine when Maidan and the consequences the protests students demonstrated against ex-president have had for religious institutions using in- V. Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an Association depth interviews, context analysis of official Agreement with the European Union. The documents, and personal observations.3 protests ended in February 2014 with the shooting of activists and the formation of a new Public religion in the global age government. During that time, religion was a highly visible and influential factor. There It is easier to see the division of secular and were public prayers on the main stage of the religious domains in the European context than protests led by clergy, who were involved in in Ukraine because of social circumstances multiple activities.1 This tense situation created and practices. This European trend contrasts challenges for secular and religious institutions with other parts of the world where religion alike. Now faced with a “post-revolutionary” is increasingly present in the public sphere4. society and the transformational processes Which path is Ukraine following? Is there a underway, churches are addressing the shift to a European model or are we witnessing pressure to change2 in order to answer to the the transformation of public religion? And if needs of believers. we use the term “public religion”, how exactly A sense of public religion emerged in we can understand it and use it to build an Ukraine during the Maidan protests at the end analytical framework? of 2013-2014 as religious leaders, groups and According to Ingolf Dalferth, modern organizations played a key role in the protests societies are experiencing a different concept of and in mediating between the authorities and publicity and media representation of religion. opposition. However, using religion as a cultural resource to shape social processes presents 3 L. Fylypovych, O. Gorkusha, Narodzhena na Maida- ni – Gromadynska Cerkva, RISU http://risu.org.ua/ua/ both opportunities and serious challenges for index/studios/studies_of_religions/56419/. religious organizations. In this paper I analyze V. Babych, personal blog: http://vasyl-babych.livejour- nal.com/189931.html. 1 Viktor Yelens‘kyy: Maydan zminyuye Tserkvy, RISU: 4 Grace Davie, Europe: The exception that proves the http://www.religion.in.ua/main/interview/24423-viktor- Rule?/ The Desecularization of the world: resurgent reli- yelenskij-majdan-zminyuye-cerkvi.html gion and world politics, ed. By Peter Berger/ Ethics and 2 Ibid. Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 65.

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 23 Tetiana Kalenychenko

5 The role of religion in public life is growing and readiness for the renewed role of religion .6 It has a significant impact on public debates as an independent player in a global arena. I and asserts its role in politics, even in secular agree with P. Beyer that public religion and its European countries.7 The concept of ambient influence can be more productive when it acts faith was developed by Matthew Engelke to as a cultural resource for social and political describe the public presence of religion.8 An structures. It does not deny the current “ambience” of religion determines the context homogenous religious landscape. However, of its publicity, removing the separation of the process of crossing other spheres of social public and private spheres under conditions structure creates new ways for the religious of a transition of religion from institutional element to have an effect. to post-institutional forms.9 José Casanova If we analyze the public manifestation of argues that the term “public religion” does not religion in the case of the Ukrainian protests necessarily entail a significant systemic impact on the Maidan, we can observe some broader on society, other than defining new boundaries tendencies. N. Luhmann proposes to look between public and private spheres of society at religious subsystems in public spheres and in terms of stimulating public debate.10 in two ways: function (direct religious According to this logic, religion can find function to search for meaning, sacrality, a place in non-religious subsystems. In the and understandings of who we are etc.) and framework of my research, I refer to a key performance (when religion is applied to proposal by Peter Beyer that the globalization other systems)12. By using these markers of of society creates a new foundation for the functions and performances, we can see how public influence of religion11. Thus, religion can public religion manifested itself, and how be the source of collective duty and legitimize its direct function changed. Before I use this collective actions in the name of concrete model to analyze the Ukrainian situation, norms in two ways: institutionally by creating I consider the wider religious context and special societal systems and subsystems its specific characteristics, which created of communication and socio-culturally particular conditions for public religion as when religion acts as a cultural resource for well. other subsystems in society. The first way, institutionally, not only requires a strong De-secularization in the Ukrainian position of religion, but also the consolidation context of religious leaders, a well-organized strategy, 5 Jens Kohrsen. How religious is the new public sphere? The 72 years of communism included forced A critical stance on the debate about public religion and secularization during the Soviet period and post-secularity. in Acta Sociologica, Vol. 55, No3, 2012. p. 275 resulted in a resurgence of new religious 6 Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization. The Crom- 13 well Press Ltd, 1994, p. 104 movements in the early 1990s . After the general 7 J. Kohrsen, p. 277. period of re-distribution of property and 8 Matthew Engelke. Angels in Swindon: Public religion and ambient faith in England. in American Ethnologist, positions, religious communities stabilized. Vol. 39, No1, p. 155. 9 M. Engelke, p. 166. 12 Nicklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society. – 10 J. Casanova. Po toy bik sekulyaryzatsiyi: relihiyna ta Tr. Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore. New York: sekulyarna dynamika nashoyi hlobal‘noyi doby. – per. z Columbia University, 1982, p. 238-242. anhl. O. Panycha. Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2017, p. 21-22 13 V. Yelens‘kyy, Relihiya i «Perebudova».in Lyudyna i 11 Ibid., 71. svit, 2000 №11-12, p. 11-21

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Ukraine was always a multi-religious country Constitution). Second, there was a revival of with a large number of Christian communities religious practices and beliefs, which began in (35,709 religious organizations at the the 1990s and led to the growth of religious beginning of 201614). In such a multi-religious organizations. Lastly, religion reentered context, the Ukrainian government officially the public sphere with the public activity of upheld the separation of religion from the clergy on the Maidan. Even after the end of the state. However, the politization of religion protests, clergy were included in civil society remained. The processes, which are occurring to a far greater extent. in the religious sphere of Ukraine, can be Besides the chosen model of analysis viewed as desecularization and, according regarding the function and performance of to Peter Berger, as the revival of religion the religious element, I also introduce two and its social influence15. Berger claims that ways of dealing with the problem of religion this process is an answer to the uncertainty in the global world according to Beyer18. The of modern reality. Vyacheslav Karpov, in first way – conservative – is a typical pattern contrast, sees the process of desecularization of behavior for religious actors, where the not as secularization in reverse, but as a emphasis is on the private sphere and helping multiform social transformation in which the people heal their soul. This goes together with role of religion is growing16. Luhmann’s understanding of function: when There are three main components of religion remains in the boundaries of its first, desecularization: rapprochement among spiritual function of searching for answers. previously secularized institutions and The second way – liberal – uses the model of religious norms; revival of religious practices religious performance by Luhmann so that and beliefs; and the presence of religion in religion is involved in the process of dealing the public sphere17. All three took place after with non-religious problems; the decisions, the Maidan events of 2014. First, there was a which will be made with the involvement of rapprochement among previously secularized religious organizations will not be religious institutions and religious norms that led to the themselves. According to Beyer, the liberal implementation of several new laws, which way, or the way of performance, allows paved the way for the creation of new religious religion to break out of its own ghetto walls educational institutions, an official prison and to come back to the public scene19. He is chaplaincy, and the recognition of theological also sure that the work social justice is optional diplomas. The clergy were involved in the by the unity of traditional way – its function or process of creating new laws through the conservative strategy – with performance or All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and the liberal way, which can create new forms Religious Organizations (on the basis of the of social cooperation and new ways for the realization of the religious element as the 14 Larysa Vladychenko. Relihiyna merezha Ukray- cultural resource for other subsystems. iny: Analiz dynamiky stanom na pochatok 2016 roku, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/ana- Peter Beyer argues that there are five lytic/63066/ types of religious public influence: collective 15 Vyacheslav Karpov, Kontseptual‘nye osnovy teoryy desekulyaryzatsyy// Religion, State, Society // #2(30) 2012, p. 118. 18 Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization. The Crom- 16 Ibid., 121. well Press Ltd., 1994, p. 53-89. 17 Ibid., 123. 19 Ibid., p. 90.

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duty; the legitimization of collective action; the Maidan. The main slogan was – we are for collective mobilization; generation of values; Europe”21. and sacralization of new developments. Facing critical challenges to human rights, support for the Maidan split Protestant Periodization: from EuroMaidan to the communities, and prompted theological Heavenly Hundred rethinking of the protest and the dogma of the “power of God”. This resulted in theological Changes in the motivation and dynamics of discussions and round tables on such themes protest and religious involvement determine as “Church in a time of war”22 and “Theology the periodization of the Maidan. We can of Maidan”23. identify four stages of protest: EuroMaidan According to Denis Brylov24, it is (until the night of 30 November 2013), peaceful important to understand where the religious Maidan (30 November 2013 – 19 January 2014), factor was relevant and where religious radical Maidan (19 January 2014 – 22 February organizations acted out of their own social- 2014) and the end of Maidan (until the end of political positions. March 2014). The EuroMaidan is characterized by the participation of students and elite, but Before the 30th of November the religious without the active participation of clergy, component can be artificially involved as protest although some were present as observers motivation. Of course, there were manipulations of during the phase of the “dancing” protest. the religion question in the case of the revolution, The only active clerical participants were from and it was used by both sides of the conflict, by both, the Protestant community. The dean of the supporters and enemies of the Maidan. Some pro- Ukrainian Evangelical Theological Seminary Russian activists in the Orthodox Church stressed and pastor of the church “Holy Trinity” Denis the problems of the European choice, concentrating Kondiuk remembers: on “Sodomites of Europe» (without seeing the same problems in the Russian Orthodox Church), issues I was very skeptical about the Maidan in its of juvenile justice and the overall anti-Christian November form. I dislike contradiction, but here lifestyle of modern Europe. we were proposed a dilemma: are you supporting the EU or are you supporting the Customs Union In contrast, others, especially the head (in cooperation with Russia?)… I was disappointed of UGCC Patriarch Svyatoslav (Shevchuk) that the Christians supported Eastern integration and the head of the UOC KP Patriarch Filaret because of their fear of “homodictature” and because (Denysenko), totally supported the European they are influenced by political manipulations.20 choice of Ukrainian society. Clerical supporters

21 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, p. 14 Igor Kaluzhniy from the Protestant 22 Cerkva v umovakh viyny: khrystyyans‘ki vidpovidi New Life Church, who became an active na aktual‘ni pytannya. Chastyna 1, RISU: http://risu.org. ua/ua/index/exclusive/reportage/57729/ Maidan activist and soldier in the ATO zone 23 V UKU vidbulas‘ konferentsiya pro bohoslov‘ya in the next phase of the conflict, described the Maydanu, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/ community/conferences/65483/ EuroMaidan period as “no one thought about 24 Ekspert: “Tserkvy postaly pered vyborom: yty za Maydanom, chy namahatysya vesty yoho za soboyu”, 20 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, Tserkva na Mayda- RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/com- ni. – K: Knyhonosha,2015. p. 21. ments/54758

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of European integration spoke about a of Ukrainian Muslims “Ummah”, numerous civilizational choice and were motivated by Protestant churches and councils, as well fear of Russia taking over Ukraine, or even as Buddhists and Neopagans. While they losing its independence. In other words, they all were present on the Maidan, they acted were making a socio-political choice, not a differently with different levels of activity and religious one, and as religious leaders they involvement in the protest movement. were more likely to act as citizens of Ukraine From the 30 November to 3 December 2013, and not as representatives of some religious numerous religious organizations in Ukraine institution or tradition. and around the world issued statements. One The Euromaidan ended rapidly with of the first reactions was from senior bishops the arrival of the Berkut special forces at 4 of the Council of Independent Evangelical a.m. on 30 November to forcibly disperse Churches of Ukraine, including Leonid students. The religious component of the Padun, and first Vice-President of Church of protests came to bear the night the monks Christian-Evangelicals Mykola Sunyuk26. On gave the protesters the possibility to hide in St. 2 December 2013, a statement from bishops Michael’s Monastery and closed their gates to of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada the Berkut. The violent intervention provoked was published and on 5 December Ecumenical mobilization and changed the main motives Patriarch Bartholomew issued a statement of the protest from European integration about “the complicated situation in Ukraine”. to a desire to defend rights and stand There was also prayer support from the against violence. The dean of the Ukrainian Bishop’s Conference in Poland on 6 December Evangelical Theological Seminary and pastor 2013. of the church “Holy Trinity” Denis Kondyuk The radical Maidan phase started on 19 remembers this moment25: December 2013 with the first open confrontation between the Berkut and protesters. The Exactly at that moment (after the attack on the crowd included representatives of right-wing students – auth.) I decided to be on the Maidan; movements and football radicals, who threw not because of violations of human rights, which bricks, Molotov cocktails, and other weapons we had all the time - we were used to them -, but in the direction of security forces. During this because of the use of force against peaceful citizens. radical stage of the protests, when there were the first victims, the religious component Thereafter, representatives from multiple became most clear to society. People turned to religious organizations were on the square, priests for advice and explanations as to why including the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic this was happening, and the clergy prayed for Church, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the defenders of the Maidan and the members Kyiv Patriarchate, Ukrainian Orthodox of the Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense. Autocephalous Church, Ukrainian Orthodox However, secular protesters did not always Church of Moscow Patriarchate, Roman agree with the active clergy involvement. A Catholic Church, Spiritual Administration of young woman, 27, who was an active protester Ukrainian Muslims, Spiritual Administration and daughter of a priest who was killed, says: Religion became obvious to me on the Maidan 25 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, Tserkva na Maydani. Kyiv: Knyhonosha, 2015, p. 46 26 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, p. 35.

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when protesters started to use force and the square became a new gathering place. The when the events unfolded on Hrushevskoho core activists of the Maidan formed the first Street. People needed religion to defend their volunteer group of chaplains from religious moral views. It played a protective function leaders. in this situation. Our people in the majority consider themselves religious. Together with Public influence of religion priests, people felt more secure, morally and physically - if the priest stands before you as What role did the religion play in the a protective barrier, then you will not be shot. Maidan events? The markers of religious According to a young male activist, who was involvement were not only active clergy an atheist and worked as a translator, the and believers, but official documents and churches tried to reconcile the different parties statements by religious leaders and other to the conflict and mediate talks between the unofficial actions. What was unique was the government and the opposition. They also manifestation in two dimensions: hierarchical confirmed by their presence that the actions of (official) presence of religion on Maidan the Maidan are well-intentioned. – when clergy were involved in protest actions – and local (inclusive) – low-level The religious factor was important. Perhaps involvement of clergy with believers. The it was not decisive, but it was important for the official (hierarchical) presence was manifested spiritual support of people, for the moral side. in clerical performances on the Maidan stage, People understood that they are right in what they clerical participation in Sunday’s viche27, are doing. Due to the priests, they knew that what leading prayer from the stage, conducting they were doing was good. There was no religious sermons, and memorial services for the dead. motivation at the forefront of the Maidan, and I The highest level of religious hierarchies think it was good that there was not. There was no from different denominations represented agitation for a military solution of the situation. their religious organizations and engaged There were attempts to pacify both sides. Therefore, in talks with the authorities through the All- I believe that the church plays an important and Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious significant role. Organizations (AUCCRO). However, perhaps the most significant contribution clergy made At the end of the Maidan there were was simply their continued presence on the three days of memorial services for the Maidan. dead protesters, who would be named the All public manifestations of religion in “Heavenly Hundred”. More than 100 people this process remain important in spite of the were killed. All the funerals of the victims danger. Some priests, including those from were carried out over a period of three days the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow by various clergy, who never left the Maidan. Patriarchate, were forced to act informally Politically, the departure of Ex-President Victor Yanukovych to Russia on the night 27 Viche is an old tradition of mass communication from the Kyiv Rus period when people came together on of February 22, 2014 marked the end of the the main square in town to make decisions. That word revolution. This changed the dynamics of was used during the Maidan period because of Sunday’s large-scale talks on the main square which actually power. The Maidan lasted until spring, when where the place to make decisions.

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because of possible persecution from both the The level of morality on the Maidan in February church leadership and security forces who shocked me. I heard discussions among priests, who worked for the government. They came in lay talked about how to ban alcohol and abuse people in clothing without any religious signs to indicate a most effective way. I will explain: they did not who they were. Protesters were intimidated and allow newcomers to swear. That was another form threatened with arrest by text messages, social of influence on people by the church.29 media, and during informal talks. Because of the politicized religious environment, some The creation of moral codes, according to bishops and senior members of the clergy Beyer, is common practice for global , suffered at different levels for their open which unite religious communication and support of the revolution, especially at the social problems30. Such moral codes, which are beginning when it was not clear whether it a privileged form of social regulation, inform would be successful or not. This indicates that the law and social norms of society. In the religion can be public, but not always on an context of the protest, such moral codes played official level or even on a visible level. The co- the role of a symbolic compass, which pointed organizer of the prayer tent, Oles’ Dmytrenko, the way to which decisions are right and emphasized the initiatives in the creation of should be accepted. One of the main markers religious communities on Maidan: of such moral codes was discovered in official statements by religious organizations31 and Further Protestant services on the Maidan were AUCCRO32 with an appeal to the government initiated not by bishops, not by the heads of to stop the violence33. organizations, but by active youth from different The moral judgement of actions and Kyiv churches. The lack of an actual reaction, decisions is another way in which religion concrete position, and elementary love of our impacts the legitimization of collective country on the part of key leaders sincerely made action as a direct statement about what is me angry. We were waiting and waiting for our right, because it reaffirms values (which bishops to make their statements. They stayed are generated with religious involvement, silent. Popular spiritual leaders disappeared in one but not religious in and of themselves). moment. 28 Despite official statements and public support for activists from different religious Moral codes and the ways of religious organizations, the legitimization of collective manifestation

29 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, p. 256. Public religion as a source of collective duty 30 Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization.The Crom- emerged when the clergy tried to change or well Press Ltd., 1994, p. 83. 31 Glava UGCC nahadav pro «vsyu povnotu establish the moral rules of life on the Maidan. vidpovidal‘nosti za te, shcho vidbuvayet‘sya v krayini, Lesya Kotvytska, an active believer and RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/state/natio- nal_religious_question/55369/ medical activist on the Maidan, recalled those 32 Zayava VRTsiRO z pryvodu eskalatsiyi nasyl‘stva u discussions by spiritual leaders: Kyyevi: http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/statements/370-state- ment-about-escalation-of-violence-in-kyiv 33 Patriarkh Filaret zaklykav prypynyty nasyllya I poperedyv Yanukovycha pro nayvyschu miru yoho 28 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, Tserkva na Mayda- vidpovidal’nosti, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ ni. – K: Knyhonosha,2015. – p. 54. all_news/state/national_religious_question/55370/

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action was additionally manifested through Razumkov Center36). the renewal of the traditional spiritual function Clergy from AUCCRO and the Spiritual (conservative way of acting). Council of Maidan took responsibility for That function meant long-term negotiations between Maidan and government conversations with protesters from both sides representatives as a means of mobilization as well as help for those who experienced for action. Religious leaders encouraged trauma, which was frequently connected with people to start to establish a dialogue, and spiritual services and even evangelization. The not to “betray” the Maidan and to continue main place for such activity were prayer tents, to peacefully protest. Then Bishop Stanislav which were interreligious and everyone could Shyrokoradyuk of the Roman-Catholic ask for help34. Moreover, the clergy took on Church asked for permission from the people the responsibility to discuss the reasons and on the stage for the opposition to speak with the goals of the protest for Maidan activists the government, because it was prohibited and for representatives from the opposing before. side (Anti-Maidan, internal forces). At the Religious activists and clergy created moment of the protest not only believers an opportunity to form a collective identity37 asked the clergy for help, some of them were as being a part of “revolutionary” society, just looking for moral support, as volunteers an imagined community associated with the from the prayer tent state: change from passive to active social action. After the end of the Maidan it was shared by People on Maidan were traumatized…Volunteers official authorities and by unofficial, influential with jackets “Pray for Ukraine” helped them to sources through the mass media, clergy, cope, they were special. Their mobility helped the volunteers and others. There were frequently mission as well; most activists from the Right asked existential questions, addressed to Sector and Self-Defense did not have enough time clergy such as “who are we?” and “why we to stand near the stage and listen to the priests35. are here?”. But a collective identity was also formed by cultural actors (poets, singers, The involvement of public religion journalists, artists etc.), opinion leaders (who on Maidan was wider and included all the shared their views on social media) and volunteer functions – from the preparation political and business elites. of tea and sandwiches to the building of The activity by spiritual actors, who were barricades. Protesters, many of them non- trying to understand events theologically, religious, said that it was a chance to see the became part of the creation of values for clergy not in a traditional way, but as part of the new public space. There were not only the population. Such inclusive activity might discussions about new values and frameworks be one of the key factors in raising the level for understanding civil society, but also of trust in the Church among the population public declarations of religious actors as the (at the level of 57%, according to the data by

36 Relihiya, Tserkva, suspil‘stvo i derzhava: dva roky pislya Maydanu, - informatsiyni materialy Tsentru 34 Molytva na Maydani, CREDO: http://www.credo-ua. Razumkova vid 26.05.2016 org/2013/12/106879 37 A. Melucci. The process of collective identity// Social 35 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, p.57. Movements and Culture/ Minneapolis, 1995, p. 26.

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generators of values. According tothe clergy influence on the Maidan aim not only for and believers, the protest was understood as theological explanations, but also a response a war between good and evil, which is why from society to the need for the sacralization religion bore new values for society.38 Such of the new developments in modern history. rhetoric is closely connected with another type The Heavenly Hundred and the “Revolution of influence –sacralization of the new turn of of Dignity” became part of the rhetoric about history – which became a “revolution”. the new renewal of the Ukrainian nation. This The book “Stones of Maidan” by priest discourse is also shaped by public religion. Mykhailo Dymyd39, who actively took part According to Immanuel Wallerstein41, there in the protest and gave sermons in Lviv is a need for transcendence and teleological and on Kyiv stages, could be regarded as globalization in order to unite society and an example of sacralization of the Maidan establish common goals. In the modern events. The Maidan barricades for him are the world, if a society is not living in crisis, it is “body of Christ”, a springboard for the battle harder to discover the “good” forces without between good and evil for Maidan activists.” having a concrete “evil”. An appellation The spiritual essence of the Maidan and the to Christian theology includes Satan as the changes that came after it is the resurrection marker of God’s presence and salvation, and baptism of people. The author focuses on and the transcendental element plays a role personal responsibility and for each course in guaranteeing moral norms. Another way of events, refers to the concept of “internal of returning religion to the public sphere is Maidan”, which secular leaders began to through the demonstration of what is good consider later. and what you have to achieve42. Protesters from , who The manifestation of the religious were used to the public presence of priests element on the Maidan was observed in its in their everyday lives, especially appealed “ideal type” which people saw in mass media to clergy. Father Ivan Galio from Sambirsko- and in memories as a “common feeling of eparchy remembers: spirituality, rightness” post-institutional and ambient. Charles Taylor emphasizes They asked me, Father, pray for me. I read “Our that social connections through the spiritual Father”, gave them cross to kiss, anointed them, practices are still strong, despite individual or and asked their names and tried to support them privatized understandings of religion43. Thus, morally. I urged them that I would be praying people are still looking for a special occasion for them to not lose their good mood, as spiritual to live together with the feeling that there is support gives people physical strength as well. That something bigger than they are. Activists was the mission for priests on the Maidan40. spoke of such feelings after the protest as well as a special bond and desire for something Different interpretations of religious bigger. That feeling is also described by Victor

38 U Toronto obhovoryly dukhovni tsinnosti Maydanu, 41 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Econo- UCU: http://ucu.edu.ua/news/17987/ my. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1979. 39 Kalenychenko T.A, Kontent-analiz knyhy «Kaminnya 42 P. Beyer, p. 85. Maydanu», Naukovyy chasopys NPU im. Drahomanova 43 Charles Taylor, The Secular Age// The Belknap Press №34 (47) of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets 40 O. Hordyeyev, T. Mukhomorova, p. 218. and London, 2007, p. 516

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Yelenskyi: Coming back to the two approaches to the public manifestation of religion – If we put aside the sacramental aspect of the problem, conservative and liberal –, the conservative then prayers and worship on Maidan entail the approach to fulfilling religious functions can creation of a special spiritual space, which not only be seen as concentrated in spiritual services, as unites that insight, but also legitimizes the mature well as in answers on the existential questions and complete community of people on Maidan44 of believers or ordinary people. By contrast, the liberal approach, which develops together Therefore, all the five types of public with society and social movements, foresees religious involvement took place on the religion on the public stage. Typically, Maidan, sacralizing social changes. Religious in such instances religious organizations organizations and leaders were looking for a have to choose between two approaches: new place for themselves. But even this desire particularism, which means realizing could not be fully realized for several reasons. their own interests as institutions (which If we look at the situation after the end of the can frequently result in the politicization protest, we can see concrete examples of this. of religion) or choosing the approach of ecumenism, which means to give answers The results of the “revolution”: to profound questions from society together ecumenism or particularism? with other religious groups 45. When religious leaders forget the needs of their own spiritual The unusual context of the Maidan, spiritual group and are united, it is easier for them to and emotional elation, created a space for cooperate in a globalized social context. The changes for religious organizations. Experts, ecumenical approach is based on religion as a journalists and clergy frequently remembered cultural resource for other subsystems, when that precisely during the protest they were groups are not closed on their own. In this united, had mutual goals and were moving case, the mutual movement is active without to reach them and did not see the differences one form of institutionalization. Peter Berger among themselves. Nevertheless, future understands ecumenism as the way to find outcomes after the end of the Maidan have brothers in dealing with a concrete problem shown that such feelings were short-lived. and to rationalize one’s own struggle in a During the public prayer on the stage you globalized world46. This automatically results could see the activists in the crowd, who put in more success, in contrast to a situation, on headphones in a demonstrative manner, when someone grabs the biggest piece of the but did not protest against the priests pie. openly. Additionally, not all the religious Social processes of seeking new organizations supported Maidan. That is why authorities under conditions of reinforced the spiritual meaning of the protest became a dissatisfaction with the social and point of division for some partner institutions economic needs of society may generate or among ministers on a personal level. new religious movements and provoke 44 Viktor Yelens‘kyy: Solidarnist‘ tserkov pered nas- tupom vlady – krytychno vazhlyva skladova yikhn‘oyi 45 P.Beyer, p. 97. spravzhn‘oyi nezalezhnosti», RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/ 46 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy. Elements of socio- index/expert_thought/interview/55166/ logical theory of religion// Doubleday, 1990, p. 141

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ecumenism47. The ecumenical movement, to goods, maintaining the old model of official which religious leaders would call an example religion and sacralized power. This, however, of “real unity on Maidan”, reached a new has led to the loss of authority for some stage of development during the revolution. religious organizations and undermined the However, its expression even on the level trust, which was earned during the protests. of religious groups will not nourish new The politicization of religious movements, but create balance in informal communities has especially aggravated the networks of horizontal cooperation between relationships between the UOC MP and religious leaders and activists due to issues UOC KP, UGCC and Orthodox communities, of trust during critical situations. Shared as well as different Muslim and Protestant values and a willingness to take risks communities, while strengthening the generated these informal networks. However, dichotomy of “friend or foe” and redistributing ecumenical expressions began to decrease the influence of religious organizations. It after the revolution and were limited to has also strengthened horizontal networks several statements and aspirations of leaders of cooperation between people of different of churches. A new level of conflict also religions. These aspects are noted in an analysis came about. Interinstitutional conflicts were of the decline of ecumenism by theologian and generated by the weakening of the central sociologist Cyrill Hovorun: government, resulting in a loss of common purpose48 and a sense of emergence of a much Hostility and discord as a comfort zone for churches more profound conflict in the country. This is were created during the period of independence a typical transition, as defined by Pareto, when and have not gone away. Now the churches are “the old law died and the new one is not yet returning to these zones - to their fundamental born”. In this situation society falls back on the identities. But this return does not coincide with old familiar system. The same process affected the aspirations of society, since the social demand religious networks in Ukraine, when they for church unity is growing. I think that Ukrainian were faced with the challenge of publicity and society is still very religious and will not become involvement in society. During their search secular in the near future. But the churches are for a new place and “open ecumenism”, they not the points of unity for it. I do not want to talk returned to older patterns of behavior in some about specific examples or about all the churches in cases after the “revolutionary” events. a single definition and emphasize particular roles, The tendencies to theologize politics and but there is a definite general trend. However, there politicize theology are especially visible in the are of course churches whose contribution to the globalized world, where there are political- unity of the Ukrainian society is constructive and religious group49. Religious and political positive.50 leaders see the direct benefits of this strategy – they receive mutual legitimization and access Changes after crisis 47 Vilfredo Pareto. Transformatsyya demokratyy (sbor- nyk)/ Terrytoryya budushcheho, M.: 2011, p. 28 Protestant theologian and professor Cherenkov 48 V. Pareto, p. 30 49 Roland Robertson, Joann Chirico, Humanity, 50 Vorozhnecha ta rozbrat zalyshayut‘sya zonamy kom- Globalization and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A fortu dlya ukrayins‘kykh tserkov – o. Kyrylo Hovorun, theoretical exploration, Sociological Analysis, 46, 1985, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/inter- p. 238. view/62242/

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sees similar tendencies and oppositions within social institutions, their public influence and the religious environment. According to him, ability to intervene socially is partial. Ukrainian religious organizations define This has led to the rapid rise of social themselves in terms of opposition to other services and volunteering, the rapid organizations, and the Maidan showed the development of the military chaplaincy fallacy of such a strategy. He writes: and an enhancement of medical and prison chaplaincy through horizontal networks of But I worry that these “home” activities will be cooperation. These are some of the successful fruitless. Gone are the days when identity was examples of cooperation between public produced by a church in a closed mode. Now religious and social movements. Their chances it is being formed in an open environment of of success increase when they move from ecumenism… But we still partially live in a an institutionalized form into spontaneous nineteenth-century paradigm. We adhere to the volunteering. Other social initiatives, which ideas of a unified local church or a nation state, are realized together with religious groups which are based on immediate and permanent and non-governmental institutions, such dependence on ethnicity, language, and religion51. as for palliative aid and dealing with HIV/AIDS or work with international The Maidan exposed the problem as a crisis of charitable religious foundations, such as religious affiliation and the churches’ inability Caritas, ADRA or Mission “Pope for Ukraine”, to meet social needs. An earlier Ukrainian have also been successful. If we analyze those researcher A. Bureyko wrote52 that the crisis initiatives as new social movements, we see of religious identity provoked an acute phase that they can propose constructive solutions of transition to a new stage of development, to social problems, which Ukrainian society which not only created the conditions of is facing, especially during this transitional external aggression, armed conflict, but also period. J. Beckford believes such social social institutions, which are deeply connected movements will be especially powerful, if with the spiritual factor. they use religion as a cultural resource and An appeal to nonviolence on the Maidan if religious groups embrace a liberal way of resulted in the recovery of the churches’ responding to the challenges of a globalized moral authority, allowing their influence world. to affect civil orientations in the process of social transformation. Later, the increase in Conclusions competition and conflicts between religious structures and their ambiguous positions The phenomenon of public religion was led to a certain loss of prestige and leverage. manifest during the Maidan events, whereby Although the level of trust in religious the religious component acted as a cultural institutions is still one of the highest among all resource for Ukrainian society in the process of transforming identity thanks to the leveling 51 Mykhaylo Cherenkov: Pid chas Maydanu relihiya of differences among the main religious bula myrotvortsem, a pid chas viyny stala mobilizato- rom, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/ groups. However, the experience of living in interview/61746/ “sacral unity” was short-termed. There was a 52 Shul‘ts É.É. Teoryya sotsyal‘nykh dvyzhenyy: proble- my teoryy y praktyky/ Nyzhnyy Novhorod, 2014, p. 56. loss of unity and increase in competition in the

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religious sphere after the “revolution”, while turn away from the liberal way of cooperation religion was also politicized in a conservative and integration into social structures. They way. This reversed the effects of the chosen choose instead competition and attempt to liberal way of involvement characterized widen their own spheres of influence. This by ecumenical cooperation, where religion has resulted in a risk of new conflicts in the served as a cultural resource for non-religious religious sphere and in conflicts between systems of society. religious and secular groups. To mitigate such According to Beyer, social movements risks, society needs a balanced strategy to deal with religious components will create wider with the manifestations of public religion, opportunities for building bridges and covering which respond to the needs of Ukrainian the gap between function and performance society, and yet will not crosscut the creation (conservative and liberal strategies)53. This of new moral codes in the sphere of law and way of thinking also has some risks for public government. religion, because religious actors can promote The case of the return of the religious their values, which might run contrary to component to the public sphere in Ukrainian social norms, instead of adding to them. Such protests is demonstrative of a resource for the a situation can create conflicts. Society can be development new social structures. The key ready to allow religious influences in some conclusion here is the need for a balanced frameworks, which creates an uncomfortable strategy, which will unite the liberal practice situation for religious actors because they of public religion through ecumenism, while have to balance their influence on social issues not denying each religious community’s and their allegiance to their beliefs. Davie traditional spiritual function. Still, such agrees that frequently a public role of religion cooperation between secular and religious is possible and even desirable for citizens54. domains requires a systematic approach as The main barrier in establishing this is the lack well as a response to strong demands from of direct contact between churches and the society. Religious activists are not yet ready to people. respond to all these public demands and to fill The result of the social-political conflict the gaps, because they too need to change. in Ukraine was new social movements, some of which used religion as a cultural resource. Their success depended on cooperation with About author: non-religious actors and organizations, as Tetiana Kalenychenko – PhD student at the well as with other religious movements. The Cultural Studies Department in the Sociology other important aspect is cooperation with of Religion at the National Pedagogical governmental institutions, which guarantees Dragomanov University, journalist at the the stability of their work and legitimizes it. Religious-Informational Service of Ukraine. While the Ukrainian government has Main professional interests: sociology and attempted to maintain a balance by trying anthropology of religion, religion and conflicts, to keep partnerships with a multi-religious religious diplomacy and peacebuilding. community, the religious groups frequently

53 P.Beyer, p. 108. 54 Davie, p. 83

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25. Charles Taylor, The Secular Age. The materialy Tsentru Razumkova vid 26.05.2016 Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 10. Ekspert: “Tserkvy postaly pered Cambridge, Massachusets and London, 2007. vyborom: yty za Maydanom, chy namahatysya 26. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist vesty yoho za soboyu”, RISU: http://risu.org. World-Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge ua/ua/index/expert_thought/comments/54758 University, 1979. 11. U Toronto obhovoryly dukhovni 27. Iryna Zherebkyna. Treshchyna natsyy/ tsinnosti Maydanu, UCU: http://ucu.edu.ua/ Synyy dyvan, fylosofsko-teoretycheskyy news/17987/ zhurnal. M.: Try kvadrata, 2014, p. 26. 12. Zahalʹne dlya vsikh nas – tse Ukrayina: ridnoviry provodyatʹ svoyi slavlennya na Other sources: Maydani, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/article_ 1. V. Babych, personal blog: http://vasyl- print.php?id=54683&name=reportage&_ babych.livejournal.com/189931.html lang=ua& 2. L. Fylypovych, O. Gorkusha, Narodzhena 13. Yevreyi na Maydani. Kursy yudayiky na Maidani – Gromadynska Cerkva, RISU i zaklyky ne vestysya na brekhnyu pro http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/studios/studies_ “antysemityzm”, Texty.org: http://texty.org. of_religions/56419 ua/pg/news/textynewseditor/read/51534/ 3. Cerkva v umovakh viyny: khrystyyansʹki Jevreji_na_Majdani_Kursy_judajiky_i_ vidpovidi na aktualʹni pytannya. Chastyna 1, zaklyky RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/exclusive/ 14. «Vid uchora na Maydani diye reportage/57729/ mizhkonfesiynyy namet», RISU: http://risu. 4. V UKU vidbulasʹ konferentsiya pro org.ua/ua/index/exclusive/reportage/54520/ bohoslovʺya Maydanu, RISU: http://risu. 15. Relihiya, Tserkva, suspilʹstvo i derzhava: org.ua/ua/index/all_news/community/ dva roky pislya Maydanu, - informational conferences/65483/ materials by Razumkov sociological survey 5. Glava UGCC nahadav pro «vsyu povnotu from 26.05.2016 vidpovidalʹnosti za te, shcho vidbuvayetʹsya v 16. Mykhaylo Cherenkov: Pid chas Maydanu krayini, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_ relihiya bula myrotvortsem, a pid chas viyny news/state/national_religious_question/55369/ stala mobilizatorom, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ 6. Zayava VRTsiRO z pryvodu eskalatsiyi ua/index/expert_thought/interview/61746/ nasylʹstva u Kyyevi: http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/ 17. Ukrainian Truth, Za ES progolosuvalo b statements/370-statement-about-escalation-of- bilshe ukrainciv, nizh za Mytnyi Soyuz, yakby violence-in-kyiv buv referendum: http://www.pravda.com.ua/ 7. Patriarkh Filaret zaklykav prypynyty news/2013/03/18/6985791/ nasyllya I poperedyv Yanukovycha pro 18. Viktor Yelensʹkyy: Solidarnistʹ tserkov nayvyschu miru yoho vidpovidal’nosti, RISU: pered nastupom vlady – krytychno http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/state/ vazhlyva skladova yikhnʹoyi spravzhnʹoyi national_religious_question/55370/ nezalezhnosti», RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/ 8. Molytva na Maydani, CREDO: http:// index/expert_thought/interview/55166/ www.credo-ua.org/2013/12/106879 19. Viktor Yelensʹkyy: Maydan zminyuye 9. Relihiya, Tserkva, suspilʹstvo i derzhava: Tserkvy, RISU: http://www.religion.in.ua/ dva roky pislya Maydanu, - informatsiyni main/interview/24423-viktor-yelenskij-

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majdan-zminyuye-cerkvi.html 26. Nykolay Danylevych: Khrystos nas 20. Maksym Vasin. Perspektyvy rozvytku obʺedynyaet, a polytyka razʺedynyaet, relihiynoho zakonodavstva Ukrayiny: Pravoslavne Ternopillya, Church.ua: http:// http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/expert_thought/ .church.ua/2015/10/22/nikolaj- analytic/63473/ danilevich-xristos-nas-obedinyaet-a-politika- 21. Viktor Yelensʹkyy: Tsʹoho roku tserkva razedinyaet/ vpershe za dovhyy chas otrymala seryoznykh 27. Patriarkh Filaret: «Pravoslavʺya zberehlo konkurentiv u sferi lyudsʹkoyi doviry ta ukrayinsʹku natsiyu», Cerkva.Info: http:// lyubovі, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/ www.cerkva.info/uk/news/patriarkh/1966- expert_thought/interview/62091/ patr-slovo-konfer.html 22. RISU, Verkhovna Rada ukhvalyla zakony 28. Vladyka Borys Gudzyak: «My khochemo proty domashnʹoho nasyllya, vrakhuvavshy pereyty do «terytoriyi hidnosti», CREDO: pozytsiyu Rady tserkov: http://risu.org.ua/ua/ http://www.credo-ua.org/2013/12/107384 index/all_news/state/legislation/65172/ 29. Report by Public Sociology Lab, 23. RISU, VRTsiRo zasudyla zminy do Moscow, 2016: http://ps-lab.ru/wp-content/ Kodeksu trudovykh zakoniv shchodo uploads/2015/04/UkraineReport.pdf «hendernoyi identychnosti» ta «seksualʹnoyi 30. Ummah, Zvernennya z pryvodu oriyentatsiyi»: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_ podiy 30 lystopada v Kyyevi: http://umma. news/community/religion_and_society/61734/ in.ua/?p=1054 24. RISU, Ukrayintsi naybilʹshe doviryayutʹ 31. Mykhaylo Yakuovych, Ukrayinsʹki Tserkvi, ne doviryayutʹ vladi, opozytsiyi ta musulʹmany na Maydani, RISU: http://risu.org. ZMI: http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/all_news/ ua/ua/index/expert_thought/analytic/55566/ community/social_questioning/65150/ 32. Vorozhnecha ta rozbrat zalyshayutʹsya 25. Larysa Vladychenko. Relihiyna merezha zonamy komfortu dlya ukrayinsʹkykh tserkov Ukrayiny: Analiz dynamiky stanom na – o. Kyrylo Hovorun, RISU: http://risu.org.ua/ pochatok 2016 roku, RISU: http://risu.org. ua/index/expert_thought/interview/62242/ ua/ua/index/expert_thought/analytic/63066/

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 38 Religious Rhetoric, Secular State? The Public References to Religion by Ukraine’s Top Politicians (1992–2016)

by Alla Marchenko

Abstract This article explores the dynamic and static aspects of the public agenda of Ukraine’s top politicians with respect to their attachment to religion and religiosity. The author analyzes official greetings conveyed by the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament between 1992 and 2016. The key questions of this research refer to the possible shifts in Ukraine’s public agenda toward “political de-secularization” and the imposed role of the Orthodox Christian vision of the religious sphere in Ukraine. Applying content and critical-discourse analysis, the author examines the patterns of interactions of public politics and religion: from sporadic declarations to the “recycling of tradition” and embedding religious concepts in political life.

Key words: political de-secularization, Ukraine, political greetings, religion in politics.

Introduction1 Over the years Independence Day has also gained in popularity and is now regarded fter the collapse of communism, Soviet as an important holiday by 20 percent of Atraditions endured in independent Ukrainians. Ukraine such as top politicians extending According to a survey conducted by New Year’s Eve greetings to the people. the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology At the same time, the new state needed to in May 20163, 80 percent of respondents establish new customs and holidays (“invent” confirmed they were Christians. According traditions, in the words of Eric Hobsbawm). A to official statistics in 2011, the majority of glance at the list of Ukrainian state holidays the parishes in Ukraine (70%) belonged to in 2016 reveals both religious and secular the Orthodox Church, 13% to the Greek- holidays. According to a sociological poll Catholic Church, 10% to Evangelical Baptism, conducted in Ukraine in February 2016, the 6% to the Pentecostal Church, while the most popular holidays in Ukraine are Easter, remaining 10% of Christian organizations Christmas, New Year’s, and International are dispersed among various entities, e.g. Women’s Day. This is much different from the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox the situation in 2012, when Ukrainians called Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh New Year’s Daytheir favorite holiday2. Day Adventists, Roman Catholics, etc. It is 1 Acknowledgements: I express my sincere gratitude to worth noting that these trends remain more the reviewers and commentators of the previous versions of this paper at the workshop „Public Religion, Ambient or less stable in the post-Soviet period. Faith. Religion and Politics in the Black Sea Region“ held The vast majority of all Christians declare in Kyiv on 29 September – 1 October, 2016 and at the Final ASCN conference „Bringing the Strands Together: New Prospects for the Social Sciences“ held in Tbilisi, stochastic sample is representative for the population of Georgia, on 18-19 November, 2016. Ukraine aged 18 and above, except those territories that 2 The survey conducted by the Kyiv International are not controlled by Ukraine. Institute of Sociology “Attitude of the Ukrainians toward 3 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology’s Survey national holidays”. Press release by Tetiana Piaskovska “Religious Self-Identification and Prayer in Ukraine”. - http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=6 Analytical Report by Olena Bogdan. - http://kiis.com.ua 19&page=1. /?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=638&page=1. The sample Sample consisted of 2020 respondents who live in all consisted of 2014 respondents from all administrative regions of Ukraine (including Kyiv) and in Crimea, and regions; its description is the same as in the previous were surveyed through face-to-face interviews. The footnote.

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 39 Alla Marchenko

their affiliation with the Orthodox Church with the European Union6 were pursued by either of Moscow or Kyiv Patriarchates, whose traditional means, including religious services parishes by far outnumber those of other attended by members of various religious Christian denominations. denominations. The significant human losses In fact, Orthodox and Greek-Catholic that have occurred since the beginning of Churches in Ukraine use the same religious 2014, when a hundred people, the so-called vocabulary, symbolism, and calendars, “Heavenly Hundred,” were shot by police which makes a general Christian discourse during the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv geared towards the nation’s majority possible. and as a result of the ongoing war in eastern There are far more tensions inside Ukrainian Ukraine, where at least 10,000 people have Orthodoxy, which is divided between the been killed according to the numerous reports Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates. The latter is of the United Nations7, could foster appeals treated as “Pro-Ukrainian”, and the former to God and religion as reference points in the - as “Pro-Russian” according to the location situation of danger and ambiguity. In other of Patriarchs and their ideological position words, these deaths have sparked a popular towards political processes in Ukraine turn toward God and religion. (“Euromaidan” protests, annexation of Crimea, The policy of “de-communization” that ongoing military conflict in Donbas), so that was introduced after the Euromaidan protests the general number of Orthodox Christians by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory under the Kyiv Patriarchate in Ukraine has and which was aimed, among other things, at increased from 34% of the general population removing Soviet symbols from the landscape in 2010 to 49% in 20164, and the number of those and toponymy of Ukraine8, inevitably touched under the Moscow Patriarchate decreased on the question of holidays. International somewhat, from 18% in 2010 to 12% in 2016. Women’s Day, celebrated on March 8, and One should also mention the relatively small Victory Day, marked on May 9, became the Muslim, Jewish and Buddhist communities target of both criticism and defense in many (less than 1% for each community) in Ukraine. groups on official and informal levels9. Such The total number of religious organizations in debates not only signal the special political Ukraine stands at around 35’000. importance of any national holiday, but also As Serhii Yekelchyk writes, the paradox emphasize the “recycling of tradition” in terms between the wish of the Orange Revolution of rethinking “what people do with ways of reformers to develop cross-national sensitivity thinking and acting that no longer quite work, and adopt the language of moderate 6 The objective of the public protests was to call for the nationalists reflected a major trend in recent signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and Ukraine’s history5. This trend emerged the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). during the Euromaidan protests, when the 7 Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine demonstrators’ goals of further integration (16 November 2016 to 15 February 2017) http://www. un.org.ua/images/stories/17th_HRMMU_Report_ENG. pdf 4 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology’s Survey 8 The full text the law is available at the website of the “Religious Self-Identification and Prayer in Ukraine”. Institute of National Memory - http://www.memory. Analytical Report by Olena Bogdan. - http://kiis.com.ua/ gov.ua/laws/law-ukraine-condemnation-communist- ?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=638&page=1 and-national-socialist-nazi-regimes-and-prohibition- 5 Yekelchyk, S. Ukraine. Birth of a Modern Nation. propagan Oxford, 2007. 9 Covered by all major Ukrainian media sources.

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and with the remains of an infrastructure that tendencies illustrate the process of “social de- is no longer maintained”10. secularization” in contemporary Ukraine. It is impossible to ignore Bryan Turner’s The concept of a “post-secular society”15 definitions of “political secularization” and in the case of Ukraine may be debated16, as “social secularization.” The former refers the relationship between religion and public to the state regulation of religious life and politics is far more complicated. The most signifies a subordinate relationship between important religious holidays (above all those these two entities, while the latter has to associated with the Orthodox Christian do with personal religious choice11. The tradition) have been marked by public, opposite process, de-secularization, is a on-camera appearances of Ukraine’s top form of counter-secularization12, whereby politicians. Given that religious and secular “social de-secularization” can be followed by holidays of state importance (for example political de-secularization, and vice versa. A Independence Day) feature speeches and national monitoring poll conducted in March official greetings conveyed by politicians 201613 showed that a majority of Ukrainians to the people of Ukraine, the televised and consider themselves “believers” and that much-reported Euromaidan protests opened percentile actually depends on the region up new opportunities for rethinking state- of Ukraine - from 93% in western Ukraine religion connections17. to 56% in . The number of This article focuses on the extent and those attending religious services has actually characteristics of the place of religion and increased - from 49% in 2000 to 58% in 2016. religiosity in political greetings expressed As Yelensky argues, “a notable feature of the on secular occasions. Can we observe any new cultural climate in Ukraine is that religion shifts in this agenda toward or away from the has met with strong social approval and religious sphere during the years of Ukraine’s has become a sort of legitimising behavior, independence? Can the process of secular- the mark of a respectable citizen”14. Such religious interaction in public speeches be 10 Luerhrmann, S. ‘Recycling Cultural Construction: characterized as “political de-secularization,” Desecularization in Post-Soviet Mari El.’ Religion, State during which the Euromaidan became a and Society 33, no. 1, pp. 37.. 11 Turner, B. ‘Religion in a Post-secular Society.’ In turning point? What are the consequences The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of of this for contemporary Ukraine, taking Religion, edited by B. S. Turner Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.; Malden, Mass., 2010.1. ‘Religious Speech: The into account its trend toward “social de- Ineffable Nature of Religious Communication in the secularization”? Some scholars have Information Age.’ Theory, Culture & Society 25, nos. 7–8: 219–35. compared Ukraine’s religious situation to 12 Karpov, V. ‘Desecularization: A Conceptual Frame- work.’ Journal of Church and State 52, no. 2, 2010, pp. the American denominational model with 232–70. its plurality, rather than European countries 13 Religion and Church in Ukrainian Society. Sociolo- gical Research. - http://old.razumkov.org.ua/upload/Re- ligiya_200516_A4.compressed.pdf The sample consisted - Volume 38 (10), pp. 213-227. of 2018 respondents who live in all regions of Ukraine 15 Habermas, J. ‘Notes on Post-Secular Society. New (including Kyiv) and in Crimea and were surveyed Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4, pp. 17–29. through face-to-face interviews. The stochastic sample is 16 Beckford, J.A. Public Religions and the Postsecular: representative for the population of Ukraine aged 18 and Critical Reflections // Journal of Scientific Study of above, except those territories that are not controlled by Religion, 2012. - № 51 (1), pp. 1-19. Ukraine. 17 Wanner, C. ‘Orthodoxy and the Future of Secularism 14 Yelensky, V. Religiosity in Ukraine according to after the Maidan in Ukraine.’ Euxeinos, no. 17 (2015), Sociological Surveys // Religion, State and Society, 2010. pp 8–13.

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Figure 1. Distribution of the greetings among the holidays and political positions.

with their adherence to a particular church18. Christmas (as well as religious holidays Thus, this article will attempt to determine celebrated by non-Christians, for example, whether the public speeches of Ukraine’s top Muslims and ), were also monitored. I politicians emphasize the Orthodox Christian relied on the official greetings of different vision of the religious sphere or, on the people holding the three highest government contrary, whether they mark the sphere of positions: the , the head religion as heterogeneous in nature, as one of the government (Prime Minister), and that “accommodate[s] the difference”19. the head of Parliament. The voice of the President is often the loudest, while the voices Methodology of other high-ranking politicians remain in the background (the official political regime For this research five secular holidays in Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential were selected: New Year’s Day (January republic, but it has shifted several times20). 1), International Women’s Day (March 8), The period of analysis covers the Constitution Day (June 28), Independence years 1992 through 2016. The total number Day (August 24) and Victory Day (May 9). of greetings analyzed is 174 and their Trends associated with greetings conveyed distribution is presented in Figure 1. The on religious holidays, such as Easter and database of Ukraine’s parliamentary

18 Casanova, J. ‘Ethno-Linguistic and Religious Plu- ralism and Democratic Constructions in Ukraine.’ In 20 In fact, after the Orange Revolution in December Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building, 2004 political elites negotiated the shift from a presi- edited by B. R. Rubin and J. Snyder, 81–103. London, dential-parliamentary to a parliamentary-presidential 1998 republic. In 2010, during Yanukovych’s rule, Ukraine 19 Wanner, C. ‘Orthodoxy and the Future of Secularism became a presidential-parliamentary again, and after the after the Maidan in Ukraine.’ Euxeinos, no. 17 (2015), Euromaidan Revolution it switched again to a parlia- pp. 8–13. mentary-presidential republic.

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 42 Alla Marchenko

Figure 2. Distribution of greetings by political positions, 1992-2016.

library21 was used as the primary source of the President took the leading role during the selection. The President’s position seems to whole period. be the most visible (80 greetings), while the High-ranking politicians comprise a positions of the Prime Minister and Head of special group that both influence and are Parliament share almost equal portions of influenced by existing social trends and greetings - twice less, about 40 greetings each. needs in Ukraine. In my research I applied The tradition of greetings expressed both content and critical discourse analysis by top politicians was established in the late of official sources to distinguish and study 1990s and early 2000s, while the President the ways in which Ukraine’s top politicians has typically delivered a speech on New publicly present their attachment to the Year’s Eve and Independence Day since 1992. sphere of religion during different periods Independence Day became an occasion for of post-independence Ukraine. Political the first speeches by the Head of Parliament secularization, in this case, would be evident (1994) and the Prime Minister (1997) as well. when one observes a conceptual separation of The timeline of changes within the defined “sacred” and “profane” (above all, the absence period can be followed in Figure 2. As we of religious concepts in public discourse see, the tradition of powerful actors to deliver beyond the religious sphere) either from the greetings was established in the 2000s, while very beginning of Ukraine’s independence or 21 Speeches of top officials of Ukraine / Bibliographic as a tendency accompanying its development. resources of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine - http://lib. Indicators of religiosity are differentiated rada.gov.ua/FirstPerson?post=15610&person=15620

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 43 Alla Marchenko

according to the five-dimensional classical enables us to understand the political greeting scheme by Charles Glock22: belief, knowledge, agenda and its possible shifts to a more or less experience, practice, and consequences. religious pole during the years of Ukraine’s Emphasis is also placed on “spirituality” independence. as a phenomenon that is important for Greetings expressed on the secular and understanding the place of religion in public religious holidays mentioned above were discourse. Hence, the scheme of conceptual present or absent in various years, and their relationships is as follows: the dimension of themes differed too. It must be emphasized “belief” encompasses such concepts as “holy,” that appeals to communities other than the “belief,” and “sacred”; the dimension of Orthodox Christian community were made “knowledge” includes such notions as “God,” from the very outset. , “Christian,” “,” “Orthodox the first president of independent Ukraine, Christians,” “other denominations,” “Jesus established the tradition of greeting the Christ”; the dimension of “experience” “Christians of Ukraine” on Christmas and encompasses the concepts “religious” and Easter in accordance with the Western style “spiritual”; the dimension of “practice”— in 1992, while his successor, President Leonid “religious symbols,” “religious actions,” Kuchma, conveyed his official greeting on “religious holidays,” and “clergymen”; and Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) in 2001. the dimension of “consequence”— “God’s The latter tradition was upheld by Viktor blessing, grace.” Yanukovych during his term as president, Besides content analysis, the critical as well as by President Petro Poroshenko in discourse analysis was conducted at three 2015. Moreover, both these leaders greeted levels - the text level, discursive practice, and the Jewish community on other occasions, sociocultural context23. The text level covers the such as Hanukkah or Passover. Several topics pertaining to religion and religiosity. Muslim holidays (Kurban-Bayram and Discursive practice is aimed at defining the Uraza-Bayram) have also been mentioned main discourse(s) of religiosity in the texts in the public greetings of of greetings and the linguistic means of and Petro Poroshenko. It is evident that their realization. Sociocultural context gives a religious invitations of different communities broader perspective on the reasons for and come from Ukrainian authorities in different consequences of the emergence of specific periods. greetings. The examined holidays differ in terms of the number of appeals to religiosity. If we Findings imagine two opposite sides of a continuum, Constitution Day would be located at one end The analysis of the content of the greetings (no appeals to religiosity), and New Year’s Day on the other (many appeals to religiosity). 22 Glock, C. Y. ‘On the Study of Religious Commit- ment.’ In J. E. Faulkner (ed.) Religion’s Influence in This may be explained by the relatively formal Contemporary Society, Readings in the Sociology of status of Constitution Day and, according to the Religion, edited by J. E. Faulkner, 38–56. Ohio, 1972. 23 Fairclough, N. ‘Critical Discourse Analysis as a above-mentioned poll of Ukrainians’ favorite Method in Social Scientific Research.’ InMethods of holidays, it is one of the least mentioned on the Critical Discourse Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer. London, 2001. list, and the newest one. The only exception

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Figure 3. Number of references to concepts in greetings with secular holidays, 1992-2016.

occurred in 2016, when President Poroshenko Women’s Day (in this case, spirituality is recited the words of a prayer, simultaneously linked to the role of women as custodians and emphasizing its unexpected connection givers). Victory Day may be located in the to the Constitution of Bendery, drafted by same imaginary continuum as Constitution Pylyp Orlyk, who is regarded as the father of Day, although greetings conveyed on the Ukrainian constitutionalism. former holiday rarely pertain to religion; they New Year’s Day remains one of the contain references to the concept of “sacred”. favorite holidays celebrated in Ukraine. The concept has a religious background, but Its enduring connection to Christmas, does not equal being “religious”; all in all “the symbolizing renewal and hope for a better sacred constructs the idea of human society as future, can suit religious issues too (despite the a meaningful, moral collective”24. This concept Soviet roots of New Year’s greetings). Another is used in various contexts of political speeches holiday with numerous religious connotations to emphasize the moral obligations of an is Independence Day, owing to its invaluable individual or a group in Ukrainian society. role in state and nation building in Ukraine). The most frequent word from our Exclusive references to spirituality are found 24 Lynch, G. The Sacred in the Modern World: A Cul- in greetings expressed on International tural Sociological Approach. 2012. - Oxford; New York, p. 233.

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framework (see Figure 2) is “belief,” used expressing greetings on Independence Day both as a noun and a verb (“to believe”). In the and New Year’s Day was a report, and such majority of cases, it refers to the embodiment a report usually contained information about of Ukraine as a state or nation (“Let us believe problems related to transition processes in Ukraine,” “I believe in the people”), and underway in all spheres of the Ukrainian despite its religious background, it has state and society. In my view, the New Year’s nothing to do with God or religion, at least Day and Independence Day holidays convey not explicitly. Thus, its meaning fits better more reflexive messages about what was with another frequent word in the table: done during the previous 12 months, while “spiritual.” “Spirituality” characterizes both the other holidays (Constitution Day, Victory clusters and may be interpreted as a sui Day, and International Women’s Day) convey generis substitution of the word “religious”; general messages that are not time-bound. typical word combinations in this regard are Victory Day also refers to events of past “spiritual revival,” “spiritual development,” commemorations and contains such terms as and “spiritual legacy.” As mentioned earlier, “sacred” to differentiate remembrance from this concept is characteristic of International profane “forgetting.” Women’s Day, but it is typical of other In the 1990s Christmas and Easter holidays, especially Independence Day. Based greetings conveyed by other denominations on existing data, initial assessments indicate appeared on the front pages of newspapers that all the greetings by the top politicians (usually in the upper right-hand corner, next have been in line with the political strategy to the masthead). This layout began to change of Ukraine’s state-building goals: integration in the 2000s, when such greetings were moved into a wider space (both post-Soviet and to the second page. Such a shift may be viewed European) and the demonstration of support as an expected signal of change in the functions for moral values, not necessarily religious of these greetings—from visible respect and values. otherness to ritual attention. The increase in The term “religious,” used to define the number of greetings each year (see Figure the sphere of religion, was a term typically 2) offers proof of a shift to this formal format. used in the early 1990s. It had a neutral form In fact, the only greetings visible for wide with no specific denominations, and it was audiences were those broadcasted on TV - so used mostly during speeches delivered on to say, the President’s address on New Year’s Independence Day. Later, other more specific Eve, Independence Day and major Christian terms were used. This trend may be explained holidays. In several recent years, social by the initial necessity to determine the place networks have also become a tool for sharing of “religion” in the former non-religious official greetings and are possibly far more USSR and to describe potential problems effective in reaching the audience25. through religious dialogue, while references One could speak of a rapid turn toward to “religiosity” mostly referred to the concepts such as “holy” and “sacred” and the characteristics or subjects of religion. Another general increase of appeals to religion in 2016 explanation may lie in the dominant genre 25 For instance, the press service of the current Prime and time of narration in holiday greetings. Minister of Ukraine posts his official greetings on his personal web-page on Originally, the dominant way of - https://www.facebook.com/volodymyrgroysman/

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in comparison with recent years (previous linguistic means particular to the analyzed “surges” were recorded in 2009, during the texts. greeting speeches of 1) Using references to Christmas as a and the New Year’s Day speech of Viktor ritual “coda” in the general New Year’s Day Yanukovych in 2012). This signifies that both greeting in the immediate post-independence context and personalities form the religious period (“Happy New Year and Merry agenda of greetings. For instance, Yushchenko Christmas to you!”), with the consequent used the phrase “I believe” six times during extension and self-sufficiency of Christmas his Independence Day speech in the final year greetings. It was typical to have separate of his presidency, and greetings on New Year’s Day and Christmas placed extraordinary emphasis on God, in the early 2010s, just as it was typical to have Christianity, and Christmas in his New Year’s a common greeting in the 1990s. Day speech in 2012. President Poroshenko 2) Appeals to God’s will and benevolence, launched the tradition of inviting the clergy especially in New Year’s Day greetings, as of different denominations to attend official well as in Independence Day messages. I state celebrations of all national holidays. He have observed that appeals to Jesus Christ emphasizes their role with a special greeting are mostly made in New Year’s greetings, (for example, by addressing “holy fathers” which is explained by its temporal proximity during greetings delivered on Constitution to Christmas (which is celebrated in Ukraine Day and Independence Day in 2016, or by according to the Julian calendar). Such appeals declaring that “by its solemnity and celebratory demonstrate religious hope instead of offering spirit Independence Day is like Christmas a strategic plan for future achievements, and to us”). Such trends indicate that appeals to they are typical for the whole period under religion in the 2000s increase during the most study. critical periods in Ukraine’s transformations or 3) Emphasizing the immanent spirituality personal careers of Ukraine’s highest-ranking of the Ukrainian people and, at the same time, politicians. their fragility and need to “revive,” “retain,” It is hard not to notice the religious and “maintain” in greetings conveyed during background of some recent greetings which the majority of Ukrainian holidays. In his first both reinforced the message and emphasized New Year’s Day speech in 1992 President the role of either branch of Christian Kravchuk declared that the collapse of the Orthodoxy in Ukraine. It was the Moscow USSR marked a “spiritual turning point” for patriarchy when Viktor Yanukovych shot his Ukraine. In recent times this innate spirituality New Year’s video in Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, the is complemented by the mentioned concepts main bastion of the patriarchy. The current of “holy” and “sacred.” President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, by Such linguistic instruments form contrast, gave his first New Year’s speech in the general discourse that I call “keeping Mykhaylivsky monastery, which belongs to spirituality, remembering God.” In this the Kyiv Patriarchy and was a hideaway for regard, it is important to stress that mentions the Euromaidan protesters beaten by police in of Christianity, which started to appear no December 2013. earlier than the 2000s, clearly outnumber the It is possible to distinguish at least three mentions of Orthodox Christianity or other

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 47 Alla Marchenko

non-Christian denominations (see Table 1). and the strong religious accents of these On the one hand, this is a sign of inclusion messages (for example, on St. Nicholas Day of various Christian groups under a common on December 19, 2009). The public speeches umbrella and, possibly, sensitivity to non- of Prime Minister were Orthodox Christians. I mentioned the closeness characterized by similar, but less intense of Orthodox Christian and Greek-Catholic accents. Such trends underscored the necessity (second biggest religious group) in Ukraine to “recycle tradition” in new social conditions. which makes this unity even natural. This is Debates over the religious identity very significant in terms of religious tolerance, of Ukraine’s leading politicians have not as it even references Ukraine in ecumenical been a typical characteristic of public media terms, not as an Orthodox or even Eastern discourse (with several exceptions, for Christian country, as one would expect. instance, for Oleksandr Turchynov, former On the other hand, such a religious shift Head of the Ukrainian Parliament, who was in public politics is an articulate exclusive called a “bloody pastor” due to his open message both to non-Christians and atheists. affiliation with one of the Protestant churches). It is surprising given the 74 years of official However, a growing tendency toward state policy of promoting and “political de-secularization” which I found in clamping down on open religious practice. In this research implies that a leading politician the post-Soviet period, government leaders in Ukraine is obliged to maintain the rituals of seem to be doing precisely the reverse. This the established system of popular greetings. may be explained by two factors: the ongoing process of “de-communization” for Ukraine, Conclusions opposition to non-religiosity which was previously treated as a collective good; the In the past 25 years of Ukraine’s independence, simultaneous worsening of the economic religion and religiosity have been a feature situation and increasing dangers of political of public speeches not as an inherent integrity of Ukraine. characteristic, but rather as a “health and Despite the numerous personnel changes wealth cult”26, and as a sphere that requires in key political positions, Ukraine’s general additional attention. Appeals to various course as a secular and religiously tolerant aspects of religiosity became more intensive state has existed from the very beginning. in the 2000s and were characterized by the It was Viktor Yushchenko who, of all the opposite trend: the need for additional help presidents to date, had a general reputation through God’s grace and, in general, “political of being a more religious person (according de-secularization” in Ukraine. to his lifestyle and public interviews); the Political greetings remain an important majority of other top Ukrainian politicians instrument for communication for Ukrainian comprised a more “formally religious” group. top politicians (first of all the President) with Yulia Tymoshenko occupies a special place among Ukrainian prime ministers in terms of 26 Turner, B. ‘Religion in a Post-secular Society.’ In The New Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Religion, her attitude to religion and religiosity. She is edited by B. S. Turner Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.; known for delivering multiple greetings to the Malden, Mass., 2010.1. ‘Religious Speech: The Ineffable Nature of Religious Communication in the Information faithful of various Christian denominations Ag e .’ Theory, Culture & Society 25, nos. 7–8: 219–235.

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wider audiences. The explanations for this are speeches attest to the separation of Christmas based on the fact that any official greeting in the greetings from New Year’s Day greetings. scope of our analysis demonstrates a milestone Special attention should be paid to the in the development of a relatively young state; transitory status of some dates, a worthy topic this was especially evident in the very first of future research. For instance, October 14 has greetings for New Year and Independence a mixed religious-secular history in Ukraine: Day. Greetings are implicitly associated with Leonid Kuchma marked it as Cossacks’ Day positive emotions quite necessary in the in his 2004 greeting; Viktor Yushchenko, as communication of the politicians and their the Day of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in electorate, typically having articulated a 2008; Yulia Tymoshenko, as both Pokrova negative attitude to the former. (Intercession of the Theotokos) and the Day This research demonstrates that religion of the Ukrainian Cossacks in 2009; Mykola and religiosity have occupied a special place Azarov, as Pokrova. October 14 was finally in Ukrainian society since the proclamation proclaimed as Defenders’ Day by President of independence. This place has been Poroshenko in 2015. different in various periods, shifting from the All in all, the analyzed processes, which establishment of attention and support for all characterize the discourses of greetings on religions and the development of the tradition national holidays, may be perceived as a of greeting the representatives of many faiths sign of “political de-secularization.” Religion (1990s) to the subsequent embeddedness of seems to be enjoying a revival, marked by religious concepts (belief, God) into political more heterogeneous declarations aimed life; from ritual to more conceptual observance, at special target audiences and a general which is essential for nation building and for Christian version in declarations intended for the legitimization of top politicians as the the general population. Appeals to spirituality, leaders of Ukraine. so numerous in the 1990s and early 2000s, The shift in agenda toward the religious became a rarity in the 2010s. As a result, pole may be characterized as being context- Ukrainian politicians address religious issues dependent. For example, the unprecedented regularly despite Ukraine’s political status as years of military conflicts and human loss in a secular state; religion serves as a powerful the Donbas region, which created a situation background for political legitimization and requiring an effective resolution and an extra as an instrument for national consolidation dose of hope for a better future, may explain during and after the Euromaidan. In the short the intensification of religious appeals. Two term, it may usher in a period of relative simultaneous trends have been observed. political stability and unification of people The first marks the religious sphere as during the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, as heterogeneous and deals with many religions, well as an economic slump; in the long term, including non-Christian confessions; the the pairing of politics and religion may lead second (more long-term) places emphasis to popular dissatisfaction, which occurred on religiosity in its Christian version (not as a result of Victor Yanukovych’s religious necessarily Orthodox Christian) with regard stance. At the same time, such “political de- to two secular holidays, New Year’s Day and secularization” may be driven by a “social de- Independence Day. The most visible processes secularization” from below or, at least, remain of secular-religious interaction in public congruent with it. Apparently, the processes

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unfolding “from above” and “from below” must be further monitored in contemporary Readings in the Sociology of Religion, Ukraine. edited by J. E. Faulkner, 38–56. Ohio, 1972. 6. Habermas, J. ‘Notes on Post-Secular Society. New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4: About author 17–29. Dr. Alla Marchenko is at the Graduate School 7. Karpov, V. ‘Desecularization: A for Social Research, Institute of Philosophy and Conceptual Framework.’ Journal of Church Sociology, at the Polish Academy of Sciences, and State52, no. 2: 232–70. Warsaw, Poland 8. Luerhrmann, S. ‘Recycling Cultural E-mail: [email protected] Construction: Desecularization in Post-Soviet Mari El.’ Religion, State and Society33, no. 1: 35–56. Bibliography 9. Lynch, G. The Sacred in the Modern World: A Cultural Sociological Approach. 1. Beckford, J.A. Public Religions and the 2012. - Oxford; New York. - 240 p. Postsecular: Critical Reflections // Journal of 10. Taylor, C. The Secular Age. Cambridge, Scientific Study of Religion, 2012. - № 51 (1). - Mass., 2007. 1-19. 11. Turner, B. ‘Religion in a Post-secular 2. Casanova, J. ‘Ethno-Linguistic and Society.’ In The New Blackwell Companion Religious Pluralism and Democratic to the Sociology of Religion, edited by B. S. Constructions in Ukraine.’ In Post-Soviet Turner Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.; Malden, Political Order: Conflict and State Building, Mass., 2010.1. ‘Religious Speech: The Ineffable edited by B. R. Rubin and J. Snyder, 81–103. Nature of Religious Communication in the London, 1998 Information Age.’ Theory, Culture & Society 3. Erlandson, Sven. Spiritual but Not 25, nos. 7–8: 219–35. Religious: A Call to Religious Revolution in 12. Wanner, C. ‘Orthodoxy and the Future America. Bloomington, 2000. of Secularism after the Maidan in Ukraine.’ 4. Fairclough, N. ‘Critical Discourse Euxeinos, no. 17 (2015): 8–13. Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific 13. Yekelchyk, S. Ukraine. Birth of a Modern Research.’ In Methods of Critical Discourse Nation. Oxford, 2007. Analysis, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael 14. Yelensky, V. Religiosity in Ukraine Meyer. London, 2001. according to Sociological Surveys // Religion, 5. Glock, C. Y. ‘On the Study of Religious State and Society, 2010. - Volume 38 (10). - pp. Commitment.’ In J. E. Faulkner (ed.) 213-227. Religion’s Influence in Contemporary Society,

Euxeinos 24 / 2017 50 Crimean Tatar Religiosity: Between Privacy and Politics

by Olena Soboleva

Abstract This article analyzes how forms of collective religiosity have transformed Crimean Tatar communities throughout the twentieth century, and especially since the political events of the last few years. As a result of forced secularization during the Soviet period, some aspects of religiosity reproduced within local communities went through a process of “domestication” (using the term of T. Dragadze). The most widespread family rituals involved collective prayers, or Dua, including canonized religious texts and the performance of certain ritual acts. After the collapse of the , these collective religious practices co-existed with institutionalized forms of Islam. Today, under the influence of political repressions by the new Russian administration, these collective religious practices have taken on defined political meanings and are used by the as a manifestation of resistance and disobedience.

Key words: Crimean Tatars, collective prayers, forced secularisation, Dua, political resistance.

“In spite of everything, our flags are streaming in migration (repatriation) and adaptation to the wind and the old men have begun to read the their homeland will be also discussed in terms Dua” of social mobility.4 The particular importance Aishe Umerova of religion in the process of collective action 1 has been a subject of study in works of scholars his article retraces the political significance in the social sciences5. Using the example of Tof collective prayers, or “Dua,” among collective prayers or “Dua”, I consider how Crimean Tatars from the second half of the religiosity shifted to the family domain under twentieth century up to their important role the pressure of forced secularization. I will today. Dua prayers are performed in families also show how family and private practices and local communities. When speaking became a tool of disobedience towards state about the Soviet period, I use the term authorities and a means to demonstrate “domestication” of religion, as suggested by political opposition under tense political Tamara Dragadze.2 This term captures the circumstances. This article is based on field process of privatizing the sacred practices that research conducted from 2006 to 2011 and took place in the Crimean Tatars’ religious complemented by historical analysis as well lives. To understand of the importance of as an analysis of ongoing media reports. religion in processes of political mobilization, The principal religion of Crimean Tatars I use theoretical frameworks from the field of is Sunni Islam. Since the Middle Ages, Sufi social movement theory (SMT).3 The revival orders (Tariqah) have played a significant of Islam during the Crimean Tartar return role in shaping Islam during the entire period

1 https://www.dialog.ua/news/128317_1503222823 4 Zaloznaya, M., & Gerber, T. P. (2012). Migration as 2 Dragadze, T. (1993). The domestication of religion Social Movement: Voluntary Group Migration and the under Soviet communism. Socialism: Ideals, ideologies, Crimean Tatar Repatriation. Population and Develop- and local practice, (31), pp. 141-150. ment Review, 38(2), 259-284. 3 Klandermans, B., & Roggeband, C. (Eds.). (2007). 5 Wald, K. D., Silverman, A. L., & Fridy, K. S. (2005). Handbook of social movements across disciplines. Making sense of religion in political life. Annual Review Springer Science & Business Media. of Political Science, 8, 121-143.

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Mestura, Crimea. 2010. © Olena Soboleva

of the and even after the their ancestral lands, the Soviet government annexation of Crimea by the . began an ideological transformation of the The Soviet forced secularization campaigns Crimean cultural space. Soviet authorities undermined the Muslim religious and launched the process of renaming places public life in Crimea as well as in the other with Turkic names beginning in the middle territories where Communist authorities were of the twentieth century. Although Muslim established. Mosques and monasteries were cemeteries and mosques had been either closed, religious leaders were persecuted, and destroyed or rebuilt, Soviet authorities began the traditional system of theological education to colonize abandoned Crimean territories. was destroyed during the Soviet period. Immigrants from the central regions of Russia Under such circumstances, some forms of were brought to Crimea to populate deserted religious practice were performed secretly and villages. became “domesticated,” meaning that they During the Soviet period, vertical or were performed at home and rarely for overtly horizontal family/communal channels were an political purposes. important means of transmission of religious The forced deportation of Crimean Tatars beliefs. At a time when professional religious to Central Asia on 18 May 1944 considerabely practitioners were repressed, ritual practices affected religious life. The connection were led by the eldest representative of the with spatial markers of religiosity, such family, who was often a woman. For example, as cemeteries, mosques, shrines, was lost. in 2010 Mestura served as a “dzuvudzylar,” After the Crimean Tatars were expelled from a ritual specialist, who is responsible for

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Mestura, Crimea. 2010 © Olena Soboleva

washing the bodies of deceased people during of religious practice was the collective ritual of funeral ceremonies. She also read prayers Dua (“prayer” in Arabic), which was conducted that had been ordered for different family in relatively small, local communities. Dua occasions. To do this, she used a book, which collective prayers can be divided into several was a collection of prayers that she received groups according to their purpose. There are from relative who could not read Arabic. She commemorative prayers after a funeral on the also learned the Arabic alphabet at a relatively 7th, 36th and 40th day, and again six months old age in Uzbekistan. Her colleague, an and one year after the death (“kyigy duasy”, Uzbek teacher of mathematics, helped her to “kemlyk duasy” - “prayer of sorrow”). Other study Arabic and to pray. “It all happened in prayers accompany festal events in the life of our school. I taught mathematics. There was a a family (“koz aydın duasy”, “eilyk duasy”), teacher. She used to secretly read prayers, read such as a birth, the building of a new house, Namaz. When children were at lunch, she used the return from a trip, and so on. Another to come in my classroom, and I would close category of Dua are aimed at blessing the the door. Then she used to read a prayer. I said intention “niyet” to do something (travel a her: “Teach me Arabic!” And she taught me. distant road or make large purchases). So I learned to read gradually. I have learned, Dua is traditionally held in the house yes.”6 Mestura’s history of turning to Islam is of the initiator of the event. Two rooms are a fairly typical one for Crimean Tatars at the usually prepared for the prayers, one for time of deportation. women and another for men. Elder members During the Soviet period, the main form of the family and respected neighbors are 6 Mestura, born in 1935. Interview recorded in 2010.

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Collective prayer. Crimea, 2016. Photo by Anton Naumov © Olena Soboleva

usually invited to the collective prayers. dervish practices, which originated in Sufi The Mullah usually reads the prayer texts, communities. and everyone recites the final parts of the The first part of the collective prayer has invocations. Some of the prayers are read in a canonized, sequenced structure of different turn by all participants, including women. parts: reading texts from the Koran; Dhikr; Young people are not directly involved in the reading the 36th Sura Ya Sin; the dedication of ritual, but they prepare and serve ritual food. worship “Bahyshlama;” and a closing prayer. During the Soviet period, elderly men who Each part of the prayer has its canonized could read Arabic, even if they had no special composition. The second part consists of theological education, assumed the role of a collectively read aloud Dhikr, or “tespe Mullahs. chekme,” (which means “to count prayer The Dua collective prayer consists beads”) or “dzhemaat zikir” (public, collective of readings of three parts: the Koran; the Dhikr). Guzel Tuymova, a researcher of Mevlid, which is a poem; and Illyahi folk Crimean Tatar religious folklore, asserts poetry. The first part of Dua is obligatory, that Crimean Tatars’ Dhikr resembles Sufi but the last two are optional and depend on devotions that exist in some orders (Kadiriyya, the desire of the master of the house or the and Mavlaviya).7 Dhikr ceremonies among type of event. Informants note that not so Crimean Tatars are accompanied by head long ago the reading of folk religious texts 7 Туймова Г. Р (2008) Религиозные музыкально sometimes was accompanied by whirling – поэтические жанры в традиционной музыке prayers. This worship ceremony is similar to крымских татар: мавлид и иляхи : дис. канд. иск. С. 62.

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Server Kerametov, Summer 2017. © Olena Soboleva

movements and the swinging of the body. The lumps of sugar, which symbolizes recited third part is central to the ritualized ceremony prayers for some other important family event. and is dedicated to the reading of the 36th This example shows how religious practices Sura Ya Sin. The fourth part of worship went through a process of folklorization and –“bahyshlama “– is an offering of prayer to domestication in the local communal domain. God. Before offering the prayer to God, the An extensive process of religious master of house asks some local religious revival began during the repatriation and specialists (a relative or neighbor) to read resettlement of Crimean Tatars on the the entire Koran (“Quran hatym”). Besides territory of their ethnic homeland. Islam that, several participants read the Sura Ya was institutionalized in several ways. First, Sin forty times (“kyrklama”) before the event the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea (DUMC) was created. Second, other begins. When the readers enter the house, they Muslim organizations from Arab countries mark each Koran with a candy and each of and the Middle East arrived on the Crimean the “kyrklama” with a lump of sugar. At the peninsula.8 If we look at return migration Dua, a ritual of passage of the Koran (“Kuran as а social movement, the subject of religion bahyshlaylar”) and “kyrklama” to God takes played a significant role in this process. place, the purpose of which, according to Religion became a politically charged matter informants, is “sending prayers to heaven.” If the participants brought more “kyrklama” 8 Yarosh, O., & Brylov, D. (2011). Muslim communities and Islamic network institutions in Ukraine: contesting than necessary, the master may keep a few authorities in shaping of Islamic localities. Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe, pp. 252- 264.

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when it came to claiming territories in Crimea Some religious organizations operating at through the actualization of spatial markers the time in Crimea acquired an illegal status of religiosity, including mosques, cemeteries, and the Spiritual Administration of Muslims and shrines. of Crimea was transformed into the Central When Crimean Tatars returned to their Spiritual Administration of Muslims - Taurian ethnic homeland, they found themselves Muftiat. At the same time, the religious and surrounded by a new cultural environment. political persecution of Crimean Tatars began. Only some architectural details and the People were arrested or kidnapped. The new natural surroundings evoked the “traditional” administration forbade all mass political cultural landscape that existed in memories. events and meetings without prior permission. The process of repatriation of the Crimean Relatives of repressed or missing members of Tatar community to Crimea was accompanied families started to hold Dua collective prayers by the reconstruction of an imaginary at home. As more and more people began to landscape. The movement for the restoration participate in these prayers, they could no of ethnic space is an important process, which longer fit in the house or yard. Hundreds has acquired different forms. Objects, places of people began to sit on the pavement, and sites with visible ethnic and confessional near parks or playgrounds. More than 1000 symbolism, such as mosques, Islamic shrines, people came to pray for a politician, Ilma memorials to victims of deportation, and so Umerov, who was placed under a compulsory on became symbolic mediators between the treatment order and sentenced to a mental community and their ethnic lands, between the health clinic. 10 present and the past9. Today shrines (Azizler), Another event that occurred in Summer mosques, and cemeteries, as sacred objects, are 2017 shows the transformation of religious more than just the sites of religious practice. community practices. On the 8 August 2017, a They have become strong ethnic and religious 76 year-old activist, Server Karametov, placed symbols. They legalize the resettlement of a single stake under the walls of the Supreme Crimean Tatars on their historical territory. Court of Crimea to protest against political Thus, for the past two decades privatized and repressions on the peninsula. He was arrested underground Islam has started going public by the police and detained for ten days. These again. Religiosity has gradually come out from events had great resonance among the Crimean communal space into the public sphere. Dua Tatars in Crimea. On August 20, a large-scale collective prayers, however, remain entirely collective prayer was organised by the local within communal practices and continue, Crimean Tatar community at the Khan Uzbek as they have for decades, to co-exist with mosque in the city of Old Crimea11. institutionalized Islam. The participants continue to be closely After the annexation of Crimea by the monitored by the police and other controlling Russian Federation in 2014, the religious life authorities, and they receive warnings. of Crimean Muslims was integrated into Although the content of these prayers is purely the formal system of Russian religious law. religious, Dua is not a private prayer anymore. 10 http://qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/krimskie-tatari- 9 Soboleva, O. (2016). Reciprocity or Conflict: Inter- pomolilis-za-ervina-ibragimova-foto-video/162780/ confessional Situation around Muslim Shrines in the 11 http://qha.com.ua/ru/obschestvo/v-krimu-prohodit- Crimea. Українознавство, (2), 157-163. dua-po-sluchayu-osvobojdeniya-karametova/177387/

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It is a public demonstration of resistance and the center of these events is the traditional a tool to summon the community. A Crimean Dua collective prayer. However, these events Tatar forced migrant, who now resides in Kyiv, are apparently not “quiet” at all. In 2016, in the thinks that the participants of these prayers village of Buyuk Onlar, about one thousand are heroes and he admires them greatly12. people gathered for a memorial prayer Although only religious texts are read during dedicated to the victims of forced deportation. the prayers, it is clear that these events are not All the participants sat in the city square, and just of religious importance. Above all, they dozens of national flags streamed in the wind have political significance. over the heads of the participants. The local Religious practices began to accompany, Mullah recited prayers with a megaphone, or even substitute, purely political events. and his words were repeated by the men and Already in the first year of coming to women present.15 power, Russian security forces banned the In conclusion, some elements of organization of demonstrations in memory of religiosity, under the stress of adversarial the victims of deportations, which in previous circumstances, such as political pressure, years were usually held by Crimean Tatars in repression, or persecution, can move into the and in all major Crimean cities. private sphere. The example of Dua collective All commemorative events are now clearly prayer shows how intercommunal religious regulated by local authorities. In 2016, local practices in the Soviet period acquired the authorities arranged commemorative activities function of consolidation and preservation of in the village of Suren on the occasion of the group identity for Crimean Tartars. Later the opening of a new memorial. Visitors were same private religious elements served as a seated on folding chairs. Political leaders of mobilization tool, a manifestation of collective Crimea and the official representatives of action and resistance, and a means to several confessions made speeches13. Such demonstrate belonging to ethnic and religious a format for commemorating the day of the groups. Collective prayers in local Crimean victims of the deportation was nothing like communities today are an effective way of numerous demonstrations that attracted tens demonstrating group unity, collaboration, of thousands of Crimean Tatars in the previous and national solidarity. years. As a matter of fact, the authorities are trying to embody the slogan voiced by the “Vice Premier Minister” of Crimea Dmitry About author Polonsky, which says that “it is necessary to Dr. Olena Soboleva is at the Rylsky Institute of commemorate quietly, but to rejoice loudly”14. Art, Folklore Studies and Ethnology Institute, Today, in response to the prohibition of at the Institute at the National Academy of mourning rallies, commemorative events are Sciences of Ukraine gradually becoming religious gatherings. In E-mail: [email protected]

12 Erfan, 1968 year of birth, recorded in 2016. 13 http://an-crimea.ru/page/articles/138734 14 https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/04/03/krymtatary/ 15 http://an-crimea.ru/page/articles/138734

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