The French Presidential Election 2017 (Second Round)
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Polish Views of the EU: the Illusion of Consensus
Warsaw, January 2017 Polish views of the EU: the illusion of consensus Adam Balcer — WiseEuropa Piotr Buras — European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Grzegorz Gromadzki — Stefan Batory Foundation Eugeniusz Smolar — Centre for International Relations There was a time when foreign policy was seen as the exclusive domain of the elite. At present, though, it is becoming increasingly difficult to take action in this area without the broader participa- tion and support of public opinion. Proof of this is found first of all in the fact that the decades-long consensus facilitating further EU integration is drawing to a close. This is being caused by various factors: the partial dysfunction of European structures (e.g. the euro crisis or the migration crisis); the EU’s decreasing ability of providing safety and prosperity for its citizens; and also because the EU has been encroaching on the competences of member states. “More integration” is no longer an obvious option; it needs to be justified and negotiated with citizens. Secondly, international policy is increasingly becoming a factor in domestic policy, not only due to European integration, but also due to continuous media coverage and the perception that citizens have that global economic process- es (the delocalisation of industries) and demographic processes (migration) influence their everyday lives. Thirdly, in connection with the crisis of trust towards representative institutions and the political establishment, appeals to forms of direct democracy are on the rise. This has been observed recently Stefan Batory Foundation in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Hungary. “Referendocracy” has begun also to encroach on the foreign policy arena.1 There is particular justification in Poland in asking the question as to what degree current foreign poli- cy is aligned with the views of citizens. -
The Socio-Political Education Cleavage in France
The socio-political education cleavage in France Are the lower educated structurally underrepresented in French democracy? Master Thesis Public administration Student: Koen Damhuis Student number: 3 1 1 2 8 5 3 Supervisor: Dr. Harmen Binnema Co-supervisor: Prof. dr. Mark Bovens School of Governance Utrecht University July 2012 Il n´y a sans doute pas de pays dans le monde où les diplômes soient mieux respectés, et leur validité aussi persistante. […] En France, le diplôme est une fusée à longue portée qui, sauf accident, vous propulse jusqu´à la retraite.1 Alain Peyrefitte La démocratie n´atteint pas ses buts quand les moins instruits sont les plus distants à l´égard de l´action politique. 2 Jérôme Jaffré 1 Peyrefitte, A. Le Mal Français, Fayard, 2006, p. 347 (Plon, 1976) 2 Jaffré, J., Le gouvernement des instruits, In: Duhamel, O. & Jaffré, J (dir.) L’état de l’opinion, 1991, Éditions de2 Jaffré, Seuil, J., 1991, Le gouvernement p.146 des instruits, In: Duhamel, O. & Jaffré, J (dir.) L’état de l’opinion, 1991, Éditions de Seuil, 1991, p.146 2 Summary By coining the notion “diploma democracy” and developing its accompanying theory, Bovens and Wille launched a debate among political scientists in the Netherlands a few years ago. According to the two authors, the lower educated citizens would have been ousted from practically every Dutch political arena during the last decades. From Parliament to government as well as in civil society – all these domains would nowadays be ruled by those with the highest diplomas. In addition to this increasing democratic underrepresentation, the lower educated would socially be more and more separated from their higher educated fellow citizens, thereby holding increasingly diverging political convictions. -
GAUCHE & DROITE Quelles Différences
Classe de 3ème EMC DROITE/GAUCHE Quelles différences ? 4 GAUCHE & DROITE Quelles différences ? SOMMAIRE C’est quoi la droite et la gauche ? Présidentielle 2017 : qui sont les 11 candidats ? / t e n ie. h p ra g o t is h / / : ps tt h Classe de 3ème EMC DROITE/GAUCHE Quelles différences ? 1 GAUCHE & DROITE Quelles différences ? Il faut rappeler, d'abord et avant tout, que tous les politiques, quelque soit leur parti, ont pour ambition de rendre les gens heureux. Les programmes prétendent tous améliorer la vie des gens. Il n'y a pas la méchante droite d'un côté, et la gentille gauche de l'autre, ou inversement. Les extrêmes n'y échappent pas, qui proposent toutefois des méthodes un peu plus radicales pour y parvenir. « Reste, qu’on soit de droite ou de gauche, à l’être intelligemment. C’est le plus difficile. C’est le plus important. L’intelligence n’est d’aucun camp. C’est pourquoi nous avons besoin des deux, et de l’alternance entre les deux ». André Comte Sponville, philosophe. Naissance de la droite et de la gauche sous la Révolution française La division droite et gauche est née pendant la Révolution française. Quand les tout nouveaux députés de l'Assemblée de 1791 ont dû se décider sur le rôle du roi, ils n'étaient pas d'accord. Certains voulaient que le roi conserve des droits (les conservateurs), d'autres souhaitaient que ses droits soient limités (les partisans du changement). Pour se distinguer, les conservateurs se sont assis à la / droite du président de l'Assemblée et les partisans du changement, à t e n sa gauche. -
French Presidential Election Prepared for CEVIPOF, Jean Jaurès Foundation and Le Monde
3 April 2017 French Presidential Election Prepared for CEVIPOF, Jean Jaurès Foundation and Le Monde CONTACTS Brice Teinturier [email protected] Jean-François Doridot [email protected] Federico Vacas [email protected] 1 ©Ipsos CEVIPOF FJJ LE MONDE – EEF 2017 - Avril 2017 Technical note SAMPLE DATES OF FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY 14 300 persons registered on the FROM 31 MARCH TO 2 APRIL 2017. ONLINE INTERVIEWS electoral rolls, constituting a QUOTA METHOD: GENDER, AGE, representative national sample of the INDIVIDUAL'S OCCUPATION, French population aged 18 years and REGION, URBAN/RURAL. over. en partenariat avec As with any quantitative survey, this study presents results subject to the margins of error inherent in statistics. This report has been drawn up in compliance with the international standard ISO 20252 "Market research, social studies and opinion". 2 ©Ipsos CEVIPOF FJJ LE MONDE – EEF 2017 - Avril 2017 FRENCH ELECTION Question: On a scale from 0 to ten, where 0 means no interest at all and 10 a lot of interest, what is your level of interst regarding the Interest for the presidential election coming presidential election? (Note from 0 to 10) No interest at all Little interest Average interest Sufficient interest Lot of interest (0 à 1) (2 à 3) (4 à 6) (7 à 8) (9 à 10) 3% 3% 15% 26% 53% Average score 8,0 Not interested Quiet interested Interested 6% 15% 79% 3 ©Ipsos CEVIPOF FJJ LE MONDE – EEF 2017 - Avril 2017 FRENCH ELECTION Question: On a scale from 0 to ten, where 0 means no interest at all and 10 a lot of interest, what is your level of interst regarding the Interest for the presidential election coming presidential election? (Note from 0 to 10) 81 80 81 79 80 75 79 Interested 74 71 71 74 20 20 21 21 19 Quite 14 15 14 15 14 15 interested 5 6 8 8 7 5 5 5 6 6 6 Not Jan. -
Voter Autrement 2017 for French Presidential Election — the Online Experiment
Voter Autrement 2017 for French Presidential Election — The Online Experiment Sylvain Bouvereta,∗, Renaud Blancha, Antoinette Baujardb, Franc¸ois Durande, Herrade Igersheimc,d, Jer´ omeˆ Lange,d, Annick Laruellef, Jean-Franc¸ois Laslierg,d, Isabelle Lebonh, Vincent Merlinh,d aLIG, Univ. Grenoble-Alpes bGATE Lyon Saint-Etienne,´ Universite´ Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne´ cBETA, Universite´ de Strasbourg dCNRS eLAMSADE, Universite´ Paris-Dauphine fUPV-EHU, Universidad del Pa´ıs Vasco gParis School of Economics hCREM, Universites´ Caen-Normandie et Rennes 1 Abstract In March and April 2017, we have run a voting experiment during the French presidential election. During this experiment, participants were asked to test several alternative voting methods to elect the French pres- ident, like scoring methods, instant-runoff voting, Borda with partial rankings. The experiment was both carried out in situ in polling stations during the first round of the presidential election (using paper ballots), and online during the month preceding the first round, and until the second round of the election (using a web application). A total of 6358 participants took part to the in situ experiment and 37739 participants took part to the online experiment. This paper provides an extensive description of the online experiment. The aim is not to provide any result about this experiment, but to describe the protocol and the format of the dataset resulting from this experiment. Keywords: Voting Theory, Experiments, Elections, Online Voting 1. Introduction In April 2017, the fourth edition of the series of experiments about alternative voting methods at the French presidential election was carried out. During this experiment, called “Voter Autrement”, voters from 5 French cities were asked, right after having voted in their respective polling stations for the first round of the official election, to test alternative voting methods for the election of the French president. -
Review of European and National Election Results Update: September 2019
REVIEW OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS UPDATE: SEPTEMBER 2019 A Public Opinion Monitoring Publication REVIEW OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS UPDATE: SEPTEMBER 2019 Directorate-General for Communication Public Opinion Monitoring Unit May 2019 - PE 640.149 IMPRESSUM AUTHORS Philipp SCHULMEISTER, Head of Unit (Editor) Alice CHIESA, Marc FRIEDLI, Dimitra TSOULOU MALAKOUDI, Matthias BÜTTNER Special thanks to EP Liaison Offices and Members’ Administration Unit PRODUCTION Katarzyna ONISZK Manuscript completed in September 2019 Brussels, © European Union, 2019 Cover photo: © Andrey Kuzmin, Shutterstock.com ABOUT THE PUBLISHER This paper has been drawn up by the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit within the Directorate–General for Communication (DG COMM) of the European Parliament. To contact the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit please write to: [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN DISCLAIMER This document is prepared for, and primarily addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL 1 1. COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 5 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS OVERVIEW 1979 - 2019 6 COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LAST UPDATE (31/07/2019) 7 CONSTITUTIVE SESSION (02/07/2019) AND OUTGOING EP SINCE 1979 8 PROPORTION OF WOMEN AND MEN PROPORTION - LAST UPDATE 02/07/2019 28 PROPORTIONS IN POLITICAL GROUPS - LAST UPDATE 02/07/2019 29 PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL GROUPS - SINCE 1979 30 2. NUMBER OF NATIONAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CONSTITUTIVE SESSION 31 3. -
“FRANCE DESERVES to BE FREE”: CONSTITUTING FRENCHNESS in MARINE LE PEN's NATIONAL FRONT/NATIONAL RALLY Submitted By
THESIS “FRANCE DESERVES TO BE FREE”: CONSTITUTING FRENCHNESS IN MARINE LE PEN’S NATIONAL FRONT/NATIONAL RALLY Submitted by Lauren Seitz Department of Communication Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado Summer 2020 Master’s Committee: Advisor: Karrin Anderson Julia Khrebtan-Hörhager Courtenay Daum Copyright by Lauren Nicole Seitz 2020 All Rights Reserved ABSTRACT “FRANCE DESERVES TO BE FREE”: CONSTITUTING FRENCHNESS IN MARINE LE PEN’S NATIONAL FRONT/NATIONAL RALLY This thesis employs constitutive rhetoric to analyze French far-right politician Marine Le Pen’s discourse. Focusing on ten of Le Pen’s speeches given between 2015 and 2019, I argue that Le Pen made use of Kenneth Burke’s steps of scapegoating and purification as a way to rewrite French national identity and constitute herself as a revolutionary political leader. Le Pen first identified with the subjects and system that she scapegoats. Next, she cast out elites, globalists, and immigrants, identifying them as scapegoats of France’s contemporary identity split. Finally, by disidentifying with the scapegoats, Le Pen constituted her followers as always already French patriots and herself as her leader. This allowed her to propose a new form of French national identity that was undergirded by far-right ideals and discourse of revolution. This thesis presents several implications for understanding contemporary French national identity, the far right, and women politicians. It also contributes to the project of internationalizing public address research in Communication Studies. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, thank you to my advisor, Kari Anderson. I truly could not have completed this thesis without your guidance, encouragement, and advice. -
Download/Print the Study in PDF Format
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN FRANCE 23rd April and 7th May 2017 European Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen running Elections monitor easily ahead in the polls just one month 1) Analysis : page 1 2) Result 1st round : page 7 before the presidential election in France 3) Result 2nd round : page 11 Corinne Deloy On 23rd April next 46.6 million French voters and 1.3 million living elsewhere in the world are being called to vote in the first round of the presidential election. The two candidates who come out ahead on the eve of 23rd April will face each other in a second round of voting Analysis that will take place two weeks later on 7th May. The presidential election will be followed on 11th and 18th June by general elections that will lead to the renewal of the 577 members’ seats in the National Assembly, the lower chamber of parliament. The election that will be taking place in an international with 26% of the vote, ahead of Marine Le Pen, who context marked by the Brexit and the victory of Donald is due to win 25% of the vote. The candidate of the Trump on 8th November last in the American presidential government right, François Fillon (Les Républicains, LR) election means that everything is now possible and is due to win 18% of the vote. On the left, with 18% more uncertain than ever before. The main issue at of the vote, Jean-Luc Mélenchon is due to draw ahead stake in this presidential election is the following: who of the Socialist Party’s representative, Benoît Hamon, will challenge Marine Le Pen (Front National, FN) in the who is due to win 10.50% of the vote. -
The Young French and the EU
Bachelor’s Thesis 15 credits The young French and the EU A case study on attitudes toward the European Union in light of a potential Frexit Author: Charlotte Renström Supervisor: Helena Eklund Semester: Fall Semester of 2018 Department of Political Science Abstract In the wake of Brexit in 2016, the conception of Frexit was born and received an impetus in the French presidential election campaigns in 2017. The scepticism toward the European Union once again found expression as Eurosceptic political parties gained ground and supporters amongst French citizens. With attitudes toward the EU in France seemingly variable and impressionable of political currents, it is important to understand from where these originate as well as what a positive or negative attitude imply in practice. Therefore, this study aims to map out attitudes among young French citizens: A group with an overall positive attitude toward the EU as well as the generation in charge of the future European Union. The study is conducted in the form of a case study, with the framework of Functional Attitude Theory guiding the analysis. The main findings include an obvious lack of knowledge on the union among the interviewees, connected to a feeling of exclusion from the same. However, benefits and rights provided by the EU are considered grounds to stay within the union. Finally, the findings are discussed and ideas for further research are suggested. Keywords European Union, France, Frexit, attitudes, functional attitude theory, utilitarian attitudes. Table of Contents 1 Introduction -
Marine Le Pen De Weg Naar De Macht Inhoud
René ter Steege Marine Le Pen De weg naar de macht Inhoud 1 | De aanslag 5 2 | In de politiek 36 3 | De aardbeving 51 4 | Aan het hoofd van de partij 69 5 | Een slechte verliezer 86 6 | De verkiezingen van 2012 102 7 | Le Pen BV 117 8 | De verdere opmars 121 9 | De breuk 136 10 | Marine’s modelstad 174 11 | President Marine? 190 Verantwoording 192 Geraadpleegde literatuur 192 1 | De aanslag Marine Le Pen en haar twee zussen lagen te slapen in het ouderlijk huis in een straat met de naam Villa Poirier in het centrum van Parijs. Het was vier uur in de ochtend van 2 november 1976 toen ze wakker schrokken van een harde knal. Rook drong de twee slaapkamertjes binnen, vaag hoorden ze het geroep van hun va- der Jean-Marie, een verdieping lager. ‘Meisjes, zijn jullie daar?!’ schreeuwde hij met een stem waarin angst zich vermengde met woede. Ja, de meisjes leefden nog, in die koude ochtend. ‘Niet de knal, maar de kou maakte me wakker,’ schreef Marine Le Pen in het boek À contre flots (Tegen de stroom in), een mengvorm van autobiografie, politieke getuigenis en pamflet uit 2006, het jaar waarin haar politieke loopbaan definitief vorm krijgt. ‘Welkom in een wereld zonder mededogen’ is de titel van het eerste hoofdstuk. Marine Le Pen werd geboren op 5 augustus 1968 in Neuilly- sur- Seine, een voorname voorstad van Parijs. Op het stadhuis weigerde een ambtenaar haar onder die, volgens hem niet bestaande, naam op te nemen in het bevolkingsregister. Haar ouders kozen dan maar voor Marion-Anne-Perrine, maar noemden haar nooit zo. -
Di Siyaseta Kurdî De Ji Şoreşê Ber Bi Restorekirinê Ve? Hamit Bozarslan * BDP ______Vahap Coşkun * ______
Arşîva Bîra Kurdan: Ji Michel Verrier gotara bi serenavê "Li Kurdistanê ji bo artêşa tirk rêya vekirî" (1993) R. 12 LE MONDE diplomatiquediplomatique kurdî Çile 2012 - Hejmar 26 www.lemonde-kurdi.com • [email protected] 24 Rûpel Wolfgang Streeck P. Daum - P. Aurel Pierre Bourdieu Antoine Champagne John Marsh Hevwelatî hikûmetên xwe êdî wekî "Di 5ê Tîrmeha 1962yê de, li bajarê Lîstikeke ku tê de herkes derewan li Dewlet û şirket îro çawa tevna Înternetê Gelo pergala perwerdehîyê dikare dezgehên xwe nabînin, lê belê di şûna Oran ê Cezayîrê bi dehan jin û mêrên hev dike û pê dizanin ku derewan jî li û telefonên destan ên GSM kontrol xizanîya li welatekî kêm bike? Weke wê de wekî dezgehên welatên din, yan ewropî bi derbên kêran, bi biviran, hev dikin. Bi rêya avakirina komîsyonan dikin? Înternet, di roja îroyîn de çawa ji ku piranîya amerîkîyan jî pê bawer jî yên rêxistinên navneteweyî yên wekî an jî bi guleyan hatin kuştin. Rast e û anketan rastîya serdestan çawa bo dewletan bûye yek ji baştirîn riyên in, yek ji sedemên bingehîn ên newek- IMF, an jî Yekîtîya Ewropî dibînin… barbarîyeke mezin bû, lê…" vediguhere rastîya herkesî? kontrolkirina muxalifan? hevîya aborî "pergala perwerdeyîyê" ye? R. 8 R. 14 R. 18 R. 20 R. 21 Di siyaseta kurdî de Ji şoreşê ber bi restorekirinê ve? HAMIT BOZARSLAN * BDP __________ Vahap Coşkun * __________ elepûra siyasî, ku navneteweyî de were nas kirin. Piştî niha Partîya Aştî û ku meseleya kurdî bala cîhanê kişand, Demokrasîyê (BDP) raya giştî ya navneteweyî -û nemaze jî nûnertîya wê dike, ji salên Yekîtîya Ewropî- bi awayekî rexnegir K1990ê û vir ve, di warê temsîlkirina nêzî siyaseta kurdî ya dewletê bûn û lêgerînên ji bo maf û azadîyên rewa tê de bêhtir mudaxîl bûn. -
Securitization of Migration and the Rising Influence of Populist Radical Right Parties in European Politics
Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi Cilt:20, No:1 (Yıl: 2021), s. 161-193 SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION AND THE RISING INFLUENCE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPEAN POLITICS Özgür ÜNAL ERİŞ* Selcen ÖNER** Araştırma Makalesi Abstract This article addresses the role of securitization of migration as the main binding factor for the populist radical right parties after the so-called ‘migration crisis’ and their increasing influence in the 2019 European Parliament elections. Firstly the formation of new security threats after the end of the Cold War is analysed. Secondly, the role of populist radical right parties in securitization of migration and their rising influence in European politics are discussed. This claim is supported by a comparative analysis of three populist radical right parties: National Rally (NR), the League, and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) by focusing on the rhetoric used by their leaders, their electoral campaigns and performance in the last European elections in 2019. Keywords: Securitization, Migration Crisis, 2019 European Parliament Elections, Populist Radical Right, National Rally, League, Alternative for Germany (AfD). Göçün Güvenlikleştirilmesi ve Popülist Radikal Sağ Partilerin Avrupa Siyasetinde Artan Etkisi Öz Bu makalede göçün güvenlikleştirilmesinin popülist radikal sağ partiler için 2015 ‘göç krizi’ sonrası temel bağlayıcı unsur olarak rolü ve bu partilerin özellikle 2019 Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerinde giderek artan etkileri incelenmektedir. Makalede ilk olarak Soğuk Savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan yeni güvenlik tehditleri, * Prof. Dr., İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi, E-posta: [email protected], ORCID: 0000-0003-0947-6761. ** Doç. Dr., Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, E-posta: [email protected], ORCID: 0000- 0001-6276-7221. Makalenin Gönderilme Tarihi: 18/01/2021 Kabul Edilme Tarihi: 09/03/2021 162 ÖZGÜR ÜNAL ERİŞ, SELCEN ÖNER sonrasında, populist radikal sağ partilerin bu güvenlikleştirilme sürecindeki rolü ve Avrupa siyasetinde artan etkileri tartışılmaktadır.