DOCSLIB.ORG

Vita September 94

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Vita September 94 January, 2016 VITA T. Clifton Morgan Department of Political Science MS 24 5104 Aspen Rice University Bellaire, TX 77401 PO Box 1892 713 661 3235 Houston, TX 77251 713 348 3373 713 348 5273 Fax Education Ph.D. in Government, University of Texas at Austin1986 Fields: International Relations, Formal Theory, Methodology M.A. in Government, University of Texas at Austin1980 B.A. in Political Science, University of Oklahoma 1978 Experience Positions Held Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science, Rice University: July 1998 through present Professor of Political Science, Rice University: July 1997 through June 1998 Associate Professor of Political Science, Rice University: July 1991 through June 1997 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rice University: July 1987 through June 1991 National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University: September 1989 through June 1990 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Florida State University: August 1985 through June 1987 Administrative Positions Chair, Department of Political Science, Rice University: July 1999 through June 2004 Director, Center for the Study of Institutions and Values, Rice University: July 1997 through June 1999 Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, Rice University: July 1991through June 1994 and July 1995 through June 1998 Research Books Palmer, Glenn and T. Clifton Morgan (2006) A Theory of Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. 2 Maoz, Zeev, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer and Richard J. Stoll, eds. (2004) Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books. Morgan, T. Clifton (1994) Untying the Knot of War: A Theory of Bargaining in International Crises. Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press. Journal Articles Morgan, T. Clifton (2015) “Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence” International Interactions, 41 (4): 744-754. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat and Yoshiharu Kobayashi (2014) “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the TIES Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 31(5): 541-558. Bapat, Navin, Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan (2013) “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data,” International Interactions, 39(1): 79-98. Morgan, T. Clifton (2013) “The Secret Ingredient on Iron Chef—Road Kill!” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30 (1): 3-10. Martinez Machain, Carla and T. Clifton Morgan (2013) “The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States’ Foreign Policy,” Armed Forces and Society, 39 (10): 102-123. Martinez Machain, Carla, T. Clifton Morgan, and Patrick M. Regan (2011) “Deterring Rebellion,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 7 (3): 295-316. Krustev, Valentin and T. Clifton Morgan (2011) “Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining,” Conflict Management and Peace Science. 28 (4): 351-76. Bapat, Navin A. and T. Clifton Morgan (2009) “Multilateral vs. Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data,” International Studies Quarterly, 53(4):1075-1094. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat and Valentin Krustev (2009) “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26 (1): 95-113. Palmer, Glenn and T. Clifton Morgan (2007) “Power Transition, The Two-Good Theory, and Neorealism: A Comparison with Comments on Recent U.S. Foreign Policy,” International Interactions, 33 (3): 329-346. 3 Mattes, Michaela and T. Clifton Morgan (2004) “When Do They Stop? Modeling the Termination of War,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Fall, pp. 179-194. Morgan, T. Clifton and Navin Bapat (2003) “Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms and Economic Coercion,” International Studies Review, December, pp. 65-79. Reprinted in Dissolving Boundaries, edited by Suzanne Werner, David Davis, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Blackwell Publishers, (2004) pp. 507-521. Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer (2003) “To Protect and to Serve: Alliances and Foreign Policy Portfolios,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, April, pp. 180-203. Miers, Anne and T. Clifton Morgan (2002) “Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?” International Interactions, April- June, pp. 117-136. Palmer, Glenn, Scott B. Wohlander and T. Clifton Morgan (2002) “Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability,” Journal of Peace Research, January, pp. 5- 26. Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer (2000) “A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, February, pp. 11-32. Morgan, T. Clifton and Christopher J. Anderson (1999) “Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950-1992,” Journal of Politics, August, pp. 799-814. Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer (1999) “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Insights from the Two-Good Theory,” Issues and Studies, May/June, pp. 35- 60. Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie L. Schwebach (1997) “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises,” International Studies Quarterly, March, pp. 27-50. Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer (1997) “A Two-Good Theory of Foreign Policy: An Application to Dispute Initiation and Reciprocation,” International Interactions, Vol. 22:3, pp. 225-244. Morgan, T. Clifton and Patrick J. Moriarty (1995) “State Characteristics and Crisis Outcomes: A Test of the Spatial Model,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Fall, pp. 197-224. Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie L. Schwebach (1995) “Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics,” International Interactions, Vol. 21:3, pp. 247-263. 4 Morgan, T. Clifton (1995) “Clinton’s Chinese Puzzle: Domestic Politics and the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions,” Issues and Studies, August, pp. 19-45. Richards, Diana, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick Wilson, Valerie Schwebach and Garry Young (1993) “Good Times, Bad Times and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, September, pp. 504-535. Morgan, T. Clifton (1993) “Economic Ties, Influence, and Taiwan-Mainland China Relations,” Issues and Studies, March, pp. 1-14. Morgan, T. Clifton (1993) “Democracy and War: Reflections on the Literature,” International Interactions, Vol. 18:3, pp. 197-203. Morgan, T. Clifton and Valerie L. Schwebach (1992) “Take Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: A Prescription for Peace?” International Interactions, Vol. 17:4, pp. 305-320. Morgan, T. Clifton and Kenneth N. Bickers (1992) “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, March, pp. 25-52. Morgan, T. Clifton and Sally H. Campbell (1991) “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, June, pp. 187-211. Morgan, T. Clifton (1990) “The Concept of War: Its Impact on Research and Policy,” Peace and Change, October, pp. 413-441. Morgan, T. Clifton (1990) “Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining,” American Journal of Political Science, May, pp. 311-333. Morgan, T. Clifton (1990) “Power, Resolve and Bargaining in International Crises,” International Interactions, Vol. 15:3, 279-302. Reprinted in Modeling International Conflict edited by Frank Zagare, Gordon and Breach, (1990), pp. 83-106. Levy, Jack S. and T. Clifton Morgan (1986) “The War-Weariness Hypothesis: An Empirical Test,” American Journal of Political Science, February, pp. 26-49. Reprinted in Persistent Patterns and Emergent Structures in a Waning Century edited by Margaret P. Karns, Praeger Publishers, (1986), pp. 126-148. Morgan, T. Clifton (1984) “A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly, December, pp. 407-426. Levy, Jack S. and T. Clifton Morgan (1984) “The Frequency and Seriousness of War: An Inverse Relationship?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, December, pp. 731-749. Book Chapters 5 Morgan, T. Clifton and Glenn Palmer (1998) “Room to Move: Security, Proaction and Institutions in Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking,” in Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy edited by Randolph Siversion, University of Michigan Press, pp. 193-220. Morgan, T. Clifton (1993) “Mediators, Allies and Opportunists: Third Parties in International Crises,” in Politics and Rationality edited by William James Booth, Patrick James and Hudson Meadwell, Cambridge University Press, pp. 266-280. Wayman, Frank W. and T. Clifton Morgan (1990) “Measuring Polarity in the International System,” in Measuring the Correlates of War edited by J. David Singer and Paul Diehl, University of Michigan Press, pp. 139-158. Morgan, T. Clifton and Jack S. Levy (1990) “Base Stealers versus Power Hitters: A Nation-State Level Analysis of the Frequency and Seriousness of War,” in Prisoners of War edited by Charles Gochman and Alan Sabrosky, Lexington Books, pp. 43-56. Morgan, T. Clifton and James Lee Ray (1989) “The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on Crisis Bargaining: Implications of a Spatial Model,” in Power and World Politics edited by Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 193-208. Morgan, T. Clifton and Jack S. Levy (1986) “The Structure of the International System and the Relationship Between the Frequency and Seriousness of War,” in Persistent Patterns and Emergent Structures in a Waning Century edited by Margaret P. Karns, Praeger Publishers, pp. 75-98. Data Bases “Threat and Imposition of Sanctions
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962: a Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, No.3 (September 1966): 249-270
    NOTES 1 INTRODUCTION: CONTENDING VIEWS-MILITARISM, MILITARIZATION AND WAR 1. Ivo Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10, no.3 (September 1966): 249-270. 2. Patrick Morgan, "Disarmament," in Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),246. 3. Stuart Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Mfecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no.2 (June 1992): 309-341,318,330; The remainder of Bremer's study has to do with the impact of military spending and not with variations caused by regime type. 4. Thomas Lindemann and Michel Louis Martin, "The Military and the Use of Force," in Giuseppe Caforio, ed., Handbook of the Sociology of the Military (New York: Kluwer, 2003),99-109,104-109. 5. Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy-The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York: King Crown's Press, 1958), 3. The concept was subsequently applied by Herbert Spencer, Otto Hintze, and Karl Marx. See Volker Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 6. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Stanislav Andreski, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1969): 499-571. 7. Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 199. 8. Karl Liebknecht, Militarism (Toronto: William Briggs, 1917); Berghahn, 18,23,25. 9. James Donovan, Militarism U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970),25. 10. Berghahn, 19. 11. Dan Reiter and Allan Starn, "IdentifYing the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation," American Political Science Review 97, no.2 (May 2003): 333-337; see also R.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Policy Analysis
    FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (listed in catalogue as Theoretical Explanations of Foreign Policy) Pol Sci 530 Jack S. Levy Rutgers University Spring 2014 Hickman 304 848/932-1073 [email protected] http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/ Office Hours: after class and by appointment This seminar focuses on how states formulate and implement their foreign policies. Foreign Policy Analysis is a well-defined subfield within the International Relations field, with its own sections in the International Studies Association and American Political Science Association (Foreign Policy Analysis and Foreign Policy, respectively). Our orientation in this course is more theoretical and process-oriented than substantive or interpretive. We focus on policy inputs and the decision-making process rather than on policy outputs. An important assumption underlying this course is that the processes through which foreign policy is made have a considerable impact on the substantive content of policy. We follow a loose a levels-of-analysis framework to organize our survey of the theoretical literature on foreign policy. We examine rational state actor, bureaucratic/ organizational, institutional, societal, and psychological models. We look at the government decision-makers, organizations, political parties, private interests, social groups, and mass publics that have an impact on foreign policy. We analyze the various constraints within which each of these sets of actors must operate, the nature of their interactions with each other and with the society as a whole, and the processes and mechanisms through which they resolve their differences and formulate policy. Although most (but not all) of our reading is written by Americans and although much of it deals primarily with American foreign policy, most of these conceptual frameworks are much more general and not restricted to the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • International Conflict PS 9450 114 Arts and Science R 6:00-8:30 Fall 2020 University of Missouri
    International Conflict PS 9450 114 Arts and Science R 6:00-8:30 Fall 2020 University of Missouri Syllabus Dr. Stephen L. Quackenbush Office: 305 Professional Building Phone: 882-2082 Office Hours: by appointment (zoom) Email: [email protected] Course Description and Objectives: The purpose of this graduate seminar is to analyze important theories regarding the causes of international conflict and war. This course will: (a) introduce students to a wide range of research on international conflict (focusing on quantitative and formal research) and (b) develop students’ ability to critically evaluate research, and consequently how to design and execute their own research projects. Books (available at University Bookstore): Required: Horowitz, Michael C., Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. 2015. Why Leaders Fight. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quackenbush, Stephen L. 2015. International Conflict: Logic and Evidence. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Sechser, Todd S., and Matthew Fuhrmann. 2017. Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Weeks, Jessica L. P. 2014. Dictators at War and Peace. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Zagare, Frank C. 2011. The Games of July: Explaining the Great War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Recommended: Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, Paul F. Diehl, and James D. Morrow, ed. 2012. Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. 1 Coursework and Grading: Participation: The quality of a graduate level seminar depends to
    [Show full text]
  • Gains and Losses in the Eyes of the Beholder
    GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK A Dissertation by YI YANG Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December 2004 Major Subject: Political Science GAINS AND LOSSES IN THE EYES OF THE BEHOLDER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISK A Dissertation by YI YANG Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved as to style and content by: ________________________________ _____________________________ Alex Mintz Di Wang (Chair of Committee) (Member) ________________________________ _____________________________ John D. Robertson Patricia Hurley (Member) (Head of Department) ________________________________ B. Dan Wood (Member) December 2004 Major Subject: Political Science iii ABSTRACT Gains and Losses in the Eyes of the Beholder: A Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making Under Risk. (December 2004) Yi Yang, B.A., Foreign Affairs College Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Alex Mintz Prospect theory is a descriptive model of individual decision-making under risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The central tenet of prospect theory posits that the risk orientation of decision-makers is affected by the gains vs. losses domains in which they are situated. Individuals are predicted to be risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Although prospect theory made significant contributions to decision theory, it has important limitations. Foremost, as noted by Levy (1997a), prospect theory is not a complete theory of decision-making.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Beyond Military Power: the Symbolic Politics Of
    BEYOND MILITARY POWER: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS TRANSFERS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY JENNIFER SPINDEL DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA MAY 2018 1 Spindel, Beyond Military Power Copyright, Jennifer Spindel, 2018 ii Spindel, Beyond Military Power For Stephanie Wall, whose love of life, desire to explore the world, and instinct to help others continues to inspire. iii Spindel, Beyond Military Power Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have possible without the support of colleagues, friends, and family – if I tried to list all of them I would likely omit some in error. You know who you are, and you have my deepest gratitude. My biggest debt is owed to my committee members. Without their continued willingness to read and comment on multiple drafts of each chapter, their patience, and their unflagging commitment to the project, I don’t know how I would have finished. First and foremost, I thank my advisor, Ron Krebs, for the motivation, for kicking my ass when I slacked (and, honestly, for kicking my ass in general), and for an unparalleled degree of thoughtfulness, investment, and kindness. He read more drafts of this project than either of us cares to admit. Ron has this amazing ability to distill arguments to their core and to identify promising nuggets of research from otherwise confused and incoherent grad student ramblings. Ron is an extraordinary scholar and mentor, and I am lucky to also call him a co-author and a friend.
    [Show full text]
  • Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes
    Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes Erik Gartzke 1 Dong-Joon Jo Word count: 10,833 Abstract Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heighten the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, we find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status, without much affecting whether states fight. 1. Introduction Since the advent of the nuclear age, speculation has raged about whether taming the atom inflames or pacifies world politics. Optimists claim that nuclear weapons deter, and therefore stabilize the politics of nations (Mearsheimer 1984, 1993; Waltz 1981, 1990). Pessimists see nuclear weapons as inciting fear, hubris, and misperception (Jervis 1984, 1988, 1989; Sagan 1989). A third, somewhat neglected possibility is that both arguments are right, and wrong. Diplomatic bargains tend to dampen the observable impact of nuclear weapons, even as contrasting tendencies tend to cancel each other out. To the degree that nuclear weapons influence the concessions proliferators are likely to obtain in lieu of force, proliferation does much less to account for behavioral conflict. Possession of nuclear weapons increases the risks to opponents that choose to fight.
    [Show full text]
  • VITA Richard J. Stoll July 2020 PERSONAL Office
    Stoll Vita. Page 1 of 21 VITA Richard J. Stoll July 2020 PERSONAL Office: Rice University Department of Political Science MS24 P.O. Box 1892 Houston, Texas 77251-1892 (713)-348-3362; FAX: 713-348-5273 e-mail: [email protected] CURRENT POSITION Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science, Rice University, 2010-present Baker Institute Scholar, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2010- present. Professor, Department of Political Science, Rice University, 1990-present. EDUCATION University of Rochester, A.B. Political Science (with distinction) 1974. University of Michigan, Ph.D. Political Science 1979. TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTERESTS International Relations, International Conflict, U.S. Foreign Policy, National Security Policy. Statistics, Research Design, Computer Simulation. PUBLICATIONS Books Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution (co-edited with Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz, Cliff Morgan and Glenn Palmer). Lexington Books. Lanham, MD. 2004. 1/21 Stoll Vita. Page 2 of 21 Exploring Realpolitik: Probing International Relations Theory With Computer Simulation (with Thomas R. Cusack). Lynne Rienner. Boulder, Colo. 1990. U.S. National Security Policy and The Soviet Union: Persistent Regularities And Extreme Contingencies. University of South Carolina Press. Columbia. 1990. Power In World Politics. (co-edited with Michael D. Ward). Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 1989. Choices In World Politics: Sovereignty And Interdependence. (co-edited with Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr). W.H. Freeman. New York. 1989. Quantitative Indicators In World Politics. (co-edited with J. David Singer). Praeger. New York. 1984. Articles and Book Chapters Hunting Malicious Bots on Twitter: An Unsupervised Approach. Zhouhan Chen, Rima S.
    [Show full text]
  • Theories of War and Peace
    1 THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE POLI SCI 631 Rutgers University Fall 2018 Jack S. Levy [email protected] http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/ Office Hours: Hickman Hall #304, Tuesday after class and by appointment "War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." Sun Tzu, The Art of War In this seminar we undertake a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on interstate war, focusing primarily on the causes of war and the conditions of peace but giving some attention to the conduct and termination of war. We emphasize research in political science but include some coverage of work in other disciplines. We examine the leading theories, their key causal variables, the paths or mechanisms through which those variables lead to war or to peace, and the degree of empirical support for various theories. Our survey includes research utilizing a variety of methodological approaches: qualitative, quantitative, experimental, formal, and experimental. Our primary focus, however, is on the logical coherence and analytic limitations of the theories and the kinds of research designs that might be useful in testing them. The seminar is designed primarily for graduate students who want to understand – and ultimately contribute to – the theoretical and empirical literature in political science on war, peace, and security. Students with different interests and students from other departments can also benefit from the seminar and are also welcome. Ideally, members of the seminar will have some familiarity with basic issues in international relations theory, philosophy of science, research design, and statistical methods.
    [Show full text]
  • CURRICULUM VITAE of ALASTAIR SMITH EMPLOYMENT
    CURRICULUM VITAE of ALASTAIR SMITH January 2021 Wilf Family Department of Politics New York University 19 West 4th Street, 2nd floor NY NY 10012 (212) 992 9678 Fax: (212) 995-4184 email: [email protected] EMPLOYMENT Bernhardt Denmark Professor of International Relations, Sept. 2015 Professor, Department of Politics, New York University, 05- present Deputy Director, Alexander Hamilton Center in Political Economy, New York University 07-08 Associate Chair, Department of Politics, New York University, 04-05 Associate Professor, Department of Politics, New York University, 02-05 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 01-02 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 98-01 Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Washington University, 96-98 National Fellow, Hoover Institution On War Revolution and Peace, 1997-98. Lecturer in Political Science and Social Thought and Analysis, Washington University, 95-96. Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center in Political Economy, Washington University 94-95 EDUCATION 1990-94 UNIVERSITY of ROCHESTER, PhD. January 1995. Dissertation: "A Theory of Alliances" Committee: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Chair; David Austen Smith; Jeffrey Banks. Field exams in Statistical Methodology, International Relations and Positive Political Theory. 1986-90 OXFORD UNIVERSITY, Worcester College, England. BA Hons Chemistry, with supplementary Molecular Biophysics. Research: High oxidation state manganese complexes with reference to photosystem II. PUBLICATIONS Books 1) The Spoils of War: Greed, Power, and the Conflicts That Made Our Greatest Presidents. Co-authored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Public Affairs Press 2016 2) The Dictator’s Handbook. Public Affairs Press 2011. Co-authored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 3) Punishing the Prince.
    [Show full text]
  • CURRICULUM VITAE ROSE Mcdermott PERSONAL
    CURRICULUM VITAE ROSE McDERMOTT PERSONAL INFORMATION: Address: Department of Political Science 36 Prospect St. Brown University Providence, Rhode Island 02906 Home: 5 East St. Unit A Providence, RI 02906 Telephone: (401) 863-2833 work (401) 831-2951 home (805) 705-0465 cell Email: [email protected] EDUCATION: 1991 Ph.D. Stanford University, Political Science 1990 M.A. Stanford University, Political Science 1988 M.A. Stanford University, Experimental Social Psychology 1986 M.A. Columbia University, Political Science 1984 B.A. Stanford University, Political Science, with distinction ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS: 2010-2011 Fellow, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University 2008-current Professor of Political Science, Brown University 2008-2009 Fellow, Stanford Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences 2006-current Senior Fellow, Stanford Center for Interdisciplinary Policy, Education and Research on Terrorism 2006 Visiting Associate Professor of Government, Harvard University 2004-2008 Associate Professor of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara 2002-2004 Assistant Professor of Political Science University of California, Santa Barbara 2001-2002 Women and Public Policy Fellow, Harvard University 1999-2000 John M. Olin Center for Strategic Studies Affiliate, Harvard University 1998-2002 Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University GRANTS AWARDED: 2003 UCSB Faculty Development Award 2001-2004 Department of Defense grant through Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall director. Funding for book project on the impact of medical and psychological illness on foreign policy decision making, and a series of experiments on biology in international relations (with Professor Stephen Rosen, Harvard University). Total grant: $500,000 2001-2002 Cornell University Peace Studies Program 2000-2001 Cornell University Peace Studies Program 1999-2000 Cornell University Peace Studies Program.
    [Show full text]
  • CURRICULUM VITAE April 21, 2015 James D. Morrow A.F.K. Organski
    CURRICULUM VITAE April 21, 2015 James D. Morrow A.F.K. Organski Collegiate Professor of World Politics University of Michigan Office: Institute for Social Research 4456 University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248 (734)-615-3172 Fax: (734)-764-3341 Email: [email protected] Education 1978 B.S. California Institute of Technology (Mathematics, with honors) 1981 M.A. University of Rochester (Political Science) 1982 Ph.D. University of Rochester (Political Science) Publications Books Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution, Cambridge University Press, 2014. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, and Randolph M. Siverson. Received the Best Book Award for 2002-2003 from Conflict Processes Section, American Political Science Association. Selected as a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title for 2004. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Chinese translation, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2014 Edited Volumes Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes, coedited with Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul F. Diehl. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Scientific Study of International Processes essays for The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark, coedited with Paul F. Diehl. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Articles in Refereed Journals “Territorial Change and Selection Institutions,” Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, 1,1(2014):11-32. “Eight Questions for A Cultural Theory of International Relations,” International Theory, 2,3(2010):475-480. “Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, 102(2008):393-400; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M.
    [Show full text]
  • Zeev Maoz Curriculum Vita
    Zeev Maoz Curriculum Vita Department of Political Science University of California, Davis One Shields Ave. Davis, CA 95616 Tel. (530) 754-0951 Fax: (530) 752-8666 E-Mail: [email protected] Website: http://maoz.ucdavis.edu Academic Education: B.A., Departments of Political Science and International Relations, Hebrew University, 1976. M.A., Department of International Relations, Hebrew University, Israel, 1978. Ph.D., Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1981. Academic Positions: Visiting Political Science Fellow, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Car- negie-Mellon University. September, 1981 - August, 1982. Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel. October, 1982 - January, 1985. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel. February, 1985—August, 1989. Visiting Professor, Department of Politics, New York University. September, 1985— August, 1989. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, September 1989—February 1991 Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, March 1991— September 1994. Professor, Department of Political Science, Tel-Aviv University, September 1994- Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science and Visiting Scholar, James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Houston, TX, 1997-1998. Zeev Maoz/CV 2 Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Ar- bor, 2003-2004 Brian Mulroney Professor of Government, Tel Aviv
    [Show full text]