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CURRICULUM VITAE April 21, 2015 James D. Morrow A.F.K. Organski CURRICULUM VITAE April 21, 2015 James D. Morrow A.F.K. Organski Collegiate Professor of World Politics University of Michigan Office: Institute for Social Research 4456 University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248 (734)-615-3172 Fax: (734)-764-3341 Email: [email protected] Education 1978 B.S. California Institute of Technology (Mathematics, with honors) 1981 M.A. University of Rochester (Political Science) 1982 Ph.D. University of Rochester (Political Science) Publications Books Order within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution, Cambridge University Press, 2014. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, and Randolph M. Siverson. Received the Best Book Award for 2002-2003 from Conflict Processes Section, American Political Science Association. Selected as a CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title for 2004. Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. Chinese translation, Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2014 Edited Volumes Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes, coedited with Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Paul F. Diehl. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Scientific Study of International Processes essays for The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark, coedited with Paul F. Diehl. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. Articles in Refereed Journals “Territorial Change and Selection Institutions,” Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, 1,1(2014):11-32. “Eight Questions for A Cultural Theory of International Relations,” International Theory, 2,3(2010):475-480. “Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, 102(2008):393-400; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?,” American Political Science Review, 101(2007):559-572. “Officers King and Zeng and the Case of the Unsupported Counterfactual,” International Studies Quarterly, 50(2007):227-229. “Compliance with the Laws of War: Dataset and Coding Rules,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 23(2006):91-113; coauthored with Hyeran Jo. “Selection Institutions and War Aims,” Economics of Governance, 7(2006):31-52; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” World Politics, 56(2004): 363-388; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. “The Laws of War, Common Conjectures and Legal Systems in International Politics,” Journal of Legal Studies, 31(2002): S41-S60. Reprinted in Beth A. Simmons, International Law: Sage Library of International Relations, Vol. 5. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007, 249-266 “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” British Journal of Political Science, 32(2002): 559-590; coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties," International Organization, 55(2001): 973-993. "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, 93(1999):791-807, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions," International Security, 24,2(1999):56-73, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?," Journal of Peace Research, 36(1999):481-489. "Policy Failure and Political Survival: the Contribution of Political Institutions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(1999): 147-161, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "The Political Determinants of International Trade: the Major Powers, 1907-1990," American Political Science Review, 92(1998): 649-661, coauthored with Randolph M. Siverson and Tressa Tabares. Also see "Correction to 'The Political Determinants of International Trade'," American Political Science Review, 93(1999): 931-933, coauthored with Randolph M. Siverson and Tressa Tabares. "Capabilities, Perception and Escalation," American Political Science Review, 91(1997): 15-27, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Ethan R. Zorick. Also see "Reply to 'Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick'," American Political Science Review, 94(2000): 429, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Ethan R. Zorick. "When Do 'Relative Gains' Impede Trade?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1997): 12-37. Reprinted in a modified version in Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds., Globalization and Armed Conflict. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, 49-75. "The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1985-1993," International Interactions, 22(1996): 41-66, coauthored with Joseph Lepgold and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. "Modelling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information," International Organization, 48(1994): 387-423. To be reprinted in Lisa L. Martin, ed., International Institutions in the New Global Economy. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, forthcoming. "Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(1994): 270-297. "Forecasting the Risks of Nuclear Proliferation: Taiwan as an Illustration of the Method," Security Studies, 2(1993): 311-331, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Samuel S. G. Wu. "Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security," International Organization, 47(1993): 207-233. "When do Power Shifts Lead to War?," American Journal of Political Science, 36(1992): 896-922, coauthored with Woosang Kim. "Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining," International Studies Quarterly, 36(1992): 153-172. Reprinted in Michael D. Intriligator and Urs Luterbacher, eds., Cooperative Models in International Relations Research. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 245-274. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of Political Science, 35(1991): 904-933. "Electoral and Congressional Incentives and Arms Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(1991): 243-263. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining," American Journal of Political Science, 33(1989): 941-972. "A Twist of Truth: A Re-Examination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(1989): 500-529. "Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics," World Politics, 41(1988): 75-97. "On the Theoretical Basis of a Measure of National Risk Attitudes," International Studies Quarterly, 31(1987): 423-438. "A Spatial Model of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, 80(1986): 1131-1150. "A Continuous-Outcome Expected Utility Theory of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(1985): 473-502. Articles in Edited Volumes “Atrocity, Policy, and the Laws of War: What does Political Science have to say to Law?”, prepared for Elgar Research Handbook on Law and Economics of Public International Law, Eugene V. Kontorovich, ed., Elgar Publishing, forthcoming. “Choosing War: State Decisions to Initiate and End Wars and Observe the Peace Afterwards,” pp. 411-442 in Rafael Wittek, Tom Snijders, and Victor Nee, eds., The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. “The Social Nature of Human Decision Making,” pp. 111-126 in Philip H. Crowley and Thomas R. Zentall, eds., Comparative Decision Making, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. “The Interaction of Theory and Data,” pp. 81-90, in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Paul F. Diehl and James D. Morrow, eds., Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. “Section Introduction: Scientific Study of International Processes,” Vol. 1, pp. clxxvi-clxxviii, in Robert A. Denemark, ed., The International Studies Encyclopedia, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010; coauthored with Paul F. Diehl. “Understanding International Conflict: Assessing the Democratic Peace and Offense-Defense Theory,” pp. 170-94, in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York: Norton, 2002. “The Selectorate Model: A Theory of Political Institutions,” in Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, eds., New Directions in Sociological Theory: The Growth of Contemporary Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2001, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. "Political Survival and International Conflict," pp.183-206, in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat, eds, War in the Changing World. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. "The Ongoing Game-Theoretic Revolution," pp. 164-192 in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000. "Political Institutions, Political Survival and Policy Success," pp. 59-84 in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds., Governing for Prosperity, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, coauthored with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?," pp. 63-83 in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3. Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, 2000. "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation
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