THE USA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER A Debate Between Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin 2 Contents 3 The Structure of the Debate The Debaters 4 FIRST SEGMENT Olavo de Carvalho’s Answer Aleksandr Dugin’s Answer: Global Transition and Its Enemies 25 SECOND SEGMENT Aleksandr Dugin’s Reply: The West Against the Rest Olavo de Carvalho’s Reply 67 THIRD SEGMENT Aleksandr Dugin’s Response Olavo de Carvalho’s Response 143 FOURTH SEGMENT Olavo de Carvalho’s Closing Remarks Aleksandr Dugin’s Closing Remarks: Against the Post-Modern World ◊ Olavo de Carvalho’s answers and replies were translated from the Portuguese by Alessandro Cota. THE INTER -AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY , GOVERNMENT , AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 3 The Debaters: Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin On March 7, 2011, Olavo de Carvalho, President of the Inter- American Institute for Philosophy, Government, and Social Thought, and Aleksandr Dugin, leader of the International Eurasian Movement, started a written debate on the topic “The USA and the New World Order.” The debate ended on May 9, 2011. Professor de Carvalho is a philosopher currently residing in the United States who has authored more than a dozen books and has been teaching an online philosophy course to more than 2,000 international students since 2008. His book Aristotle in a New Perspective (1996) has been acclaimed as a highly original contribution to the understanding of the Greek philosopher. Dugin is Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical strategist, leading organizer of the Eurasian Movement and considered the most influential Russian thinker of the post-Soviet era. His book, The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia (1997) has had a large influence on Russian military and foreign policy elites and has been adopted as a textbook in the General Staff Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The Structure of the Debate In the first segment, both participants respond to the following question: “What are the historical, political, ideological and economic factors and actors that now define the dynamics and configuration of power in the world, and what is the U.S. position in what is known as New World Order?” In the second, Aleksandr Dugin replies to the answer Olavo de Carvalho offered to the question posed by the organizers of the debate, and Olavo de Carvalho responds to Aleksandr Dugin’s reply. Next, in the third segment, Dugin examines and addresses de Carvalho’s response, and de Carvalho’s, in turn, examines and deals with Dugin’s examination. Finally, the debate ends with each thinker offering his closing statements. THE INTER -AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY , GOVERNMENT , AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 4 First Segment THE INTER -AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY , GOVERNMENT , AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 5 Olavo de Carvalho’s Answer Words change their meaning, weight and value according to the situations of speech. Upon entering this debate I must clarify from the outset that it is not a debate at all. The very idea of a debate presupposes both an opposite symmetry between the contending parties, from the point of view of their convictions, and some direct symmetry of their respective socio- professional status: intellectuals discuss with intellectuals, politicians with politicians, professors with professors, preachers of religion with preachers of atheism, and so forth. As for convictions, if we understand this term as only general statements about the structure of reality, mine do not differ from Professor Dugin’s in many essential points. Does he believe in God? So do I. Does he think a metaphysics of the absolute is possible? So do I. Does he wager that life has a meaning? So do I. Does he understand traditions, homeland, and family as the values that must be preserved above supposed economic and administrative conveniences? So do I. Does he see with horror the globalist project of the Rockfellers and Soros? So do I. It is not possible to organize a debate between two people who are in agreement. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the actual positions we occupy in society, our differences are so numerous, so deep and so irreducible that the very proposal of putting us face to face has a certain comic incongruity to it. I am just a philosopher, writer, and professor, committed to the search of what seems to me to be the truth and to educating a group of people who are so kind as to pay attention to what I say. Neither these people nor I hold any public job. We do not have any influence on national or international politics. We do not even have the ambition—much less an explicit project—for changing the course of history, whatever it may be. Our only hope is to know reality to the utmost degree of our power and one day leave this life aware that we did not live in illusions and self- delusion, that we did not let ourselves be misled and corrupted by the Prince of this World and by the promises of the ideologues, his servants. In the current power hierarchy of my native country, my opinion is worthless, except maybe as a negative example and an incarnation of absolute evil, which is a source of great satisfaction to me. In the country where I live, the government considers me at worst an inoffensive eccentric. No political party, mass movement, government institution, church or religious sect considers me its mentor. So I can give my opinion as I wish, and change my opinion as many times as it seems right to me, with no THE INTER -AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY , GOVERNMENT , AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 6 devastating practical consequences beyond the modest circle of my personal existence. Now Professor Dugin, the son of a KGB officer and the political mentor of a man who is the very incarnation of the KGB, is the creator and guide of one of the widest and most ambitious geopolitical plans of all time—a plan adopted and followed as closely as possible by a nation which has the largest army in the world, the most efficient and daring secret service and a network of alliances that extends throughout four continents. To say that Professor Dugin is at the center and pinnacle of power is a simple matter of realism. To implement his plans, he has at his disposal Vladimir Putin’s strong arm, the armies of Russia and China and every terrorist organization of the Middle East, not to mention practically every leftist, fascist and neo- Nazi movement which today operate under the banner of his “Eurasian” project. As for myself, I not only lack a plan for my own retirement, but my only available war resources are my dog Big Mac and an old hunting shotgun. This tremendous existential difference (fully illustrated by the pictures below) makes our opinions, even where their verbal expressions coincide to the letter, signify entirely different things in the framework of our respective goals. The answers to the questions that inspire this debate will show this, I hope, as clearly as do the photos. Mr. de Carvalho and his two dogs, Mr. Aleksandr Dugin. Big Mac and Missy. There are two questions: who are the actors in the world scene and what is the position of the United States in it? THE INTER -AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY , GOVERNMENT , AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 2012 7 As for the first question: aside from Catholic and Protestant Christianity, which I shall address later on, the historic forces that today contend for power in the world array themselves into three projects of global dominance, which I will tentatively call the “Russian-Chinese,” the “Western” (sometimes mistakenly called “Anglo-American”) and the “Islamic” projects. Each of these has a well documented history, which shows their remote origins, the transformations they have gone through in the course of time and the present state of their implementation. The agents that personify these projects today are as follows: 1. The ruling elite of Russia and China, and particularly the secret services of these two countries. 2. The Western financial elite, as represented particularly in the Bilderberg Club, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission. 3. The Muslim Brotherhood, the religious leaders of several Islamic countries and the governments of some Muslim countries. Of these three agents, only the first can be conceived of in strictly geopolitical terms, since its plans and actions correspond to well-defined national and regional interests. The second, which is more advanced in the implementation of its plans for world government, places itself explicitly above any national interests, including those of its countries of origin, which serve as its base of operations. In the third, conflicts of interests between national governments and the overarching goal of a Universal Caliphate are always ultimately resolved in favor of the latter, which, though currently existing only as an ideal, enjoys symbolic authority founded upon Koranic commandments that no Islamic government would dare to overtly challenge. The conceptions of global power that these three agents strive to implement are very different from one another because they owe to heterogeneous and sometimes incompatible inspirations. Therefore, they are not similar forces, or as it were, species of the same genus. They do not fight for the same goals and, when they occasionally resort to the same weapons (for example, economic warfare) they do so in different strategic contexts, where employing such weapons does not necessarily serve the same objectives. Although nominally the relationships among them are competitive and antagonistic, sometimes even of a military nature, there are vast areas of fusion and collaboration, as flexible and changeable as they may be.