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russian analytical russian analytical digest 60/09 digest analysis Fascist Tendencies in Russia’s Political Establishment: The Rise of the International Eurasian Movement By Andreas Umland, Eichstaett, Bavaria Abstract Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent advocate of fascist and anti-Western views, has risen from a fringe ideologue to deeply penetrate into Russian governmental offices, mass media, civil society and academia in ways that many in the West do not realize or understand. Prominent members of Russian society are affiliated with his International Eurasian Movement. Among Dugin’s most important collaborators are electronic and print media commentator Mikhail Leont’ev and the legendary TV producer and PR specialist Ivan Demidov. If Dugin’s views become more widely accepted, a new Cold War will be the least that the West should expect from Russia during the coming years. The Rise of Aleksandr Dugin course that must be taken seriously. Dugin’s numerous In recent years, various forms of nationalism have be- links to the political and academic establishments of a come a part of everyday Russian political and social life. number of post-Soviet countries, as well as institutions Since the end of the 1990s, an increasingly aggressive in Turkey, remain understudied or misrepresented. In racist sub-culture has been infecting sections of Russia’s other cases, Dugin and his followers receive more se- youth, and become the topic of numerous analyses by rious attention, yet are still portrayed as anachronis- Russian and non-Russian observers. Several new radi- tic, backward-looking imperialists – merely a partic- cal right-wing organizations, like the Movement Against ularly radical form of contemporary Russian anti-glo- Illegal Emigration, known by its Russian acronym balism. Many such assessments downplay the mani- DPNI, have attracted extensive attention from domestic fest neo-fascism of Dugin’s bellicose ideology. Neither and foreign journalists, scholars and monitors. Parallel the stunning public appeal nor the grave political im- tendencies within Russian intellectual life, in contrast, plications of Duginism are well-understood in Russia have received less national and international notice al- or the West today. though their repercussions can increasingly be felt in the political thinking and behavior of Moscow’s rulers. It The Members of the Supreme Council of the is generally acknowledged that a shrill anti-American- International Eurasian Movement ism, as well as various other phobias, today characterize A marginal conspiracy theorist in the 1990s, Dugin not only marginal groups, but also the Russian main- has, during the last 10 years, become a respected com- stream. However, in many analyses, the sources of, and mentator and writer on contemporary world affairs, channels for, such tendencies in Russia’s elite strata re- in general, and Russia’s foreign policy, in particular. main obscure. This has happened in spite of his frank praise of the Among the dozens of extremely anti-Western publi- SS Ahnenerbe institute (Heritage of the Forefathers), cists and pundits present in Russian official and public enthusiastic prophecy of a Russian “fascist fascism,” life today, Aleksandr Dugin and his various followers and numerous similar statements during the ear- stand out as a network of especially industrious politi- ly and mid-1990s. Dugin’s rise began in 1998 when cal ideologues and activists who have managed to pen- then State Duma Speaker Gennadii Seleznyov, a lead- etrate Russian governmental offices, mass media, civil er of the Communist Party, appointed him as an ad- society and academia. Dugin’s bizarre ideas have been visor. Dugin’s unexpected appearance as an official analyzed in dozens of scholarly and journalistic texts employee of the presidium of the parliament’s low- (see the Suggested Reading at the end of this article). er house marked the radical rightist’s break-through At the same time, instead of being treated as a political from the lunatic fringe into the political establishment phenomenon, the Duginists are sometimes presented of the Russian Federation (RF). Since then, Dugin’s as peculiarly post-Soviet curiosities. Occasionally, they presence and weight in Russian political and academ- are used to illustrate the degree of Russia’s confusion ic life has only grown. after the collapse of its empire rather than perceived as Since its foundation as the Socio-Political engines of broader trends in contemporary Russian dis- Movement “Eurasia” in 2001, Dugin’s main orga- 13 russian analytical russian analytical digest 60/09 digest nization, the Mezhdunarodnoe “Evraziiskoe dvizhe- • Head of the Congress of the Peoples of the Northern nie” (MED; International Eurasian Movement), has Caucasus and Secretary for National Issues of the included a number of high-ranking government offi- Union of Writers of Russia Brontoi Bediurov. cials, such as: In addition, the MED’s Supreme Council contains po- • former RF Minister of Culture Aleksandr Sokolov, litical and academic functionaries from various CIS • Chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee countries. Among them were, in early April 2009, on International Relations Mikhail Margelov, the: • former advisor to President Yeltsin and RF • Rector of the Lev Gumilyov Eurasian National Ambassador to Denmark Dmitrii Riurikov, University of Astana (Kazakhstan) Sarsyngali • former Head of the RF Ministry of Justice Department Abdymanapov, on Political Parties and Social Organizations Aleksei • Ambassador of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan to Russia Zhafiarov, and others. and Head of the Council of Directors of Postnoff Ltd While these figures are today no longer listed on the Apas Dzhumagulov, MED’s website (http://evrazia.info/), and may have • Director of the Academy of Management attached cut their ties with Dugin, the MED still boasts a to the Office of the President of Belarus and Director number of prominent personalities as members of of the Research Institute on the Theory and Practice its Supreme Council. They included in early April of Government of the Republic of Belarus Evgenii 2009: Matusevich, • Federation Council Vice-Speaker Aleksandr • Rector of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University of Torshin, Bishkek Vladimir Nifad’ev, • Presidential advisor Aslambek Aslakhanov, • Director of the Akhmad Donish Institute of History, • South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoity, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Tajik Academy • Odnako (However) TV show host and editor-in- of Sciences Rakhim Masov, chief of the weekly political journal Profil’ (Profile) • Rector of the Makhambet Utemisov Western Mikhail Leont’ev, Kazakhstani State University of Uralsk Tuiakbai • former Deputy Foreign Minister and current RF Ryzbekov, Ambassador to Latvia Viktor Kaliuzhnii, • Leader of the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine • Yakutiia (Sakha) Minister of Culture and Rector of Nataliia Vitrenko, the Arctic State Institute of Culture and Art, Andrei Finally, it is noteworthy that a number of public fig- Borisov, ures from countries outside the former Soviet Union • Head of the RF Territorial Directorate’s State have, according to MED’s website, also agreed to en- Committee for Property responsible for Moscow ter the Supreme Council of the International Eurasian State University Zeidula Iuzbekov, Movement. They include the • Chief Mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of the • Head of the İşçi Partisi (Labour Party) of Turkey Muslims of Russia and European Countries of the Doğu Perinçek (currently in prison), C.I.S. Talgat Tadzhuddin, • French Air Force General (ret.) and leader of the • President of the National Association of TV and Forum for France Pierre-Marie Gallois, Radio Broadcasters and member of the Directorate • Director of the Center for Central Asian and of the Academy of Russian Television Eduard Caucasian Studies at Luleå, Sweden, and Editor- Sagalaev, in-Chief of the scholarly journal Central Asia and • Head of the RF Council of Ambassadors and the Caucasus Murad Esenov, President of the Russian-Turkish Friendship Society • Lecturer of the Faculty of Policy Studies of Iwate “Rutam” Al’bert Chernyshov, Prefectural University, Japan, Iukiko Kuroiwa, • Editor-in-Chief of the Russian army newspaper • conspirologist and author of the book Vladimir Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star) Nikolai Efimov, Poutine et l’Eurasie (Charmes: Les Amis de la • President of the Consulting Firm Neokon and Culture Européenne, 2005), Jean Parvulesco, founder of the website Worldcrisis.ru Mikhail • Editor-in-Chief of the Milano journal Eurasia: Khazin, Rivista di Studi Geopolitici (of which Dugin is an • Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences editorial board member) Tiberio Graziani, and Vice-President of the Society of Georgians of • Head of the Congress of Serbs of Eurasia (KSEA) Russia Severian Zagarishvili, Mila Alečković-Nikolić, and 14 russian analytical russian analytical digest 60/09 digest • General (ret.) and former functionary of the Serbian in view of his stated closeness to the Strassers, would Radical Party Božidar Delić. seem to belong. Dugin’s Public References to Fascism Mikhail Leont’ev and Ivan Demidov as While the ties linking some of these figures to Dugin Dugin’s Accomplices are obvious, the reasons for the MED affiliation of Normally, such details would be sufficient for serious others listed here remain a mystery. As indicated, students of international security to dismiss this figure throughout the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly eulogized, and his organization as objects worthy of deeper polit-
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