JOSEPH GOEBBELS AND NAZI RADIO PROPAGANDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE by Chester Ferdinand Casanave Jr. A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requ,irements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Division of Communications Morehead State University December, 1975 APP-!+1~THESES - Yl\ o. st.\ 1j1 Q_ 335f ' ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author would like to express his sincerest graditude to the following people: George Harper and Dr. Joe Misiewicz for their help and consideration in the formulation of many ideas here. Thanks also to Wanda Jones for her patience and help in construction and typing, to my wife Michelle, for her under­ standing and support, finally to Dr. Frederick Voigt for his careful and generous supervision during this experience. ~ccepted by the faculty of the School of Humanities, Morehead State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements f or the Master of Arts degree . Master ' s Committee: TABLE OF CONTENTS fage CHAPTER I Introduction and Purpose .....••..•....... 1 CHAPTER II Procedure and Criteria.................. 5 CHAPTER III Goebbels the Man. • • . • . • . 18 CHAPTER IV Gcebbel's Philosophy •.................. 39 CHAPTER V Ministry Structure. • . 99 CHAPTER VI Summary and Conclusions. .129 APPENDIX I. ......................... .139 APPENDIX II • • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .156 BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .163 i C::HAPTER I Introduction and Purpose On the evening of May first, 1945, Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels climbed the steps leading out of the Fuehrer Bunker and walked a short way into the Chancellery garden in the heart of Berlin. There he paused a moment to survey the shell-pocked landscape, raised a gun to his head and shot himself. It was a last act of propaganda, a fitting climax to the carefully contrived pageant he had labored for over twenty years to create. It was intended to seal the covenant he had made with legend, in his own mind and hopefully in the mmnds of the German people. A few hours later a contingent of Russian troops found his staff still at their desks in the Ministry of Public Enlightment and ~ Propaganda, attending to the ongoing neeqs of the German mind amidst the flames and bursting she~ls. They had received no orders to stop their work. The end of the man and his Ministry indicate the amount of dedication Goebbels possessed. Whether he can be considered a failure is a question one must ask when one considers his fate. Goebbels died believing he and his Fuehrer had been betrayed by others in the·Nazi hierarchy. Throughout his career he believed that his efforts to implement effective propaganda programs were being undermined by Nazi officials without expertise and under­ standing of the requirements of such programs. 1 2 While his Ministry had extraordinary influence over the .. Gennan public at large, Goebbels .neve.r·.really enjoyed coll\Plete control of the German media. He did not absolutely control the:·press, and was constantly at odds with those·,who did. He lamented for years the authority of the Wehramacht over military news releases, an authority which caused much trouble in efforts for unified and effective propaganda. His protests to Hitler brought fil:eeti_ng mollification, promises and sometimes rebuke. While he lost faith in Hitler towards the end of the war, he never lost his impassioned loyalty to the image he • 1 helped to create. Hitler, however held Goebbels at armslength almost to the end. The Fuehrer maneuvered Goebbels, contended with him and guided the little Doktor along the paths he saw fit. He never lost sight of the fact that Goebbels was an extremely complex and forceful person. Hitler saw to it that Goebbels remained in a constant state of conflict with those around him to insure that he represented no threat to his own political security. If Hitler had accol!)2dated the Minister of Propaganda, reduced the conflict, and granted the desired authority at the right times, the result of the pr_ograms in the Ministry might well have been different. Had Goebbels been able to rally support for his projects and gather about himself the cadre he sought, he might have placed himself in a position to be much more effectively heared by both Hitler and the German.people. _Again, if Goebbels himself had .been able to contravene the 3 effects of his passionate affection for the person of the Fuehrer he might have acted more reasonably towards the end of the war, As it was, his work and his efforts were markedly impeded by circumstances out of his control, politically, and personally. According to such an argument, it might be said he failed in his endeavor. But one should consider his accomplishments and philosophy before assuming failure on the part of Joseph Goebbels. Before his death he created a system of evaluati.ng and disseminating information to a state, and later, to a continent which, in theory, might have worked had it not been for the inability of those around him to appreciate it. In his early career he mastered the art of political activism on a scale that has yet to be effectively equaled. He first grasped the true value of radio as a means of warfare and exploitation.· While he publically professed an acute contempt for the German masses, he successfully manipulated the thinking of some six_ty million people for many years. His philosophy and policy has been studied as a supreme example, alb£!:t Machiavellian, of the art of psychological manipulation of a mass using the most modern techniques of his day. His procedures in the exploitation of subdued cultures through mass media w~ effective in the case of France and Holland, and for a time even E.ngland under siege. It is the aim of this thesis to explore the structure of the propaganda organization in Nazi Germany under Goebbels, illustrate his technique, specifically in radio, relate both to his philosophy, and in doing so to ascertain the nature of his efforts in relation 4 to the efforts of others with whom he had to contend, and with whom he came into conflict. Finally, as an adjunct, to illustrate whether he actually succeded or failed in his calling. In the light of these aims, the following questions will be answered in the course of this thesis: 1. What characterized the organizational structure of the Propaganda Ministry? 2. What characterized Goebbels' technique? 3. What was Goebbels' philosophy of propaganda and was it consistent with his techniques? 4. What is the measure of Goebbels' success and- failure? Some rather extensive efforts were made in the course of research on this thesis. The author, for instance,·checked the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. for a comprehensive listing of English and German information on Geobbels. In some cases there was a wait of up to five months in obtaining certain materials. It is perhaps in order to remark that some biographical information is included not as romantic generalization, but rather to provide an insight into some of the early experiences and influences that played a large and significant part in Goebbels' development. Such information is essential in understanding the unique environment, upbringing and education out of which Goebbels arose. This information may serve to provide some basis for examining the psychological constitution of Goebbels. CHAPTER II Procedure and Criteria The sources utilized in this thesis are primarily the surviving texts of Goebbels ' own diaries, the minutes of his secret conferences, and the diaries of ~udolph Semmler, his press chief of many years . Goebbels believed himself to be the curator of the official Nazi history and wrote copious accounts of his day-to-day activities and impressions throughout his career. He would dictate these accounts to a stenographer for hours at the end of each day and they would be transcribed and bound. He did so with the intention of utilizing them after retirement in the composition of historic memoirs which he believed would be the standard work on the founding and development of the Thi rd Reich. They are at once candid and embellished and obviously written with public and scholarly consumption in mind. Actually, most of his c reative work was written in the diary format , i . e . Michael, a semi-autobiographical novel. His earlier diaries, which he began as a student, are much more candid, not having been written necessarily for public consumption, and are very poetic. He fancied himse lf an activist, revolutionary and a martyr . The official diaries, however, have come down to us only in part. They were found in rubble and preserved, having been translated by Louis Lochner, a wire service correspondent in Germany during the war. These diaries run for about seventeen months , with gaps of up to a month at points . It is believed that the diaries survived in 5 6 toto and were found by the advancing Russian armies who neither deny nor confirm possession. Those that remain are sufficient, however, to provide a clear insight into the method, technique and philosophy of the propagandist. They depict a callous, but sometimes remorseful, attitude toward the aberant form of journalism that the Nazis developed. They also indicate clearly that Dr. Goebbels worked in an atmosphere of continuous conflict with the other strongmen in the Nazi upper echelons. Goebbels pulled no punches in his descriptions of his confederates and, as an educated man, showed great contempt for some of his less enlightened collegues.- A German peasant, working in the Chancell.!::Y area happened upon a stack of carbon copy minutes among piles of waste paper he was intending to gather and sell as fuel shortly after the surrender. He glanced at the top sheets and realized what he had found and took the stack to the allied headquarters in Berlin.