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Political Trends in Russia
russian analytical russian analytical digest 60/09 digest analysis Fascist Tendencies in Russia’s Political Establishment: The Rise of the International Eurasian Movement By Andreas Umland, Eichstaett, Bavaria Abstract Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent advocate of fascist and anti-Western views, has risen from a fringe ideologue to deeply penetrate into Russian governmental offices, mass media, civil society and academia in ways that many in the West do not realize or understand. Prominent members of Russian society are affiliated with his International Eurasian Movement. Among Dugin’s most important collaborators are electronic and print media commentator Mikhail Leont’ev and the legendary TV producer and PR specialist Ivan Demidov. If Dugin’s views become more widely accepted, a new Cold War will be the least that the West should expect from Russia during the coming years. The Rise of Aleksandr Dugin course that must be taken seriously. Dugin’s numerous In recent years, various forms of nationalism have be- links to the political and academic establishments of a come a part of everyday Russian political and social life. number of post-Soviet countries, as well as institutions Since the end of the 1990s, an increasingly aggressive in Turkey, remain understudied or misrepresented. In racist sub-culture has been infecting sections of Russia’s other cases, Dugin and his followers receive more se- youth, and become the topic of numerous analyses by rious attention, yet are still portrayed as anachronis- Russian and non-Russian observers. Several new radi- tic, backward-looking imperialists – merely a partic- cal right-wing organizations, like the Movement Against ularly radical form of contemporary Russian anti-glo- Illegal Emigration, known by its Russian acronym balism. -
Spencer Sunshine*
Journal of Social Justice, Vol. 9, 2019 (© 2019) ISSN: 2164-7100 Looking Left at Antisemitism Spencer Sunshine* The question of antisemitism inside of the Left—referred to as “left antisemitism”—is a stubborn and persistent problem. And while the Right exaggerates both its depth and scope, the Left has repeatedly refused to face the issue. It is entangled in scandals about antisemitism at an increasing rate. On the Western Left, some antisemitism manifests in the form of conspiracy theories, but there is also a hegemonic refusal to acknowledge antisemitism’s existence and presence. This, in turn, is part of a larger refusal to deal with Jewish issues in general, or to engage with the Jewish community as a real entity. Debates around left antisemitism have risen in tandem with the spread of anti-Zionism inside of the Left, especially since the Second Intifada. Anti-Zionism is not, by itself, antisemitism. One can call for the Right of Return, as well as dissolving Israel as a Jewish state, without being antisemitic. But there is a Venn diagram between anti- Zionism and antisemitism, and the overlap is both significant and has many shades of grey to it. One of the main reasons the Left can’t acknowledge problems with antisemitism is that Jews persistently trouble categories, and the Left would have to rethink many things—including how it approaches anti- imperialism, nationalism of the oppressed, anti-Zionism, identity politics, populism, conspiracy theories, and critiques of finance capital—if it was to truly struggle with the question. The Left understands that white supremacy isn’t just the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazis, but that it is part of the fabric of society, and there is no shortcut to unstitching it. -
The Christchurch Attack Report: Key Takeaways on Tarrant’S Radicalization and Attack Planning
The Christchurch Attack Report: Key Takeaways on Tarrant’s Radicalization and Attack Planning Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Chelsea Daymon and Amarnath Amarasingam i The Christchurch Attack Report: Key Takeaways on Tarrant’s Radicalization and Attack Planning Yannick Veilleux-Lepage, Chelsea Daymon and Amarnath Amarasingam ICCT Perspective December 2020 ii About ICCT The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution- oriented implementation support on prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counterterrorism. ICCT’s work focuses on themes at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human rights-related aspects of counterterrorism. The major project areas concern countering violent extremism, rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims’ voices. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism. Licensing and Distribution ICCT publications are published in open access format and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons -
Brenton Tarrant: the Processes Which Brought Him to Engage in Political Violence
CSTPV Short Papers Brenton Tarrant: the processes which brought him to engage in political violence Beatrice Williamson 1 Contents Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3 Brenton Tarrant .................................................................................................................... 3 Conceptualising Tarrant and his violence ............................................................................. 5 The Lone Actor Puzzle ........................................................................................................... 5 ‘A dark social web’: online ‘radicalisation’ ............................................................................ 7 Online communities: Social Network Ties and Framing .................................................... 7 Funnelling and Streams ..................................................................................................... 9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 11 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 12 2 Introduction Individual radicalisation is a complex and bespoke process influenced by multiple factors and variables, meaning every individual follows their own path to terrorism and political violence. This paper will endeavour to demonstrate and explore some of the -
Olena Semenyaka, the “First Lady” of Ukrainian Nationalism
Olena Semenyaka, The “First Lady” of Ukrainian Nationalism Adrien Nonjon Illiberalism Studies Program Working Papers, September 2020 For years, Ukrainian nationalist movements such as Svoboda or Pravyi Sektor were promoting an introverted, state-centered nationalism inherited from the early 1930s’ Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (Orhanizatsiia Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv) and largely dominated by Western Ukrainian and Galician nationalist worldviews. The EuroMaidan revolution, Crimea’s annexation by Russia, and the war in Donbas changed the paradigm of Ukrainian nationalism, giving birth to the Azov movement. The Azov National Corps (Natsional’nyj korpus), led by Andriy Biletsky, was created on October 16, 2014, on the basis of the Azov regiment, now integrated into the Ukrainian National Guard. The Azov National Corps is now a nationalist party claiming around 10,000 members and deployed in Ukrainian society through various initiatives, such as patriotic training camps for children (Azovets) and militia groups (Natsional’ny druzhiny). Azov can be described as a neo- nationalism, in tune with current European far-right transformations: it refuses to be locked into old- fashioned myths obsessed with a colonial relationship to Russia, and it sees itself as outward-looking in that its intellectual framework goes beyond Ukraine’s territory, deliberately engaging pan- European strategies. Olena Semenyaka (b. 1987) is the female figurehead of the Azov movement: she has been the international secretary of the National Corps since 2018 (and de facto leader since the party’s very foundation in 2016) while leading the publishing house and metapolitical club Plomin (Flame). Gaining in visibility as the Azov regiment transformed into a multifaceted movement, Semenyaka has become a major nationalist theorist in Ukraine. -
Russian Analytical Digest 14/07 Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today
rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 14/07 ddigestigest Analysis Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today By Andreas Umland, Kiev, Ukraine Summary Th e past year witnessed a welcome sensitization of the Russian public towards skinhead attacks and ultra-na- tionalist propaganda. Nevertheless, the administration of Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin-controlled mass me- dia have maintained an ambiguous stance with regard to xenophobic tendencies in politics and public discourse. While primitive hatred of foreigners and ethnic violence are offi cially stigmatized, the dissemination of national stereotypes and anti-Americanism, in particular, by Kremlin-directed mass media and political pundits contin- ues unabated. For example, the notorious publicist Alexander Dugin, who openly propagated fascist ideas in the 1990s, has become an important player in shaping the discourse of Russian political and intellectual elites today. It remains to be seen how the Russian leadership will handle the challenges resulting from such a contradictory approach to its domestic and foreign policies in the coming years. A New Sensitization Towards Right-Wing Ambiguous Reactions Extremism? espite such encouraging signs, the Kremlin-con- n view of escalating violent attacks and other actions Dtrolled mass media have an altogether ambivalent Iagainst foreigners, the debate on Russian fascism is stance toward right-wing extremist tendencies. Al- currently experiencing a new high in the Russian me- though manifest anti-Semitism and violent racism are dia. Th ere was a similar debate in the mid-1990s, when now heavily criticized and visibly stigmatized, other xe- the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and nophobic patterns remain present, or are even increasing, the “intransigent opposition,” a state of near-civil war in reporting on foreign news and political commentaries. -
Ways in and Ways out Ways and in Ways Høigård Tajet Kirsti
Ways In and Ways Out Ways and In Ways Høigård Tajet Kirsti NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology Faculty of Social Sciences Master’s thesis and Technology Management Department of Political Science Trondheim, Spring2012 Trondheim, Science thesisinPolitical Master’s Extremism Islamist versus Right-WingExtremism Deradicalization: and ofRadicalization An Analysis Out InandWays Ways Høigård Tajet Kirsti To SL, with the hopes that you will someday deradicalize as well Acknowledgements I want to express my gratitude to my supervisor Tanja Ellingsen for good help, positive remarks and good assistance along the way. I also want to express my gratitude to my informants for letting me dig in their troublesome and often difficult past, I have learnt at least as much about human grief as I have about radicalization and deradicalization. Without the informants this thesis had not existed. I also want to thank Rashad Ali for meeting me at the British Museum where the atmosphere is great for deep conversations, and for all the assistance he provided me in the aftermath of the interview. I also want to express my gratitude to Hanif Qadir for welcoming me into the Active Change Foundation in London and for letting me interview him. I am also grateful to Pat Parry in the United Kingdom for assistance along the way. In addition I want to express my gratitude to all the people that I have been in contact with regarding finding the right informants, in particular all the local police stations that have helped me along the way, Åfjord Lensmannskontor, Manglerud Politistasjon, Brumunddal Lensmannskontor and Stange Lensmannskontor. -
Accelerationism Theory
CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES VANCOUVER ACCELERATIONISM THEORY BRIEFING NOTE April 12, 2021 Disclaimer: This Briefing Note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. Title: Accelerationsim Theory Date: 12/04/2021 Disclaimer: This briefing note contains summaries of open sources and does not represent the views of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies. PURPOSE STATEMENT This briefing note examines accelerationism theory and its connection to several white nationalist groups that may be considered Violent Transnational Social Movements (VTSM), and the potential threats that accelerationism poses to national security and political stability. Since the mid-2010s, some members of the far-right and white nationalist movements have reportedly embraced and promoted accelerationism as a key component of their ideology using online forums (Anti-Defamation League, 2019; Beauchamp, 2019). This briefing note also examines the reported connections between accelerationism and acts of soft and kinetic violence committed against minorities, immigrant communities, Jewish communities, and governments (Beauchamp, 2019; Dearden, 2020; Waugh, 2019). THE SECURITY PROBLEM Several white nationalist groups that embrace accelerationism emerged in the late 2010s including Atomwaffen Division and The Base. Believers in accelerationism have recently been linked to several instances of soft and kinetic violence, which allegedly aim to de-stabilise existing social structures (Beauchamp, 2019; Dearden, 2020; Waugh, 2019). The continued online promotion of accelerationism poses a serious potential threat to minorities, immigrant communities, Jewish communities, and governments (Beauchamp, 2019). Accelerationists are often radicalised through easily accessible internet sources and encrypted chat rooms. -
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Fascism 10 (2021) 166-185 ‘The Girl Who Was Chased by Fire’: Violence and Passion in Contemporary Swedish Fascist Fiction Mattias Gardell Centre for Multidisciplinary Studies of Racism, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden [email protected] Abstract Fascism invites its adherents to be part of something greater than themselves, invoking their longing for honor and glory, passion and heroism. An important avenue for articulating its affective dimension is cultural production. This article investigates the role of violence and passion in contemporary Swedish-language fascist fiction. The protagonist is typically a young white man or woman who wakes up to the realities of the ongoing white genocide through being exposed to violent crime committed by racialized aliens protected by the System. Seeking revenge, the protagonist learns how to be a man or meets her hero, and is introduced to fascist ideology and the art of killing. Fascist literature identifies aggression and ethnical cleansing as altruistic acts of love. With its passionate celebration of violence, fascism hails the productivity of destructivity, and the life-bequeathing aspects of death, which is at the core of fascism’s urge for national rebirth. Keywords Sweden – fascist culture – fascist fiction – violence – heroism – death – love – radical nationalism Fascism – here used in its Griffian sense as a generic term for revolutionary nationalisms centered on a mythic core of national rebirth – has a discernible affective dimension. It offers its adherents to be part of something greater than themselves, invoking their longing for glory, honor, and beauty, and inducing their capacities for hate, love, self-sacrifice, and violence. An important avenue © Mattias Gardell, 2021 | doi:10.1163/22116257-10010004 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the prevailingDownloaded cc-by license from Brill.com09/30/2021at the time of 05:35:12PM publication. -
The Boston Marathon Bombing in the New York Times and Le Figaro
University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2014 News and the Public Sphere: The Boston Marathon Bombing in The New York Times and Le Figaro Ioana Alexandra Coman University of Tennessee - Knoxville, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, International and Intercultural Communication Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, and the Mass Communication Commons Recommended Citation Coman, Ioana Alexandra, "News and the Public Sphere: The Boston Marathon Bombing in The New York Times and Le Figaro. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2014. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2812 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Ioana Alexandra Coman entitled "News and the Public Sphere: The Boston Marathon Bombing in The New York Times and Le Figaro." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Communication and Information. Peter Gross, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Elizabeth Hendrickson, Suzie Allard, Michael Palenchar, Harry Dahms Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. -
Anton Shekhovtsov
RUSSIAN CONNECTIONS TO THE FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE Anton Shekhovtsov Contents Executive summary Nothing New under the Sun Post-Soviet period and early Putin era European far-right politicians and pro-Kremlin fake election observation Russian media and the European far right Political cooperation between Russian stakeholders and the European far right – Austria – France – Germany – Italy Moscow’s objectives of engaging with the European far right Policy recommendations Executive summary • Today’s relations between the European far right and various Russian pro-Kremlin actors reflect a historical reality: Soviet state actors were prepared to cooperate with European right-wing extremists to entrench the international position of the Soviet Union and to inflict damage to the capitalist West, while some European right-wing extremists sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union as an ally in their struggle against Western capitalism and imperialism. • After the Second World War, Soviet authorities provided financial support to West German and Austrian right-wing extremists as a way to influence politics and political debates in those countries; in particular, Soviet funding was used to cover publishing costs of far-right newspapers and information bulletins. • After the collapse of the Soviet Union, European far-right activists and politicians revived their interest in cooperating with Russian actors, but they could only reach out to Russian ultranationalists who opposed the democratising Russian authorities that aspired to become part of the liberal-democratic West, not undermine it. • The first area of institutionalised cooperation between the European far right and Russian pro-Kremlin actors was politically biased (fake) international election observation, a form of political activity performed by international actors and aimed at advancing interests of politicians and political forces by imitating credible election monitoring during electoral processes. -
The Future of South Korea: Alternative Scenarios for 2030
THE FUTURE OF SOUTH KOREA: ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS FOR 2030 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE DECEMBER 2012 By Hyeonju Son Dissertation Committee: Jim Dator, Chairperson Manfred Henningsen Debora Halbert Hagen Koo Jang Hyun Kim Keywords: alternative futures scenarios, vision, preferred futures, Korea ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation contains far more than the accumulation of years of working with futures studies. It has been a long journey, reflecting my own personal experience, vision, story, and family and social relationships. Indeed this dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of the generous and inspiring people around me. I really appreciate their contribution to my development as a person and a scholar. My deepest gratitude goes to my advisor, Jim Dator, a talented teacher and passionate futurist, who guided me with his vast knowledge and expertise, and who promptly, answered my questions with comprehensive solutions. I am truly grateful to him for his patience, ongoing support, and wisdom. I would like to thank other committee members for their personal and intellectual support: Manfred Henningsen, Debora Halbert, Hagen Koo, and Jang Hyun Kim. I especially owe a huge debt of gratitude to Debora Halbert who put a lot of effort into the final stages of my writing. She not only edited my work, but also preserved my motivations with her encouragement. I also wish to extend a thank you to Sun-Ki Chai and Jungmin Seo, who were former committee members and inevitably left before the dissertation was completed.