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Analysis Alexander Dugin, the Issue of Post-Soviet Fascism, and Russian Political Discourse Today By Andreas Umland, Kiev, Ukraine

Summary Th e past year witnessed a welcome sensitization of the Russian public towards skinhead attacks and ultra-na- tionalist propaganda. Nevertheless, the administration of Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin-controlled mass me- dia have maintained an ambiguous stance with regard to xenophobic tendencies in politics and public discourse. While primitive hatred of foreigners and ethnic violence are offi cially stigmatized, the dissemination of national stereotypes and anti-Americanism, in particular, by Kremlin-directed mass media and political pundits contin- ues unabated. For example, the notorious publicist Alexander Dugin, who openly propagated fascist ideas in the 1990s, has become an important player in shaping the discourse of Russian political and intellectual elites today. It remains to be seen how the Russian leadership will handle the challenges resulting from such a contradictory approach to its domestic and foreign policies in the coming years.

A New Sensitization Towards Right-Wing Ambiguous Reactions Extremism? espite such encouraging signs, the Kremlin-con- n view of escalating violent attacks and other actions Dtrolled mass media have an altogether ambivalent Iagainst foreigners, the debate on Russian fascism is stance toward right-wing extremist tendencies. Al- currently experiencing a new high in the Russian me- though manifest anti-Semitism and violent racism are dia. Th ere was a similar debate in the mid-1990s, when now heavily criticized and visibly stigmatized, other xe- the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and nophobic patterns remain present, or are even increasing, the “intransigent opposition,” a state of near-civil war in reporting on foreign news and political commentaries. in Moscow, the ascent of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the In addition to the traditional anti-Western, anti-Baltic, appearance of neo-Nazi parties, and the fi rst Chechen anti-Gypsy, and anti-Polish refl exes, this is increasingly war, gave rise to the notion of a “Weimar Russia.” Even true for prejudices against Ukrainians and Caucasians, though this construct has made only rare appearances recently, especially, against Georgians. Unquestionably, in commentaries in recent months, the current media though, it is the US that holds fi rst place among the debate is also marked by alarmism. “enemies of Russia,” as projected by the Russian state It is to be welcomed that the increasing right-wing media. Th e increasingly primitive and profound anti- extremist tendencies within the party landscape and Americanism seen, for example, in prime time political youth culture, which had been largely ignored for many television shows like “Odnako” (“However”, hosted by years, are now at least partially acknowledged by the Mikhail Leontiev), “Realnaia politika” (“Real Politics”, Russian public, and countermeasures are being debated. hosted by Gleb Pavlovsky), or “Post scriptum” (hosted Even the Russian judiciary, which has been known for by Alexei Pushkov) is raised to the level of a Manichean its pro-nationalist bias is beginning to submit to the world-view, where the US is made responsible for the pressure of public opinion (or the presidential adminis- majority of mishaps and failures in recent Russian, and tration), and now applies the Russian penal code’s sec- indeed global, history, and where US society mutates tion on xenophobic crimes more frequently than was the into the negative Other of Russian civilization. It is curi- case during the 1990s. Other promising developments ous that Germany – the country that has caused Russia include the sharp reactions of state offi cials to a xeno- the most harm in recent history – is often excepted from phobic campaign advertisement aired by the “Rodina” this paranoid perception of the external world and styl- alliance ahead of elections for the Moscow municipal ized as a collective friend of Russia, probably not least parliament and the measures against the often deadly because of Putin’s personal preferences (a distorted view skinhead attacks on immigrants and visiting students. that has, however, been stoked by the unorthodox ap- Offi cial statements on such issues occasionally refer to proach to Russia of former German chancellor Gerhard the “anti-fascist” heritage of the Soviet Union and to the Schröder). Russian people’s alleged special deep-rooted aversion Finally, it is important to note that despite the in- against fascism. creasing censure of certain right-wing extremist ten- 2 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

dencies, the representatives of ultra-nationalist political as European integral Traditionalism (René Guénon, groups regarded as close to President Putin have been Julius Evola, Claudio Mutti, etc.), Western geopolitics excepted from the Kremlin’s campaigns to discredit the (Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, radically nationalist camp. Th is is true in particular for and others), the German “conservative revolution” (Carl Zhirinovsky’s so-called Liberal Democratic Party, al- Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, though many statements made by Zhirinovsky and his etc.), and the francophone New Right (Alain de Benoist, entourage equally stir xenophobic hatred among the Robert Steuckers, Jean Th iriart). population (for example, his notorious pamphlet “Th e Furthermore, during the 1990s, Dugin repeatedly Last Leap toward the South”). Last year Putin person- hinted at his sympathy for selected aspects of Italian ally awarded the “Order of Merit for the Fatherland” Fascism and National Socialism, such as the SS and its (fourth degree) to Zhirinovsky – a man who in Ahnenerbe (“Ancestral Heritage”) Institute, and has de- September 1995 had physically attacked a female MP, scribed the Th ird Reich as the most consistent incarna- Yevgenia Tishkovskaya, in the State Duma in front of tion of the “Th ird Way” that he advocates. In the chap- TV cameras. ter “Fascism – Boundless and Red” of the online version of his 1997 book Tampliery Proletariata (Th e Templar Aberrations of the Intelligentsia Knights of the Proletariat), he expressed the hope that esides such tendencies in the broader public, there the inconsistent application of originally correct ideas Bare similarly contradictory developments in the dis- by Hitler, Mussolini, etc. would, eventually, be followed course of the elites and political pundits. On the one in post-Soviet Russia by the emergence of a “fascist fas- hand, the political leadership is promoting integration cism”. In Dugin’s apocalyptic worldview, global history of Russia into Western organizations such as the G8 consists of a centuries-old confrontation between hier- and the World Trade Organization. On the other hand, archically organized “Eurasian” continental powers and the political discourse of experts, as well as intellectual liberal “Atlantic” naval powers. Today, this confronta- life in general, are characterized by the spread of an anti- tion is carried out between Russia and the US as the Western consensus often described as “Eurasian,” the main representatives of the two antagonistic types of essence of which is the assertion that Russia is “diff er- civilization, and its fi nal battle is approaching (Dugin ent” from, or indeed, by its nature, the opposite of the uses the German word Endkampf, which has fascist con- US. Th e Russian book market is experiencing a glut of notations, without a Russian translation). vituperative political lampoons whose main features in- One might expect Dugin, and other extremely right- clude pathological anti-Americanism, absurd conspiracy wing pundits off ering similar pro-fascist statements, to theories, apocalyptic visions, and bizarre fantasies of be subjected to the same public stigmatization as neo- national rebirth. Among the more or less widely read Nazi parties and skinhead groups are currently experi- authors of such concoctions are Sergei Kurginyan, Igor encing. However, this has not been the case so far. On Shafarevich, Oleg Platonov, Maxim Kalashnikov (a.k.a. the contrary, Dugin and others of his ilk, such as the Vladimir Kucherenko), and Sergei Kara-Murza. well-known editor-in-chief of Russia’s leading ultra- Probably the best-known writer and commentator nationalist weekly Zavtra (“Tomorrow”), Aleksandr of this kind is Aleksandr Dugin (b. 1962), who holds a Prochanov, are popular guests in prime-time political doctorate in political science (from an obscure Russian television shows such as Vremena (“Times”, hosted by provincial institute) and is the founder, chief ideologue, Vladimir Pozner), Tem vremenem (“In the Meantime”, and chairman of the so-called International “Eurasian hosted by Aleksandr Archangelsky), Voskresni vecher’ Movement,” whose Supreme Council boasts among (“Sunday Evening”), or K Baryeru (“To the Barricade”, its members the Russian Federation’s Culture Minister hosted by Vladimir Solovyov), and are even invited to Aleksandr Sokolov, Vice Speaker of the Federation popular talk shows like Pust govoryat (“Let Th em Speak”, Council, Aleksandr Torshin, several diplomats, and hosted by Andrei Malakhov). other similarly illustrious personages, including some marginal Western intellectuals and CIS politicians. Th e Post-Soviet Conception of Fascism Dugin’s increasing celebrity is remarkable consider- he fact that Dugin has so far been “spared” by the ing that the chief “Neo-Eurasian” is not only among TKremlin-controlled media and his political oppo- the most infl uential, but also one of the most brazen nents is not only due to his recent celebrity as a “radical of the ultra-nationalist publicists. While authors such centrist” and fanatical supporter of Putin, but also his as Kurginyan or Kara-Murza are satisfi ed to promote ability to win the sympathies of prominent members a renaissance of classical Russian anti-Western senti- of the Russian legislative and executive braches. He has ments in their pamphlets and subtly draw on Western likewise managed to avoid the charge of promoting fas- sources, Dugin admits openly that his main ideas are cism by adapting his writings and public image to the based on non-Russian anti-democratic concepts such distorted conception of fascism inherited from Soviet 3 rrusslandussland russian analytical digest 14/07 aanalysennalysen

propaganda. In the post-Soviet discourse, the term “fas- West that accompanies the agitational realignment of cism” is equated with German National Socialism and foreign news reporting increases the playing fi eld for the its external trappings, such as the swastika or Roman sa- propagation of anti-Western slogans which also furthers lute. Occasionally, the propagandistic usage of the term the spread of extremist ideas proposed by Dugin and “fascism” goes so far as to include all ideas regarded as theorists with similar leanings. “anti-Russian”, and, paradoxically, becomes a rhetorical instrument in xenophobic agitation campaigns of Rus- Outlook sian ultra-nationalists. ill the newfound sensitivity towards nationalist Th e example of Dugin illustrates that, as a result of Wtendencies lead to a sustained return to tolerant the idiosyncratic conception of generic fascism in post- and liberal aspects of Russia’s political tradition? Or is Soviet Russia, it is suffi cient to rhetorically dissociate this new tendency no more than the latest episode in the oneself from the worst crimes of Nazi Germany and to Putin administration’s fl uctuating media campaigns? refrain from blatant copying of Nazi symbols in order to One can identify two contrary trends – one ideolog- avoid public stigmatization as a “fascist”. Th is approach ical, the other pragmatic – whose collision has restored would, at least, explain why, on the one hand, obviously a certain measure of controversy to the generally dull neo-Nazi groups such as the “Russian National Unity” public discourse in Russia. On the one hand, the dualist of Aleksandr Barkashov or skinhead gangs are being vo- worldview introduced by the Kremlin in the past few cally suppressed by the executive and judiciary, while on years – the simple, but honest Russians struggling for in- the other hand ultra-nationalist writers who, in terms of dependence against a devious, soulless, imperialist West their rhetoric, are no less radical are not only tolerated, – fulfi ls an important role in legitimating the “tough” but have unhindered access to public platforms and course of the resurging Russia under its new president. state-controlled media, and are, sometimes, allocated However, the offi cially approved paranoia also opens the an active role in PR projects of the Kremlin’s political fl oodgates for radical conclusions. Since the US model technologists. of society is presented as the antithesis of Russian civi- lization, one should not be surprised when youth gangs 1984 – Déjà Vu of violent thugs try to prevent an “Americanization” of nother factor in favor of Dugin and similar publi- Russian society in their way. Th e damage caused by Acists is the return of the Russian leadership to quasi- such reactions to the international image of Russia is, Orwellian forms of organizing public discourse. Krem- in turn, incompatible with the equally strong tendency lin-controlled political reporting in the mass media has towards establishing the country as a respected part- become a succession of national-patriotic happenings in ner of the Western countries and as becoming a part which international developments of any kind – wheth- of the “civilized world” (the preferred Russian term for er a Russia-China summit or Russian athletes’ perfor- the economically advanced democratic states). Besides, mance at the Olympics, the “Orange Revolution” or for- the leadership of the Kremlin appears to be consider- eign success of a Russian fantasy movie – are exaggerated ing large-scale immigration as a way of replenishing the into either collective triumphs or shared humiliations of rapidly dwindling population of the Russian Federation, the Russian nation under its faithful leadership. which would create new, potentially explosive, tensions. Th e attendant superfi ciality and emotionality of Finally, the fanatical anti-Americanism and pro-Iranian public debates, which occasionally degenerate into bi- positions of Dugin and others are in contradiction to a zarre shouting matches between participants of political number of security policy preferences of the Kremlin television shows, replace serious analysis. Political com- and its eff orts to join the international coalition against mentaries are fi xated on the “here and now” which, in terrorism as a full member. Due to these and other chal- the case of Dugin, may have contributed to the fact that lenges in the coming years, the – at least partial – hando- his well-known neo-fascist stance during the 1990s has ver of power in 2008 will gain additional importance. been “forgotten”. Th e mantra-like disparagement of the Translated from the German by Christopher Findlay

About the Author: Dr. Andreas Umland is DAAD Lecturer in German Studies at the National Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv, Ukraine. Further Reading: Anastasia V. Mitrofanova, Th e Politicization of Russian Orthodoxy: Actors and Ideas, Stuttgart: Ibidem Publishers, 2005 (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 13). Marlene Laruelle, “Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?” Kennan Institute Occasional Papers, no. 294 (2006), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/OP294.pdf Roger Griffi n, Werner Loh, and Andreas Umland (eds.), Fascism Past and Present, West and East: An International Debate on Concepts and Cases in the Comparative Study of the Extreme Right, Stuttgart: Ibidem Publishers, 2006 (Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, vol. 35). 4