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198 ELINOR MASON

(corresponding to what I call the objective, the subjective, and the pro‑ CHRIS HEATHWOOD spective) butargues that prospectivismuses the primary sense of ’ought'. 27. Prichard, ”Duty and Ignorance of Fact,” p. 93. 28. Graham, ”InDefense of Objectivismabout MoralObligation,” pp. 91‐92. IO Subjective theories of well- 29. Prichard, ”Duty and Ignorance of Fact,” p. 94. 3o. Prichard, “Dutyand Ignorance of Fact,” p. 94. 31. Zimmerman, Livingwith Uncertainty,pp. 13‐14. 32. Hudson, ”Subjectivization in ,” p. 224. 33. Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences. See also Sepielli, ”What to Do When You Don’tKnowWhat to Do”;and Bykvist, ”Howto do Wrong Knowingly and Get Away with It,” pp. 35‐36. 34. Graham, "In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation.” This THE TOPIC OF WELL-BEING strategy is also suggested by Bykvist, ”How to do Wrong Knowingly Classical hedonistic makes the following claims:that andGet Away withIt,” pp. 35‐38; Portmore, Commonsense Consequen‑ our fundamental moralobligation is to make the world asgoodaswe tialism, pp. 15‐16;and Driver,,p. I 25.Smart says that what is right is what would actually produce best consequences (”An can make it [consequentialism); that the world is made better just Outline ofaSystemofUtilitarianEthics,” p.47) and yet that oneought to when the creatures in it are made better off (welfarism); and that dowhat would maximizeprobable benefit [p. 12), but he does notdefend creatures are made better offjust in case they receivea greaterbalance the divergence in here. of pleasure over (). The third of these claims is essen‑ 35. For more on this see Mason, ”Objectivism and Prospectivism about tially a theory of well-being. Other forms ofutilitarianism make use Rightness,” pp. 17‐19. of different accounts of well-being, but whatever the version of util‑ itarianism, well-being appears in the foundations. Thus a complete examinationof utilitarianismincludes a study of well-being. Wecanget at ourtopic in morefamiliar ways aswell, and ourtopic is of interest independently of the role it plays in utilitarian theory. We can get at our topic by taking note of some obvious facts: that some livesgobetter than others; that somethings that befall us in life are , and others bad; that certain things are harmfulto people and others beneficial. Each of these facts involves the of well‑ being, or welfare, or of alifegoing well for the personliving it.Many other familiar expressions ‐ ’ of life’, 'a life worth living’,’the in B. Eggleston and D. Miller (eds.), good life’, ’inone’s best interest’, ’What’s in it for me?’ ‐ involvethe same . We thus make claims about well-being all the . The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism Such claims naturallygive riseto aphilosophical question: What isit (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 199‐219. that makes a life go well or badly for the person livingit? Ourquestionis notthe perhaps morefamiliar question: What sorts of things tend to cause people to be better or worse off? It is interest‑ ing to investigate whether people’s lives are made better by, say,

Thanks to Paul Bowman, Ben Bradley,Ben Eggleston, Eden Lin,Dale Miller,and Iason Raibley.

I99 2.00 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 201 winning the lottery, spending less time on the internet, or having obligations. This isofcourse true if utilitarianismistrue, butit isno children. But these are notthe sorts of questions that philosophers of less trueotherwise. Foron anyplausible moral theory, the effects that well-being ask. If your life would be made better by winning the an act would have on the welfare of people and other animals is at lottery, this is due to the effects that winning the lottery would least one morallyrelevant consideration.Utilitarianismstands outin have on other features of your life, such as on your ability to pay for claiming that well‐being is the only basic morally relevant factor. college or on the sorts of vacations you could take (and the of Well-being also matters for politics. When deciding which political these latter things might similarly lie wholly in their effects). But in systems, institutions, and laws we ought to adopt, one obviously the philosophy of well‐being, we are trying to figure out what things relevant factor is how well people will fare under the possible are in themselves in our interest to have. We are asking, that is,what schemes. Well-being relates also to . One kind of justice, for things are intrinsically good or bad for people, as opposed to what instance, involves distributing welfare according to desert. The con‑ things are merely instrumentallygood or bad for people. cept of well-being is also tied upwith many and vices, moral Noris our question: What things make the world intrinsically better and non-moral. For example, a considerate person is one who fre‑ or worse? The philosophical question of welfare is the question of what quently considers the interests of others, while a selfish person does things are intrinsicallygoodfor people, and other subjects ofwelfare. But this insufficiently.A personwho can delay gratification for the sake we also make claims about what things are good period, or good ”from of her long-term interests is aprudent person [thisiswhy ’prudential the point of view of the Universe.”I For example, some people believe value’ is yet another synonym for ’well-being’). Welfare is probably that it is good in itself when something beautiful exists, even when no also conceptually connected to each of the following phenomena: one will ever observe it. Whether or not this view is correct, philoso‑ love, empathy, care, envy, pity,dread, reward, punishment, compas‑ phers of well‐being are notasking about this kindof value. Butit is easy sion, hatred, and malice. Seeing the connections that the concept of to confuse it withwell-being, because the clearest example of something welfare has to other concepts can even help us to identify the very that makes the worldbetteris someone’8havingthings go betterfor him concept we meanto be asking about in the first place. or her.The claim that it is good when things go well for someone is not trivial, however.The easiest wayto see this isto noticethat it mayhave exceptions. It may fail to be a good thing, for example, when wicked SUBJECTIVE VS. OBIECTIVE THEORIES people are well-off,- perhaps it would be better if they were badly off. OF WELL-BEING Finally,ourquestionisnot:What sortoflifemakes for amorallygood life? It seems that we can easily imagine someone leading a morally The distinction upstanding life that turns out to be of no benefit to her. But even if we One way to begin answering the question of what makes a person’s became persuaded, through philosophical argument, that this is not life go well for himor her is simply to produce a list of things whose possible, perhaps because moral is its own reward, it still seems presence in our lives seems to make them better. Here is an incom‑ that beingwell-off and being moralare distinct phenomena. plete listof some possibilities: It hardly needs arguingthat the question of what makes a person’s life go well is important. First, the question is just inherently inter‑ enjoyment esting, and worth studying in itsownright, even if answering it were freedom relevant to no other importantquestions. It also has obvious practical implications: most of us want to get a good life, and knowing what beingrespected one is might help us get one. Aside from these direct reasons to be knowledge interested, our topic is relevant to many of the mostimportant ques‑ health tions we aspeople face. Most obviously, it is relevant to our moral achieving one’s goals 202 CHRISHEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 203

friendship subjective approach aswellasacentral reason for preferring an objec‑ gettingwhat one wants tive theory. In the process of doing this, we will further clarify the being a good person distinction between subjective and objective theories of well-being. being in love creative activity contemplating important questions General considerations in support of aesthetic appreciation Perhaps the mainreason to think that the subjective approach isright excelling at worthwhile activities isthat there isa strong, widely shared intuitionthat suggests that the subjective approach is correct. This is expressed in a fre‑ Most or all of these have opposites that are intuitively bad, but to quently quoted passage by the philosopher Peter Railton: keep things simpler, we willfocus on the good things. Something interesting about our list above is that allof the items It does seem to me to capture animportantfeature of the concept of intrinsic on it are things that mostpeople enjoy, and want in their lives. They value to say that what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a are things we have positive attitudes toward (or, in some cases, they connectionwithwhat hewould find in somedegree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated just are positive attitudes). This raises a question that is among the conception of someone’s good to imaginethat it mightfail in any such way to deepest and mostcentral to the philosophicalstudy of well-being: Are engage him.“ the things on the list above good solely in virtue of the positive attitudes that we have toward them, or do they benefit us whether Many share Railton’s intuition.If we do, and if our evaluative intu‑ or notwe have these attitudes toward them.2 As might have itionsare aguide tothe truthabout value, then thisgives us reasonto put the question: Do we want these things in our lives because it is think that the subjective approach to well-being is the correct one. good to have them, or is it good to have them in our lives because we For Railton’s intuition seems to be more or less just another way of wantthem?2 This is essentially the questionof whether well-being is puttingthe subjective approach. objective or subjective. Subjectivists maintain that something can If this sounds question-begging against the objectivist, a related benefit a person only if he wants it, likes it, or cares about it, or it way for the subjectivist to support her View is to elicit a similar otherwise connects up in some important way with some positive intuition,but about aparticular case. This might seem less question‑ attitude of his. Objectivists deny this, holding that at least some of begging. Here is such a case: the things that make our lives better do so independently of our Henryreads aphilosophy book that makes animpressiononhim.Theauthor particular interests, likes, and cares. defends anobjective theory of well-being that includes many of the items on What do we mean by 'positive attitude’? We mean to include our sample list above. Henry wants to get a good life, and so he goes about attitudes of favoring something, wanting it, caring about it,valuing tryingto acquire these things. Forexample, to increase hisknowledge‐ one of it,believing it valuable, likingit,trying to get it,having it asa goal, the basic, intrinsic of life, according to the author ‐ Henry reads a being fond of it, being for it, having an interest in it, and the like. textbook on entomology and acquires a vast knowledge of insects. Henry Philosophers call these ’pro-attitudes’.3 Notallsubjective theories of finds, however, that this newknowledge, asheputsit,”does nothingfor me.” well-being hold that all the attitudes just listed are relevant to well‑ He pursuedit onlybecause the author recommended it,and hecanmusterno being. A particularsubjective theory willoften single outone ofthem enthusiasm for what hehas learned,or forthe fact that he has learnedit.Hein asthe pro-attitude that is required for a personto bebenefitted. no way cares that he has allthis newknowledge,and he never willcare.It has In the nextsection, wewillsurvey some of the particularvarieties of no practical application to anything in hislife,and it never will. subjective theory; in the remainder of this section, wewilllook at what Nowask yourself: Was Henrybenefittedbygainingthis vast knowl‑ most reason general is perhaps the important for preferring the edge of entomology? The subjectivist expects that your judgment will 204 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 205 bethat, no,Henrywas notbenefitted. If so, this supports subjectivism Further clarification of the distinction over objectivism about well-being. For objectivists who affirm the intrinsic value of knowledge are committed to saying that Henry was It is worth makinga further clarification about subjectivism. As we in fact benefitted by gaining this knowledge. noted earlier, a Socratic way to think of subjectivism about well‑ Objectivists who do notinclude knowledge on their list avoid this being is asthe view that things are good for people in virtue of the particular counterexample, but they will postulate other intrinsic pro~attitudes they take toward those things. We also said that the goods, such as, say, freedom. The subjectivist will then ask us to theory that happiness is the good is a subjective theory. Butconsider imagine a new case: a case of someone who dutifully increases her someone who, while very happy about many things, never stops to share of the putative good ‐ perhaps she moves to a state with fewer consider her ownhappiness, and so never takes up any pro- or con‑ laws restrictingher freedom ‐ but who finds that she just does notcare attitudes toward it.If the Socratic wayofunderstandingsubjectivism about having this newalleged good, and that it does notget her my is literally correct, then the happiness theory willcount asa form of thing else that she cares about, wants, or likes. Because the putative objectivism. For, as this example illustrates, it is possible on this good in question is objective ‐ i.e., it bears no necessary connection to theory for something (namely, being happy) to be good for someone positive attitudes on the partof asubject who has it ‐ it willalways be without her taking up anypro-attitudes toward that thing. possible for it to leave some people cold. If weshare the intuitionthat One way to try to handle this is to reject the Socratic understand‑ such people receive no benefit when they receive the alleged good, we ingof subjectivism astoo narrow, and to hold that have acounterexample to the objective theory in question. a theory is subjective just in case it implies the following: that something is Some putative goods on the list above are notobjective. Consider intrinsically good for someone just in case either [ij she has a certainpro‑ happiness, or at least one kindof happiness: beinghappy about some‑ attitude toward it, or (ii) it itself involves a certain pro~attitude of hers thing in your life, such asyour job. Being happy about your job does toward something. bear a necessary connection to a positive attitude of yours, because This criterion counts the happiness theory as a subjective theory being happy about your job is one such attitude. Being happy about because, onthe happiness theory, the only thing that is intrinsically your job cannotleave youcold, since the very attitude of beinghappy good for people is athing ‐ their beinghappy about something‐ that about your job is an attitude of finding something to some degree itself involves their ownpro-attitudes toward something {their being compelling or attractive. Thus we cannot construct a case analogous happy about something justisapro-attitude towardsomething).This to the case of Henryabout the putativegood of beinghappy.This will will be our official of subjectivism about well-being. not help objectivists, of course, since a theory that claims that the Correspondingly, objectivism about well-being is the view that at single, fundamental humangood is beinghappy is asubjective rather least one fundamental, intrinsic human good does not involve any than an objective theory. pro-attitudes on the part of the . Other putative goods on the list above are clearly objective. Knowledge, if an intrinsic welfare good, is an objective one because it need notconnect up in any way with our pro-attitudes. Note that General considerations in support of obiectivism this is true even though knowledge is {at least in part) amental state. One motivation for being an objectivist about well-being is that it Thus it is a mistake to understand the objective‐subjective distinc‑ just sounds plausibleto say that things likefreedom, respect,knowl‑ tion asit is used in the philosophy of well-being asinvolvingmerely edge, health, and love make our lives better. But we have to be the distinctionbetween statesofthe worldand states ofmind.To bea careful. Subjectivists can agree with this plausible , since subjectivist about well-being, it is notenough to holdthat well-being they know that mostpeople have pro-attitudes toward these things, is wholly determined by subjective states, or mental states. It has to . or at least that these things cause mostpeople to have pro-attitudes be the right kindof subjective state ‐ a ”pro” or ”con” . (such ashappiness or enjoyment) toward other things. Thus when 206 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well‐being 207

these people get the things on the listabove, their liveswillbemade exposure to great art is intrinsically good for people orthat engaging better even according to subjectivism. To putit another way, sub‑ in immoralactivities is intrinsically badfor people. jectivists hold that the things on this list are typically instrumen‑ To these objections, some subjectivists [including Rawls himself) tallygood for ustohave, and hope tofully accountfor their intuitive ”bite the bullet.” They think that, on reflection, such lives in fact can value in this way. be good for the people livingthem. After all, these activities are just However, some objectivists willcontinue to insistthat the value of the sorts of activities they wantto be doing, and likedoing. This may at least some such items is intrinsic and attitude‐independent. In be easier to swallow when we remindourselves that accepting such a support of this, they might offer the following kind of argument claim does notcommit one to the View that these lives are morally against subjectivism. It begins by imaginingsomeonewho has bizarre good, or that they manifest excellence, or that they are good in other interests, or, perhaps more effectively, base or immoral interests. ways that are distinct from their being beneficial to those living Thus, ”imagine[s] someone whose only pleasure is to them. count blades of grass in ... park squares and well-trimmed lawns.”S One’s ultimate View concerning such cases, and concerning the G. E. Moore compares ”the state of of a drunkard, when he is considerations above in support of subjectivism, willhelp determine intensely pleased with breaking crockery” to ”that of a manwho is where one stands on this most important philosophical question of fullyrealisingallthat is exquisite in the tragedy of KingLear.”6 As an well-being: whether to accept asubjective or an objective theory. example of a morally corrupt interest, we can imagine a pedophile Before discussing specific kinds of subjective theory, it is worth engagingin the immoral activitieshevery muchwants to beengaging mentioningathirdoption, onewewillnothave space toexplorehere: in. Finally, has us ”[s]uppose an intelligent person a hybrid of subjectivism and objectivism. According to the hybrid receives a brain injury that reduces himto the mental condition of a theory, well-being consists in receivingthings that (I)the subject has contented infant, and that such desires asremainto himare satisfied some pro-attitude toward (or that otherwise involvepro-attitudes on by acustodian, sothat he is free from care.” Nagelclaims that ”[s]uch the partof the subject) and that (2) have some value, or special status, a development would be widely regarded asa severe misfortune, not independent of these attitudes.One’s lifegoes betternotsimplywhen only for his friends and , or for society, but also, and primar‑ one gets what one wants or likes, but when one is wanting or liking, ily,for the personhimself ... He is the one we pity, though of course and getting, the right things. These mightinclude some of the things he does notmindhis condition.”7 on our list above. It is very much worth investigating the extent to According to the objection, subjective theories are committed to which the argumentsand considerations discussed in this essay apply the following: that Rawls’s grass-counter can get a great life by doing to hybridtheories of well‐being.8 nothingmorethan countingblades ofgrass allday; that, solongasthe amount of pleasure is the same between the two cases, it is just as well, in terms of howgood it makes your life,to break crockery while VARIETIES OF SUBJECTIVISM drunk as it is to appreciate great art; that it is, at least considered in On one popular taxonomy, there are three main kinds of theory of itself, a great good for the pedophile when he molests children,- and well-being: that the brain-injury Victimhas in fact suffered nomisfortune, solong asthe desires that remain to him are well enough satisfied. But, the hedonism, according to which pleasure or enjoyment is the only thing that argumentcontinues, surely claims such asthese are implausible. One ultimately makes a lifeworth living; kindof evidence for this maybe that we would notwantsomeone we the desire theory, according to which what isultimatelyin aperson’s interest love, such asour ownchild, to livealifelikeany of the lives imagined is getting what he wants, whatever it is; and here. We can avoid these putatively implausible claims by including vobiectiVism, accordingto whichat least someofwhat intrinsically makes our objective elements into our theory of well‐being, such as that lives better does so whether or notwe enjoy it or want it.9 208 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 209

We have already discussed objectivism (and it is discussed in greater means to his ownpleasure. The argument from psychologicalhedon‑ depth in the next chapter). The desire theory is the paradigmatic ism uses this psychological claim as a premise in establishing the version of the subjective approach to well-being. Hedonism is often conclusion that the only thing that is intrinsically good for someone also classified asasubjective theory, though, aswe willsee, this issue is his ownpleasure. To movefrom this premise to this conclusion, the is somewhat complicated. In what remains, we will introduce and argument requires the additional, often suppressed premise that only briefly explore hedonism, including how to classify it, and conclude what a person desires for itsownsake is intrinsically good for him. with a lengthier treatment of the desire theory of welfare. Along the This argument is almost universally rejected nowadays, even by way, we willbriefly discuss two kinds of subjective theory that may hedonists.I3 Notonly does the sweepinggeneralization of psycholog‑ or may not be covered by the above taxonomy: eudaimonism, the ical hedonism seem too simplistic, the second premise ‐ that only View, often associated with hedonism, that well‐being consists in what a person desires for itsownsake is intrinsicallygood for him‐ is happiness,- and the aim achievement theory, the view, often associ‑ evidently an abandonment of hedonism as the fundamental ated with the desire theory, that successfully achieving our aims is about well-being and amoveto the desire theory. what makes our lives gowell. A related subjective theory, which we This raises the question of just what relation pleasure has to our will nothave space to discuss, appeals notto the subject’s desires or pro-attitudes, and this, in turn, bears on the question of whether aims, but to the subject’s values.IO hedonism should count as an objective or asubjective theory. There are two main views of the of pleasure. On the felt-quality Hedonism theory, pleasure is a single, uniform sensation or feeling, in the same general category as itch sensations or nauseous feelings (only Hedonism is among the oldest of philosophical doctrines still dis‑ pleasant!). On the attitudinal theory, pleasure fundamentally is, or cussed and defended today, dating back to the Indian philosopher involves, anattitude‐ apro~attitude thatwecantake uptowardother Carvaka around 600 BCE and the Greek philosopher Aristippus mental states, like itches and nauseous feelings, or states of the around 400 BCE.II The notions that is bad for the one suffer‑ world. ing and enjoyment good for the one getting it are intuitive raw It would seem that whether hedonismqualifies asanobjective or a data that any plausible theory of well‐being must accommodate. subjective theory depends on which general approach to the nature of Hedonism is controversial largely because it claims that nothing pleasure is correct. If afelt-quality theory is true, and pleasure isjust else is of fundamental intrinsic significance to how well our lives go. one feeling among others, a feeling one may or maynot care about, In ordinary language, the term’hedonist’ connotes adecadent, self‑ want, or like, then pleasure, if good, would seem to be an objective indulgent devotion to the gratification of sensual and gastronomic good, and hedonism anobjective theory ofwell‐being. Butif pleasure desires. But it is no part of the philosophical doctrine of hedonism is instead a pro-attitude, or essentially involves some pro-attitude, that this is the way to live.Hedonismis notthe egoistic view that only then pleasure, if good, would seem to be a subjective good, and one’s ownpleasures andpains should concernone, and hedonists often hedonism a subjective theory of well‐being. It is important to recog‑ emphasize the greater reliability,permanence, and freedom frompain‑ nizethat the issuehere is notmerely oneoftaxonomy.Ifhedonism is ful side effects of intellectual, aesthetic, and moralpleasures. an objective theory, then it,like other objective theories, is commit‑ The most popular argument, historically speaking, for hedonism ted to the perhaps counterintuitive that something somepeople about well-being appeals to a theory of human motivationknownas may find in no way attractive, or that in no way connects to any psychologicalhedonism.”Accordingto psychologicalhedonism, the positive attitudes of theirs, is nonetheless of benefit to them. If only thing that anyone ever desires for its own sake is his own hedonism is a subjective theory, it avoids this implication. pleasure (ignoring pain here for brevity). Thus, whenever a person If hedonism is a subjective theory, due to pleasure’s being explain‑ desires something other than his own pleasure, he desires it as a able in termsof somepro‐attitude, does it remaina distinctive theory,

212 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 213

theory, a life on the machine willbe in manyways worse Philosophers have considered many other restrictions, such as than anordinary life, in which manydesires about the external world restrictions to self‐regarding desires (or desires about oneself),25 global are satisfied. The desire theory of welfare thus appears to avoid the desires (or desires about one’s whole life],26 and second-order desires experience‐machine objection. (or desires about one’s desires).27 Some of these willcome up whenwe Perhaps the earliest discussion of the desire theory of any depth is discuss objections to the desire approach, to which we nowturn. found in ’s , though it may If what’s good for us is what we want, then whatever we want is have been endorsed centuries earlier by Thomas Hobbes and also good for us. But surely we sometimes wantthings that turn outto be .22 It gained prominence in the twentieth century no good for us. The most common kindof case involves ignorance. with the rise of welfare economics and decision theory, where pref‑ For example, I mighthave a desire to eat some food, notknowingthat erence theories of well-being or utility are often simply assumed. it will cause a severe allergic reaction in me, or I might want to see Economists may be motivated to assume the theory because it is some band perform in concert, not knowing that they will perform thought to make well‐being easier to measure than it would be on terribly. The desire theory seems to imply, mistakenly, that satisfy‑ hedonism, since our desires are thought to be revealed through our ingthese ill‐informed desires isin my interest. , especially in free markets. Others have been motivated to The lesson that many philosophers draw from such cases is that accept the desire theory rather than an objective theory because they well-being is connected notto our actual desires butto our idealized believe the former to fit better with a naturalistic worldview. desires.28 These are the desires we would have if we knew all the Objective theories that posit more than one basic good also face a relevant facts, were appreciating them vividly, were making no mis‑ problem concerning how to compare goods of very different kinds. takes in reasoning, and the like. The idealized‐desire theory of well‑ Monistic theories like the desire theory avoid this. Today the desire being can claim that it is no benefit to me to eat the allergenic food or theory is oftenregarded asthe leading theory of well‐being, especially attend the bad concertbecause I would nothave wanted these things among utilitarians.23 if I knew the relevant facts and were appreciating them vividly. Another putative attraction of the desire theory is that it very Some may hold out hope that the move to idealized desires can straightforwardly conforms to the intuition, introduced earlier, that solve other problems aswell. Perhaps it can provide a solution not what is intrinsically good for a person must besomething he or she only to cases of desires based onmistakenbeliefs and the like,but to finds to some degree compelling or attractive. For to desire some‑ other sorts of putatively defective desire. Recall the earlier cases of thing, whatever else it is, is surely to find it to some degree compel‑ the people who desire to count blades of grass, to break crockery ling or attractive. As the theory that most clearly conforms to this while drunk, or to abuse children. Some desire theorists might be intuition and asthe theory that makes use of what is perhaps the tempted to claim that satisfyingthese desires is of nobenefit because fundamental pro‐attitude, the desire theory is the paradigmatic sub‑ no one Who knew all the relevant facts, was appreciating them viv‑ jective theory of well‐being. idly, was making no mistakes in reasoning, etc. would desire such The simplest version of the desire theory of welfare claims that the things. But one has to be careful. This move runs the risk of turning satisfaction of anyofone’s actualdesires isintrinsically good for one. the desire theory intoanobjective theory ofwell‐beingin subjectivist This unrestricted, actualist theory is seldom defended. Perhaps the clothing. It is notopen to idealized-desire theorists to claim that part most common departure from it counts only the satisfaction of of what it is to be idealized is to desire the right things, that is, the intrinsic desires, or desires for things for their own sakes, rather things it is good to get no matteryour desires. That is closet objecti‑ than for what they might lead to.24 When we get what we merely vism. The conditions of idealization mustbestated in value‐neutral instrumentally want, it is natural to suppose that this is, at best, of terms, and without reference to things that were identifiedviaabelief mere instrumentalvalue. in their objective welfare value. 2124 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 215

Returningto the original objection of putatively defective desires, so widely over the world that their objects extend far outside the bound of it is actually notobvious that it succeeds in the first place.29 Consider what, with any plausibility, one could take astouching one's well-being.34 the case of the allergenic food. I desire to eat it,notknowing that it A common response to this problem is thus that the desire theory will make me sick. The objection claims that the actualist desire should be restricted to count only desires that are about one’s own theory is committed to saying that it is nonetheless in my interest life, or about oneself.35 According to another proposal, we should to satisfy this desire. Butconsider twothings we mighthave in mind count only those desires that are also among ouraims or goals (thus when we say that it is in my interest to satisfy some desire. We might the aim achievement theory).36 Both of these proposals seem to meanthat it is in my interest allthings considered‐ that is, takingall handle Parfit’s case. Parflt’s desire that the stranger be cured is not the effects of satisfying the desire into account. Or we might mean about Parfit or hislife. Noris it an aimofhis, since hetakes nosteps merely that it is good in itself ‐ intrinsically good ‐ to satisfy the to try to achieve it.Thus each theory agrees that Parfit’s lifeis made desire. The objection assumes, plausibly, that it is notin my interest no better when the stranger is cured. all things considered to satisfy my desire to eat the food. But the But these restrictions may exclude too much. Consider the com‑ actualist desire theory can accommodate this. For if I satisfy my mondesire that one’s teamwin. I do notmean a teamone plays for ‑ desire to eat the food, this willcause manyof my other actualdesires ‑ desires about such ateammight countasdesires about one’s ownlife, desires notto bein pain,desires to play golf, etc.‐ to befrustrated. All and may qualify asaims ‐ but a team one roots for from a distance. that the actualist desire theory is committed to is the claim that it is Such desires are certainly not about oneself, and presumably not goodin itselffor me to satisfy my desire to eat the food. Butthis claim about one's ownlife either. And that one‘s teamwin is nottypically is notimplausible.Intuitively,ignoringthe effects, it is good for meto amongone’s aims or goals; most of us know we have no power over get to eat this food I very much want to eat. whether our team wins. Thus theories that exclude non-self‑ Thus, moving to an idealized theory may be less well-motivated regarding desires and desires that are not aims imply, implausibly, than it originally appears. It also brings with it new problems. One that people receivenobenefitwhen their desire that their teamwinis family of problems concerns the concept and process of idealiza‑ satisfied. tion.3° Another problem is that it is possible for what I would want An alternative solution to the scope problem takes itscue from the under conditions to betotally uninteresting, or even repugnant, detail that Parfit’sstranger is cured unbeknownst tohim.Perhaps the to me asI actually am. But idealized theories of well-being are sup‑ proper scope of the desire theory excludes desires the satisfaction of posed to telluswhat’s good for usaswe actually are.“ which we are unaware.” This theory gets the right result both in The second objection that we will consider has been called the Parfit’s case and concerning the desire that one’s team win. But it is ”scope problem” for desire theories.” The following example by not clear that it gets to the heart of the initial worry. Here ishow Derek Parfit illustrates the problem: T. M. Scanlon presents the initialworry:

Suppose that I meeta stranger who has what is believed to be a fatal disease. Someone might have a desire about the chemical composition of some star, My sympathy is aroused, and I strongly want this stranger to be cured. We about whether blue was Napoleon’s favorite color, or about whether Julius never meet again. Later, unknown to me, this stranger is cured. On the Caesar was anhonest man.Butit would be odd to suggest that the well-being Unrestricted Desire-Fulfilment Theory, this event is good for me, and of apersonwho has such desires is affectedby these facts themselves?“3 makes my lifegobetter. This is notplausible. We should reject this theory.33 Scanlon thinks that satisfyingsuch desires is of no benefit evenwhen James Griffin offers adiagnosis: one is aware that the desires are satisfied. I leave it to the reader to The breadth of the [desire] account, which is itsattraction, is also itsgreatest decide whether this is right.Readers may also wish to reconsider the flaw .. . It allows my utility to be determined by things that ...do notaffect original objection. Some desire theorists maintainthat the best reply my life in any way at all. The trouble is that one’s desires spread themselves 216 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 217 isto ”bite the bullet" in the first place, and maintainthat Parfit’s life have. If that’s right, this suggests a surprising asymmetry: the desire is made better when the stranger is cured, even if only a little bit.” theory of well-being should ignore future-directed desires but count The third and final problem for desire theories that we will con‑ present‐ and past‐directed desires. However the problem of changing sider is the problem of changing desires. Our desires change over desires isultimately resolved, it poses questions that any subjective time. When the desires concern what’s going on at the time of the theory of well-being must grapple with. desire, this maybeno problem. Each night of the week, Iwantsome‑ thing different for dinner. In this case of changing desires, the desire CONCLUSION theory implies that what’s good for me is to get the different meal I want each evening. But some of our changing desires concern what The notion of well-being plays some part in answering most, and goes on at asingle time. Suppose I want, for years, to goskydiving on perhaps even literally all, moral questions. Yet there is no consensus my fortiethbirthday. But asthe day approaches, my interests change, amongphilosophers concerningwhichgeneral kindof theory ofwell‑ and I become strongly averse to doing this. being is correct, or which specific version of any general kindis best. Probably the mostcommonreactionto this case willbe that it is in Fortunately, we do not have to know which theory of well-being is my interest to satisfy my present desire notto go skydiving on my correct in order to come to responsible answers to many of the moral fortieth birthday at the expense of frustrating my past desires to go questions that involvewell-being. Forcertainkindsofact areharmful skydiving. (This is assuming that I will not later regret not having and others beneficialon allof the theories ofwell‐being that wehave gone skydiving‐ that I willnothave persistent desires in the future to considered. We can thus know that such acts are wrong or right on have done it.)And this reactionseems right no matterhow longheld these bases Without having to know precisely what well-being and strongthe past desires to goskydivingwere. This suggests that, to consists in. Still, a full accounting of the act’s moral status would determine what benefits aperson, we ignore her past desires.40 require the correct account of well‐being. However, other cases might suggest that we should take into account past desires. We tend to think that we ought to respect the NOTES Wishes of the dead ‐ for example concerningwhether and where they willbeburied. Onenaturalview is that we dothis for their sake ‐ that . Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 420. is, for their benefit. If that’s right,then the desire theory should count . See , Euthyphro, 10a. at least somepast desires. On the other hand, manyfindit absurd that . Nowell‐Smith, Ethics, pp. 111‐113. . Railton, ”Facts and Values,” p.9. a person can bebenefitted or harmed after he is dead. If that’s right, . Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 432. then we mustfindanother explanationfor why we should respect the G. E. Moore, Ethics, pp. 237‐238. wishes of the dead, assuming that we should. . Nagel, ”Death,” p.77. If past desires canbe ignored, this suggests the view that the desire . On hybrid theories, see Parfit, , pp. 501‐502,‑ theory countonly desires for what goes on at the timeof the desire. As Kagan, ”Well‐Being asEnjoyingthe Good”; and Heathwood, ”Welfare,” R.M. Hare, a proponent of this View, puts it,the theory ”admits only pp. 652~653. now‐for‐now and then‐for-then preferences,” to the exclusion of any 9. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 493. now-for‐then or then‐for-now preferences.41 IO. See, e.g., Raibley, “Well‐Being and the Priority of Values”,- and Tiberius But, asbefore, this might seem to exclude too much. For suppose and Plakias, ”Well‐Being,” § 3. that I do in fact strongly regret, for years, nothaving gone skydiving II. Madhava Acharya, Sarva‐Dars’ana-Samgraha, pp. 2‐11,- and on my fortieth birthday. If so, perhaps it was in my interest to force Laertius, Lives and Opinions,pp. 81‐96. myself to go skydiving, despite my strong aversion to it at the time, . 12. See Epicurus, Extant Remains; Bentham, IPML, chapter I (pp. 11‐16); and (.8. Mill, Utilitarianisrn, chapter 2 (Collected Works, vol. x, for the sake of satisfying the ”then‐for-now” desires I would come to 218 CHRIS HEATHWOOD Subjective theories of well-being 219

pp. 209‐226). See also , Nicomachean Ethics, book x, chapter 2 33‑ Parfit,Reasons and Persons, p. 494. (pp. 184‐185); and Diogenes Laértius, Lives and Opinions, pp. 89~9o. 34. Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 16‐17. 13. See Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, book 1,chapter 4, §§ 1 ‐ 2. 35‑ Overvold, ”Self-Interest and Getting What You Want"; and Parfit, I4. Feldman, Pleasure and the GoodLife, chapter 4. Reasons and Persons, p. 494. 15. Spencer, The of Psychology, § 125 (vol. 1,pp. 280‐281]; Brandt, 36. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 119‐121. A Theory of the Good and the Right, p. 38; and Heathwood, ”The 37‑ Heathwood, ”Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism,” pp. 547‐ 551; and Reduction of Sensory Pleasure to Desire.” Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics,pp. 127‐128. 16. Heathwood, ”Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism." 38. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 114. 17. I.S.Mill, Utilitarianism, Collected Works, vol. x, p.21r. 39‘ Lukas, "Desire Satisfactionism and the Problem of Irrelevant Desires.” 18. G.E.Moore, Principia Ethica, § 47 (pp. 77‐79}. 40. Brandt, A Theory of the Goodand the Right, pp. 247‐253. 19. Nozick,Anarchy, State, and Utopia,pp. 44‐45. 4I. Hare,Moral Thinking, pp. 101‐103. 20. See Railton, ” and Prescriptivity,” p. 170; Crisp, ”Hedonism Reconsidered,” §5(pp. 635‐642); and Feldman, “What WeLearnfrom the Experience Machine” for discussions of and/or replies to the experience‑ machine objection. 2.1. Feldman, What Is This Thing CalledHappiness!criticizes life-satisfaction theories of happiness and defends ahedonistic theory, aswell ascriticizes and defends, respectively, the corresponding versions of eudaimonism. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, chapter 6 defends a life‑ satisfaction account of happiness and a corresponding eudaimonistic theory of welfare. See also Haybron, The Pursuitof Unhappiness. 22. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, book I, chapter 9, § 3 (pp. 109‑ I I 3); Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 30; and Spinoza, Ethics, part In, prop. 9 (pp. 499‐500)‑ 23. See Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, andEthics,p. I I 3; Shaw, Contemporary Ethics, p. 53; and Haybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness, p. 3. 24. Sidgwick, The Methodsof Ethics,p. 109;and vonWright, The Varieties of Goodness, pp. 103‐104. 25. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics,p. I 12;andOvervold, "Self-Interest and GettingWhat You Want.” 16. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 111 ‐ 112; Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 497‐498; and Carson, Value and the Good Life, pp. 73‐74. 27. Railton, "Facts and Values,” p. 16,- and Kraut, ”Desire and the Human Good," p. 40. 28. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 110‐ 1I r,- and Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right,p. 247. 29. Heathwood, "The Problem of Defective Desires,” pp. 491‐493. 3o. Sobel, ”Full-InformationAccounts ofWell‐Being”; and Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and FullInformationAccounts of the Good.” 31. Griffin, Well-Being, p. r 1; see Railton, ”Facts and Values,” p. 16 for a possible solution. 32. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, p. I 35.