PHL382 Agency and the Self 3 Credit points Unit Guide Semester 1, 2012 Department of Philosophy Undergraduate Unit Guide Department of Philosophy PHL382: Agency and the Self, Credit Point Value: 3 Semester 1, 2012 Students in this unit should read this unit guide carefully at the start of semester. It contains important information about the unit. If anything in it is unclear, please consult one of the teaching staff in the unit. TEACHING STAFF Unit Convenor Name: Dr Paul Formosa Email: [email protected] Office: W6A 735 Consultation hours: Wednesdays 2-3 pm General enquiries Name: Clara Wong Phone: 9850 8837 Email: [email protected] Office: W6A 739 CLASSES For lecture times and classrooms please consult the MQ Timetable website: http://www.timetables.mq.edu.au. This website will display up-to-date information on your classes and classroom locations. The timetable as it stands at present is listed below (see the above website for up-to-date details). On-Campus Sessions 2 Lectures Dates Time Location Lecture See below Wednesday 9-11am E5A-130 Tutorials Date Time Location Session 1 See below Wednesday 12-1 pm X5B-251 Session 2 See below Wednesday 1-2 pm X5B-251 All students must attend the 2 hour Lecture and 1 Tutorial session each week. See the detailed Weekly Schedule (below) for details. Changes made to previous offerings of the unit Previous offerings of this unit have been worth 4 credit points. Since this offering of the unit is worth 3 credit points, some material has been cut from previous offerings of the unit, some of the content has been updated, some new background material has been added, and the assessment requirements have been modified. ABOUT THIS UNIT This unit explores some of the central issues in contemporary philosophical moral psychology. The unit is divided into three sections. However, before commencing these three sections there will be a background lecture which explores the influential views on personal identity and selfhood defended by John Locke and David Hume, as well as the accounts of agency and autonomy defended by Hume and Immanuel Kant. These background views serve as a foundation for much of the contemporary literature. The first section focuses on freedom of the will, the nature and value of autonomy and debates about whether autonomy is compatible with socialisation. In the second section we discuss a range of issues concerning moral responsibility, including the implications of luck and causal determination for responsibility, whether moral responsibility requires an ability to do otherwise, and the conditions under which persons should be exempted from responsibility for their actions. The third section focuses on contemporary theories of personal identity, exploring the differences between metaphysical, practical and narrative theories of identity. Section 1: Autonomy and Critical Reflection (Weeks 3-5) Many philosophers consider the capacity for critical reflection to be a defining feature of human agents and to underlie our capacity for autonomous decision- making and action. But what does critical reflection involve and how is it best understood? And why do we value autonomy? In addressing these and other questions, we will examine a range of contemporary theories of autonomy and the debates raised by them, beginning with Harry Frankfurt‘s classic analysis of freedom of the will and Gary Watson‘s well-known reply to Frankfurt. The Frankfurt-Watson debate will form the background to a discussion of more recent accounts of autonomy, which focus on the relationship between autonomy and socialisation and examine the ways in which oppressive socialisation can interfere with autonomy and the capacities for critical reflection. Section 2: Moral Responsibility and Freedom (Weeks 6-8) 3 One of the core features of moral agency is that we regard moral agents as morally responsible for their actions. Indeed, the practices of attributing moral responsibility to persons, holding them accountable for their actions, and thereby making them liable for praise or blame, reward or punishment, are central to our moral and legal frameworks. Some philosophers have raised doubts, however, about the basis and justification of these practices. We will begin this section of the unit by considering the phenomenon of ‗moral luck‘, first discussed by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, and its implications for our conceptions of moral responsibility. We will then assess Peter Strawson‘s famous account of moral responsibility as constituted by ‗reactive attitudes‘. Strawson‘s account attempts to tackle a number of important issues, including whether moral responsibility is compatible with causal determination, what kind of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility, and the conditions under which persons are, or should be, exempted from moral responsibility for their actions. In this section of the unit we will also consider what might be meant by the commonly stated claim that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise and we will assess the plausibility of this claim. Finally, we will consider a range of views that link moral responsibility with the capacity to respond to reasons. Section 3: Personal, Practical and Narrative Identity ( Weeks 9-13) In his book Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit develops what he calls a reductionist account of personal identity. He argues famously that personal identity does not matter and that the experiences of a person‘s life and the relations between these experiences can be described impersonally, that is, without reference to the person who is the subject of those experiences. Parfit develops his account of personal identity via a number of thought experiments designed to test our intuitions about whether bodily continuity or some form of psychological continuity is central to what matters to us when we are concerned for our future survival. Following examination of Parfit‘s central claims and arguments, we will consider a range of critical responses to his views, particularly those of Christine Korsgaard, Marya Schecthman and Paul Ricoeur. These responses raise the questions of what constitutes the unity of a person‘s life and how best to characterise the peculiar, first -personal, quality of our own experiences, bodies and memories. Their theories and arguments also help clarify the difference between metaphysical, practical and narrative approaches to the issues of agency and selfhood. LEARNING OUTCOMES All academic programmes at Macquarie seek to develop graduate capabilities. These are: COGNITIVE CAPABILITIES 1. Discipline Specific Knowledge and Skills Our graduates will take with them the intellectual development, depth and breadth of knowledge, scholarly understanding, and specific subject content in their chosen fields to make them competent and confident in their subject or profession. They will be able to demonstrate, where relevant, professional technical competence and meet professional standards. They will be able to articulate the structure of knowledge of their discipline, be able to adapt 4 discipline-specific knowledge to novel situations, and be able to contribute from their discipline to inter-disciplinary solutions to problems. 2. Critical, Analytical and Integrative Thinking We want our graduates to be capable of reasoning, questioning and analysing, and to integrate and synthesise learning and knowledge from a range of sources and environments; to be able to critique constraints, assumptions and limitations; to be able to think independent ly and systemically in relation to scholarly activity, in the workplace, and in the world. We want them to have a level of scientific and information technology literacy. 3. Problem Solving and Research Capability Our graduates should be capable of researching; of analysing, and interpreting and assessing data and information in various forms; of drawing connections across fields of knowledge; and they should be able to relate their knowledge to complex situations at work or in the world, in order to diagnose and solve problems. We want them to have the confidence to take the initiative in doing so, within an awareness of their own limitations. 4. Creative and Innovative Our graduates will also be capable of creative thinking and of creating knowledge. They will be imaginative and open to experience and capable of innovation at work and in the community. We want them to be engaged in applying their critical, creative thinking. INTERPERSONAL OR SOCIAL CAPABILITIES 5. Effective Communication We want to develop in our students the ability to communicate and convey their views in forms effective with different audiences. We want our graduates to take with them the capability to read, listen, question, gather and evaluate information resources in a variety of formats, assess, write clearly, speak effectively, and to use visual communication and communication technologies as appropriate. 6. Engaged and Ethical Local and Global citizens As local citizens our graduates will be aware of indigenous perspectives and of the nation‘s historical context. They will be engaged with the challenges of contemporary society and with knowledge and ideas. We want our graduates to have respect for diversity, to be open- minded, sensitive to others and inclusive, and to be open to other cultures and perspectives: they should have a level of cultural literacy. Our graduates should be aware of disadvantage and social justice, and be willing to participate to help create a wiser and better society. 7. Socially and Environmentally Active and Responsible We want our graduates to be aware of and have respect for self and others; to be able to work with others as a leader and a team player; to have a sense of connectedness with others and country; and to have a sense of mutual obligation. Our graduates should be informed and active participants in moving society towards sustainability. PERSONAL CAPABILITIES 5 8. Capable of Professional and Personal Judgement and Initiative We want our graduates to have emotional intelligence and sound interpersonal skills and to demonstrate discernment and common sense in their professional and personal judgement.