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Oxford Philosophy Oxford Contents Xford Philosophers At3:AM Philosophers O Xford 27 N 26 T 24 N 22 20 16 14 Anita Avramides Themindofothers 12 N 8 6 5 That’S An OXFORD 2014 PHILOSOPHY 6 16 24 5 22 12 26 OXFORD 2014 PHILOSOPHY 8 14 28 20 5 Welcome from the Chair of the Faculty Board Edward Harcourt Contact us Credits Acknowledgements 6 News Oxford Philosophy Editors Paul Lodge The editors would like to thank the 8 Climate Change Is A Moral Problem John Broome Faculty of Philosophy James Knight following people for their kind help and assistance: 12 The Mind of Others Anita Avramides Radcliffe Humanities Art Direction Keiko Ikeuchi Radcliffe Observatory Quarter 14 Women of Distinction & Design www.keikoikeuchi.co.uk Nick Rawlins Woodstock Road Robert Taylor 16 Anger and Forgiveness Martha Nussbaum Oxford, OX2 6GG Photography Keiko Ikeuchi Maria, Cecily and Edwin Lock UK Lady Margaret Hall 20 That’s an... Interesting Combination Laura Simmons (Cover, pp. 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 22) Robert Taylor St Hilda’s College Somerville College 22 Nolloth Professors: Then and Now Brian Leftow email: [email protected] (Mary Warnock, p.14 and back cover) 24 Tribute: Grahame Lock Etienne Balibar tel: +44 (0)1865 276926 26 New Books CONTENTS 27 Oxford Philosophers at 3:AM For news, events and further information, please visit: www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk Cover: Statue of G. W. Leibniz in the Museum of Natural History, Oxford 2 3 WElcOME from the Chair of the Faculty Board Edward Harcourt Keble College ssue six of Oxford Philosophy sees the Faculty on the but a few), on subjects ranging from the metaphysics of verge of some exciting opportunities: we are in the entanglement in nature and in the divine, to population process of appointing to no less than five joint posts ethics, the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy I(each associated with a college fellowship) – two in ancient of psychiatry. Oxford is fortunate to have a number of philosophy, two in ethics and/or political philosophy, college-funded junior research fellowships in philosophy, and one in the philosophy of language. In addition, but external funding also helps to maintain and enhance following John Hawthorne’s announced departure for the the Faculty as a place for post-doctoral research, critical as University of Southern California, the Waynflete Chair of that is not only to the intellectual vitality of the Faculty but Metaphysical Philosophy is about to be be advertised. And also to bringing on the next generation of philosophers. Michaelmas Term 2014 already saw the Faculty adding to We are certainly succeeding in that. its number the new White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Jeff McMahan, who joined us from Rutgers University As Brian Leiter was putting the finishing touches to the in New Jersey. We are confident that we will take the 2014 Philosophical Gourmet Report – an international opportunity these vacancies offer to add still further to the ranking of philosophy departments in which Oxford was extraordinary quality, depth and diversity of the Faculty, recently ranked a close second in the world – he contacted some of which is showcased in the pages that follow. me to ask who was new in Oxford philosophy and who had moved on. Aided by several colleagues I assembled a With these opportunities, however, also come certain list, including no fewer than 35 Faculty members holding challenges. It speaks for the high standing of philosophy full-time but fixed-term appointments, either in a research as a discipline that some extravagantly funded overseas project based in the Faculty or in one of the colleges: an universities see expanding their philosophy programmes impressive example of Oxford philosophy’s strength at as a quick way to enhance their status – as one US the post-doctoral level. In the end Leiter refused to list a colleague put it ‘more effective than expanding in single one of them, seemingly out of mere disbelief that literature, and cheaper than expanding in physics’. any philosophy department could be that big. Well, ours Moreover, now that more and more universities outside is, and in a comprehensive website redesign scheduled for the English-speaking world – in Scandinavia and the Low later this academic year we plan to do much more to draw Countries, for example – are offering philosophy courses attention to the range of research activity by our fixed- in English, the market for Anglophone philosophers term as well as our permanent members. is getting larger all the time. Oxford therefore has to fight hard to retain, as well as to recruit, outstanding On a more personal note, the sixth issue of Oxford philosophers on what is now a highly competitive and Philosophy sees the Chair of the Faculty Board installed highly internationalized scene. for the first time in a dedicated office in the Radcliffe Humanities building –holders of this post have, until now, In this context it is pleasing to note that yet another of been itinerant players, perching in the office of whichever the Faculty’s permanent positions – this time a tutorial administrative officer has been prepared to host them. fellowship at Balliol - has recently been fully endowed by Notwithstanding the inevitable contract furniture, it a private donation together with match-funding from the is a magnificent space, with Delft tiles in the fireplace, University’s Teaching Fund. This adds to similar recent eighteenth-century graffiti on the window-panes and, as I Teaching Fund posts at Worcester, Trinity, St Anne’s and have not yet tired of telling my children, a ceiling higher Somerville. It is equally pleasing to note the Faculty’s than our house is wide. Former students of the Faculty, recent success in attracting external funding, from whether graduate or undergraduate, are very welcome to bodies including the European Research Council, the come and knock on the door. Templeton Foundation and the Wellcome Trust (to name 4 5 NEWS Ofra Ian Phillips John Oxford Philosophy Top in 2014 REF Magidor appears Broome 35th White’s Professor awarded in The Honoured Leverhulme Twice Oxford’s Faculty of Philosophy performed outstandingly in of Moral Philosophy Philosopher’s the 2014 Research Exercise Framework, which is a national Prize Annual assessment of the quality of research in UK universities. The Faculty is Congratulations to Ofra Magidor, Congratulations to Ian Phillips, Fellow We are please to note two honours With 51% of overall research activity assessed at the top grade delighted to welcome Fellow of Balliol College, who has been of St Anne’s College, whose paper accorded to Professor John Broome, of 4*, Oxford was placed ahead of all other UK philosophy Jeff McMahan, awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize. “Afterimages and Sensation”, has been who retired as White’s Professor of departments. This achievement was especially notable given who succeeds John Awarded since 2001, the Leverhulme chosen as one of the ten best pieces Moral Philosophy in 2014. that the work of over 70 Faculty members was submitted for Broome as the new Prizes recognise ‘the achievement of published in philosophy in 2013 by consideration - which was by far the largest number nationally White’s Professor of early career researchers whose work the editors of The Philosopher’s Annual John has been elected in the class for a philosophy department. Moral Philosophy. has already attracted international and appears in the 2014 edition of the of 2014 to the American Academy The White’s chair was recognition and whose future career is journal. of Arts and Sciences as a Foreign The Faculty is grateful to our REF co-ordinator Adrian Moore, endowed in 1621, and exceptionally promising’. The scheme Honorary Member of the Academy, Tom Moore, Bryn Harris, the members of the Faculty’s Research since 1877 has been makes up to thirty awards a year, across We would also like to congratulate one of America’s most prestigious Committee, and to all those who contribute to the Faculty’s associated with a a range of academic disciplines. Ofra’s Andrew Bacon (now Assistant honorary societies and a leading centre outstanding result. fellowship at Corpus current research ranges over philosophy Professor at the University of for independent policy research. The Christi College. of language, metaphysics, epistemology, Southern California, but who recently current membership includes more than Previous holders of and philosophy of mathematics, and she studied for his BPhil and DPhil at 250 Nobel laureates and more than 60 the professorship is particularly interested in connecting Oxford, and was a Junior Research Pulitzer Prize winners. include T. H. Green, recent debates in these cognate fields to Fellow at Magdalen) whose paper J. L. Austin, R. M. classic questions in the foundations of ‘Qunatificational Logic and Empty John was further the recipient of the Hare and Bernard language. Names’ also appears in the this edition State of Philosophy Prize, otherwise Williams. of the The Philosopher’s Annual. known as The Philosophers’ Stone, which is awarded by the University of Bayreuth. The Stone is, in at least one sense, the weightiest philosophy prize in Jeff first came to Oxford in 1976 as a Rhodes Scholar. After the world, and is awarded particularly initial undergraduate work in the US in English literature, for work that makes a connection he began the study of philosophy by doing a second BA between philosophy and economics. in PPE in two years at Corpus Christi College. He then started work on his DPhil thesis on issues in population ethics under the supervision of Jonathan Glover and Derek Parfit but exhausted his funding at Oxford after Susanne Bobzien and Cecilia Timothy Williamson elected The Metaphysics of one year. He thus moved to St. John’s College, Cambridge, Trifogli elected Fellows of the an Honorary Fellow of the Entanglement first on a research studentship and then as a research fellow, where he completed his PhD in 1986 under the British Academy Royal Irish Academy supervision of Bernard Williams.
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