Colloquium 6

Ethical Reflection and the Shaping of

Character: Plato's Republic and Stoicism

CHRISTOPHER GILL

I. Introduction

In this article I explore a striking, and perhaps paradoxical, feature of Greek ethical thought. This is that, in at least two areas of Greek philosophy (Plato's Republic and Stoicism), a complex and credible model of ethical development is combined with an ideal type of character which is often seen as hopelessly unrealistic, and perhaps positively repellent: the ideal which the Stoics call apatheia, or 'absence of passion.' By examining certain aspects of Platonic and Stoic thinking, I aim to bring out both the credibility of their model of ethical development and also the plausibility of the idea that this development might lead to a form of apatheia that is not wholly repellent. The model of ethical development, in broad outline, is a two-stage one: first, the development of pre-reflective virtue, through an upbringing and participation in interpersonal and communal relationships; then that of post-reflective virtue, through systematic ethical debate or dialectic, a form of virtue based on, but deepening or modifying, pre-reflective virtue.1 This model can be subdivided into

On this model, and the alternative Greek model, in which reflection is a prerequisite for virtue, see Gill 1996b, 4.6, 5.7; also, on the characteristic structures of thinking in Greek ethical philosophy, Annas 1993, esp. chs. 1 and 22. Here, as elsewhere, I use 'her/him' and 'he/she' indifferently as indefinite two versions. The first is represented by Aristotle's ethical writings, especially the Nicomachean Ethics, and Stoic theory, at least in one prevalent pattern? In this version, the development towards pre- reflective virtue can occur, in principle, within conventional societies; post-reflective virtue may modify pre-reflective virtue, but needs to be based on this. Plato's Republic has in common with these other theories a two-stage model, and one in which communal involvement is an indispensable basis for pre-reflective virtue. It differs from these two other theories, however, in stipulating that the only community in which this pre-reflective development can occur properly is one which is shaped by those whose wisdom is based on a combination of proper pre- and post-reflective virtue. Why should we regard the two-stage model of ethical development as a credible one? Its strength is that it brings together, and establishes a coherent relationship between, features which are more often kept separate in modern ethical theory: the roles of interpersonal and communal involvement and of reflection. The idea that a credible picture of ethical progress should be placed against a credible picture of human psychological development, and that any such picture should take account of the shaping power of interpersonal and communal relationships, is a key insight of these Greek theories, and one shared by some modern theories, notably those of Bernard Williams 1985 and Alasdair MacIntyre 1981, 1988. On the other hand, what those modern theories omit or devalue is the thought that philosophical reflection can make an independent contribution to understanding the nature and basis of ethical norms and also to shaping ethical attitudes and character. The latter thought has been emphasized by, for instance, John Rawls 1971, Alan Gewirth 1977, and Derek Parfit 1984. But these theories have been criticized by Williams and MacIntyre for failing to take account of the crucial role of socially-based development in providing a conceptual, as well as psychological, basis for ethical life Plato's Republic and the Aristotelian and Stoic theories seem to me to combine these two aspects. They do so coherently, in insisting that post- personal pronouns, even when summarizing (though not translating) ancient authors who use only male forms for this purpose. 2 For the reading of Aristotle's EN assumed in these comments, see Gill 1996b, 5.6, and, on parallels between the Aristotelian pattern and that of Plato's Republic and of Stoicism, see 4.2 and 365-9. 3 See esp. Williams 1985, chs. 4-5, also 1981, ch. 1; MacIntyre 1981, chs. 4-6.