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In Defence of the Importance of Substance Ontology for Personal Identity and the Self/Person Durham E-Theses In Defence of the Importance of Substance Ontology for Personal Identity and the Self/Person GUTA, MIHRETU,PETROS How to cite: GUTA, MIHRETU,PETROS (2014) In Defence of the Importance of Substance Ontology for Personal Identity and the Self/Person, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10915/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 In Defence of the Importance of Substance Ontology for Personal Identity and the Self/Person Examined by Professor J.P. Moreland (External) Dr. Peter Vickers (Internal) Professor Geoffrey Scarre (Independent Chair) Mihretu Petros Guta Doctor of Philosophy Philosophy Department Durham University 2014 The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. Part of Chapter 2 appeared in Metaphysics or Modernity? (2013) Edited by Simon Baumgartner, Thimo Heisenberg and Sebastian Krebs, University of Bamberg Press. Part of Chapter 6 appeared in Philosophia Christi. (2011) Vol. 13, No. 1 ii Abstract This thesis attempts to show the advantage of substance ontology in providing us the most preferable framework, both on methodological as well as philosophical grounds, to have a better grip on the diachronic problem of personal identity. In this case, substance ontology plays multi-faceted roles in terms of allowing us for example, to make sense of the persistence of persons over time, intrinsic changes persons undergo while maintaining their identity over time, etc. However, substance ontology has not been taken seriously by the majority of philosophers. This is because there is a deep seated but mistaken assumption among contemporary analytic philosophers that given the advances in modern science, substance ontology is irrelevant. It is also not uncommon to see philosophers questionably appealing to an extremely controversial Locke’s theory of substratum (i.e., ‘something we know not what’) to justify their rejection of any notion that goes by the name substance. However, with close examination, at the heart of such a rejection of substance ontology lies the naturalistic ontology, according to which everything in the universe has to be explained in purely physical terms as dictated by the physical sciences (e.g., physics and chemistry). But as I will argue in this thesis, when it comes to the metaphysics of the self and its identity over time, the naturalistic ontology suffers from a serious lack of explanatory adequacy. I argue that ultimately, the controversy over the nature of the self is a metaphysical issue in that it is not for science to adjudicate what the nature of the self has to be. In light of this, the conception of substance ontology I defend in this thesis can be taken as Aristotelian in spirit as opposed to Lockean. The category of substance has a fundamental ontological primacy over any other non-substantial entities such as events, places, time, properties (or tropes) and so on. I will argue that substance ontology understood in this way is indeed the most plausible and sustainable conception. iii Dedication This thesis is dedicated to Professor E.J. Lowe, my supervisor, who suddenly passed away while I was wrapping up my thesis. It was a pleasure to study under an extraordinary metaphysician who knew the nuts and bolts of the subject matter. I was not only impressed by his intelligence, but also by his kindness and care for his students. His legacy will continue on. I also dedicate this thesis to my wife Angela, my son Pete, my mom Aberash Haile and to my sister Nesanet Petros. iv Acknowledgements First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors Professor E.J. Lowe and Dr. Sophie Gibb for their incredible guidance over the past three years. My thoughts have also been shaped because of the influence of so many other philosophers. I especially want to thank those philosophers with whom I had a chance for face-to-face conversations. In this regard, I thank Saul Kripke (City University of New York), Barry Stroud (University of Berkeley), Lynne Baker-Rudder (University of Massachusetts), Harold Noonan (University of Nottingham), Eric Olson (University of Sheffield), J.P. Moreland (Biola University), Wolfram Hinzen (University of Barcelona/Durham), Robin Hendry (Durham University), Benedict Smith (Durham University), John Heil (St. Louis University Washington), Peter Simons (University of Dublin), Richard King (University of Glasgow), Richard Swinburne (Oxford University) and Jorge Gracia (Buffalo New York State University). I also had a chance to develop my ideas in various conferences and discussion groups. In this regard, I thank the Ethiopian Graduate School of Theology (EGST) where I served as a guest lecturer on Philosophical Theology in the summer of 2013. While I was at EGST, I had a chance to give a public lecture on part of chapter eight of this thesis. I also thank the Durham Emergence Project Reading Group, where I have had a fascinating exchange of ideas with talented philosophers and scientists. I also thank the Durham Metaphysics Reading Group for excellent weekly meetings and discussions from which I benefited a lot. I also thank the organizers of the Bamberg University International Philosophy Summer School in Germany, which I attended in the summer of 2012. I immensely benefited from my interactions with a group of talented philosophers. I also thank the John Templeton Foundation for inviting me to Ghana to participate in a panel discussion on the ontology of persons in the summer of 2013. I thank the organizers of the Rivendell Institute Summer School at Yale University, which I attended in the summer of 2013. I presented chapter two of this thesis at a philosophy conference organized jointly by the University of Bergen in Norway and Durham University in 2012. I thank the participants from this conference for their comments. I also thank the Durham Eidos Philosophy Community for stimulating discussions over the last three years, where most v chapters of this thesis were presented. I also benefited from interaction with the speakers as well as the attendees of the International Interdisciplinary Conference entitled: Perspectives on the First Person Pronoun “I”: Looking at Metaphysics, Linguistics and Neuroscience, which took place at Durham University from May 15-17, 2014. I was the lead organizer of this conference. The late Professor E.J. Lowe (in memorium) and Angie Guta were co-organizers. I also want to thank Ustinov College as well as Durham Philosophy Department for travel grants for me to participate in various conferences. I also thank Dr. Alex Carruth, Dr. Matthew Tugby, Dr. Ian Kidd and Dr. Benedict Smith and Mr. David Westland for reading different parts of this thesis and for giving me their invaluable input. I also thank Dr. Alex Carruth, Dr. James Miller, Mr. Henry Taylor and Mr. David Westland for stimulating discussions over the past three years. I would like to thank my thesis examiners Professor JP Moreland and Dr. Peter Vickers for the stimulating viva session. My thanks also goes to Professor Geoffrey Scarre for chairing the viva session. Had it not been for my wife and son, I would not have been able to come thus far. They have constantly been my encouragers and cheerleaders. I cannot repay them. They will always live in my heart. Thank you. vi Table of Contents Part I: Scene Setting ……………………………………………………………………………………………….12 Chapter One: Introduction-A Survey of the Contemporary Philosophical Debate on the Nature of the Self/Person and of Personal Identity………………………………………………….13 1.1 The Question …………………………………………………………………………………………….14 1.1.1 Rene Descartes’s Answer …………………………………………………………21 1.1.1.1 The Epistemology of the Self …………………………………….…..21 1.1.1.2 The Ontology of the Self ……………………………………………..…26 1.1.2 Alternative answers …………………………………………………………………..28 1.1.2.1 The Two Reasons …………………………………………………………..29 1.1.2.2 Locating the Objection …………………………………………………..29 A. The Existence Level ……………………………………………………….30 B. The Terminology Level …………………………………………………..32 C. The Unity Level ………………………………………………………………37 1.1.2.3 The Lesson and the challenge ……………………………………..…38 1.1.2.4 Boethius’s Way ……………………………………………………………..42 1.2 Historical Context ……………………………………………………………………………………….47 1.2.1 The Common Answer ………………………………………………………………..50 1.2.2 Common Approaches ………………………………………………………………..57 A. Identity: Numerical and Qualitative …………………………………….57 B. Persistence, change and identity …………………………………………60 C. The Difference ………………………………………………………………..…..63 D. Methodology ……………………………………………………………………….65 E. Thesis Outline ……………………………………………………………………..66 Part II: Historical Legacies………………………………………………………………………………………….68 Chapter Two: John Locke on Substance, the Substantial-Self/Person Question
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