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A::WE~. ~ ftA ~.., ~ ~ ~ ., ~, Mozambique ..--...,'~..--... EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS Peace Process FOR (SOUTHERN) AFRICA Bulletin Issue 12 - September 1994 Written by Joseph Hanlon and Rachel Waterhouse Material may be freely reprinted Published by AWEPA, the European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa Prins Hendrikkade 48, 1012 AC Amsterdam Rua D. Joao IV 163 (CP 2465) Maputo Av Patrice Lumumba 290, Maputo Tel:(31) 20 - 6266639 Fax:(31) 20 - 6220130 Tel:(258) 1 - 492425 Fax:(258) 1 - 741089 Tel:(258) 1 - 42744 Fax:(258) 1 - 429743 Comment: On the Angola road? It has become a cliche to say that Mozambique able to draw on demobilised soldiers. But is not Angola. But Mozambique is moving toward Renamo's real fear is of the Police Rapid 27-28 October elections without satisfying three Intervention force. An effective and well trained essential parts of the peace accord signed in riot control police which is now being used to Rome two years ago, and some worrying break up mutinies and road closures, the rapid parallels with Angola are becoming apparent. intervention force is absolutely essential to some Mozambique will go into elections without a minimal degree of order. But the UN Security new unified army, as was specified under the Council team visiting in August discovered that peace accord. This means that no one can it has heavy weapons and is receiving what is enforce the outcome of the election, even if it is effectively military training. Under the peace declared free and fair. The UN operation in accord the police remained under government Mozambique (ONUMOZ) has the largest and best control; without the new joint army this gives trained army in the country, but it will not use it Frelimo the second most important military force to force the losers to accept the election result. in the country. Also in violation of the accord, both sides The third violation of the peace accord is that. appear to have retained military forces, although as we report elsewhere in this issue, there are on a much smaller scale than Angola, and to still two administrations in Mozambique. Renamo have major arms caches. Renamo appears to be has retained effective control of its zones and keeping groups of demobilised soldiers together continues to restrict access to government and in zones it controls, including 500 men in Frelimo officials and even civic education teams. Inhaminga. In early September it also revealed Another parallel with Angola has been the that it had violated the peace accord by failing to consistent refusal of the United Nations list more than 1000 soldiers -- 5 % of its army -­ Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) to and Frelimo rightly fears that it may have more denounce violations of the peace accord. For hidden. With arms, soldiers and communication example, ONUMOZ has publicly denied that in place, Renamo could reconstruct a small army there are problems with access in the face of quickly. ample evidence. On its side the government has kept some The final parallel with Angola is that the two officers out of the new army and may also be sides have apparently not come to any Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin -- Sept 1994 -- 1 arrangement as to the post-election role of the loser. Feeble new army This election campaign and the latter years of the war have been less a struggle over political "By the time elections are held, the defence capacity ideas than a battle for power and access to of the new Mozambique Armed Defence Force resources through the state. It is extremely naive (FADM) will probably be minimal, with no operational to think that either of the two armed parties will air-force or navy and little heavy-weapons handling give up its demand for a share of money and capacity", predicted United Nations Deputy Special power just because it has lost the election. Representative in Mozambique, Behrooz Sadry, two months ahead of elections. Already one of the parties has been making wild Sadry added" FADM could, by that time, be able claims about electoral fraud which might be used to undertake certain security tasks, principally to renounce the results. protection of its own barracks and installations, and Much of the press discussion of, and munitions depots -- but it would need far more international pressure for, a pre-election logistical support than it has now, to be truly agreement has centred around a South Africa­ operational" . style government of national unity -- which has And the new army will be very small. Under the proved unacceptable to key elements within Rome peace accord it was to have 30,000 men, Frelimo. But there are many different ways in 15,000 from each side. By early September, only which power- or cake-sharing might be agreed, 11,403 people had gone into the new army, 3,715 including jobs, houses, contracts, commitments from Renamo and 8,688 from government; only half relating to future local elections, and long term of those will be trained before the election. financial support for the losing party. On 9 September, the fifth FADM infantry brigade, combining former government and Renamo opposition Without some pre-election agreement, there soldiers finished a four week crash-course training will necessarily be a period of intense negotiation under Mozambican, British and Zimbabwean after the election. Since both sides have military instruction at Manhica military training camp in forces, this could easily become "armed Maputo province. Instructors at Manhica said it was negotiations". The kinds of roadblocks and likely to be the last infantry battalion trained ahead of hostage takings which have occurred in the past October elections, although initial plans had been to few months could become much more serious if train 15 battalions of 742 soldiers each by then. large number of armed men with proper officers The plans were laid before frustration and and communication systems were involved. disillusionment tore through the ranks of government Renamo would have a base in zones it continues and Renamo troops alike; soldiers on both sides to control; Frelimo would have its base in the refused to join the FADM. cities. A British training officer at Manhica, Paul Daly, said on 9 September "There are still 1600 soldiers A return to war as happened in Angola is destined for FADM at Boane [training camp, Maputo highly unlikely in Mozambique. But there is a real province], but almost half of them are officers, and danger of armed negotiations extending over we may need most of the rest to make up a shortfall several months and degenerating into chaos and in numbers of the other battalions already trained". confusion. One training officer at Manhica, who was among Mozambique's registration process ran very a first group of 540 Mozambican instructors trained smoothly and registration brigades deserve high by the British at Nyanga military camp in Zimbabwe, praise; this suggests that the election will run argued it was easy to understand why soldiers no smoothly as well. Angola's election process ran longer wanted to join the FADM, given continued extremely well, but it was meaningless because derisory wages (MT 73,000/month for a private, the peace accord had not been carried out. As worth less than US$ 12/month) and poor logistical Mozambique goes into its elections without its conditions including shortages of soap, toothpaste Rome peace accord having been satisfied, is it and boot-polish. At the FADM 5th Infantry Battalion passing out going down the Angola road? parade, Manhica Camp Commander Lt. Col. Mulumo Joseph Hanlon Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin -- Sept 1994 -- 2 Mafavisse complained that "Life and training at the number of violent protests over recent weeks, staged centre have been negatively affected by lack of by soldiers, ex-soldiers, guards, para-military and weapons, uniforms, a doctor, medicines, roofing informal forces across the country. sheets, kitchen equipment and the late arrival of In northern Nampula province alone, Governor salaries" . Alfredo Gamito reported 90 "mutinies" in the last As the newly trained troops paraded, one three months, causing the death of ten people instructor ran round after them picking up dozens of including civilians and police. ill-fitting caps which fell to the floor. In most cases, the rioters demanded pensions, The Nyanga-trained instructor said "We don't demobilisation benefits, food supplies and other intend to stage any protests, but we'll wait and see material goods, usually picking civilian victims as the how the new government treats us after elections. target of their anger. They have been taking As things are, demobilisation might be a better hostages, holding up traffic, and looting markets and option" . warehouses. Humanitarian aid organisations have According to observer sources from the nation's stopped work in some parts of the centre and north, peace-keeping commissions, a keen FADM Supreme after their workers were threatened and their Command faced intransigence from certain hardline warehouses stripped. figures in the government military who opposed the ONUMOZ increasingly washed its hands of many new joint army. By September the FADM still had no such disturbances, classing them as criminal rather approved budget, after its own proposals were than military activity and therefore a job for the modified by the Ministry of Defence, still run by the national police. Government had a policy of trying to same ex-generals who ran it during the war. negotiate with the demonstrators rather than use Following the mutinies of soldiers wanting to be force, but by being seen to give in to their demands demobilised, government army hawks finally allowed it encouraged an increasing spiral of incidents. the ONUMOZ to disable certain heavy weapons. But Finally on 2 September, Interior Minister Manuel Sadry said ONUMOZ was to take custody of all Antonio said the police would "no longer tolerate heavy weaponry until either FADM had capacity to such criminality".

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