CSIS BRIEFS

Iran’s Protests and the Threat to Domestic Stability

By Seth G. Jones and Danika Newlee NOVEMBER 2019

THE ISSUE As protests surge in Iraq and Lebanon, the Iranian regime also has to deal with its own protest movement. Since late 2017, there have been hundreds of protests in per month about such issues as deteriorating economic conditions, environmental degradation, and political grievances. However, these protests are unlikely to threaten regime survival—at least for now. The Iranian protest movement is currently too decentralized and Iranian security forces are likely too strong to overthrow the regime. Still, the litany of grievances in Iran suggest that the regime will have to deal with persistent domestic discontent.

eeks of mass demonstrations regime.”3 Not to be outdone, Trump adviser Rudolph have engulfed Lebanon and Giuliani predicted that “the people of Iran obviously have Iraq, two countries where Iran had enough. The sanctions are working. The currency is wields significant influence. On going to nothing . . . these are the kinds of conditions October 29, 2019, for example, that lead to successful revolutions.”4 Lebanese Prime Minister Saad In light of these views and the broader protests in Hariri resigned following massive protests. In Iraq, W countries like Iraq and Lebanon, this CSIS brief asks two violent demonstrations erupted as protesters complained main questions. What types of grievances have caused about poor economic conditions, the government’s failure Iranian protests? Does the current protest movement to deliver adequate public services, and Iran’s influence represent a veritable threat to the regime? To answer in the country. these questions, this brief utilizes qualitative and Even before the Lebanese and Iraqi protests began, quantitative information. It compiles a list of major domestic unrest within Iran prompted many observers Iranian protests since the 1890s and assesses factors to predict that the regime was on the verge of collapse. that contributed to the outbreak of protests. In addition, As former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton it utilizes the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data tweeted, “With the recent protests in #Iran, we can see (ACLED) project to compile and analyze over 4,200 the danger that the regime is in.”1 Representative Gerry protests from January 2018 through October 2019.5 Connolly (D-VA) remarked that “protests throughout Iran suggest that clerical rule’s days are numbered. In analyzing the data, this brief makes several arguments. Iranians want more freedom.”2 Citing unnamed senior First, while protests in Iran are not new, the number and U.S. government officials, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz breadth of protests today are significant compared to noted that U.S. policymakers “believe there is now a rare previous years. Since late 2017, there have been hundreds opportunity to bring about the collapse of the Iranian of small protests per month led by a range of networks

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east CSIS BRIEFS | | 1 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program WWW.CSIS.ORG from shopkeepers to students to truckers. They have survival of the regime—at least at the moment. Though protested about economic conditions, environmental galvanized by Lebanese and Iraqi protests, the Iranian issues, political grievances, and cultural issues. Second, protest movement remains fractured and lacks central however, these protests are unlikely to threaten the leadership, and the regime’s security and intelligence

Figure 1: Examples of Historical Iranian Protests

PROTEST DESCRIPTION

In 1890, Nasir al-Din Shah granted a monopoly over the purchase, sale, and export of tobacco TOBACCO PROTESTS grown in Iran to a British subject. But merchants and others whose livelihoods depended on the (1890-1892) tobacco business were furious. Protests erupted across cities in an alliance that encompassed the bazaaris (merchant class) and ulema (Muslim leaders).

CONSTITUTIONAL Riots initially broke out when merchants raised the price of sugar in the face of rising REVOLUTION international prices. Mullahs and merchants then demanded reforms. The revolution led to the (1905-1911) establishment of a parliament during the .

MOSSADEQ PROTESTS Protests broke out across Iran against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, who was AND OVERTHROW overthrown in a coup with support from the and . General (1953) Fazlollah Zahedi became prime minister and the Shah returned from temporary exile.

KHORDAD UPRISING Protests in Iran erupted in June following the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini after his (1963) denouncement of Iranian Shah and Israel.

Protests led by conservative Shia occurred in the shrine city of Qum against the government QUM PROTESTS and its progressive policies. They shouted anti-government slogans as they smashed windows (1975) and doors and used sticks, stones, and clubs to attack policemen.

A popular uprising, with massive protests, that led to the overthrow of Mohammad ISLAMIC REVOLUTION Pahlavi and the replacement of his government with an Islamic republic under Ayatollah (1978-1979) Khomeini.

From August 1991 to August 1994, several protests occurred in cities like , Shiraz, Arak, SQUATTER PROTESTS , Ghazvin, and . Many of the protests were sparked by urban squatters who were (1991-1994) angered by municipal authorities’ attempts to evict them and destroy their dwellings.

Protests erupted in July following the regime’s closure of the reformist newspaper Salam. STUDENT PROTESTS Police raids sparked six days of demonstrations and rioting throughout the country, during (1999) which police killed several people, wounded hundreds of others, and arrested over a thousand individuals.

Protests occurred following the controversial 2009 Iranian presidential election results (a GREEN MOVEMENT disputed victory by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) and in support of opposition (2009-2010) candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

ARAB SPRING Following a groundswell of protests across the Arab world during the “Arab Spring,” the Green PROTESTS Movement organized protests beginning in February 2011. Sporadic protests continued into (2011-2012) 2012 but were eventually crushed by the regime.

Protests arose in cities throughout Iran beginning in December 2017 and continuing into 2018. The first one took place in Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest city, led by protesters initially focused DEY PROTESTS on economic grievances. As the protests spread, however, their scope expanded to include (2017-2018) opposition to the regime and concerns about corruption, environmental degradation, and other issues.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 2 Today’s protests are unlikely to threaten Khordad uprising in 1963 occurred following the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini after his denouncement of the the survival of the regime—at least at Shah and Israel. In 1999, students protested the closure the moment. of a reformist newspaper and a subsequent police raid against a student dormitory in what became known as the forces are strong. The capabilities of Iran’s police forces 18th of Tir and Kuye Deneshgah Disaster.10 In 2009, the have improved since the 2009 Green Movement, and the Green Movement was initially triggered by concerns about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij can election-rigging following the disputed victory of Mahmoud act as surge forces if protests intensify and spread. Ahmadinejad and the defeat of Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Finally, the Dey Protests—which, as discussed above, began The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first in December 2017 as a reaction to economic concerns— examines Iran’s history of protests and domestic unrest. quickly evolved into a wide-ranging political opposition The second section analyzes recent Iranian protests. The movement. They became significantly more anti-regime third assesses the regime’s response, including Iran’s than the reform-minded Green Movement, with chants of efforts to strengthen its security forces. And the fourth “death to the dictator” and “we will die, we will die, we will section highlights Iranian weaknesses and vulnerabilities. take back Iran” becoming common.11 Still, both the Green PATTERNS OF GRIEVANCE AND UNREST Movement and Dey Protests lacked significant organization, Iran has a robust history of protests that have tested the limiting the threat posed to the regime. state. As one history of Iranian protests concluded, “The Third, protests have increasingly been motivated by topics of revolution and resistance are central to the history environmental grievances, including water and food of the modern Muslim world, and especially to Iran.”6 As shortages. Since the mid-2000s, these grievances have Figure 1 highlights, there have been a wide range of protests been largely water-related, as major rivers and lakes in in Iran’s history, which have been caused by economic, , East Azerbaijan, and Ahvaz have dried up due to political, environmental, and other grievances.7 In virtually all a combination of climate change and wasteful irrigation of these cases, more than one factor triggered the protests. practices. The shrinking of Lake Urmia in particular sparked First, economic grievances have triggered the vast a series of violent protests in the city of Tabriz between 12 majority of protests in Iran, a trend which has historical 2010-2011. Meanwhile, when Tehran imposed water precedents in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth use bans on the agricultural sector in 2013 as a result of centuries. These grievances frequently include rising water shortages, farmers took to the streets to complain 13 unemployment, increasing prices of basic commodities, about unequal water distribution practices. Not all growing inflation, or a recession. For example, the tobacco environmental protests have been water-specific, however. protests in 1890 occurred in part because Nasir al-Din Shah In early 2017 and during the Dey Protests, some individuals granted a monopoly over the purchase, sale, and export protested about poor infrastructure planning that caused of tobacco in Iran to a British subject. Nationalism and a marshes to dry up, as well as higher levels of air pollution— resentment of British domination also fueled the protests. including in Ahvaz, designated by the World Health 14 Demonstrations erupted in Tehran, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Organization as the most polluted city in the world. other locations.8 Over a decade later, riots broke out in Fourth, there were a range of other protests motivated in Tehran when merchants raised the price of sugar during the part by religious, cultural, and other grievances. The 1979 constitutional revolution, leading merchants and mullahs revolution was a popular uprising that led to the overthrow to push for reforms. In recent history, the 2017 Dey Protests of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and the replacement of were sparked, at least initially, by frustration with poor his government with an Islamic republic under Ayatollah economic conditions. The protests then expanded to include Khomeini. Religious leaders were deeply involved in several opposition to the regime and concerns about corruption, other demonstrations, such as the tobacco protests and the environmental degradation, and other issues.9 Constitutional Revolution. Second, some protests also occurred because of political While protests have occurred with some frequency, grievances, such as the passage of unpopular policies or revolutions—which lead to regime change—have been programs, arrests of political leaders, anger at government rare in Iran and other countries. One of the challenges corruption, or real or perceived fraudulent elections. The in starting a revolution is what economist Mancur Olson

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 3 termed the “collective action problem.”15 Individuals— a divided internal elite, popular social groups that are including would-be revolutionaries—value numerous mobilized to protest the regime, and an ideology that goods that can be produced only through collective action. justifies rebellion against the state.17 The absence of many of Collective goods are non-excludable; everyone can take these factors helps explain why most protests in Iran have advantage of them, regardless of whether they play a role not led to revolutions. in securing the good. If a group or network overthrows an oppressive government, for example, many people may THE CONTOURS OF RECENT PROTESTS benefit. Yet individuals also value purely personal goods, This section examines the over 4,200 protests that took such as the time, opportunity cost, and risk involved in place after the conclusion of the Dey Protests, from January acting collectively. In other words, the benefits of collective 2018 through October 2019. The data used here were drawn action are often public, while the costs are private. Under primarily from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data these circumstances, every person’s best move is to stay project (ACLED), corroborated and updated as necessary home and let someone else work for the public benefit. The using primary sources as well as Iranian and Western media injury or death of participants (and sometimes their friends, reporting on individual protest events. family members, and neighbors), financial difficulties, Recent protests occurred in nearly every province of the unpleasantness of living a clandestine lifestyle, and forced country, as illustrated in Figure 2. Many of the geographic relocation dissuade many people from participating in the areas in Figure 2 that fall outside of the heat area are 16 initial stages of a revolution. The central implication of the sparsely populated, further highlighting the pervasiveness collective action paradigm is that activists face tremendous of the protests. Though generally more diffuse and rural obstacles in launching revolutions—let alone successfully than the Green Movement, current demonstrations have overthrowing a regime. been particularly intense in Tehran and cities like Isfahan In addition to the collective action problem, research on and Ahvaz. Motivations for current protests have nearly revolutions indicates that several conditions need to be in always fallen into one or more of the categories highlighted place for a revolution to occur: a weak and economically in the previous section: economic, which includes labor- uncompetitive state, poor or co-optable security forces, related protests and comprises the majority of cases

Figure 2: Heat Map of Protests in Iran, January 2018 to October 2019 Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www.acleddata.com.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 4 studied here; political, including anti-regime and anti-West removed several senior officials, including Masoud Karbasian, demonstrations; environmental; and religious, cultural, the economic affairs and finance minister, and Valiollah Seif, and other grievances. As noted in the previous section, a the governor of the Central Bank.21 combination of these factors fueled most protests. However, On the labor front, there were over 2,500 protests from the protests generally erupted because of local issues and January 2018 to October 2019.22 Several notable protests lacked centralized leadership and cohesion. included: Economic Grievances: The Dey Protests served as a catalyst • On May 1, 2018 (International Labor Day), protesters for many Iranians dissatisfied with their economic marched in Tehran, Kordestan, Alborz, Isfahan, situation. As a result, 72 percent of demonstrations since Khuzstan, Yazd, Gilan, Razavi Khorasan, and Ghazvin January 2018 were fueled by economic grievances.18 provinces to demand higher wages, better working Significant motivations include labor concerns (such as conditions, and more protection after retirement.23 unpaid wages, factory closures, job insecurity, and poor News outlets indicated that hundreds of people working conditions) and issues related to the devaluation of protested in Tehran alone, and the police arrested the rial (Iran’s currency), high rates of inflation, and Iranian dozens of demonstrators across the country.24 companies defrauding their investors. Figure 3 depicts a timeline of these protests. • In May and September 2018, thousands of Iranian truck drivers went on strike in over 240 towns and The largest non-labor related protest movement during this cities across Iran.25 Protesters were motivated by the time period was the so-called “bazaari protests,” which took high costs of fuel and spare parts, which compounded place in Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz in late June 2018. These problems already caused by low wages and poor protests were carried out by urban merchants (or bazaaris) insurance benefits.26 who closed their shops and took to the streets after the value of the rial reached a new low of 90,000 rials to one dollar • On four separate occasions over the 2018-2019 on June 24, 2018.19 Thebazaari protests comprised one of period—in May 2018, November 2018, March 2019, the largest protests in Tehran since 2012, when sanctions and May 2019—the Coordinating Council of Teachers crippled the Iranian economy.20 Though the police clamped Syndicates in Iran encouraged protests, which resulted down on the 2018 bazaari demonstrations, some hard-liners in sweeping teachers’ demonstrations across the within the Iranian government used them as an opportunity country.27 These protests occurred in at least 55 cities to attack the Rouhani regime for failing to adequately and 16 provinces, as teachers decried low salaries, address Iran’s economic situation. As a result, the parliament poor health insurance, and a lack of job security. Some

300Figure 3: Number of Economic Protests by Month, January 2018 to October 2019

250

200

150

100

50

0 - - - - -  -  -  - - -  - - - - - - -  -  -  - - -

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www.acleddata.com transnational threats project

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 5 also demanded the right to unionize and insisted government officials attended the rally in Tehran, where that the Iranian regime release teachers detained in protesters set fire to American and Israeli flags and effigies of previous strikes.28 President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 33 The final economic protests of note were those related Netanyahu. Previous anti-Western protests were smaller to fraud, of which there were 409 in 36 different cities and reactive, including in response to U.S. government between January 2018 and October 2019. The primary actions like its withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018 target of these protests were Iran’s private financial and President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s firms, which are owned and managed by individuals capital in December 2017. with links to religious institutions and the IRGC.29 These Environmental Grievances: There were 261 environmental firms—including the Caspian Credit Institution and protests between January 2018 and October 2019, the al-Hujaj—operated under limited regulation and majority of which were water related.34 Figure 4 shows the accountability, and their investments in unprofitable ebb and flow of these protests over time. While there were real-estate development ventures, as well as a culture not nearly as many environmental protests as economic of corruption, caused millions of Iranians to lose their ones, they were widespread and took place in over 90 cities savings.30 In April-May 2018 and January-February 2019, and towns.35 defrauded consumers took to the streets en masse to There were several spikes in the data. The first took demand repayment. place in April 2018 when farmers across Iran protested Political Grievances: In examining Iran’s demonstrations since against the Iranian government’s inability to provide the Dey Protests, nearly 450 were in part political in nature. water for its citizens during a period of sustained drought. Some involved political grievances with the regime, including Another wave of protests was centered in Khuzestan concerns about corruption. The majority of protesters in and Bushehr provinces in June and July of 2018, with this category demanded the release of political prisoners, demonstrations against water shortages, pollution, and low including journalists and activists who were arrested in water quality.36 There were other protests concentrated in previous protests. Other demonstrations were against the Isfahan Province in November 2018 when Isfahan farmers United States and Israel or in support of the regime against protested government mismanagement of water pipelines its domestic opponents.31 On Quds Day (May 31, 2019), for for irrigation which led to water shortages across the example, Iranians in at least 220 cities across the country province. While these protests were ongoing, the Iranian protested in support of Palestine and in opposition to the government cancelled funding for all water projects in U.S.-led Middle East peace plan.32 Several high-ranking Isfahan in the following year’s budget because of “financial

35Figure 4: Number of Water-Related Protests by Month

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 - - - - -  -  -  - - -  - - - - - - -  -  -  - - -

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www.acleddata.com. transnational threats project

%" CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 6 limitations,” which led to an increase in protest activity, Rouhani attempted some cooption after the Dey Protests as well as the resignation of all 18 members of parliament by acknowledging the legitimacy of certain protestor from Isfahan Province.37 In March 2019, devastating grievances, Iranian leaders have frequently resorted to flooding in southwestern Iran—particularly in Khuzestan coercive instruments to defuse unrest.44 Province—resulted in another wide-ranging series of Strengthening the Security Forces: The regime took steps protests against government mismanagement of the crisis. to improve the capabilities of the police and other Finally, farmers across multiple provinces again protested security forces following the Green Movement in 2009 against continuing water shortages in June and July 2019. and subsequent protests. As the first line of defense As discussed above, water-related protests are by no means against protesters, the police—officially called the Law unprecedented in Iran. However, the combination of severe Enforcement Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran (or drought conditions (with 2017 being the country’s driest NAJA)—play an important role in regime stability. The year in over 67 years) and excessive dam construction by regime expanded the number of police stations and 38 the IRGC exacerbated tensions. provided additional capabilities like armored vehicles, Other Grievances: Finally, some Iranians protested in part water spray for crowd control, and heavy weapons to because of cultural, religious, and other concerns. While deter or respond to riots. The regime also constructed there were only around 55 unique events between January new police headquarters, offices, and stations throughout 2018 and October 2019 caused by cultural and religious the country. In Tehran alone, the government created grievances, there were two case studies that represented more than 400 patrolling units in 375 municipal potential flashpoints. neighborhoods.45 The regime dramatically expanded the Intelligence and Public Security Police (polis-e ettelaat One was the so-called “headscarf protests,” often referred va amniyat-e omumi, or PAVA). It gathers intelligence in to as White Wednesdays. Led by individuals like Masih cities, towns, and neighborhoods through local informant Alinejad and Vida Movahedi, these individuals opposed networks (known as mokhber-e mahhali); identifies and Iran’s laws requiring women to wear the hijab (or modest penetrates protest movements; and arrests those that dress, including headscarves) for religious reasons. Though threaten the regime.46 protests against the hijab have taken place sporadically across Iran since the 1979 revolution, the latest wave began The regime also provided more resources to the police in December 2017. to deal with domestic instability. In 2018, the Iranian Parliament increased the NAJA’s budget by over 200 A second cycle of protests took place in Khuzestan percent, including a 400 percent increase for weapons Province.39 Iranian Arabs demonstrated in March 2018 and armaments following the 2018 Dey Protests.47 In against an Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) addition, Iranian police today are better organized, television show for children which failed to include Arabs trained, and equipped than they were a decade ago. They in a segment about Iran’s ethnic minorities.40 Ethnic also have more robust human and signals intelligence discontent in Khuzestan has been growing for some time, collection capabilities. The increased capabilities appear with Arabs in the region increasingly vocal about the to have improved police performance, since the regime Iranian government’s “policies of poverty, marginalization, has generally not deployed militarized Basij units or IRGC 41 exclusion, unemployment, and deprivation.” The protests forces in the most recent rounds of protests. The absence in Ahvaz reflected these sentiments, moving beyond their of the Basij and IRGC might also suggest that the protests initial IRIB target to include complaints of inadequate have been relatively small, contained, and disorganized. Arabic-language education and media more broadly, as well Limited opinion polling in Iran also indicates that the public as high rates of Arab unemployment in the region.42 believes the police have been relatively fair in dealing with STATE RESPONSE protesters. About 66 percent of Iranians surveyed thought Iran responded to these protests by trying to strengthen that the police handled the 2017-2018 protests “very well” 48 its security forces and develop more effective or “somewhat well,” according to one poll. technological capabilities. Regimes have historically Improving Technology and Cyber Capabilities: The used a range of tools to prevent or respond to protests, 2009 protesters were able to leverage social media to from coercion (such as arresting individuals) to cooption communicate, organize, and criticize the regime. But (such as buying citizen loyalty).43 While President the Iranian government studied the communication

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 7 methods of protesters after the Green Movement regarding , encourage protests, or differ from major dispersed and cracked down on the use of the internet domestic or international policies.55 The government and social media in subsequent protests. The NAJA has completely blocked Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and established the Cyberspace Police (polis-e faza-ye towlid Google, in addition to major blog-hosting platforms like va tabadol-e ettelaat, or FATA) in 2011 to monitor online WordPress, Blogspot, and Blogger. content, investigate cybercrimes like financial scams and violations of privacy, and crack down on online activists WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES and banned content. In October 2012, for example, FATA Though the current protest movement does not pose officers arrested Beheshti, who had written critical a serious threat to the regime—at least not yet—there articles about the regime in his blog Magalh 91. FATA had are weaknesses and vulnerabilities within Iran caused been monitoring his internet and social media activity, by local grievances. Several of the factors that have including his criticism of Ayatollah Khamenei and other caused protests in the past—such as economic, political, senior government officials for corruption, human rights environmental, and cultural grievances—are significant abuses, and poor policy decision. On November 3, 2012, and unlikely to improve in the near future. Economic Beheshti was killed while in police custody.49 conditions remain bleak because of the U.S. economic sanctions and regime mismanagement. Real GDP growth More broadly, the Iranian regime has increased its use plummeted to -3.9 percent in 2018 and an estimated -6 of cameras, improved facial recognition technology percent in 2019.56 The value of the rial plummeted from to identify protesters, conducted extensive media 32,000 to the dollar at the time of the nuclear deal to censorship inside the country, and attempted to create a relatively closed system of information. The regime 154,000 to the dollar on the unofficial market by May 7, 57 banned Viber, the messaging app Telegram, and the 2019. By August 2019, the rial was trading at 116,500 photo-sharing platform Instagram in an effort to to the dollar, along with a monthly inflation rate of 40 undermine the ability of protesters to communicate, percent, national unemployment around 12 percent, and 58 organize, and distribute information. Regime youth unemployment around 25 percent. There are also 59 security forces also periodically cut off mobile lines deep political and social divisions in the country. and temporarily banned other popular social media applications during protests in some areas.50 In early The factors that have caused protests in 2018, at the height of anti-government protests, the Iranian regime occasionally blocked access to foreign the past are significant and unlikely to data and servers.51 The government has also jammed improve in the near future. satellite television stations. During the 2013 presidential elections, the government jammed satellite channels like BBC Persian and Voice of America, particularly on According to one poll, there is significant frustration election day.52 The police and the Basij militia have with current conditions. Approximately 95 percent of additionally combated the use of satellite television by Iranian respondents said that “the government should do confiscating satellite equipment and arresting those more to keep the price of food products from increasing.” caught in possession of it.53 Eighty-one percent agreed that “the government should compensate people who lost money when some financial Tehran also uses firewalls and other preventive institutions failed.” More generally, almost three quarters technologies to block domestic access to specific sites believed that “the government is not doing enough” in an effort to eventually move all Iranian traffic to a to help the poor or “farmers who are suffering due to “National Information Network,” or “halal internet,” the drought.” In addition, 96 percent believed that the that can be more easily censored, monitored, and 60 defended from foreign activity and culture.54 The government should do more to fight corruption. government prevents public access to tens of thousands Along with U.S. sanctions, these factors will continue of websites, including those run by international news to create the conditions for protests in the country, sources, Iranian opposition groups, ethnic and religious though the government’s coercive measures will likely minorities, and human rights groups. The Iranian regime prevent regime change. Still, the United States can better also blocks websites if they diverge from official doctrine exploit holes in Iran’s information crackdown to better

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 8 allow Iranians to air their grievances. While the regime access to information, including through state-run media, blocked Telegram, for example, many Iranians use Virtual make it vulnerable to a U.S. and Western information Private Networks (VPNs) to regain access.61 The U.S. State campaign. Department’s Internet Freedom program—which seeks to counter the efforts of authoritarian regimes like Iran to censor, monitor, and control the internet—has had Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and director of the some success in helping individuals bypass firewalls Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and by using tools and software like Tor, a website which International Studies (CSIS). He is the author, most recently, of enables anonymous communication.62 These holes make “A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle Iran vulnerable to information campaigns, whether by in Poland” (W.W. Norton). Danika Newlee is the program overt public diplomacy efforts or covert, state-sponsored manager and research associate for the Transnational Threats political warfare. Project at CSIS. The United States should expand these types of programs. It should also support other information sources for This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct Iranians at home and abroad, particularly those that sponsorship contributed to this brief. highlight issues of interest to protesters (including the environment, human rights, and religious or cultural flashpoints). While satellite dishes are illegal within Iran, at least 70 percent of the population owns them and uses them to stream satellite channels from abroad.63 Historically, this content has been created and broadcast by large Western media corporations, such as BBC Persian and Voice of America’s Persian News Network. In recent years, however, their popularity has been outstripped by smaller, highly targeted networks, often established by Iranians in exile.64 The most popular of these is Manoto TV, a London-based network with creative programming designed to appeal to younger generations, which claimed 40 million viewers in 2018.65 Overall, the persistence of protests in Iran and other countries in the region—such as Lebanon and Iraq— suggests that a major component of U.S. competition with Iran should be ideological. After all, the U.S. information campaign against the Soviet Union—which included such platforms and systems as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and the U.S. Information Agency—was critical during the Cold War. The United States’ greatest strengths—its support of democratic principles, open markets, and free press— are also Iran’s most significant weaknesses. Iran’s authoritarian political system and attempt to control

CSIS BRIEFS are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. Cover Photo: STR/AFP/Getty Images)

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 9 ENDNOTES 21. Asa Fitch and Aresu Eqbali, “Rouhani Suffers Fresh Blow After Iran’s Parliament Ousts Economy Minister,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2018, 1. John Bolton, Twitter post, January 12, 2018, 1:22 p.m., https://twitter. https://www.wsj.com/articles/rouhani-suffers-fresh-blow-after-irans-par- com/AmbJohnBolton/status/951927426052972544. liament-ousts-economy-minister-1535296186; “Authorities Replace Central 2. Gerry Connolly, Twitter post, December 31, 2017, 10:36 a.m., Bank Governor,” Economist Intelligence Unit, July 30, 2018, https://www. https://twitter.com/GerryConnolly/status/947537050772918272?ref_ eiu.com/industry/article/656999049/authorities-replace-central-bank-gov- src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwter- ernor/2018-07-30. m%5E947537050772918272&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.voanews. 22. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www. com%2Fmiddle-east%2Fmembers-congress-react-iran-protests. acleddata.com. 33. Amir Tibon and Amos Harel, “‘One Little Kick and It’s Done’: Senior 23. Ibid. Trump Advisers Believe It’s Possible to Hasten Collapse of Iranian Regime,” Haaretz, July 1, 2018, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-senior- 24. “Iran Arrests Dozens at International Workers’ Day Protests,” Al-Monitor, trump-advisers-believe-it-s-possible-to-hasten-collapse-of-iran-1.6223784. May 2, 2019, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/05/iran- may-day-workers-protests-arrests-parliament-bakhshi.html; “Iran Arrests 4. “Trump Lawyer Giuliani Says Iran’s Government Will Be Overthrown,” Re- 6 as Labor Day Demonstrators Defy Protest Ban,” Associated Press, May 1, uters, September 22, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-op- 2018, https://www.apnews.com/f7b7205bbee74ec6a6c272819dfec433. position/trump-lawyer-giuliani-says-irans-government-will-be-overthrown- idUSKCN1M3005. 25. Saidi, “More Protests, No Progress.” 5. On ACLED see Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); 26. “The Truck Strike in Iran Entered Its Second Day,” BBC Persian, May 23, https://www.acleddata.com. 2018, http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-44222542. 6. See, for example, Nikki R. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World: Resistance 27. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www. and Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 1995), ix. acleddata.com; Michael Lipin, “Iran’s Poorly Paid Teachers on Nationwide Strike for 2nd Day,” Voice of America, November 15, 2018, https://www. 7. See, for example, a similar list of factors for revolutions in Charles voanews.com/middle-east/voa-news-iran/irans-poorly-paid-teachers-na- Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- tionwide-strike-2nd-day. versity Press, 2004), 6. 28. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www. 8. Keddie, Iran and the Muslim World, 76-77. acleddata.com. 9. See, for example, Sanam Vakil, “Iran on the Brink: Challenges and Oppor- 29. Farnaz Fassihi and Asa Fitch, “The Spark Behind Iran’s Unrest: Millions tunities for Washington,” Hoover Institution, July 17, 2018, https://www. of Defrauded Investors,” Wall Street Journal, January, 11, 2018, https://www. hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/vakil_webreadypdf.pdf. wsj.com/articles/the-spark-behind-irans-unrest-millions-of-defrauded-in- 10. Arash Reisinezhad, “The Iranian Green Movement: Fragmented Collec- vestors-1515698701. tive Action and Fragile Collective Action,” Iranian Studies 48, no. 2 (2015), 30. Fassihi and Fitch, “The Spark Behind Iran’s Unrest.” 199. 31. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); https://www. 11. Ramin Mostaghim and Shashank Bengali, “‘Death to the dictator!’ is new acleddata.com. rallying cry in Iran as antigovernment protests spread to capital,” Los Ange- les Times, December 30, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/ 32. Ibid. la-fg-iran-protests-20171230-story.html. 33. Amir Vahdat, “Protesters in Iran, Iraq Burn Israel, US Flags on ‘Quds 12. Thomas Erdbrink, “Its Great Lake Shriveled, Iran Confronts Crisis of Day,’” Associated Press, May 31, 2019, https://www.apnews.com/fe- Water Supply” New York Times, January 30, 2014, https://www.nytimes. 7f04ea375d4ff0b194c63ea22cc61e. com/2014/01/31/world/middleeast/its-great-lake-shriveled-iran-confronts- 34. Nik and Alireza Nader, “Iran is Committing Suicide by De- crisis-of-water-supply.html. hydration,” Foreign Policy, February 25, 2019, https://foreignpolicy. 13. Dietrich Borchardt et al., Integrated Water Resources Management: com/2019/02/25/iran-is-committing-suicide-by-dehydration/. Concept, Research and Implementation (: Springer International 35. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://www. Publishing, 2016). acleddata.com. 14. See “World Health Organization Global Urban Ambient Air Pollution 36. “Water Shortage, Pollution Spark Fresh Protests in Iran’s Abadan,” Al Ja- Database (update 2016),” WHO, https://www.who.int/airpollution/data/ zeera, July 2, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/water-short- cities-2016/en/. age-pollution-spark-fresh-protests-iran-abadan-180702072113204.html. 15. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 37. Tamer Badawi, “Iran’s Water Problem,” Carnegie Endowment for Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). International Peace, December 11, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/ 16. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “How ‘Free’ is Free Riding sada/77935. in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” 38. Holly Dagres, “Why Iran’s Water Problems Aren’t Going Away Anytime World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 2007): 177-216. Soon,” Atlantic Council, July 8, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ 17. See, for example, Jack Goldstone, “Modern Revolutions? Yes They Are,” iransource/why-iran-s-water-problems-aren-t-going-away-anytime-soon. Harvard International Review (2008); Goldstone, “Theories of Revolution: The 39. Hannah Ritchie, “Iranian Protesters Defiant in the Face of ‘Worst’ Third Generation,”World Politics 32, no. 3, (April 1980): 425-453. Crackdown in a Decade,” CNN, February 11, 2019, https://www.cnn. 18. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED),https://www. com/2019/02/11/middleeast/iran-crackdown-protesters-intl/index.html. acleddata.com. 40. Saidi, “More Protests, No Progress.” 19. Mike Saidi, “More Protests, No Progress,” American Enterprise Institute, 41. Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian Arabs Stage Rallies in Khuzestan to Protest December 2018, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/More- State-Sanctioned Discrimination,” Middle East Institute, March 30, 2018, Protests-No-Progress.pdf. https://www.mei.edu/publications/iranian-arabs-stage-rallies-khuz- 20. “Iran economic protests shut Tehran’s Grand ,” BBC World, June estan-protest-state-sanctioned-discrimination. 25, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44602189.

CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 10 42. Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, “In Southern Province, Iran’s Arabs Report 60. Mohseni, Gallagher, and Ramsay, Iranian Public Opinion after the Protests. Crackdown as Regional Tension Simmers,” Reuters, May 3, 2018, https:// 61. “Iranians Return To Banned Telegram As It Proves Effective In Flood www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-rights-arrests/in-southern-province-irans- Relief,” Radio Farda, April 11, 2019, https://en.radiofarda.com/a/iranians- arabs-report-crackdown-as-regional-tension-simmers-idUSKBN1I41I5. return-to-banned-telegram-as-it-proves-effective-in-flood-relief/29874542. 43. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, “Cooperation, Cooptation, and html. Rebellion Under Dictatorships,” Economics and Politics 18, no. 1, (March 62. Ryan Henry, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Erin York, Portfolio Assessment of 2006): 1-26; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the the Department of State Internet Freedom Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative Political Studies 40, no. 11 (November 2014). 2007): 1279-1301; Saeid Golkar, “Manipulated Society: Paralyizing the Mass- 63. Suddaf Chaudry, “Are Iranian Satellite Channels Aiding Regime Change?” es in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and The Arab Weekly, February 18, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/are-irani- Society 29 (2016): 135-155. an-satellite-channels-aiding-regime-change. 44. Katzman, “Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options.” 64. BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 45. “Afzayesh-e Ghasht-e polise dar Payetakhat” (Increasing of Po- 65. Chaudry, “Are Iranian Satellite Channels Aiding Regime Change?” lice Patrols in the Capital), ISNA, October 2014, https://www.isna.ir/ news/93070704253. 46. Saeid Golkar, The Evolution of Iran’s Police Forces and Social Control in the Islamic Republic (Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, July 2018), 6. 47. Mike Saida, More Protests, No Progress: The 2018 Iran Protests(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, December 2018). 48. Ebrahim Mohseni, Nancy Gallagher, and Clay Ramsay, Iranian Public Opinion after the Protests (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland, July 2018). 49. Sattar Beheshti, Committee to Protect Journalists, https://cpj.org/data/ people/sattar-beheshti/. 50. Mike Saida, More Protests, No Progress: The 2018 Iran Protests (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, December 2018); Daniel Baldino and Jarrad Goold, “Iran and the Emergence of Information and Communications Technology: The Evolution of Revolution?”Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 1 (2014): 17-35. 51. “Iran: Freedom on the Net 2018,” Freedom House, 2018, https://free- domhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2018/iran. 52. Rahimi, “Censorship and the Islamic Republic,” 358-378; Rahimi, “The State of Digital Exception: Censorship and Dissent in Post-Revolutionary Iran,” in Muzammil M. Hussain and Philip N. Howard, eds., State Power 2.0: Authoritarian Entrenchment and Political Engagement Worldwide (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2014), 33-44. 53. Saeid Golkar, “Manipulated Society: Paralyizing the Masses in Post-Rev- olutionary Iran.” 54. Price, “Iran and the Soft War,” 2397-2415. 55. Freedom on the Net 2018 (Washington: Freedom House, 2018), https:// freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2018_Final%20Book- let_11_1_2018.pdf; Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2017: Iran (Wash- ington, DC: 2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN%20 2017_Iran.pdf. 56. Real GDP growth data come from International Monetary Fund, IMF DataMapper, 2019, https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_ RPCH@WEO/IRN?year=2019. 57. “Iran Currency Slips to Around 7-Month Lows as U.S. Tensions Rise,” Re- uters, May 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-rial/iran-currency- slips-to-around-7-month-lows-as-us-tensions-rise-idUSD5N1XF03S; Amir Vahdat and Jon Gambrell, “Iran Moves to Strike 4 Zeroes from Its Battered Currency,” ABC News, August 21, 2019, https://abcnews.go.com/Interna- tional/wireStory/iran-moves-strike-zeroes-battered-currency-65092364. 58. Vahdat and Gambrell, “Iran Moves to Strike 4 Zeroes from Its Battered Currency.” 59. Kevan Harris, A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 211.

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