In 1952, Britain and were in the middle of an oil dispute. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

(AIOC) was nationalized by the Iranian government under its fiery, bombastic premier, Mohammad

Mossadeq (1880-1967).1 This was a tremendous loss for the British, the biggest stockholder in the company.2 As US Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it, “never had so few lost so much so stupidly in so short a time.”3 The oil nationalization came after the Iranian government had reopened negotiations of oil concessions with Britain. These negotiations were largely unsuccessful for Britain, due to Mossadeq’s aggressive negotiating style and his hatred of the British. In 1951, Mossadeq told US Special Envoy W.

Averell Harriman, “You don’t know how crafty they [the British] are. You do not know how evil they are.

You do not know how they sully everything they touch.”4

The British retaliated against oil nationalization by conducting threatening military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf and installing an embargo, which stopped the flow of Iranian oil to the rest of the world, mistakenly assuming that once Mossadeq saw the extent of Iranian dependence on the West, he would mute his support of oil nationalization. When he did not, one British lawmaker said, “really, it seemed hardly fair that dignified and correct Western statesmanship should be defeated by the antics of incomprehensible orientals.”5

The tension during this dispute was one of the many factors involved in the Iranian coup of 1953, in which the government of premier Mohammad Mossadeq was overthrown in an effort supported by the

CIA (in its Operation Ajax) as well as the British international intelligence service, the MI6. The result was the installment of Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi (1897-1963) as premier.6 The triumph of the CIA

1 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Mohammad Mossadeq." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed December ​ ​ 26, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Mosaddeq. ​ ​ 2 "D'Arcy Concession (1901)." Encyclopedia.com. Accessed December 26, 2018. ​ ​ https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/darcy-concession-1901. ​ 3 Abrahamian, Ervand. The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations. New York, NY: ​ ​ New Press, 2015, 9. 4 Walters, Vernon A. Silent Missions. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978, 247-248. ​ ​ 5 Elwell-Sutton, L.P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955, 258. ​ ​ 6 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Amy McKenna, and Surabhi Sinha. "Fazlollah Zahedi." Encyclopedia ​ Britannica. Last modified August 29, 2018. Accessed December 28, 2018. ​ https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fazlollah-Zahedi. ​ and MI6 in the 1953 coup of Iranian premier Mohammad Mossadeq was a tragic response to the US and

Britain’s fears that Mossadeq’s policies were further legitimizing Iranian labor movements, anti-West movements, Iranian nationalism, and more broadly conflict between the Middle East and the West.

Iranian nationalism has a history that goes back to July of 1906, when the Shah (of the ) put in place the constitution of Iran after demonstrations in favor of democracy. The executive branch worked in the interest of the Shah; a hierarchy of courts including a Supreme Court was set up to rule on civil matters; and a bicameral legislative branch comprising a parliament (the Majles) with 136 members elected every 2 years, and a Senate with members appointed by the Shah and approved by the people. After World War I, the Qajar dynasty was overthrown by Reza Khan and Zia ed-Din. Reza Khan later took over as Minister of War, and moved on to became premier in 1923 and Shah in 1925.7

Mohammad Mossadeq said of Reza Khan’s rule: “There was always a reasonable balance between revenues and expenditures. The public servants of the country were not particularly well informed; nor did they have all the expert knowledge needed for a good modern government. Nevertheless, they managed to administer the country in their own way, according to their own peculiar sense of wisdom and disposition, and by their faith in the survival of the country. They did manage to turn the wheels in the right direction without the need to beg for money from foreigners.”8 Khan’s goals as Shah were based in the ideals of nationalism and the desire to modernize. His nationalism led to more widespread suspicion on the part of Iranians towards the Soviets and the British. After the 1941 occupation of Iran by the

British and Soviets, Reza Khan fled, leaving his son, , as the shah, putting in place a legacy of Iranian nationalism that paved the way for others such as Mohammad Mossadeq.

The 1953 Iranian coup was caused in part by the Cold War and the Red Scare. After seeing the policies of Mohammad Mossadeq such as the nationalization of British oil, the US worried that Iran

7 The Battle for Iran. 1974. Accessed December 26, 2018. ​ ​ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/CIA%20-%20Battle%20for%20Iran%20-%202013%20rel ease.PDF, 7. ​ 8 Homa Katouzian, ed. Musaddiq’s Memoirs London: Jebhe Publications, 1988, 114. ​ ​ would fall under Soviet influence. The considered the Middle East, and especially Iran, as a prize in the Cold War.9 One British ambassador said of fears of Soviet influence in Iran, “It is regrettable but a fact that the Persians are ideal Stalin-fodder. They are untruthful, backbiters, undisciplined, incapable of unity, without a plan. The Soviet system is equipped with a complete theoretical scheme for everything from God to galoshes.”10 While much of the fear of Soviet influence in Iran was unwarranted considering Mohammad Mossadeq’s objections not only to British influence in Iran but also to other influences, the USSR did account for 23% of foreign Iranian trade in 1926-27 and 38% in 1928-29.11

The Cold War motivation for the US involvement was further shown by an incident in 1944 in which Iran was plunged into Anglo-Soviet conflicts. After Mossadeq had been seated in the Iranian parliament, the Soviets publicly demanded oil concessions from Iran, mostly in the north. George

Kennan, the architect of the US’s Cold War Containment Policy, said of this move,

The basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not need for

oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area coupled

with the concern for prestige. The oil of northern Iran is important not as

something Russia needs but as something it might be dangerous for anyone else

to exploit. The territory lies near the vital Caucasian oil center which so closely

escaped complete conquest in the present war. The Kremlin deems it essential to

its security that no other great power should have even the chance of getting a

foothold there. It probably sees no other way to assure this than by seeking

greater political and economic control for itself.12

9 Koch, Scott A. ''Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister ​ Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953. June 1998. Accessed December 26, 2018. ​ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%204%20-%20CIA%20-%20Zendebad%20Shah%20- %202000%20release.PDF, 1. ​ 10 British Ambassador, March 19, 1946, FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52670; it is unclear the extent to which Western ​ ​ racism figured in the events described in this paper. 11 The Battle for Iran, 11. ​ ​ 12 George Kennan to the Secretary of State, November 7, 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, vol. 4, ​ ​ 470

The year before, the US State Department and the British Foreign Office had also demanded an oil concession, but privately.

Thus Iran was forced to pick a side: the British or the Soviets. Mohammad Mossadeq, as an

Iranian nationalist and supporter of oil nationalization, passionately opposed both of them. He argued that allowing a northern oil concession would be detrimental in the same way that the 1901 D’Arcy

Concession (to the British in southern Iran) had been, and that the granting of more concessions would incentivise more Western powers to seek concessions from Iran. Iran ended up refusing all oil concessions until the end of World War II, angering the Soviets.

In the end, Iran negotiated a deal in which the Soviets would own 51% of Iranian oil stock in northern Iranian provinces and Iran would own 49% for 25 years, after which Iran would own 51% and the Soviets 49% for the following 25 years.13 However, this deal was rejected by the Majles (Iranian parliament) with nationalists and communists aligning with each other. The Majles then forbade the government from conceding oil to any foreign country and encouraged renegotiations of oil concessions that had already been made, with a bill proposed by Mohammad Mossadeq. As President Roosevelt described the nationalism that Mossadeq later represented,

The Iranians distrust the motives of both Britain and Russia and believe that the

future existence of Iran as an independent nation is threatened… For the most

part the attitude of the Iranian officials, and indeed of the Iranian people who are

in a position to appraise conditions, is one of intense bitterness towards Great

Britain... Toward Russia there is less bitterness… The Iranians openly charge and

believe that Britain has been guilty of conduct akin to that of the Nazis in Europe.

13 Abrahamian, 43.

If the Iranians had to decide today between Britain and Russia they would in my

opinion unquestioningly choose the Russians.14

However, anything less than total support of the West against Soviet interests was seen by the outgoing

British ambassador to Iran as “appeasement” of the Soviets in northern Iran, which he warned would “in the last analysis threaten our vital oil supplies in the south.”15 Few people saw what was actually coming.

When the Soviet deal was rejected, negotiations with Britain over previous oil concessions were also reopened, making oil nationalization became a possibility.

The history of Iranian oil is complex. In 1901, William Knox D’Arcy, a British businessman, negotiated a 60 year oil concession covering 480,000 square miles of land in southern and central Iran.16

In 1905, after gaining little profits, he sold his rights to Burma Oil. Burma Oil later became known as the

Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), then the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), and later British

Petroleum (BP).17 From the acquisition of the D’Arcy Concession in 1905 until the nationalization of the concession in 1951, the British government earned $1.3 billion in taxes and dividends, while the Iranians only earned $310 million in royalties.18 The British also controlled 52.5% of the voting rights in the

Abadan oil refinery, one of AIOC’s sources of profit.19 To preserve this advantage, the British invaded

Iran and Iraq in World War II, a fact later admitted by Winston Churchill, who noted that the British were concerned with German meddling in British oil in Abadan.20

Furthermore, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company maintained an exploitative policy in which it hired

Indian and Palestinian migrant workers instead of Iranian natives (who demanded job security and higher

14 General Patrick Hurley, “Memorandum to the President, State Department,” Foreign Relations of the United ​ States: 1943 Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, vol. 4, 364-366. ​ 15 British Ambassador, “Memorandum on Withdrawal of British Troops (25 May 1945),” in State Department ​ Unpublished Declassified Files, July 30, 1946, NND 760050. ​ 16 "Tripartite Treaty of Alliance." Encyclopedia.com. Accessed January 5, 2019. ​ ​ https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/tripartite-treaty-alliance. ​ 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Abrahamian, 10. 20 Abrahamian, 11.

pay).21 Many of their workers lived in shanty towns. Thus AIOC was not well liked by the public. The

British Foreign Office claimed that AIOC was “reluctant to divulge even to us the profit element per barrel in Persian operations much less the basis on which it is calculated.”22

The exploitative and opaque modus operandi of AIOC led to strikes, aligned with and ​ ​ coordinated by the pro-Soviet communist Iranian Tudeh Party, whose unions had the support of 75% of the workforce.23 On May Day 1946, 80,000 workers conducted a rally that led to another strike, standing up against their exploitation and in support of their labor benefiting their country, not foreigners.24 One speaker at the May Day 1946 rally said: “Oh brothers, the production of oil in our land is like jewels. We must try to get those jewels back. If we don’t, we are worthless.”25 The strike was only quelled when the government declared martial law, conducted mass arrests, and raised the minimum wage.

These tensions provided the perfect opportunity for the emergence of an Iranian nationalist, who would stand up to the British and push oil nationalization. A senior British official for the Ministry of

Fuel said: “I cannot get it out of my mind that the Tudeh party, though admittedly a revolutionary party, may be the party of the future in Persia which is going to look after the interests of the working man.”26

The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations came to the same conclusion: “By the time of the

Abadan strike Tudeh had managed to secure effective control over the AIOC employees and Iranian organized labor in general.”27 In the eyes of American McCarthyists and advocates of the domino theory, if the Tudeh Party were to rule Iran, that would be one more country to succumb to communism, which could ultimately inspire strikes and riots in the US and Britain.

21 Abrahamian, 16-17. 22 Foreign Office, “Sale of Oil to the Admiralty,” FO 371/Persia 1951/34-91620. ​ ​ 23 British Labour Attaché, “Memorandum on Tudeh Activities Against AIOC,” FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52713. ​ ​ 24 Abrahamian, 19. 25 British Consul in Khorramshahr, “Report on Tudeh Activities in the Oil Industry,” FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52714. ​ ​ 26 Cabinet Notes, June 26, 1946, FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52717. ​ ​ 27 US Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism Washington, DC: ​ ​ 1949, 8.

The history of Iranian nationalism, labor, and anti-West sentiment led the US to overthrow the government of Mohammad Mossadeq. In August 1953, the CIA, in Operation Ajax, helped overthrow

Premier Mossadeq. Largely considered a foreign policy blunder today, the CIA at the time viewed the coup as a last resort to help the Iranian people and save them from Iranian nationalism. Indeed, behind the scenes, the US government encouraged the Shah to sign decrees that could legally remove Mossadeq; the

US subsequently organized opposition to Mossadeq into one coalition, using propaganda to demonize

Mossadeq in the eyes of the Iranian population.28 The US and Britain then had to decide who would replace Mossadeq. Some thought it should be Ayatollah Kashani, a former Mossadeq ally who had turned against him, but the US decided instead to install Fazlollah Zahedi, a former Nazi collaborator due to his anti-British leanings during World War II. The State Department described him as “friendly to the United

States and Britain” and said he “would be acceptable to both Governments.”29 He was also willing to take the job. Fazlollah Zahedi remained the prime minister of Iran until 1955. In 1951, Zahedi became the minister of the interior, keeping his post after Mossadeq was appointed, but later resigning when he was accused of plotting the coup. Thus, under heavy direction from the CIA, the Shah of Iran fled and appointed Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister to replace Mossadeq.30 Zahedi militarily overthrew

Mossadeq on August 19, 1953, and assumed power. Finally, the US cut aid to Iran, making Iranians angry at their premier.

The motivations behind the coup were clear. The US and Britain believed that if Mohammad

Mossadeq were to keep power, Iranian oil nationalization would continue, ties with the Soviets would strengthen, labor strikes of 80,000 would continue (potentially inspiring people around the world), and

Western interests would continue to be ignored. Mohammad Mossadeq, as an Iranian nationalist, was the

28 Wilber, Donald. "Summary of Wilber History." Accessed December 26, 2018. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%202%20-%201954-00-00%20Summary%20of%20 Wilber%20history.pdf. ​ 29 Koch, 19. 30McKenna and Sinha.

face of this system. However, despite the clear motivations behind the coup, the US claimed to worry that

Iran’s nationalist policies were nudging Iran towards being a failed state, “sliding toward economic and political chaos.” They attributed a humanitarian motive to the coup.31 The United States, in 1950, interpreted Iran’s economy as “backward,” due to its base in agriculture, and even believed that

“conditions in Iran were deteriorating almost to the point of no return” in 1953.32 Oil revenues, after the dispute with Britain over the D’Arcy Concession, fell from £16.03 million in 1950 to £8.3 million in

1952.33 Mossadeq’s prioritization of Iranian sovereignty over profit was perplexing to the west. The CIA wrote about this: “[Mossadeq] had become so committed to nationalism that he did things that could not have conceivably helped his people even in the best and most altruistic of worlds.”34

Nevertheless, the values of transparency and decency won in the end. Despite the clear misunderstandings by the US government with respect to Iran, in 2013, the CIA admitted its role in the

1953 coup, and released information about the British attempts to censor reports of their own involvement under Freedom of Information laws, in an attempt to right a wrong. However, there could also be a selfish motive behind the document release, as it could have been done to partially invalidate Iran’s uses the

1953 coup to this day as an example of failed and dangerous US foreign policy, and the danger of

American and British governments. Much of the information about the coup was destroyed, so we will never know the whole truth.35 But from what we know, the 1953 Iranian coup was a response to Iranian labor movements, anti-West movements, and nationalism. Thus the short-term triumph of the US and

Great Britain in this coup led to a long-term tragedy, the deterioration of US-Iran relations.

31 The Battle for Iran, 1. ​ ​ 32 The Battle for Iran, 5; The Battle for Iran, 31. ​ ​ ​ ​ 33 The Battle for Iran, 5. ​ ​ 34 The Battle for Iran, 26. ​ ​ 35 Byrne.

Bibliography Primary "Anti-Tudeh Activities of the Zahedi Government." September 10, 1953. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%2014%20-%201953-09-10%20Anti-Tudeh%20activ ities.pdf. ​ This source illustrated the Zahedi government's desire to crack down on the Tudeh party. This is important considering the fact that the Zahedi government was heavily propped up by the US at the height of the Red Scare. The Battle for Iran. 1974. Accessed December 26, 2018. ​ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/CIA%20-%20Battle%20for%20Iran%20-%202013%20rel ease.PDF. ​ This CIA history provided me with a detailed outline of the coup and the US's perspective on it. British Ambassador, March 19, 1946, FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52670. ​ ​ This source provided me with a useful quote about the fears of Iran becoming communist. British Ambassador, “Memorandum on Withdrawl of British Troops (25 May 1945),” in State Department ​ Unpublished Declassified Files, July 30, 1946, NND 760050. ​ This document gave me a useful quote on British-Soviet oil conflicts. British Consul in Khorramshahr, “Report on Tudeh Activities in the Oil Industry,” FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52714 ​ ​ This source provided a useful quote from a speaker during the Tudeh strikes. British Labour Attaché, “Memorandum on Tudeh Activities Against AIOC,” FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52713. ​ ​ This memo gave me a useful statistic that 75% of the Abadan labor force was enrolled in unions coordinated by the Tudeh Party. Cabinet Notes, June 26, 1946, FO 371/Persia 1946/34-52717. ​ ​ This source provided me with a quote from a British official who feared the Tudeh Party. Elwell-Sutton, L.P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1955. ​ ​ I found this source in the Koch document (also cited). The quote cited from it shows the racial element present in Anglo-Iranian oil disputes. Foreign Office, “Sale of Oil to the Admiralty,” FO 371/Persia 1951/34-91620. ​ ​ This source gave me a quote about AIOC’s lack of transparency. General Patrick Hurley, “Memorandum to the President, State Department,” Foreign Relations of the United States: ​ 1943 Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964, vol. 4. ​ This source provided me with a quote from President Franklin Delano Roosevelt about Iranian nationalism. George Kennan to the Secretary of State, November 7, 1944, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, vol. 4. ​ ​ This source provided a useful quote about the American perspective on Soviet actions in Iran. Homa Katouzian, ed. Musaddiq’s Memoirs London: Jebhe Publications, 1988. ​ ​ This source provided me with a quote from Mohammad Mossadeq talking about early Iranian democracy. Koch, Scott A. ''Zendebad, Shah!": The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister ​ Mohammed Mossadeq, August 1953. June 1998. Accessed December 26, 2018. ​ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%204%20-%20CIA%20-%20Zendebad%20Shah%20- %202000%20release.PDF. ​ This source supplemented my knowledge by providing a more recent account of the coup from an American perspective. It also showed how the CIA's views on the coup evolved over time. US Congress, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism Washington, DC: ​ ​ 1949. This source provided me with a quote from the US congress assessing the Tudeh strikes. Wilber, Donald. "Summary of Wilber History." Accessed December 26, 2018. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%202%20-%201954-00-00%20Summary%20of%20 Wilber%20history.pdf. ​ This source provided a basic outline of the coup and how America was pulling the strings throughout the process from behind the scenes.

Secondary Abrahamian, Ervand. The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations. New York, NY: ​ ​ New Press, 2015. This source outlined the coup and the contributing factors that led to it, including the US and Britain's role in the coup. It also led me to other sources. Byrne, Malcom, ed. "CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup." The National Security Archive. Last modified August 19, 2013. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/. ​ ​ This source summarized the declassification of CIA documents related to the 1953 Iranian coup. Many of the documents themselves (also cited) were useful for my project. "D'Arcy Concession (1901)." Encyclopedia.com. Accessed December 26, 2018. ​ ​ https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/darcy-concession-1901. ​ This source provided context to the Iranian coup by summarizing the 1901 D'Arcy Oil Concession. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Mohammad Mossadeq." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed December ​ ​ 26, 2018. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammad-Mosaddeq. ​ ​ This biography of Mohammad Mossadeq helped me examine the possible contributing factors to the 1953 Iranian coup. The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Amy McKenna, and Surabhi Sinha. "Fazlollah Zahedi." Encyclopedia ​ Britannica. Last modified August 29, 2018. Accessed December 28, 2018. ​ https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fazlollah-Zahedi. ​ This source summarized the life of Fazlollah Zahedi, the leader of the 1953 coup. Kamali Dehghan, Saeed, and Richard Norton-Taylor. "CIA Admits Role in 1953 Iranian Coup." The Guardian, ​ ​ August 19, 2013. Accessed December 26, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup. ​ This source provided background information on the declassification of documents about the 1953 coup and led me to find primary documents. New World Encyclopedia Contributors. "1953 Iranian Coup D'État." New World Encyclopedia. Last modified ​ ​ March 13, 2018. Accessed December 26, 2018. http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/1953_Iranian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat. ​ This source gave me a brief overview of my topic to start my research. "Tripartite Treaty of Alliance." Encyclopedia.com. Accessed January 5, 2019. ​ ​ https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/tripartite-treaty-alliance. ​ This source gave me an overview of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, in which the British and Soviets promised to retreat from Iran after World War II was over. Walters, Vernon A. Silent Missions. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978. ​ ​ This source provided a useful quote from Mohammad Mossadeq about the British.