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Containment & the Shah Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm In March 1953, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” determined that the United States government could no lon- Containment and the Shah: In April 1950, the containment policy expanded from simply ger approve of Mossadegh’s nationalizing efforts. Massive How Eisenhower and the CIA brought down Democracy diplomatic policies to include military action through NSC- demonstrations had taken place in Iran in support of Mossa- 68, a secret document that emphasized a belief that the goal degh, which were instigated mostly from the Tudeh Party in and Encouraged Corrupt Leadership in Iran of the Soviet Union was to overthrow free institutions world- Iran, the predominant communist party. wide. To enact the policies necessary to combat communism, the document states that a strong military is “an ultimate Associating Mossadegh with these communists, the US gov- U.S.-Iran Relations are Thawing. Why Were They Frozen to Begin With? | Ellie Holliday guarantee of our national security and an indispensable ernment approved a budget of one million dollars in April backdrop to the conduct of the policy of ‘containment’.” Be- 1953, to be used to put Mossadegh out of power by any means ginning the hyperbolic discourse on the subject of the Cold necessary. Through a series of political decisions, Mossade- On March 17, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Al- War, NSC-68 uses apocalyptic language to describe the issues gh incited increasing United States opposition. He declared bright addressed a crowd at the Omni Shoreham Ho- between the Soviet Union and the United States, claiming martial law and stripped the Shah of power. When the British tel in Washington saying, “In 1953, the United States the imminent destruction of the US and all Western civili- finally agreed to a fifty-fifty split of the oil company, Mos- played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow zation should communism spread. Such language fueled the sadegh instead demanded $50 million in damages. In turn, of Iran’s popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossade- administration’s fervent commitment to containment and Ei- the British and the US selected General Fazlollah Zahedi to gh. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions senhower’s fears of communist expansion. become their chief sup- were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was port for a coup against clearly a setback for Iran’s political development. And it Eisenhower’s preference for using covert action to combat the Mossadegh. is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent spread of communism is best expressed through the Doo- this intervention by America in their internal affairs.” little Report. To prevent congressional oversight of the CIA, The plan, known as While her statement was not an outright apology for US Eisenhower appointed an oversight committee that reported TPAJAX, was to start involvement in the coup, Secretary Albright’s address directly to him. The chairman of this committee, James Doo- with a smear campaign constituted the most contrite US position to date, nearly little, authored an eponymous report echoing Eisenhower’s to diminish the power 50 years after the establishment of the Iranian dictator- own beliefs that the United States should employ covert es- of Mossadegh within ship. Still, the citizens of Iran were not satisfied with this pionage tactics to destroy enemies of the US. Eisenhower’s the country. The ba- weak excuse for the political upheaval instigated by the tight control on the CIA suggested his intended course of ac- sic premise of the plan US in their country, of which they were still feeling the tion: to use the CIA and covert tactics to combat the spread was simple: convince after-effects. of communism by any means necessary. This was the case for the Shah that the UK the CIA-supported coups in Iran. and the US supported Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the presidency in 1953 Modern democracy in Iran - elections in 2009. him and wanted to pro- on the promise that he would continue the work of | Photo by: Rafael Poveda As seen throughout modern history, money and resources tect Iran from the Soviet the previous administration preventing the spread of are common incentives for foreign government intervention. threat of communism, necessitating that Mossadegh be re- communism to other nations. His faithful adherence Such was the case regarding the United States’ interest in the moved from power. The CIA subsequently persuaded the to this policy of containment led to the perception of a affairs of Iran in the 1950s. The democratically-elected na- Shah to choose Zahedi as the new head of government. If communist threat in Iran and subsequent measures to tionalist leader Mohammad Mosaddegh instantly national- this plan was unsuccessful, the CIA would incite a military overthrow the popularly-elected government. However, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi meets with President Eisenhower | Photo from the ized Iran’s oil industry once he took office in 1951. Previously coup in order to place him in power. what was perceived as communism was merely a na- National Archives controlled by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, this tionalist movement led by leftist politicians seeking to nationalization proved intolerable to the United Kingdom. The US and Britain’s smear campaign proved successful due reform their country. Instead of preventing the spread United States. We then examine the legacy of these actions, or rath- The British refused to compromise and did not accept the to their control of most of the Iranian newspapers and use of communism, Eisenhower’s use of the Central Intel- er, the after-effects of CIA involvement, specifically how the United compensation that Mossadegh offered for their lost access to of anti-Mossadegh propaganda. When the CIA carried out ligence Agency (CIA) in overthrowing the government States’ placement of dictators in the country directly led to events such resources. In October 1952, Mossadegh cut off all diplomat- the lynchpin of its plan in August to arrest Mossadegh under of Mohammad Mossadegh actually encouraged the as the Iranian Revolution. While the popular narrative suggests Eisen- ic ties with Great Britain, Winston Churchill was re-elected orders of the Shah (who had been coerced into signing those evolution of a brutal, dictatorial regime that plagued the hower altruistically sought to use covert action to protect the citizens Prime Minister, and Eisenhower was elected in the United agreements), he had been tipped off and was prepared. He ar- citizens for many years to come. The Iranian coup illus- of the third world from communism, his policies resulted in the es- States, setting up their opportunity to alter the Iranian situ- rested Zahedi’s lieutenant and declared the orders of the Shah trates the excessive use of the CIA that characterized the tablishment of dictatorships, including the oppressive, violent regime ation. illegal. This wasn’t the end of TPAJAX, however. The CIA Cold War grand strategy of containment. that plagued the citizens of Iran for decades. fabricated an interview with Zahedi and published the Shah’s The following month, representatives of British Intelligence orders in the Iranian press, defending the Shah’s actions. Ad- We examine the actions taken by the CIA in Iran and Containment, the predominant policy of the Cold War, centered on met with members of Eisenhower’s administration to discuss ditionally, Eisenhower used paid agitators to violently break reveal their enduring legacy: how the Eisenhower ad- the assumption that the Soviet Union sought to extend their empire, a plan to assert influence in Iran. In retaliation for their lost up the ongoing protests. On August 19th, 1953, Mohammed ministration and the CIA brought down a democratic overthrowing political regimes that were hostile to their ideology. As oil resources, the British Intelligence representatives suggest- Mosaddegh was arrested at his home, and the Shah returned government and subjected the citizens of a country to George Kennan, the famous author of containment strategy, states: “it ed joint political action to remove Mossadegh from power. to Iran to rule. years of dictatorial rule installed and supported by the is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the 13 | Ex-Patt Magazine of Foreign Affairs Fall 2013 | 14 fact Mosaddegh took advantage of by rig- and supported the Shah’s secret security The story of the CIA-incited coup in ging elections in his favor and appointing force. When President John F. Kennedy Iran did not stop with Mosaddegh’s ar- only ministers who most benefited him- entered office in 1961, he recommended rest. There were many unintended con- self. America continued to support the that the Shah introduce Western-based sequences of the intervention that came Shah’s regime, especially since it bene- reforms in the country, such as industri- to light in the years following the coup. fitted from Iranian oil exports. The Shah alization and secularization. Immediately after the Shah returned to sought to grow the Iranian army and power, he began a reign of oppression viewed American ties as the means to Brewing protests and discontent came to and corruption. The Iranian Parliament achieve his goal. The United States gov- a head in what is now called the White was successfully destroyed by the coup, a ernment poured money into the country Revolution between 1960 and 1963, when many students could be heard ly and witnessed their national leaders ism. It must be realized that American shouting their nostalgic support for the spending the money wastefully or simply intervention in Iran throughout the 20th Mossadegh government. The protests pocketing it. In the wake of public anger century was the very catalyst that caused were violently quelled.
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