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Home , Ahmad Qavam, Bijan (designer), Fazlollah Zahedi, Iraj, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Reza Shah

Iran and the CIA This page intentionally left blank and the CIA The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited

Darioush Bayandor © 2010 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-57927-9 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the , the , Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-36788-7 ISBN 978-0-230-27730-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230277304 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the . 10987654321 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 For my grandchildren Max, Tara, Angelika and Arthur; hoping this book may serve them as a bridge to their roots History, unresolved, can be a heavy weight President Contents

List of Illustrations x

Acknowledgements xii

Preface xiv

Introduction 1 How the story evolved 3 How did a myth about the CIA role develop and prevail? 5 Why did the CIA files remain unclassified? 9

1 The Context 11 Foreign influence as a prime mover in Iranian politics 12 The Tudeh Party 13 The Crisis, 1945–46 14 Mohammad-Reza 16 The as a socio-political force 18 Ayatollah Seyyed Abol’qassem Kashani: the precursor of clerical activism 20 Razmara: prelude to the oil crisis 22

2 The Advent of Mosaddeq and the Oil Crisis 27 The rise of the 27 The nomination of Mosaddeq 29 Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq: a sketch 31 The initial British reaction to oil nationalization 33 The early American attitude to the oil dispute 35 Political line-ups in 39 Early conduct of the oil dispute 40 The British complaint to the Security Council 43 The Washington oil talks 44 The World Bank proposal 48 Early forebodings 50

vii viii Contents

3 Mosaddeq’s Second Government, July 1952 to 52 The Qavam hiatus and the Siy’e Tyr popular uprising (21 July 1952) 54 Rift among Mosaddeq supporters 57 A wedge to break the oil log-jam: the Truman-Churchill joint offer 59 Mosaddeq’s reforms and the theory of legitimacy 62 The British two-pronged strategy: subversion and engagement 64 The covert track 65 The engagement track 68 Diplomatic relations with Britain are broken off 69 Final attempts to resolve the oil dispute 70 A day forgotten in the Iranian collective memory 72

4 The Downslide 74 The clash at the helm; the February 1953 jumble 75 The Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi: a retrospective sketch 78 General 81 Internal conspiracies 82 The abduction of the police chief 84 The link-up: TPAJAX and the internal cabal 84 The summer of all dangers 87 The taming of the Shah 89 The failure of the TPAJAX coup 94

5 The Downfall 98 The gathering storm, 16–18 August 1953 99 The backlash: events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq on 19 August 105 Monitoring by the US Embassy 110 The final hours 111 The military factor in the fall of Mosaddeq 113 TPAJAX military planning and the role of Iranian officers 115

6 The Anatomy of 19 August 118 CIA station activism in Tehran, 16–19 August 123 The role of Iranian agents 125 Surprise in Washington 131 Ambassador Henderson’s last meeting with Mosaddeq 133 The CIA money 136 Contents ix

An orphan British secret document 140 Analysis of the British secret document 141 A coup d’état, a popular uprising or something else? 144

7 Where Did the Spark Come From? 147 The missing link: the Boroujerdi factor 150

8 Summary and Conclusions 155 Power structure and internal dynamics in the early 1950s 155 Mosaddeq’s rule 158 The handling of the oil crisis and stalemate 161 External and internal conspiracies 162 The TPAJAX coup and its aftermath 165 The involvement of ulama 172 The causes of Mosaddeq’s defeat 173

Notes 176

Direct Sources of the Study 234

Index 238 List of Illustrations

1 Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran (1941–79) 17 2 Ayatollah Seyyed Abol’qassem Kashani 20 3 Ayatollah Kashani flanked by Seyyed Navvab-Safavi, the leader of Fada’i¯ an¯ terrorist group 22 4 Prime Minister Razmara, shortly before his assassination in March 1951 24 5 Doctor Mosaddeq’s first Cabinet. General Fazlollah Zahedi as Minister of the Interior is second from the left 31 6 Mosaddeq’s likeness on the cover of TIME Magazine, 4 June 1951 32 7 Mosaddeq being greeted by Ambassador Henry Grady (left) on arrival in New York, October 1951. Mosaddeq’s son and personal physician Dr Qolam-Hossein Mosaddeq is looking on 38 8 Harriman’s visit to Tehran in August 1951 42 9 Mosaddeq being helped by the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie to his seat at the Security Council 44 10 Mosaddeq talking to Under-Secretary George McGhee 45 11 Mosaddeq being greeted at the by President Truman 47 12 Mosaddeq on the cover of TIME Magazine, 7 January 1952, designating him as ‘Man of the Year’ for 1951 52 13 55 14 Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad-Hossein Boroujerdi 79 15 General Fazlollah Zahedi as he emerged from his hideout on 19 August 1953 81 16 Court Minister Hossein Ala 83 17 Princess , the Shah’s twin-sister, April 1951 91 18 Brigadier-General Norman Schwarzkopf 92 19 Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, as an oil executive in the 1960s 93 20 Under-Secretary of State (General) Walter Bedell Smith 97 21 The Shah and Queen Soraya arriving in , 18 August, 1953 100

x List of Illustrations xi

22 Crowds drag down ’s statue from Shah-Reza Square, 17 August, 1953 102 23 Interior Minister Dr Golam’hossein Sadiqi arriving at Mosaddeq’s house in the early afternoon of 19 August as described in his memoirs 109 24 Mosaddeq waving from his car 112 25 General Zahedi and close associates shortly after Mosaddeq’s downfall in 1953 113 26 Kim Roosevelt in his guise of the gentleman-spy in the late 1940s 123 27 Asadolloh Rashidian, successful businessman, in the early 1960s 126 28 A scene from a well-groomed Tudeh Party procession in Tehran, c. 1951 127 29 Tudeh boss Noreddin Kianouri in a pose in the early 1980s 129 30 Loy Henderson US Ambassador in Tehran 1951–55 134 31 A scene from the 19 August pro-Shah demonstrations in Tehran 139 32 A sparse group of pro-Shah demonstrators fraternizing with the military on 19 August while ordinary people applaud from the balconies of their houses 148 Acknowledgements

This project started off as an extension of academic debates and private discussions in inner Iranian circles. It was expanded to its current form thanks to encouragement from many friends and scholars who read the earlier drafts. My special thanks go to Professor Sharam Chubin, Direc- tor of Studies, Centre for Security Policy, and to Charlie Naas, the former State Department Director for Iran and Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran, for their encouragement and endorsing the publication of this book. Professor Houshang Nahavani, former rector, board- director and professor in Tehran and Paris, provided useful comments and encour- agement. Professor Mark Gasiorowski, who should be regarded as the doyen of historians of this chapter of Iran’s history, was kind enough to patiently read an early draft and make comments, maintaining, needless to say, his position as reflected in his extensive and valuable writings. I wish also to thank Professor of Baruch College (CUNY) who, in spite of reservations on certain points, recommended its publication. Karim Sadjadpour of Carnegie Endowment was most generous with his time, encouragement and support. , a key player in the events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq – later the Shah’s foreign minister, ambassador to London and twice to Washington – was most generous with his time, grant- ing me interviews and some photos from his personal collection for which I am most grateful. Farhad Shirzad of IBEX publishing house in Washington kindly authorized reproduction of some historical photos from the Zahedi memoirs he published in Persian in 2006; also helpful in this respect was Farrokh Derakhshani from the Agha Khan Foun- dation in Geneva. My thanks also go to Stephen Langlie who, as an eyewitness to the events of August 1953, shared his insights as well as a valuable photo from his personal collections. The Mosaddeq Foundation Library in Geneva enabled me to have ready access to invaluable mate- rial and sources, especially in the . I wish to address a warm word of thanks to its distinguished founder/director Professor Majid Bayat. The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library kindly authorized publication of a number of archive photos from Doctor Mosaddeq’s trip to New York and Washington in October–November 1951. I am also indebted to Chelsea Millner of the Eisenhower Presidential Library for her help.

xii Acknowledgements xiii

Friends and former colleagues Amini, Anvar, Said Amirdivani, Dolatabadi, Dr Ahmad Minai, Parviz Mohajer, Ali Seirafi and Dr Ahmad Tehrani read the earlier drafts of this book and provided useful comments and much encouragement. Last but not least, Anandi Rasanayagam, a colleague from my UN days and himself author of a marvellous book on , and Jean Swoyer, a veteran of the American Foreign Service, provided valuable editorial advice having read selected chapters of the manuscript. I am indebted to them both. Preface

This book is an attempt to canvass the 27-month-long premiership of Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq in a dispassionate effort to shed further light on the events which led to his downfall on 19 August 1953. The event no doubt changed the destiny of Iran and may have had an impact on the broader scheme of things on the world scene. It surely created a political fault-line that has divided Iranians for several generations. For reasons elaborated in the Introduction, its searing effects have not been effaced. Further, judging by its frequent evocation in the media and the volume of academic and pseudo-academic publications, the subject has lost little of its political relevance or intellectual allure. Indeed, few episodes in Middle East contemporary history have been the subject of such an incisive probe. A first question, then, is why to rewrite that chapter of history? Writing in 2003 for a scholarly work on the downfall of Mosaddeq, a renowned American historian, Professor William Roger Louis, started his chapter with a thoughtful caveat: The overthrow of the Mosaddeq government in August 1953, he wrote: ‘is a subject that invites periodic reassessment ...Greater distance and greater access to archive mate- rial encourage a more dispassionate view of a subject still riddled with ideological assumptions’ (emphasis is mine).1 When in the winter of 2006 I began preparing the rudiments of the present volume, I was animated in part by the same conviction. As an avid student of Iran’s contemporary history, I was broadly familiar with the literature on the Mosaddeq era. A perception of foul play causing his overthrow on 19 August 1953 had grown overwhelming, especially in the years following the publication in 1979 of a book authored by Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, who by then was already reputed to have engineered the final blow against the Mosaddeq government.2 Spurred by his ‘revelations’, and no doubt by the demise of the imperial regime in Iran, a large volume of books, articles and trea- tises emerged in the following two and a half decades. Scholarship in the United States and Britain was based on extensive and meritori- ous research, including interviews with former CIA and SIS/MI6 agents involved in the coup plan in 1953. Memoirs published in Iran and else- where by the main protagonists or side-players have also enriched the

xiv Preface xv literature. This impressive body of scholarship, however, had not, to my mind, escaped the ravages of ideologically-based assumptions. Nor, as was also noted by Professor Louis, have all Iran files been released in spite of the lapse of well over half a century. In 2000, the leak of a secret CIA internal history to produced the first authoritative account of the Agency’s operations in Iran during 1953.3 The document, written only a year after the event, was in great part concerned with the operation TPAJAX, a plot which culminated in a failed coup attempt against Mosaddeq in the late hours of 15 August 1953. The internal history’s coverage of the events subse- quent to that attempt – and their relation to activities carried out by the CIA Station in Tehran – is decidedly less limpid. The CIA internal history, in effect, remains inconclusive, even reticent, about the nexus between the action taken by CIA operatives in Tehran and the happenings that resulted in the collapse of the Mosaddeq government on 19 August. This is in spite of the fact that, perforce, the CIA document reflects debrief- ings by the field operatives, notably Kim Roosevelt. Yet an uninitiated reader could easily misconstrue the report as an endorsement of what Roosevelt later came to claim. To my incredulous mind, something troubling was amiss. The nar- rative in Roosevelt’s Countercoup had something of the unreal in its main thrust, not far from screen sagas where a hero single-handedly (or almost) manages to beat back incredible odds in a hostile environ- ment. In this case, the American hero manages to turn around an initial setback and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat in less than 48 hours. On the flipside, the claim by Shah and his regime to the effect that the fall of Mosaddeq was the backwash of a spontaneous popular uprising (Q¯ıam’e¯ Melli) was hardly convincing. What was the missing link in the conundrum that was the fall of Mosaddeq? That was the challenge I set out to explore. This book is the result of that endeavour. Substantive evidence and analyses on the main theme are laid out in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, while the first four chapters provide a schematic description of the background against which the dramatic events of August 1953 unfolded. The findings of the study are recapitulated in the Conclusions. The book is primarily based on the US archive documents, 1946–53, commonly abbreviated as FRUS, backed by the already tapped British Foreign Office material, covering the period up to the break-off of diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain in October 1952. The CIA internal history has been analysed and drawn on. A British top-secret report (dated 2 September 1953), which to this date, to the best of my knowledge, has gone unnoticed in history books xvi Preface of this episode, is printed in the State Department’s declassified Iran files (FRUS 1952–1954, Volume X). Produced barely two weeks after the fall of Mosaddeq, the eight-page document is fully analysed in Chapter six. Other than material from governmental sources, memoirs and recollec- tions of major protagonists – Mosaddeq, Kermit Roosevelt, and Ardeshir Zahedi – and some lesser actors like Qolam-Hossein Sadiqi, Mozaffar Baqa’ei, Norredin Kianouri, Christopher Woodhouse, Samuel Falle, and others – have also been thoroughly examined. As usually is the case with memoirs, they represent a personal baggage, a mix of facts, mem- ory lapses or deliberate spins, leaving it to the historian to sift through facts and factoids. An effort to this effect has been made through cross- checking the information conveyed. Press coverage by The New York Times and Time, as well as titbits from the Iranian press and Rouzshomari (Iranian daily news archive), and also Persian language literature have been surveyed. Where conclusions are drawn from non-archival sources, they have invariably been cross-checked for corroborating evidence. The career paths, character traits and mannerisms of the main protagonists are sketched-out to the extent that these elements were believed to have influenced the events. The narrative is backed up with extensive annotations in reference notes which provide peripheral information on the specific topics treated and the background against which the interplay of actors can better be understood. They should be considered as an adjunct to the narrative, kept separate only to maintain the flow of the main text yet essential for a better understanding of the period and the political context in which events unfolded. When it comes to the Iranian protagonists of the drama, I have remained within the strict confines of evidence and archive. No one is condemned or vindicated. The primary task of the historian is to produce data and conduct probes; there are no verdicts, only findings. Those of this study, at any event, are unlikely to satisfy unconditional supporters of any of the national or religious figures of the time. Yet one single observation about Mosaddeq might be deemed in order. Mosaddeq as a historical persona need not be idolized. He is justly remembered as the man who shed the shackles of the neo-colonialist hold over Iran’s main source of livelihood, the oil industries. He is also in the vanguard of third-world awakening in the post-Second World War period. Yet Mosaddeq was not infallible; his strategic errors contributed to the ripening of cumulative factors which brought about his downfall. This reality should not prevent Iranians from proudly cherishing his memory and lauding his historical accomplishments. Preface xvii

A word about transliteration of Persian

The guideline in the Chicago Manual, Edition 14, has been flexibly applied to all Persian words, exception being made for diacriticals in proper names. Transliterations, in general, are based on the Persian pronunciation of the names of Arab origin (Mohammad rather than ; Hossein rather than Hussein); composite proper names have been separated by a hyphen (Mohammad-Hossein); while in cases of fusion of two elements in a single proper name, the apostrophe (’) is used to separate the components (Abol’qassem, rather than Abol- Qassem; Abdol’hossein rather than Abdol-Hossein). The same punc- tuation mark, combined with the letter (e), is used for vocal liaisons between the words where applicable, (Khater¯ at’e¯ Aval¯ın Sepahbod’e Iran, rather than Khater¯ at-i¯ Aval¯ın Sepahbod-i Iran). Finally, (’ei) rather than (i) is used for endings of such names as Tabataba’ei or Baqa’ei.

Darioush Bayandor