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Iran and the CIA This Page Intentionally Left Blank Iran and the CIA the Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited Iran and the CIA This page intentionally left blank Iran and the CIA The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited Darioush Bayandor © Darioush Bayandor 2010 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2010 978-0-230-57927-9 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-36788-7 ISBN 978-0-230-27730-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230277304 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10987654321 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 For my grandchildren Max, Tara, Angelika and Arthur; hoping this book may serve them as a bridge to their roots History, unresolved, can be a heavy weight President Barack Obama Contents List of Illustrations x Acknowledgements xii Preface xiv Introduction 1 How the story evolved 3 How did a myth about the CIA role develop and prevail? 5 Why did the CIA files remain unclassified? 9 1 The Context 11 Foreign influence as a prime mover in Iranian politics 12 The Tudeh Party 13 The Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945–46 14 Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi 16 The Ulama as a socio-political force 18 Ayatollah Seyyed Abol’qassem Kashani: the precursor of clerical activism 20 Razmara: prelude to the oil nationalization crisis 22 2 The Advent of Mosaddeq and the Oil Crisis 27 The rise of the National Front 27 The nomination of Mosaddeq 29 Doctor Mohammad Mosaddeq: a sketch 31 The initial British reaction to oil nationalization 33 The early American attitude to the oil dispute 35 Political line-ups in Tehran 39 Early conduct of the oil dispute 40 The British complaint to the Security Council 43 The Washington oil talks 44 The World Bank proposal 48 Early forebodings 50 vii viii Contents 3 Mosaddeq’s Second Government, July 1952 to August 1953 52 The Qavam hiatus and the Siy’e Tyr popular uprising (21 July 1952) 54 Rift among Mosaddeq supporters 57 A wedge to break the oil log-jam: the Truman-Churchill joint offer 59 Mosaddeq’s reforms and the theory of legitimacy 62 The British two-pronged strategy: subversion and engagement 64 The covert track 65 The engagement track 68 Diplomatic relations with Britain are broken off 69 Final attempts to resolve the oil dispute 70 A day forgotten in the Iranian collective memory 72 4 The Downslide 74 The clash at the helm; the February 1953 jumble 75 The Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi: a retrospective sketch 78 General Fazlollah Zahedi 81 Internal conspiracies 82 The abduction of the police chief 84 The link-up: TPAJAX and the internal cabal 84 The summer of all dangers 87 The taming of the Shah 89 The failure of the TPAJAX coup 94 5 The Downfall 98 The gathering storm, 16–18 August 1953 99 The backlash: events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq on 19 August 105 Monitoring by the US Embassy 110 The final hours 111 The military factor in the fall of Mosaddeq 113 TPAJAX military planning and the role of Iranian officers 115 6 The Anatomy of 19 August 118 CIA station activism in Tehran, 16–19 August 123 The role of Iranian agents 125 Surprise in Washington 131 Ambassador Henderson’s last meeting with Mosaddeq 133 The CIA money 136 Contents ix An orphan British secret document 140 Analysis of the British secret document 141 A coup d’état, a popular uprising or something else? 144 7 Where Did the Spark Come From? 147 The missing link: the Boroujerdi factor 150 8 Summary and Conclusions 155 Power structure and internal dynamics in the early 1950s 155 Mosaddeq’s rule 158 The handling of the oil crisis and stalemate 161 External and internal conspiracies 162 The TPAJAX coup and its aftermath 165 The involvement of ulama 172 The causes of Mosaddeq’s defeat 173 Notes 176 Direct Sources of the Study 234 Index 238 List of Illustrations 1 Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran (1941–79) 17 2 Ayatollah Seyyed Abol’qassem Kashani 20 3 Ayatollah Kashani flanked by Seyyed Navvab-Safavi, the leader of Fada’i¯ an¯ Islam terrorist group 22 4 Prime Minister Razmara, shortly before his assassination in March 1951 24 5 Doctor Mosaddeq’s first Cabinet. General Fazlollah Zahedi as Minister of the Interior is second from the left 31 6 Mosaddeq’s likeness on the cover of TIME Magazine, 4 June 1951 32 7 Mosaddeq being greeted by Ambassador Henry Grady (left) on arrival in New York, October 1951. Mosaddeq’s son and personal physician Dr Qolam-Hossein Mosaddeq is looking on 38 8 Harriman’s visit to Tehran in August 1951 42 9 Mosaddeq being helped by the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie to his seat at the Security Council 44 10 Mosaddeq talking to Under-Secretary George McGhee 45 11 Mosaddeq being greeted at the White House by President Truman 47 12 Mosaddeq on the cover of TIME Magazine, 7 January 1952, designating him as ‘Man of the Year’ for 1951 52 13 Ahmad Qavam 55 14 Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad-Hossein Boroujerdi 79 15 General Fazlollah Zahedi as he emerged from his hideout on 19 August 1953 81 16 Court Minister Hossein Ala 83 17 Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah’s twin-sister, April 1951 91 18 Brigadier-General Norman Schwarzkopf 92 19 Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, as an oil executive in the 1960s 93 20 Under-Secretary of State (General) Walter Bedell Smith 97 21 The Shah and Queen Soraya arriving in Rome, 18 August, 1953 100 x List of Illustrations xi 22 Crowds drag down Reza Shah’s statue from Shah-Reza Square, 17 August, 1953 102 23 Interior Minister Dr Golam’hossein Sadiqi arriving at Mosaddeq’s house in the early afternoon of 19 August as described in his memoirs 109 24 Mosaddeq waving from his car 112 25 General Zahedi and close associates shortly after Mosaddeq’s downfall in 1953 113 26 Kim Roosevelt in his guise of the gentleman-spy in the late 1940s 123 27 Asadolloh Rashidian, successful businessman, in the early 1960s 126 28 A scene from a well-groomed Tudeh Party procession in Tehran, c. 1951 127 29 Tudeh boss Noreddin Kianouri in a pose in the early 1980s 129 30 Loy Henderson US Ambassador in Tehran 1951–55 134 31 A scene from the 19 August pro-Shah demonstrations in Tehran 139 32 A sparse group of pro-Shah demonstrators fraternizing with the military on 19 August while ordinary people applaud from the balconies of their houses 148 Acknowledgements This project started off as an extension of academic debates and private discussions in inner Iranian circles. It was expanded to its current form thanks to encouragement from many friends and scholars who read the earlier drafts. My special thanks go to Professor Sharam Chubin, Direc- tor of Studies, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and to Charlie Naas, the former State Department Director for Iran and Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran, for their encouragement and endorsing the publication of this book. Professor Houshang Nahavani, former rector, board- director and professor in Tehran and Paris, provided useful comments and encour- agement. Professor Mark Gasiorowski, who should be regarded as the doyen of historians of this chapter of Iran’s history, was kind enough to patiently read an early draft and make comments, maintaining, needless to say, his position as reflected in his extensive and valuable writings. I wish also to thank Professor Ervand Abrahamian of Baruch College (CUNY) who, in spite of reservations on certain points, recommended its publication. Karim Sadjadpour of Carnegie Endowment was most generous with his time, encouragement and support. Ardeshir Zahedi, a key player in the events leading to the fall of Mosaddeq – later the Shah’s foreign minister, ambassador to London and twice to Washington – was most generous with his time, grant- ing me interviews and some photos from his personal collection for which I am most grateful. Farhad Shirzad of IBEX publishing house in Washington kindly authorized reproduction of some historical photos from the Zahedi memoirs he published in Persian in 2006; also helpful in this respect was Farrokh Derakhshani from the Agha Khan Foun- dation in Geneva.
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