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“Anti-Americanism in XXth century Europe” Institute

Project directed by Professor Claude Fohlen

Project Paper No. 8 University European Institute.

EUI WORKING Cadmus,

ITALIAN DIPLOMACY on PERCEPTIONS OF University

AFTER WORLD WAR II (1 9 Access

by European Open Antonio Varsori Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (F I) by produced version Digitised Repository.

This paper should hot be reproduced in whole or in part

without prior permission of the author Research Institute University European Institute. Cadmus, on University Access European Open Author(s). Available The 2020. ©

Printed in Italy in November 1986 Library European University Institute EUI Badia Fiesolana the

I - 50016 San Domenico (FI) by produced version Digitised Italian Diplomacy and Contrasting Perceptions of American Policy Repository.

after World War II (1947 - 1950) Research

Antonio Varsori Institute

The attempt at analysing the attitude of the Italian University diplomatic service towards U.S. policy during the early "cold war" years is not without difficulties. We lack serious studies about

the image Italian politicians and diplomats developed of their European

international partners.(1) Historiography about post-war Ttalian- Institute.

American relations offers us some interesting studies, but, for Cadmus, on obvious reasons, scholars' attention focused more on U.S. policy University towards Italy than on Italy's policy towards the U.S.(2) Usually, Access too, the memoirs and diaries of Italian diplomats cannot be European regarded as useful sources for understanding Italy's foreign Open policy. Italian-American relations, however, offer historians two Author(s). interesting exceptions : Alberto Tarchiani's Dieci anni tra Roma e Available

Washington and Egidio Ortona's Anni d'America 1944-1951.0) The 2020. ©

Besides these general remarks, assessments of the Italian in diplomatic service's attitude towards the U.S. have very often been influenced by well-rooted commonplaces. Some of them were the Library results of political and journalistic polemics, which developed EUI the between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s as an obvious consequence by of wide-spread criticism of the U.S. role in international affairs. As an example, in a pamphlet published in 1968, L. produced version Digitised _ 2 - Repository. Graziano charged the Italian diplomatic service with subservience

to U.S. policy : Research

Our diplomatic skill means a sheer compliance with (U.S.) views. Only when and if the "big brother" gives us an

example, we are ready to follow that example (...) Our Institute diplomats are working in this context of structural deficiencies and for the sake of a dubious realpolitik.(4)

I might quote many journalistic or historical essays which University have been based on such an assumption. For the period I am dealing

with, I would mention Faenza's and Fini's Gli Americani in European

Italia (5). a book published in 1976 and widely read as its Institute. authors largely quoted American official records, made available Cadmus,

under the Freedom of Information Act. Even this study, however, is on of little avail; Faenza and Fini seemed to be more interested in University

exposing OSS or CIA plots and intrigues than in seriously Access

examining Italian-American relations. As for Italian diplomats and European Open anti-Communist politicians, they were usually regarded as fools or cowards, ready to comply with every wish of their American Author(s). Available "masters". Of course we must not forget how a well-known American The 2020. revisionist historian, Gabriel Kolko. had labelled Count Sforza. © in Italian Foreign Minister during the post-war period, an "American

ploy".(6) Library

Even if this sort of judgment has been superseded by more EUI

thoughtful and cautious evaluations, many sections of Italian the

public opinion still believe that complete subservience to the by

U.S. is a common feature in the Italian diplomatic service. In

1979 a group of political scientists carried out an analysis of produced version Digitised 3 Repository. the attitude of Italian public opinion towards foreign affairs. A questionnaire was submitted to 433 opinion leaders. Most of them

stated their belief that the Italian diplomatic service had a good Research training, but that it was conditioned in its activities and

decisions by foreign influence; obviously the source of this Institute influence was U.S. policy.(7)

Regardless of these commonplaces and generalizations, what University was the real attitude of the Italian diplomatic service towards the U.S. during the post-war period ? Were Italian diplomatic European activities so influenced by American choices ? Were Italian diplomats so blindly pro-American as to neglect their country's Institute. interests ? Cadmus, on The picture an analysis of Italian diplomatic documents gives University us is much more complex and varied. Access In this essay I have tried to answer the above-mentioned European questions. but of course my researches will have to be Open substantiated by further studies. It is only during the last few Author(s). years that the diplomatic documents for the post-war period - kept Available

at the Italian Foreign Ministry archives - have become available The 2020. © to Italian and foreign scholars. Unluckily the papers of the in

Washington Embassy are an exception to this rule because the Library arrangement of this class is still in progress. However, we can EUI find copies of the most important telegrams, letters and memoranda the from and to Washington in other record groups, such as Paris by

Embassy, London Embassy and "Direzione Generate Affari

Politici".f8) Some private and state archives (Fondazione Luigi produced version Digitised 4 Repository. Einaudi, Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Biblioteca Ambrosiana) may also be considered as further useful sources. Research

Of course in this brief paper it was impossible to analyse the attitude of the whole Italian diplomatic service; I have Institute focused my attention on some outstanding figures, such as Alberto

Tarchiani, Italian Ambassador in Washington, and Pietro Quaroni, University the well-known and influential ambassador in Paris.(9) I have not forgotten Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, who was Italian ambassador in European London (10), nor Count Vittorio Zoppi, who in 1948 was appointed segretario generale of Palazzo Chigi (at that time the buildingInstitute. where the Italian Foreign Office was located). Anyone who is Cadmus, on

familiar with the structures of the Italian Foreign Ministry willUniversity easily realize the important role played by a segretario generale. Access Finally, one cannot omit Count Sforza's role; appointed Foreign European Open Minister in 1947, he retained his office till 1951. He was of course a politician, but he had been a career diplomat and I think Author(s). he always regarded himself as a diplomat.(11) As points of Available

reference for this study I have chosen a few events (from theThe 2020. ©

Marshall Plan, to Italy's joining the Atlantic Pact, to the Korean in

War), which are essential points both in international affairs and Library in post-war Italian-Arnerican relations. EUI the

The early months of 1947 were particularly relevant in by shaping both the Italian internal situation and Italy's foreign policy. Italy became an element in "cold war" politics and began produced to align herself with the Western world. De Gasperi's journey to version Digitised 5 Repository. the United States at the beginning of January was - and still is - regarded as the first proof of Italy's attempt at building up a

steady relationship with the Truman administration.(12) During Research that same month, moreover, Italy went through the Socialist split,

with the foundation of an anti-Communist Social Democratic party, Institute and a government crisis. The third De Gasperi Cabinet was characterized by a weakened influence of the leftist parties. This University sort of cabinet reshuffle offered De Gasperi the opportunity to appoint as Foreign Minister - after Nenni's experience - Count European Carlo Sforza, a republican, who was, with the Christian Democratic

Prime Minister, to become one of the main "actors" in Italian Institute. foreign policy during the late 1940s and the early 195Cs. A few Cadmus, on months later, in May/June 1947, a further government crisis led to University the final dismissal of Socialist and Communist ministers from the Access Italian Cabinet. It was the beginning of a hard struggle between European the Left on one hand, and the pro-Western moderate parties on the Open other. In the background it was easv to foresee the approaching Author(s). general elections of April 1948 and it was not difficult to Available

realize how Italian internal conflicts were strictly connected The 2020. © with the more general conflict of interests between the U.3. and in the U.S.S.R.(13) Library That same June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall EUI launched his plan for the economic recovery of Europe. Italian the adhesion to the American project was immediate and by enthusiastic.(14) Sforza greeted the Marshall Plan as a proof of

American unselfishness and generosity. In April 1948 Sforza wrote produced an article on this American economic initiative. In his essay. version Digitised 6

which was published by "Foreign Affairs", the Italian Foreign Repository.

Minister stated: Research

The Harvard speech was a turning point in the history of the relations between Europe and America, and Europeans are

deeply grateful to Secretary Marshall and to the United Institute States for taking this approach to a solution of our common problems.(15)

And he stressed : University

The Italian Government greeted the Marshall Plan with unconditional approval from the first moment.(16) European Institute. Apart from these statements, mainly aimed at impressing Cadmus, American public opinion, the Marshall Plan and U.S. economic aid on were regarded by the Italian Foreign Ministry as useful means toUniversity

promote Italian national - and sometimes nationalist - aims. We Access thus discover a first example of the Italian diplomatic service's European Open utilitarian approach to the relationship with the U.S. After the

Second World War Italy was a defeated and impoverished country, Author(s). Available her imperial dreams had been frustrated and, in spite of her co The 2020.

belligerency, she had been compelled to accept a punitive peace, © in which had been signed on February 10, 1947. Not until the end of

July 1947 did the Italian Constituent Assembly ratify the peace Library treaty, amidst protests and complaints against the victorious EUI

powers. Moreover, many problems were still unsettled; the future the of Trieste, the fate of the Italian Fleet, the former colonial by empire. Italy was regarded with suspicion and/or contempt by her

major Western European partners, Great Britain and France. Only produced version Digitised 7 Repository. the United States had from 1943 onwards shown some goodwill and understanding towards Italian aspirations and needs. The first

aims of Italian foreign policy - and of any diplomat or foreign Research minister - were: fa) to overcome the political, economic and

military clauses of the peace treaty, (b) to gain for Italy a Institute major role in some traditional spheres of influence (Western

Europe and the Mediterranean Sea), (c) to recover a status in University international affairs, which could be similar to that of France or

Great Britain. Italian diplomats looked at the Marshall Plan and European at the U.S. approach to European economic problems above all as

the first real chance, after the signature of the peace treaty, to Institute.

recover for their country the political role they were advocating. Cadmus, on Of course it was impossible to forget the economic meaning and University

consequences of the Marshall Plan. But some Italian diplomats, in Access particular the officials of the "Direzione Affari Economici", had European few illusions about U.S. projects and aims. In their opinion. U.S. Open

aims were not always consistent with the Italian economic system. Author(s). The officials of the "Direzione Affari Economici" had developed Available

such a view before the launching of the Marshall Plan. At the end The 2020. ©

of 1946, for example, Egidio Ortona, at that time a young junior in member of the Washington Embassy staff, had some conversations Library with Angelo Di Nola and Umberto Grazzi about U.S. economic aid to EUI Italy. Ortona wrote: "At that time (...) one could already find the

deep impatience towards the (United States)".(17) by

Ortona moreover stressed how some Italian diplomats believed

that the United States, in their economic policy towards Italy, produced had only selfish interests. They openly critized U.S. economic version Digitised 8

choices, and it is very likely that, in spite of the lip service Repository. they paid to any American economic initiative, they made every

effort to adapt U.S. choices to Italian interests. The Marshall Research

Plan did not change the attitude of these Foreign Office

officials. Some Italian records give us a picture of Palazzo Institute

Chigi's complaints towards American economic authorities. Of course the Italian diplomatic service did not reject the economic University aid the United States were ready to give Western Europe, and

Italian diplomats put pressure on Washington authorities to get more and more economic help, but they resented American European interferences and U.S. claims to a final say in Italian economicInstitute. policy choices.(18) As a further example, I may recall what Pietro Cadmus, on Quaroni wrote in a report drafted in August 1947 and addressed to University Palazzo Chigi. He thought the primary American aim was development Access of a free economic area in Western Europe, which could be opened European to a flow of American goods. He was skeptical about the room for Open manoeuvre left to Western European governments : Author(s). Available

(The Americans) think that European nations are naughtyThe 2020.

children, unable to rule themselves (...) and that the United©

States' sacred duty is to avail themselves of this in opportunity to compel (Europeans) to get things straight. (...) If we wish to get U.S. economic aid we are compelled to accept every condition the United States will impose on us. (1 9) Library EUI

We may discern here some of the concepts Quaroni would have the developed during the following years: Europe was a decaying by continent facing a young and powerful nation, the United States,

which, however, was very often unable to understand or to deal produced version Digitised Repository. with its European partners. We have a further example of Quaroni's views in a report on the international situation, which the

ambassador wrote for Sforza at the beginning of October 1947. In Research his despatch he analysed both Soviet and American foreign policy aims. In his opinion, Moscow and Washington were often behaving in Institute similar ways : University The two enemies have a common aim : to destroy the political groups and parties which could be regarded as potential fifth columns: next year, just (...) as we shall witness a

strengthening of the 'democratic' or pro-Communist elements European in the Governments which belong to the Soviet sphere of influence, we shall experience in the American sphere of influence, especially in France and in Italy, a definite Institute. development toward stiff anti-Coramunist rtigimes. (20) Cadmus, on

In the same document we may find some interesting remarks University about American foreign policy. Quaroni didn't share the view that Access American policy was based on Kennan's containment, and he feared European the warlike attitude of some U.S. politicians and military Open leaders. The Italian ambassador did not exclude the hypothesis Author(s). that the Americans were planning a preventive war against the Available

Soviet Union. As for the Marshall Plan, in Quaroni's opinion the The 2020. ©

American project was aimed at building up a "European warfare in industry", in particular a German one. Quaroni didn't think that Library in the short term a third world war was approaching, but in his EUI concluding remarks he wrote : the by

Unluckily I don't foresee any sign of detente between the two enemies; as a consequence I cannot foresee a peaceful period for us, unhappy Europeans. We are - and we cannot do very much to modify this situation - pawns in a fight between two produced giants, and the Italians and the French, who are the weakest links in the American chain, can regard themselves as very version Digitised 10

lucky if this conflict is not transforming them into a new Repository. Spain or into a new China.(21)

This pessimist approach did not prevent Quaroni - like other Research

Italian diplomats sharing his views - from regarding the United

States as an obvious point of reference for any Italian diplomatic Institute initiative. On the other hand, U.S. lack of experience seemed to offer experienced and 'Machiavellian' European politicians some University good chances to exploit American 'naive' enthusiasm. Italy, in particular, had to become the standard-bearer of any American plan. Quaroni supported the project for European economic European

integration, especially the Italian-French Customs Union, as an Institute.

instrument to please the Truman administration. In May 1948 Cadmus, on Quaroni wrote Sforza: University Access As in this period European integration is an American fixed idea (pallino) (sic !) we need to make every effort in order European to show the Americans that we are zealous supporters of this Open project.(22) Author(s). He added: Available The 2020. ©

In this field we are going to accept even the most foolish in decisions, if this is the American will (...). When one has a master, he must examine with care also his master's mistakes.(23) Library

Of course Quaroni's cynical opinions, which regarded the EUI the United States as mere instruments of Italian nationalist policy, by were not shared by every Italian diplomat. The Italian ambassador in Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, and many members in his produced Embassy's staff had an almost complete confidence in U.S. policy version Digitised and they often advocated a consistent development in Palazzo Repository.

Chigi's attitude. The Italian Government, in the Embassy's

opinion, had to rely completely on U.S. advice and guidance, Research

Tarchiani hoped to foster a true mutual friendship between Rome

and Washington. During the first years of his mission in the Institute

American capital he had drawn the conclusion that, among the

Western powers, the United States had the most favourable approach University to Italian problems. When the "cold war" reached its climax,

Tarchiani's opinions were strengthened by his anti-Communist bias: the United States was the most powerful bulwark against Soviet European aggressiveness and the only guarantee of saving Italy from Institute.

Communist influence.(24) Cadmus, on During the first months of 1948 Tarchiani's hopes seemed to University be confirmed by U.S. attitudes. The approaching Italian general Access elections focused the Truman administration's attention on the European Italian situation. The political, economic and military initatives Open of the United States Government aimed at influencing Italian Author(s). public opinion were usually effective. American policy was one Available

among a number of elements which led to a Christian Democratic The 2020. © victory, and it strengthened Palazzo Chigi's hopes.(25) The in

Italian Foreign Ministry believed Washington's attitude was an Library important element in the electoral contest, but they did not fail EUI to exploit it in an utilitarian way as an instrument for achieving the the major aim of Italian foreign policy: revision of the peace by treaty. We must not forget how the future of Trieste, of the

Italian Fleet and of the former colonies were still the main produced concerns of the Italian diplomatic service. On some occasions, version Digitised Repository. during the weeks which preceded the general elections, Palazzo

Chigi officials - and Sforza himself - believed it was possible to play the United States against Great Britain and France in order Research to extract from the Western powers as many political, military and economic concessions as possible.(26) Institute

In some Italian diplomatic and political quarters, moreover, the Christian Democratic victory led to an over-estimation of the University role Italy could have in U.S. strategy. Some top officials believed that the support the Truman administration had shown for European De Gasperi's policy could be regarded as the achievement of an

Italian-American special relationship. The next step was anInstitute. obvious one: owing to her friendly relations with Washington, Cadmus, on

Italy could negotiate with the Western powers, especially FranceUniversity and Great Britain, not only the unsettled oroblems connected with Access the peace treaty, byt also her role in world affairs.(27) European Open This misconception of the U.S. attitude towards Italy lasted till the end of 1949 and greatly influenced the approach of the Author(s). Italian diplomatic service to the problem of a Western 'option'. Available

The building up of a military and political alliance of the WestThe 2020. © had become a pressing need with the worsening in East-West in relations. The first real Western reaction had been Bevin's speech Library of January 22nd 1948 about a Western European union.(28) The EUI Italian authorities, who during the first months of 1948 had the

disregarded this issue were confronted in late Spring with the by problem of Italy's attitude towards a developing Western system.

The discussions which ensued between the Italian Ambassadors in produced Washington, London, Paris and Moscow on the one hand and Palazzo version Digitised 1 3

Chigi on the other have been examined by M. Toscano.(29) In this Repository. context, it is interesting to single out the Italian evaluation of

American policy. It is well known that Manlio Brosio, at that time Research

Italian ambassador in Moscow, rejected the hypothesis of early

Italian adhesion to a Western bloc. In a despatch he sent Palazzo Institute

Chigi on April 28th 1948, he stated his support for Italian neutrality, even if he recognized Italy as belonging to the University Western world. Brosio's attention focused on Soviet attitudes and on the future of Italian-Soviet relations, but he did not forget also to examine American policy towards Italy. He wrote: European Institute.

The United States have a vital interest in avoiding our Cadmus,

isolation and our falling a prey to Soviet expansionism. The on Italian elections were proofs of this deep interest.(30) University

In spite of this belief, which was shared by many Palazzo Chigi Access

officials Brosio added: European Open

The United States are fully aware that, in case of an open Author(s). conflict, they cannot defend Italy, and as a consequence they Available don't rely on our territory as an offensive base; but their

main aim is to avoid our country falling unharmed and without The 2020.

any resistance into Communist hands. On the other hand we ©

cannot content ourselves with a mere American guarantee; that in creates a danger of becoming a casus belli for U.3. political strategy: if an official guarantee is not coupled with a real chance for effective military defence, we are full’/ entitled to look after our interests.(31) Library EUI

As for Tarchiani, he shared his colleague's optimism about the the role Italy was playing in U.8. strategic plans; but from this by assumption he drew a different conclusion. In a report drafted in

June 1948 and addressed to Count Sforza, Tarchiani criticized produced version Digitised 14 Repository. Brosio's hope for Italian neutrality and advocated a definite

Western choice. The United States, in Tarchiani's opinion, could

not content themselves with mere words; they wanted deeds from Research their European partners: Institute

Italy's defence (...) depends (in the Truman administration's opinion) on her linking with sound, powerful and effective friends, and on an effective and adequate rearmament.(32) University

Only the Truman administration could be regarded as a sound, powerful and effective friend and only the United States could European become the source for an Italian military - as well as political - Institute. build-up. Tarchiani's confidence in U.S. policy was evident, and Cadmus,

he was trying to infuse his optimistic views into more cautious on

Palazzo Chigi officials. University

Quaroni too believed the United States to be the only point Access

of reference for any Italian diplomatic initiative aiming at an European Open adhesion to a Western system. But he was less optimistic than

Tarchiani about U.S. interest in Italian capabilities.(33) As for Author(s). Available the Italian ambassador in London, Duke Tommaso Gallarati Scotti, The 2020. in his reports he stressed how the core of the Western world was © in an American-British partnership, so that the United States could

not, in the European context, disregard British views. Library

Accordingly, it was only through negotiating with London and EUI

adhesion to the Brussels Pact that Italy might become a full the by member of the Western world.(34)

Palazzo Chigi examined the ambassadors' opinions with care

and tried to work out a synthesis of such contrasting suggestions. produced version Digitised 15 Repository. The role the United States had to play in Italian strategy was

sketched out in a memorandum which Count Vittorio Zoppi wrote in

late Spring 1948: Research

U.S. policy aimed at strengthening Italy must not end in the Institute post-election period. Before the elections this attitude was aimed at convincing the Italian people that it was in their interest to be faithful to democratic principles and to a Western friendship, because only these elements could satisfy their legitimate aspirations. Now we need such a policy in University order: a) to convince the Italian people that their government's political choices were correct

b) to gain the favour of the more moderate sections of the European opposition c) to popularize among the Italian people the issue of an Italian adhesion to the Western system.(35) Institute. Cadmus,

Zoppi had no doubt whatsoever about U.S. support for Italian on University aspirations: a friendly American attitude was regarded as simply a

fact. On the grounds of this assumption, the segretario generale Access

believed Italy could extract from the British Cabinet a favourable European Open solution to the problem of the former colonies, from the French

the return of her quota of the Italian fleet, and in general a Author(s). Available place for Italy in the negotiations over the future of Germany. The 2020. These were Italy's conditions for accession to the Brussels Pact © in or to a wider Western system. As a matter of fact Zoppi's over-

optimistic programme was a proof of his nationalist views. Library

Washington was only an instrument in Zoppi's policy. The main EUI

points of reference in his strategy were still London and Paris; the by he hoped to play the United States against France and, above all,

Great Britain. His attention was still focused on Europe and the

Mediterranean. and in his opinion the Truman administration was produced version Digitised 16 Repository. made up of naive politicians ready to swallow any Italian claim for the sake of preserving Italy from the Communist danger. Zoppi and Palazzo Chigi as a whole rejected the more realistic views of Research some Italian Ambassadors, such as Quaroni and Gallarati Scotti, who believed Italy had no room to negotiate its accession to the Institute

Brussels Pact or to a Western bloc.

In late Spring 1948 Italy approached the British Cabinet, but University the Italian overtures were stubbornly rejected by the Foreign

Office. In spite of this diplomatic setback, many Palazzo Chigi European officials went on relying on their belief in an Italian-American Institute. special relationship.(36) Sforza seemed to share this view, and on Cadmus, many occasions he thought that Italy could, for the time being, on

avoid any definite public statement about her attitude towards the University

Western world. Access European Open In my opinion - Sforza wrote - the real and main issue is the defence of the Italian territory (against any aggression from the Eastern bloc) and in this context only the American attitude is a relevant element.(37) Author(s). Available

This conviction led Count Sforza to favour U.S. plans for The 2020. ©

European economic integration, especially in the O.E.E.C. in negotiations.(38) But the wrong judgment about the degree of Library American interest in Italy's strategic position deceived Palazzo EUI Chigi. The Brussels Pact was regarded as a mere European - Anglo- the

French - alliance, which Italy could "outflank" with the consent by of the Truman administration. Main Italian aims were: (a) to obtain from Washington a military and political guarantee of the produced Italian borders, (b) to be provided with new weapons by the United version Digitised Repository. States. Tarchiani's reports were regarded as proofs of American goodwill and they increased Italian expectations.(39) Of course

Palazzo Chigi neither understood or wished to understand what Research

Tarchiani's messages were implying: that only unconditional support of any American initiative could lead to U.S. approval of Institute some Italian claims.

For their part, the Ambassadors in London and Paris went on University stressing their different views. As for Gallarati Scotti, he stated that in the context of a Western system it was impossible European to isolate the American position: the defence of the Western world involved the whole Atlantic system, and Great Britain. France and Institute.

Canada also played major roles in shaping the Western military Cadmus, on

alliance.f40) As usually, Quaroni was by far less optimistic than University

Palazzo Chigi. In August 1948 he suggested that Sforza ascertain Access the real attitude of the United States towards Italy. He confirmed European Open his low opinion of American political leadership, but he explained: Author(s). Available

We are so dependent on the United States that we cannot The 2020. forget their attitude towards us. Over these last few months, © perhaps unconsciously, we have been impairing our in relationship with the United States. We have two weak points: the Marshall Plan (...) and the American opinion of our

foreign policy. If we were effective in implementing the Library E.R.P. directives, we could gain some room for manoeuvre in

our foreign policy. If we had an outspoken pro-American EUI policy we could be freer in implementing the E.R.P. directives. But as we neither have a clear pro-American the

policy nor are implementing the E.R.P. directives, we risk by facing a serious crisis.(41)

Quaroni added: produced version Digitised 18 Repository. In the short term I don't believe we'll have a war, but in the long term I fear a war is unavoidable. On the other hand, I don't think we'll experience a softening of the cold war. We are the victims of the cold war and we cannot do anything to modify this situation.(42) Research

Quaroni's statements puzzled some Palazzo Chigi officials, Institute who, on the contrary, had more confidence in their skill at pleasing American leaders. Likewise, some leading politicians did University not share Quaroni's pessimistic views. President Einaudi, who used to read some of Quaroni's reports - a further proof of the

influential role played by the Ambassador - wrote Quaroni in order European to have more definite opinions about the international Institute. situation.(43) The Ambassador answered Einaudi by examining the Cadmus,

rivalry which opposed the United States to the Soviet Union: on University

Nobody can avoid a war between the United States and the Access Soviet Union. Both countries are young, impulsive, barbarian; European

both countries want to get everything; both countries are Open convinced they have a right to world leadership. There is no choice: either one of them recognizes its rival's leaderhip - but I don't think that is very likely - or they will have to fight it out.(44) Author(s). Available

In Quaroni's opinion - I must stress that he underrated the The 2020. © atomic question - the cold war was only the first step towards a in real war. Quaroni thought that American strategy was based on a Library strengthening of Western Europe and of the Middle East. The Truman EUI Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had been elements aimed at the

strengthening Western Europe; the next step could have been by

European rearmament. In his opinion, as Italy had already joined the Marshall Plan, she was bound to a Western choice. The produced Americans would have resented any lack of enthusiasm. Quaroni version Digitised stressed his beliefs, and criticized the Italian politicians who Repository. had too much confidence in the idealistic statements of American

leaders; these statements were only propaganda instruments. Research

Nevertheless, the Italian Ambassador wrote Einaudi: Institute

The United States stands for Western ideals, which, despite faults, are based on some degree of respect for human values. Russia symbolizes Communist totalitarianism, which, under the

cloak of appealing ideals, hides a merciless police University rtjgime. (46)

In a further letter to Einaudi, Quaroni tried to widen the European scope of his analysis of American and Soviet policies. As for the Institute. United States, he explained: Cadmus, on

I think that American liberalism is not as sound as University nineteenth-century British liberalism. I think that, while it

is difficult to convince the American people to fight in Access order to defend American interests (...), they are ready to fight (as they did twice in the last twenty years) for the European sake of an ideology.(46) Open

Quaroni did not believe the United States was pursuing an Author(s). aggressive policy: the strengthening of the Western world was a Available The

consequence of a Soviet threat, but he feared American messianism 2020. © in and U.S. consciousness of power: Library When t spoke about 'young and barbarian' peoples I meant the naive confidence both Russians and Americans have in their EUI ideals; such a confidence leads them to convert other peoples and to be intoxicated by their own power, bv their the technological progress. Both peoples, though to a different by degree, are influenced by these elements.(47) produced version Digitised 20 Repository. As I already stressed, Quaroni's pessimist views about

American foreign policy and Italy's international role did not dispel the hopes several Palazzo Chigi officials still held about Research ttalian-American relations. t do not think it useful here to recall how Italian hopes were largely frustrated by the United Institute

States during the second half of 1948. Even when, at the end of that year, Italian leaders realized they had no chance to University negotiate accession to the Western bloc - i.e. the Atlantic Pact - some Italian diplomats still believed the Truman administration's European attitude could be the clue to the solution of any Italian difficulty. Only in February 1949 did Palazzo Chigi, Sforza and De Institute.

Gasperi understand that France could become a real friendly Cadmus, on

partner and that French support was a paramount element in the University process leading to Italian adhesion to the Atlantic Pact.(48) Access In spite of these developments, for a few months after the European Open signature of the Atlantic Pact. some Foreign Ministry officials believed that Italy could play an outstanding role in. American Author(s). strategy. Moreover, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, Palazzo Available

Chigi thought it was possible to exploit this unlikely American The 2020. © support in order to recover an international status which might be in similar to the British one or the French one. On the basis of this Library assumption both Zoppi and Sforza tried to obtain from the Western EUI partners a seat for Italy on the Standing Group of the Atlantic the

Pact.(49) On that occasion Washington Embassy officials showed a by more definite understanding of the situation. On the other hand they still had a deep confidence in American sympathy for Italian produced aspirations; and in Tarchiani’s opinion, Italy had to comply with version Digitised 21 Repository. United States projects as the only way to achieve at least some limited aims.(50) Quaroni, on the contrary, believed that, for the

time being, Italy could secure only a minor role in the Atlantic Research alliance, because, in his opinion, American attention was focused

on Great Britain and to a lesser extent on France.(51) At the Institute

Atlantic Council meeting in September 1949, Sforza's proposals were of course rejected, and the United States delegates gave no University support whatsoever to Italian demands.(52)

This event was a first step in a process which led to a European growing disappointment with the United States in many Italian diplomatic quarters. This development in Palazzo Chigi's attitude Institute. was strengthened by further reasons: (a) increasing public Cadmus, on criticism by E.C.A. officials of the Italian role in the European University

Recovery Program (53) and (b) the doubts some Italian politicians Access had about American plans for European rearmament. Once again European Quaroni recorded this shift in Italian feelings towards the United Open

States. In a report he wrote in March 1950 he complained that even Author(s). if "everybody was ready to recognize American leadership in Available

shaping (Western) foreign policy (...) we could not accept (...) The 2020. © being kept in the dark" about Western political strategy.(54) in

Only Tarchiani was firm in his opinions about the United Library States. The Truman administration's decision to promote European EUI rearmament through the Military Assistance Program opened a debate the

among some Western countries in the Atlantic Pact. In his letters by and telegrams Tarchiani advocated definite Italian support for these American initiatives. In the Italian Ambassador's opinion produced the United States had become the real masters on the European version Digitised 22 Repository. scene, and Italy might benefit from complete compliance with

American wishes.(55) He believed it was in Ttalys interest to

favour American economic and military plans, and he wrote Zoppi: Research

In this context (the Mutual Defense Assistance Program), it Institute seems to me that we must remember how in our relationship with the United States we should always be on the credit side, so if we show our goodwill towards the United States we'll benefit from both a political and an economic point of view.(56) University

Tarchiani seemed by then ready to embrace any American plan.

In his view the main issue was the conflict between Communism and European the "free world"; the United States was the leading nation of theInstitute.

"free world" and Italy had to support wholeheartedly the choices Cadmus, on of the Truman administration. University The Korean war offered Tarchiani further opportunities to Access show his beliefs. During the first weeks after the North Korean European aggression, Tarchiani's telegrams tried to convince Palazzo Chigi Open about the validity of American diplomatic , and military Author(s). initiatives. He thought moreover that the Korean war could have Available

strenghtened both the American decision to rearm Europe and theThe 2020. ©

American involvement in European affairs. Such a development was in regarded by Tarchiani as a good opportunity to promote Italian interests and to strengthen the relations between Rome and Library

Washington. In a report to Sforza the Italian Ambassador wrote: EUI the by I should not be suprised if in NATO we'll be faced not only with further chances of quicker aid, but also with an invitation to give (the United States) more support.(57) produced version Digitised Repository. On July 13th, 1950, Tarchiani suggested to Sforza that Italy

should state her solidarity with the Truman administration in an

effective way.(58) Research

As for Ouaroni's attitude, the outbreak of hostilities in the

Korean peninsula led to a furthering of his fears and suspicions Institute

about American policy. Even if he had developed a good opinion of

Truman's reaction to Korean events, he feared that the United University States could lose its nerves and resort to atomic weapons. Such a

decision might have led to Soviet aggression against Western European Europe. Institute.

From our point of view - Ouaroni wrote - the best option is Cadmus,

for the United States to be ready to take some blows and to on avoid any atomic retaliation till Europe is ready to defend herself. But we have no power whatsoever to convince the University Americans to be patient.(59) Access

In a report he sent Count Sforza at the end of September 1950, European Open Ouaroni confirmed his concern: Author(s). Available The Korean war had perhaps too serious an impact on world

opinion. But the international situation was very serious The 2020.

even before the beginning of the Korean war. The Americans ©

are not hysterical; they behaved in a reckless way before the in Korean war.(60)

In Ouaroni's opinion, the key point in American strategy was Library

still the defence of Western Europe, and the area between the Elbe EUI the and the Atlantic Ocean was of vital interest for Washington. by Ouaroni therefore believed that French and German rearmament was

among the major objectives of the Truman administration, while produced Italy played a minor role in American strategic plans. These version Digitised 24 -

remarks led the Italian Ambassador to broaden his analysis, and he Repository. stated that the minor role Italy was playing in American strategy

had been caused by other reasons too: the misunderstandings in Research economic relations between the two countries and the low opinion

Washington authorities were developing about Italian politics. Institute

Quaroni's attention focused on the implementation of the Marshall

Plan: University

The American authorities underrated our problems, our lack of organization and capacity to benefit from U.S. aid. We disregarded some American fixed ideas (...) we provided them European with wrong information, we made promises which we were unable

or didn't want to keep. What is more, we forgot to use Institute. propaganda (...). The Americans have no confidence in our

ability and they think our Government is unable to rule, our Cadmus,

Civil Service to carry out any programme, our people to on believe any plan. American confidence in our promises, in our projects, in our effectiveness is very scanty.(61) University Access Quaroni had singled out one of the main problems affecting European relations between Italy and the United States. During the previous Open months, however, Tarchiani had already informed the Italian Author(s). Foreign Ministry of his worries about American criticisms of Available

Italian economci policy.(62) The 2020. ©

The development in the relationship between Italy and the in

United States also influenced Palazzo Chigi: disappointment and frustration were becoming usual elements in the Italian Foreign Library

Ministry’s attitude towards the United States. At the end of EUI the November 1950, in an important memorandum on Italian-American by relations, Zoppi stressed the unfavourable development of the

American attitude, in both public opinion and the administration, produced version Digitised 25 Repository. towards Italy. His words were a definite warning to Italian politicians: Research

The Washington Embassy firmly stressed the growing disappointment of both Congress and the Administration at what is regarded as European apathy, (...) sluggishness and Institute hesitation. (Our Embassy in Washington) also stressed how American attention was focusing more and more on our country.(63) University

Zoppi shared some American criticism, and he singled out the

Italian economic departments as those most responsible for the European lack of compliance with American plans and expectations. He Institute. stressed the uneasy position of Italian diplomatic representatives Cadmus, in the face of Washington administration complaints, and foresaw a on

worsening in Italy's international role: University Access

The Americans - Zoppi wrote - are demanding that we work out European

an effective defence plan and examine it together. They want Open to give us some aid on the basis of the financial resources approved by Congress before these resources run out. Moreover, they are asking us to ascertain whether we can make any further effort (in this field); thev are asking us to Author(s). carry out a plan aimed at encouraging Italian industry, with Available their help, to have a share in the process of European rearmament.(64) The 2020. © in The segretario generale had a positive opinion of American

intentions, but his conclusions were influenced bv a deep Library pessimism: EUI the by (In the end) we'll comply with American wishes (...) but we'll do that among so many doubts, hesitations and proofs of technical and operational inefficiency and with such sluggishness that we'll lose any benefit, that is. instruments we might have used in order to strengthen our produced political and military position.(65) version Digitised 26 Repository. We may regard this statement as a turning point in the attitude of the Italian diplomatic service towards the United

States. At the end of 1950 the Italian approach to the Research relationship with Washington seemed to waver between two contrasting moods. On the one hand some Italian diplomats and Institute politicians were "begging" aid and sympathy from Washington on the ground of Italian weakness. On the other it was possible to University discover in some diplomatic quarters a shy conviction of being able to deceive "naive" Americans with mere words and promises. European These contrasting attitudes were, however, based on the same assumption. Because of the cold war the United States was regarded Institute. as the only source of hope for the Western world. But Italian Cadmus, on

diplomats' confidence in U.S. skills was decreasing. On many University occasions Italian hopes had been frustrated by Washington Access authorities. Italy was regarded in the American capital as a minor European Open element; American press and E.C.A. administrators were complaining about Italian ability to work out any plan for economic and social Author(s). reform; Italy had been barred from a major role in the Atlantic Available alliance. In Italian diplomatic quarters too it was obvious that The 2020. ©

Great Britain, France and Germany were the real partners of the in

United States in the European context. Nor can we forget how some Library diplomats, perhaps with the exception of Tarchiani, were beginning EUI to fear the uncertainties and inconsistencies of American foreign the

policy. Of course Italian diplomats realized that Italian by politicians too were responsible for the worsening in relations between Italy and the United States. produced version Digitised 27 Repository. As a consequence of this situation Italian diplomats seemed to rediscover, in their policy towards the United States, a traditional feature of Italian foreign policy, the "sacro Research egoismo". Italy had to pay lip service to any American plan or wish, because she was not in a position to oppose or criticize Institute

American decisions. But under the surface of this mere formal adhesion, Italy had to pursue her national - and sometims petty - University interests.

A large section of the Italian diplomatic service therefore European regarded a definite pro-American stand as a cornerstone of Italian foreign policy. But this choice was the result of a utilitarian Institute. and skeptical approach to American initiatives. Paradoxically this Cadmus, on

attitude could coexist with disappointment and frustration towards University

the United States and with a lack of real confidence in U.S. Access values and projects: the appearance of mutual distrust was an European Open obvious consequence of such a situation. Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version Digitised © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository. 29 Repository. Notes

1. ) We may, however, mention N. KOGAN, The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy, New York, Praeger 1953 fit. translation La polTtica estera italiana, Milano, Lerici 1965) and the more Research recent N. KOGAN - C. MORGARDINT - M.P. SALANI - M. MARAVALLE, Realta e immagine della politica estera italiana, Milano, SiufFrtt 1 $80.------Institute 2. ) See in particular the works by E. Pastorelli, E. Di Nolfo, E. Aga Rossi, J.E. Miller.

3. ) A. TARCHIANI, Dieci Anni tra Roma e Washington, Milan, Mondadori 1955; Ei ÓRTONA, Anni d'America. La ricostruzione : University 1944/1951, Bologna, il Mulino 1984.

4. ) L. GRAZIANO, La politica estera italiana nel dopoguerra,

Padova, Marsilio 1968, p. 32y European

5. ) R. FAENZA - M. FINI, Gli americani in Italia, Milano, Feltrinelli 1976. Institute.

6. ) G. KOLKO, The Politics of War. The World and United States Cadmus,

Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, New York, 1970, p. 46. on University 7. ) N. KOGAN - C. MONGARDINI - M.P. SALANI - M. MARAVALLE, op. cit., p. 145. Access 8. ) An analysis of the structures of the Italian Foreign Ministry European

and of its archives is in E. SERRA, La diplomazia in Italia, Open Milano, Angeli 1984, pp. 21-5'7. 217-2377! ‘

9. ) On P. Quaroni see P. QUARONI, Valigia Diplomatica, Milano, 1956; ID., Il mondo di un ambasciatore, Milano, 1965. Author(s). Available 10. ) See: N. RAPONI, Tommaso Gallarati Scotti tra politica e cultura. Milano, 1971 ; A"! CANAVERO, Tommaso Gallarati Scotti The 2020. and His Role i-n Italian Foreign Policy After World War II, © "The Journal of Italian History", II, No. T7 Spring 1979, pp. in 32-51. Gallarati Scotti, Tarchiani and Brosio were not career diplomats. They had entered the diplomatic career with the

fall of the fascist rtlgime in a attempt at favouring a Library process of defascistization of Italian civil service. EUI 11. ) Sforza left many essays and articles about his diplomatic activities. In this context one might mention C. SFORZA, the

Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi. La politica estera italiana dal by 1947 al 1951, Roma, Atlante 1952. See moreover L. ZENO, Ritratto di Carlo Sforza, Firenze, Le Monnier 1976.

12. ) See, in particular, S. GALANTE, La fine di un compromesso storico. PCI e PC nella crisi del 1 947, Milano, Angeli 1 980; produced ID.," La scelta americana della DC, AA. VV. , La Democrazia cristiana dal fascismo al 18 aprile, Venezia, Marsilio 19787 version Digitised 30

pp. 112-163; s . SERFATY, Gli Stati Uniti, l'Italia e la Repository. guerra fredda: l'anno della decisione: 1947, Ti BONAZZI (ed.), America-Europa: la circolazione delle idee, Bologna, Il Mulino 1976. Research 13. ) As for the Italian political situation on the eve of the general elections see A. GAMBINO, Storia del dopoguerra dalla liberazione al potere DC, Roma/Bari, Laterza 1973, pp. 329-

427. Un U.3. attitudes, J.E. MILLER, Taking Off the Gloves: Institute The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948, "Dipolomatic History", Vllt, 1983, No. 4, pp. 33-35.

14. ) On Italian attitudes towards the Marshall Plan see: E. AGA

ROSSI (ed.), II Piano Marshall e l'Europa, Roma, Istituto University dell'Enciclopedia Italiana 1983, pp. 121-2Ó1; R. QUARTARARO, L'Italia e il Piano Marshall, "Storia contemporaena", XV, No. 4, August 1984, pp"! 647-721 .

15. ) C. SFORZA, Italy, the Marshall Plan and the 'Third Force', European "Foreign Affairs", XXVI, 1948, No. 3, p. 451. Institute. 16. ) C. SFORZA, ibidem. Cadmus, 17. ) E. ORTONA, op, cit. , pp. 162-163. on

18. ) See R. QUARTARARO, op. cit., passim. Some interestingUniversity documents in Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Segreteria

di De Gasperi, b. 21, f. 162. Access

19. ) Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri (ASMAE), Ambasciata European di Parigi (APa), b. 378, f. 1, report No. 692/9181/2425, Open Quaroni to Sforza, 10.8.47.

20. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 378, f. 1, report No. 891/11735/3089, Quaroni Author(s). to Sforza, 7.10.47. Available

21. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 378; f. 1, ibidem. The 2020. ©

22. ) ACS, PCM, Segreteria di De Gasperi, b. 21, f. 162, report No. in 665/9629/1868, Quaroni to Sforza, 19.5.48.

23. ) ACS, PCM, ibidem. Library 24. ) See A. TARCHIANI, op. cit., passim and E. ORTONA, op. cit., passim. EUI the 25. ) J.E. MILLER, op. cit. by 26. ) See G. ROSSI, Trieste e Colonie alla vigilia delle elezioni del 18 aprile 1948, "Rivista li studi politici internazionali", XLVI, 1979, No. 2, pp. 205-231; P.

PASTORELLI, La crisi del marzo 1948 nei rapporti italo- produced americani, "Nuova Antologia", CXIV, 1979; J.E. MILLER, op. cit. ; A. VARSORI, La Gran Bretagna e le elezioni politicise version Digitised 31 Repository. italiane del 18 aprile 1948, "Storia contemporanea", XIII, 1982, No. 2, pp. 5-70.

27. ) About the development of the Italian attitude see: M.

TOSCANO, Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione Research dell'Italia al Patto atlantico, IP., Pagine di s t o n a diplomatica contemporaena, II, Origini ~e vicende della seconda guerra mondiale. Milano, GiuffrU 1963; P. PASTORELLI,

L 'adesione dell'Italia al Patto atlantico, 'Storia Institute contemporanea", XlV, 1983, No. 6 , pp. 1015-1031; A. VARSORI, La scelta occidentale dell'Italia (1948-1949), I, 'Storia delle relazioni internazionali", I., 1985. No. T, pp. 95-159.

28. ) For an appraisal of Bevin's speech see A. bULLOCK, Ernest University Bevin Foreign Secretary 1945-1951, London, Heinemann 1983, pp. 517- 522.------*------

29. ) M. TOSCANO, op. cit. European

30. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 1, copy of report, Brosio to Sforza, 28.4.48. For an analysis of Brosio’s attitude and of Italian Institute. policy towards the Soviet Union see R. M0R0ZZ0 DELLA ROCCA, La politica estera italiana e l'Unione Sovietica (1944-1948), Cadmus,

Roma, La Goliardica 1985, pp. 371-415. on

31. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 1, ibidem. University

32. ) ASMAE, Affari Politici (AP), Italia, b. 150, f. 1, report No. Access 5500/2119, Tarchiani to Sforza, 6.6.48, confidential. For

Tarchiani's views see also ASMAE, APa, b. 399, f. 1 report European No. 4398/1669, Tarchiani to Sforza, 5.5.48, secret. Open

33. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 405. f. I, report No. 708/10144/2019, Quaroni to Sforza, 29.5.48. Author(s). Available 34. ) Biblioteca Ambrosiana Milano (BAM), Carte Gallarati Scotti.

cart. 17, f. 20, tel. No. 2499/950, Gallarati Scotti to The 2020. Italian Foreign Ministry, 10.3.48. © in 35. ) BAM, Carte Gallarati Scotti, cart. 16, f. 17, memorandum drafted by V. Zoppi, May 1948. For an appraisal of this

important document see also M. TOSCANO, op. cit. For a Library further analysis of Italian attitudes see A. VARSORI, La

scelta occidentale..., already quoted. EUI

36. ) A. VARSORI, ibidem. the by 37. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 2, letter No. 1067 Segr. Pol., Zoppi to Quaroni, July 1948.

38. ) See C. SFORZA, Cinque anni .... cit. For an overall analysis

of the Italian attitude towards European problems see R. produced RANIERI, Europeismo e politica europea: osservazioni sulla presenza italiana in Europa occidentale dal 1947 al 19517 version Digitised 32 Repository. "Storia delle relazioni internazionali", I, 1985, No. 1, pp. 161-181.

39. ) For Tarchiani's views see A. TARCHTANI, op. cit.; E. ORTONA,

op. cit.; ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 1, tei. No. 23815, Italian Research Foreign Ministry to various Italian Embassies, 14.8.48.

40. ) BAM, Carte Gallarati Scotti, cart. 17, f. 20, Memorandum

"Italy and Western Union", 23.8.48. Institute

41 . ) ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f. 1, report No. 1020/1539653135, Quaroni to Sforza, 26.8.48.

42. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f. 1, ibidem. University

43. ) Fondazione Luigi Einaudi - Torino (FLE), Archivio Luigi Einaudi (ALE), b. 2 (1948), f. "Quaroni Pietro", draft of a 8.48, Einaudi to Quaroni. letter, 14. European

44. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f . 1 , report No. 1115/16838/8492, Quaroni to Einaudi, 21.9.48, italics added. Institute.

45. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 405, f. 1 , ibidem. Cadmus, on 46. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f . 1, report No. 1508/20083/4280, Quaroni to Einaudi, 10.11.48. University

47. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 410, f. 1 , ibidem. Access

48. ) See thè essays on thè Italian accession to thè Atlantic Pact European by Toscano, Pastorelli, Varsori. Open

49. ) On Italian diplomatic activities in this context see the documents in ASMAE, Apa, b. 444 and b. 445. As an example, Author(s). see ASMAE, APa, b. 445, f. 1, letter No. 848 Segr. Pol., Available Zoppi to Quaroni, 13.8.49, secret. The 2020. 50. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 445, f. 1, report No. 7212/3238, Luciolli to © Italian Foreign Ministry, 19.8.49., secret. in

51 . ) ASMAE, APa, b. 445, f. 1, tel. Mo. 976/3151, Quaroni to

Italian Foreign Ministry, 8.8.49. Library

52. ) On this episode see ASMAE, APa, b. 445 and ACS, Sforza EUI Papers, b. 7, f. III. the

53. ) See R. QUARTARARO, op. cit.; E. ORTONA, op. cit.; as a by further example see ASMAE, AP, U.S.A., 1949", b. 30, f. 2, letter No. 10397/4899, Tarchiani to Zoppi, 7.12.49., confidential.

54. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 475, f. 2, report No. 355/1183, Quaroni to produced Sforza, 27.3.50. version Digitised 33 Repository. 55. ) ASMAE APa, b. 476, f. 1, tel. No. 2908/1583, Tarchiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, March 1950, secret; report No. 3410/1995, Tarchiani to Sforza, 30.3.50, secret.

56. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 2, report without No., Tarchiani to Research Zoppi, 16.4.50.

57. ) FLE, ALE, b. 3, 1950, f. "Tarchiani Alberto", copy of a secret report, Tarchiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, 6.7.50. Institute

58. ) FLE, ALE, b. 3, 1950, f. "Tarchiani Alberto", report No. 7602/4377, Tarchiano to Sforza, 13.7.50., secret.; ASMAE, APa, b.. 476, f. 3, tel. No. 7605/4380, Tarchiani to Italian University Foreign Ministry, 1 3.7.50, secret.

59.) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, report No. 641/3663, Quaroni to Sforza, 14.8.50. European 60.) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, report No. 721/3838, Quaroni to Sforza, 30.9.50. Institute. 61. ) ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, ibidem. Cadmus,

62. ) See, as an example, ASMAE, APa, b. 476, f. 3, tel. No. on 10459/6035. '"archiani to Italian Foreign Ministry, 3.10.50, secret. University

63. ) FLE. ALE, b. 3, 1950, f. "Zoppi Vittorio", Zoppi to Sforza, Access 22.11.50. See also ASMAE, APa, b. 477, f. 1, memorandum

drafted by V. Zoppi, 22.10.50. European Open 64. ) FLE, ALE, ibidem.

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86/253: Frances LYNCH The Economic Effects of tKe Korean War in France, 1950-1952 Library

86/254: Richard T. GRIFFITHS The European Agricultural Community, EUI Alan S. MILWARD 1948-1954 the

86/255: Helge PHARO The Third Force, Atlanticism and by Norwegian Attitudes Towards European Integration

86/256: Scott NEWTON Operation "Robot" and the Political produced Economy of Sterling Convertibility, 1951-1952 version

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86/257: Luigi MONTRUCCHIO Lipschitz Continuous Policy Functions for Strongly Concave Optimization Research Problems

86/258: Gunther TEUBNER Unternehnienskorporatismus Institute New Industrial Policy und das "Wesen" der juristischen Person

86/259: Stefan GRUCHMANN Externali taetenmanageinen t durch

Verbaende University

86/260: Aurelio ALAIMO City Government in the Nineteenth Century United States Studies and Research of the American

Historiography European

86/261: Odile QUINTIN New Strategies in the EEC for Equal Institute. Opportunities in Employment for Men und Women. Cadmus,

86/262: Patrick KENIS Public Ownership: Economizing on

Democracy or Democratizing Economy? University Access European Open Author(s). Available The 2020. © in Library EUI the by produced version

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