China-India Space Race: Rhetoric or Reality?
Science, Technology and Energy Seminar Harvard University South Asia Center February 26, 2014
Jaganath Sankaran Post-Doctoral Fellow International Security Program/Project of Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School, Harvard University 1 Presentation Outline….
• Civilian Space Race……‘Soft Power’ Projection – China • Limited access to advanced tech • Active efforts to leverage space for political goals – India • Wider access to advanced tech • Passive efforts to leverage space for political goals
• Military Space Race……‘Hard Power’ Projection – Both, India and China, have satellites with potential military applications….not as extensive or integrated as U.S. forces – Chinese responses motivated by U.S. space and missile defense plans – Indian Response Driven By China’s Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Test….NPT Redux
2 Civilian Space Race ‘Soft Power’ Projection
3 Recent Chinese and Indian Space Exploration Ventures
• October 2003 – Shenzou V Launch January 2007 – Space Capsule Reentry • October 2005 – Shenzou VI October 2008 – Chandrayaan 1 Lunar • October 2008 – Shenzou VII Probe November 2013 – Mangalyaan (Mars • October 2007 – Chang’e 1 Lunar Orbiter Mission) Probe
• October 2010 - Chang’e 2 Lunar Chandrayaan 2 Lunar Lander Probe Human Space Flight • December 2013 – Chang’e 3 Lunar Lander mission • September 2011 - Tiangong-1 (Small Space Lab)
• Tiangong-2 & 3 (small space labs)
• Space Station • Moon Mission 4 China‘s Principal Partner….Russia
• Russia sold China the technology the formed the basis of its manned space program
• Russian companies have signed contracts worth tens of millions of dollars with China
• Yuri Nosenko, deputy head of Russia’s federal space agency: “We are glad to see the successes of our Chinese colleagues, but it would extremely difficult to achieve replace Soyuz.”
“Russia, China Plan Joint Space Projects,” November 10, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/russia-china-plan-joint-space-projects-1.596454
5 China’s Troubled Partnership With Europe
• China pledged ~$300 million to become full partner in Galileo navigation project • European governments stepped in to fund…placing security restrictions • China disinvited. Move motivated by China’s decision to build Beidou • “China’s ambitions also has changed. China originally said it was designing its own smaller, regional system for military use. Then China moved to a global civil system. It is one thing to work together in one context. It is quite another in another context.”
Peter B. de Selding , “European Officials Poised To Remove Chinese Payload From Galileo Sats,” Space News, March 12, 2010, 6 http://www.spacenews.com/article/european-officials-poised-remove-chinese-payloads-galileo-sats
India’s International Cooperation
• 2004 - U.S.-India Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Agreement spelled out nuclear and space cooperation • 2008 – Chandrayaan 1 (2 U.S. experiments, Germany, UK, Sweden) • Chandrayaan 2 (lunar lander of Russia and India; French and U.S. Co-operation)
B. N. Suresh, “History of Indian Launchers,” Acta Astronautica 63, 2008; James Clay Moltz, “Asia’s Space Race. National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks,” Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, pp. 124. 7 China Space ‘Soft Power’
• Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)
• Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand. Turkey as a later entrant.
• Training foreign scientists in Chinese institutions
• HJ-A/Small Multi Mission Satellite (SMMS) donated by China
• Thailand purchased THEOS from Europe with sophisticated sensing payload
• Asia-Pacific Ground Based Optical Space Objects Observation System (APOSOS)
“APSCO: Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. Introduction of the Organization and It’s Space Cooperative Activities,” http://swfound.org/media/41415/11.%20pres%20swf-cas%20space%20policies%20and%20laws%20-%20xu%20yansong%20-%20apsco%20intro.pdf; James Clay Moltz, “Asia’s Space Race. National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks,” Columbia University Press, New York, 2012. 8 ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Hard Power’ Asia-Pacific Ground Based Optical Space Objects Observation System (APOSOS)
9 ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Hard Power’ Satellite Development and Launch Services Aid
Though commercial China offers favorable credit terms, low- or zero-interest rates. In some deals, launch costs has been covered by China.
• 2007 - Nigcomsat-1 (Nigeria) • 2008 - Venesat-1 (Venezuela) • Paksat-IR (Pakistan) • Laosat-1 (Laos) • Tupac Katari (Bolivia)
10 India: Subdued ‘Soft Power’ Cooperative Development/Acquire Self- Reliance
• Belgium (PROBA) • Canada (ASTROSAT/UVIT) • Denmark • France (MEGHA-TROPIQUES) • Germany (TUBSAT) • Italy (AGILE) • Indonesia • ISRAEL (POLARIS, TECSAR-1) • Japan • Netherlands • Singapore • South Korea (KITSAT-3) • Switzerland (SWISS CUBE) • Turkey 11 Military Space Race ‘Hard Power’ Projection
12 China’s Military Space Posture
• Apparent efforts at building military-space infrastructure, yet modest gains in military doctrinal innovation – Yaogan series (SAR, EO) – Beidou not smartly integrated for military application
• Offensive space capabilities – Direct ascent kinetic impact Anti-Satellite (ASAT) missile
13 China’s Military Space Posture…
– Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Zonghuai summarized the official Chinese view in the UNCD as: • Considerable progress has been made in outer space- related weapons research and military technology. • Meanwhile, military doctrines and concepts such as “control of space” and “ensuring space superiority” have been unveiled successively. • It is imperative to conclude an international legal instrument devoted to preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in space.
14 U.S. More Worried About China’s Offensive Space Capabilities….
• The U.S. military better exploits space surveillance capabilities than any other nation
• Given this advantage, China will find it prudent to directly attack these satellites—executing a space “pearl harbor”
• Without its eyes and ears in space to provide warning and real-time intelligence, the U.S. would be in a painfully awkward situation
• Too much rhetoric, too little detail – China’s most powerful missiles, its solid-fueled Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) would not be able to reach GPS or communication satellites. – Alternate systems for ISR: U-2, E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), RC-135 Rivet Joint, EP-3E (Aries II), E-3 Sentry, E-2C Hawkeye, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-SX, MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1C Grey Eagle, MQ-5 Hunter, MQ-8 Firescout, RQ-7 Shadow
15 India’s Military Space Posture
• Modest effort at Military-Space Integration – 2001 IRS Technology Experiment Satellite – 2008 Integrated Space Cell (IDS Hq) – Cartosat-2A (0.8 m) & Israeli SAR serves India’s Defence Intelligence Agency’s Defense Imagery Processing and Analysis Center – 2009 Risat-2 SAR – 2010 Cartosat 2B
• Offensive Space Capabilities – “Our satellites are vulnerable to ASAT weapons because our neighborhood possess one” – Air Chief Marshall P. V. Naik – NPT like concern – being secluded from an ASAT power grouping
16 Thank you. Questions, please.
17 ITAR Limits China’s Access To U.S. and European Markets • In 2008, Eutelsat purchased insurance enabling it to use Chinese rockets
• In 2009, Eutelsat announced the launch of French Thales-built satellite using Chinese rockets
• Chinese rockets cost ~$50 million, roughly half of U.S/European rockets
• U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrbacher called for sanctions on France
• Strong ITAR opposition in USA; France’s Arianespace also opposed
• Intelsat and SES have lobbied U.S. government to allow launch contracts with China and India
James Clay Moltz, “Asia’s Space Race. National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks,” Columbia University Press, New York, 2012, pp. 99; Andy Pasztor, “Satellite Firm Prepares For Launches By China,” The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2008, 18 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120922446319047485