Mapping National Anxieties
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The Pluralistic Poverty of Phalang Pracharat
ISSUE: 2021 No. 29 ISSN 2335-6677 RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS Singapore | 12 March 2021 Thailand’s Elected Junta: The Pluralistic Poverty of Phalang Pracharat Paul Chambers* Left: Deputy Prime Minister and Phalang Pracharat Party Leader General Prawit Wongsuwan Source:https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Prawit_Wongsuwan_Thailand%27s_Minister_of_D efense.jpg. Right: Prime Minister and Defense Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha Source:https://th.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E0%B9%84%E0%B8%9F%E0%B8%A5%E0%B9%8C:Prayu th_2018_cropped.jpg. * Paul Chambers is Lecturer and Special Advisor for International Affairs, Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand, and, in March-May 2021, Visiting Fellow with the Thailand Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 1 ISSUE: 2021 No. 29 ISSN 2335-6677 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Thailand’s Phalang Pracharat Party is a “junta party” established as a proxy for the 2014-2019 junta and the military, and specifically designed to sustain the power of the generals Prawit Wongsuwan, Prayut Chan-ocha and Anupong Paochinda. • Phalang Pracharat was created by the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), and although it is extremely factionalized, having 20 cliques, it is nevertheless dominated by an Army faction headed by General Prawit Wongsuwan. • The party is financed by powerful corporations and by its intra-party faction leaders. • In 2021, Phalang Pracharat has become a model for other militaries in Southeast Asia intent on institutionalising their power. In Thailand itself, the party has become so well- entrenched that it will be a difficult task removing it from office. 2 ISSUE: 2021 No. -
Thailand's Red Networks: from Street Forces to Eminent Civil Society
Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Freiburg (Germany) Occasional Paper Series www.southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de Occasional Paper N° 14 (April 2013) Thailand’s Red Networks: From Street Forces to Eminent Civil Society Coalitions Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Kyoto University) Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Kyoto University)* Series Editors Jürgen Rüland, Judith Schlehe, Günther Schulze, Sabine Dabringhaus, Stefan Seitz The emergence of the red shirt coalitions was a result of the development in Thai politics during the past decades. They are the first real mass movement that Thailand has ever produced due to their approach of directly involving the grassroots population while campaigning for a larger political space for the underclass at a national level, thus being projected as a potential danger to the old power structure. The prolonged protests of the red shirt movement has exceeded all expectations and defied all the expressions of contempt against them by the Thai urban elite. This paper argues that the modern Thai political system is best viewed as a place dominated by the elite who were never radically threatened ‘from below’ and that the red shirt movement has been a challenge from bottom-up. Following this argument, it seeks to codify the transforming dynamism of a complicated set of political processes and actors in Thailand, while investigating the rise of the red shirt movement as a catalyst in such transformation. Thailand, Red shirts, Civil Society Organizations, Thaksin Shinawatra, Network Monarchy, United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship, Lèse-majesté Law Please do not quote or cite without permission of the author. Comments are very welcome. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the author in the first instance. -
Thailand White Paper
THE BANGKOK MASSACRES: A CALL FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ―A White Paper by Amsterdam & Peroff LLP EXECUTIVE SUMMARY For four years, the people of Thailand have been the victims of a systematic and unrelenting assault on their most fundamental right — the right to self-determination through genuine elections based on the will of the people. The assault against democracy was launched with the planning and execution of a military coup d’état in 2006. In collaboration with members of the Privy Council, Thai military generals overthrew the popularly elected, democratic government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, whose Thai Rak Thai party had won three consecutive national elections in 2001, 2005 and 2006. The 2006 military coup marked the beginning of an attempt to restore the hegemony of Thailand’s old moneyed elites, military generals, high-ranking civil servants, and royal advisors (the “Establishment”) through the annihilation of an electoral force that had come to present a major, historical challenge to their power. The regime put in place by the coup hijacked the institutions of government, dissolved Thai Rak Thai and banned its leaders from political participation for five years. When the successor to Thai Rak Thai managed to win the next national election in late 2007, an ad hoc court consisting of judges hand-picked by the coup-makers dissolved that party as well, allowing Abhisit Vejjajiva’s rise to the Prime Minister’s office. Abhisit’s administration, however, has since been forced to impose an array of repressive measures to maintain its illegitimate grip and quash the democratic movement that sprung up as a reaction to the 2006 military coup as well as the 2008 “judicial coups.” Among other things, the government blocked some 50,000 web sites, shut down the opposition’s satellite television station, and incarcerated a record number of people under Thailand’s infamous lèse-majesté legislation and the equally draconian Computer Crimes Act. -
Thailand's Moment of Truth — Royal Succession After the King Passes Away.” - U.S
THAILAND’S MOMENT OF TRUTH A SECRET HISTORY OF 21ST CENTURY SIAM #THAISTORY | VERSION 1.0 | 241011 ANDREW MACGREGOR MARSHALL MAIL | TWITTER | BLOG | FACEBOOK | GOOGLE+ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License. This story is dedicated to the people of Thailand and to the memory of my colleague Hiroyuki Muramoto, killed in Bangkok on April 10, 2010. Many people provided wonderful support and inspiration as I wrote it. In particular I would like to thank three whose faith and love made all the difference: my father and mother, and the brave girl who got banned from Burma. ABOUT ME I’m a freelance journalist based in Asia and writing mainly about Asian politics, human rights, political risk and media ethics. For 17 years I worked for Reuters, including long spells as correspondent in Jakarta in 1998-2000, deputy bureau chief in Bangkok in 2000-2002, Baghdad bureau chief in 2003-2005, and managing editor for the Middle East in 2006-2008. In 2008 I moved to Singapore as chief correspondent for political risk, and in late 2010 I became deputy editor for emerging and frontier Asia. I resigned in June 2011, over this story. I’ve reported from more than three dozen countries, on every continent except South America. I’ve covered conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and East Timor; and political upheaval in Israel, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. Of all the leading world figures I’ve interviewed, the three I most enjoyed talking to were Aung San Suu Kyi, Xanana Gusmao, and the Dalai Lama. -
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“PM STANDS ON HIS CRIPPLED LEGITINACY“ Wandah Waenawea CONCEPTS Political legitimacy:1 The foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed of that right. Political power:2 Is a type of power held by a group in a society which allows administration of some or all of public resources, including labor, and wealth. There are many ways to obtain possession of such power. Demonstration:3 Is a form of nonviolent action by groups of people in favor of a political or other cause, normally consisting of walking in a march and a meeting (rally) to hear speakers. Actions such as blockades and sit-ins may also be referred to as demonstrations. A political rally or protest Red shirt: The term5inology and the symbol of protester (The government of Abbhisit Wejjajiva). 1 Sternberger, Dolf “Legitimacy” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (ed. D.L. Sills) Vol. 9 (p. 244) New York: Macmillan, 1968 2 I.C. MacMillan (1978) Strategy Formulation: political concepts, St Paul, MN, West Publishing; 3 Oxford English Dictionary Volume 1 | Number 1 | January-June 2013 15 Yellow shirt: The terminology and the symbol of protester (The government of Thaksin Shinawat). Political crisis:4 Is any unstable and dangerous social situation regarding economic, military, personal, political, or societal affairs, especially one involving an impending abrupt change. More loosely, it is a term meaning ‘a testing time’ or ‘emergency event. CHAPTER I A. Background Since 2008, there has been an ongoing political crisis in Thailand in form of a conflict between thePeople’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the People’s Power Party (PPP) governments of Prime Ministers Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, respectively, and later between the Democrat Party government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). -
Thailand: the Evolving Conflict in the South
THAILAND: THE EVOLVING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH Asia Report N°241 – 11 December 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. STATE OF THE INSURGENCY .................................................................................... 2 A. THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT ....................................................................................................... 2 B. PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE .............................................................................................................. 4 C. MORE CAPABLE MILITANTS ........................................................................................................ 5 D. 31 MARCH BOMBINGS ................................................................................................................. 6 E. PLATOON-SIZED ATTACKS ........................................................................................................... 6 III. THE SECURITY RESPONSE ......................................................................................... 8 A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES, 2012-2014 ......... 10 B. SPECIAL LAWS ........................................................................................................................... 10 C. SECURITY FORCES .................................................................................................................... -
Southern Thailand
SOUTHERN THAILAND: THE PROBLEM WITH PARAMILITARIES Asia Report N°140 – 23 October 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. PARAMILITARISM IN THAILAND.......................................................................... 2 III. RANGERS....................................................................................................................... 4 A. EXPANSION OF RANGERS IN THE SOUTH................................................................................5 B. TA SEH SHOOTINGS AND ISLAMIC SCHOOL RAID................................................................9 C. THE KILLING OF YAKARIYA PA’OHMANI .............................................................................10 D. ALLEGED RAPE IN PATAE AND THE PATTANI PROTESTS......................................................10 1. The Patae case..........................................................................................................11 2. Patani protests..........................................................................................................12 IV. THE VOLUNTEER DEFENCE CORPS.................................................................. 14 V. VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AND SELF DEFENCE VOLUNTEERS ................ 15 A. WEAPONS THEFTS ...............................................................................................................16 -
The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics by Zachary Abuza
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 6 The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics by Zachary Abuza Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Complex Operations, and Center for Strategic Conferencing. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, and publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Thai and U.S. Army Soldiers participate in Cobra Gold 2006, a combined annual joint training exercise involving the United States, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. Photo by Efren Lopez, U.S. Air Force The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics By Zachary Abuza Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 6 Series Editors: C. Nicholas Rostow and Phillip C. Saunders National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. -
Annual Report
Annual Report Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation Phase II 2015 UNDP-JAPAN Partnership Fund Annual Report Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation Phase 2 (STEP II) Project January - December 2015 UNDP Thailand Country Office TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 I BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION 3 II INTRODUCTION 3 III EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 IV KEY ACHIEVEMENTS 7 V SITUATION IN SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES 36 VI MONITORING&EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 38 VII DISBURSEMENT AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 41 ANNEX I: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 42 I. BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION Project Title: Southern Thailand Empowerment and Participation (STEP) Phase II UNDP Project ID 00090901 Project Duration 3 years (January 2015-December 2017) Reporting Period April-June 2015 Total Approved Project Budget 813,740 USD Participating UN agencies - 2 Implementing Partners/ Prince of Songkla University, Southern National collaborating agencies Border Provinces Administration Centre. Office of the National Security Council, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior International collaborating agencies - Donors JAPAN-UNDP Partnership Fund TRAC 1.1.3 (Conflict Prevention and Recovery) UNDP Contact officer 1. Wisoot Tantinan, Programme Specialist 2.Naruedee Janthasing, Senior Project Manager Project website http://step.psu.ac.th/ II. INTRODUCTION (1) Project Background The impact of violence in the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, s is jeopardizing human security and development for people living in the area. In addition to the victims of attacks, local people are indirectly beleaguered by the impact of violence. Residents, of which Malay-Muslims comprise around 80 percent, have to contend with insecurity, disrupted education, and fears generated by the activities of both the insurgents and security forces on a regular basis. -
ANNEX 1: Climate Risk Profile for Thailand and Project Target Areas
PIMS 3771 THAILAND SCCF Project - Annexes ANNEX 1: Climate Risk Profile for Thailand and Project Target Areas Location &Climate of Thailand Thailand is located between 5°40’ and 20°30’ N latitudes and 97°20’ and 105°45’ E longitudes in South East Asia. The country borders Myanmar to the north and west, Laos to the northeast, Cambodia to the east and Malaysia to the south. Thailand can be divided into four major natural geographic regions: the mountainous north the arid northeast, comprised mainly by the Korat Plateau the fertile central plains, which include the Chao Phraya River Basin, and the southern peninsula. Thailand’s 2,600 km coastline runs mainly along the Gulf of Thailand (1,660km), with a shorter stretch of coast along the Andaman Sea (950km) on the western side of the southern peninsula. The Gulf of Thailand is relatively shallow and has an area of 30,400km², while the Andaman Sea is much larger and deeper. There are altogether 23 provinces (including Bangkok) along the two coasts, with most bordering the Gulf of Thailand, a few along the Andaman Sea, and a few with borders along both coasts. The proposed project focuses on Thailand’s narrow southern peninsula, which is flanked by the Gulf of Thailand to the east, the Andaman Sea to the west and Malaysia to the south. Thailand’s climate is classified as tropical savannah in the ‘mainland’ and tropical monsoon in the southern peninsula, which experiences a slightly different climate because of its geography and its close proximity to the sea. Across the country there are three main seasons; hot, wet and mild. -
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April 2015, Volume 26, Number 2 $13.00 The Authoritarian Resurgence Lilia Shevtsova on Russia Javier Corrales on Venezuela Abbas Milani/Alex Vatanka on Iran Frederic Wehrey on Saudi Arabia Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement Michael C. Davis Victoria Tin-bor Hui The Freedom House Survey for 2014 Arch Puddington Zoltan Barany on Transitions from Military Rule Yun-han Chu & Bridget Welsh on East Asia’s Millennials Elisabete Azevedo-Harman on Mozambique Pierre Englebert on Zimbabwe Harley Balzer on Vladimir Putin Transitional Justice and Its Discontents Duncan McCargo TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ITS DISCONTENTS Duncan McCargo Duncan McCargo teaches political science at Columbia University and the University of Leeds. His latest book is Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict (2012). He recently completed a Lever- hulme Trust Major Research Fellowship on politics and justice. At a military base outside Phnom Penh, two elderly defendants initially refused to cooperate following the October 2014 opening of the second stage of their trial for presiding over mass killings during the 1975–79 Khmer Rouge regime. A third defendant died in early 2013, a few months after a fourth was ruled unfit to be tried. So far only one case at the Tri- bunal has run its full course, that of a former torture-center chief who is currently serving a life sentence. Cambodia’s authoritarian government (it has long been rated Not Free by Freedom House) is blocking any further arrests, and the US$200 million that the international community has spent so far on a flawed “hybrid” tribunal (it is considered both Cam- bodian and international) will probably result in just three convictions. -
Islam in Thailand Before the Bangkok Period
ISLAM IN THAILAND BEFORE THE BANGKOK PERIOD by RAYMOND SCUPIN* To understand the expansion of Islam into southern Thailand, it is necessary to view it from the perspective of the spread oflslam to southeastern Asia. Although there were con tacts between Muslim and southeast Asian countries as early as the fourth century A.D., and Persian-Arabic trading colonies were established as early as the ninth century A.D., mass con versions to Islam, in a sociological sense, did not begin until the thirteenth century A.D. I In general, Persian and Arabic traders were not successful in transplanting their religious tradi tions. These colonies were, for the most part, transient or impermanent. 2 The intensification of Islamic proselytizing in southeast Asia had to await the implantation of Islam in the Gujerati area of northwest India and the increase of the Muslim population in the Malabar and Coromandel coasts, the development of Sufism, and the fall of Baghdad in A.D. 12583. In the context of the global movement of Islam, the Mongol invasion and the subsequent fall of Baghdad led to an exodus oflearned Muslim scholars and missionaries to south, southeast, and east Asia. This, coupled with the emergence of Sufism, the mystical variation of Islam, paved the way for a successful missionary enterprise. Sufism, as were Hinduism and Bud dhism which preceded it, was eclectic enough to accommodate itself to indigenous mystical and ~piritual patterns.4 And the Muslim traders from India, who were also enthusiastic about Sufism, aided in the establishment of Islam in the merchant princedoms of northern Sumatra, the Celebes, Java, and the ports of Malaysia.