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August 9, 2021 Thai Enquirer Summary COVID-19 News

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August 9, 2021 Thai Enquirer Summary COVID-19 News Thailand recorded yet another day of record infection today Today’s numbers are as follows: Total New Infections = 19,603 Community Infection = 19,290 Prison Infection = 313 Total + cases (ATK or Antigen) = 958 Total New Death = 149 Total New Recovery = 19,819 Total Infection including ATK = 20,561 Details of data for each day can be found @ https://ddc.moph.go.th/covid19-dashboard/ Infection over the weekend continued to show record high numbers as well. On Saturday August 7th the infection level (including ATK) stood at 27,864 positive cases (out of this 21,838 positive cases were from PCR tests). Deaths on Saturday stood at a record high of 212 people. On Sunday the PCR positive cases were 19,983 cases while deaths were at 138. 27,864 Although the official figures of the past 2-days has been below 20,000, the simulation done by a professor at Mahidol University shows that Thailand’s infection numbers could rise to a total of nearly 4 million by end of October. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuanchan Singkran, Faculty of Environment and Resources, Mahidol University, forecast and analyzed the results. ‘Covid-19 situation’ according to a ‘mathematical simulation’ indications are that the infection of COVID-19 Thailand is likely to reach 1 million as of August 19 (from 775,108 as of today) and hit 4 million by the end of October 2021. From the forecast from January 12 to October 31, it was found that the daily infection rate for the 4th wave was in the range of 20,295-50,931 cases/day. The professor said that there will be approximately 1 million cumulative infections for the 4th wave by August 19th and this will increase to 3.8 million by October 31st 2021. This move also comes just when the Prayut government is looking to open the country’s borders as per the announcement by Prayut Chan-o-cha in a nationalized television address on June 16th 2021 to open the country within 120-days from that date. Inoculation Drive The inoculation numbers have seen a sharp increase before the weekend with a record high of inoculation taking place on Thursday and Friday. Friday saw inoculation of 647,571 doses. This included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd doses for many of the frontline workers. Saturday’s inoculation numbers fell to 197,184 doses for all 3 kinds (1st, 2nd & 3rd dose). Data for Sunday’s inoculation will be revealed at around 12:30 pm today (Monday). The inoculation drive continues while those in intensive care unit and on ventilators continues to remain high. Those in ICU stand at 5,157 people Those on ventilators stand at 1.070 While inoculation drive continued, Anutin Charvirakul, Minister of Public Health, was trending on Twitter for pictures appeared that in which a cut-out in the background showed that the Pfizer vaccine was ‘complimentary’ from Anutin in Nakorn Sawan province. The 1.5 million doses of Pfizer is the donation from the United States of America but it seems Anuthin is on track to gobble up the credit for the vaccine although he was among the 1st people since late last year to say that Pfizer vaccine was not needed for Thailand because AstraZeneca would be in so much abundance that there would be no arms to inoculate Thais (well we all know what the truth is now, because the entire country is scrambling to get their 1st dose of AstraZeneca or any vaccine for that matter sake). Left – The real cut-out at an inoculation centre for Pfizer that puts Anutin’s name as the ‘donor’ of the vaccine. Right – The internet’s ‘Real News’ cut-out, which cuts the name of Anutin and says ‘Jo Biden – President of USA’ donates the vaccines Public Service Announcement Listed below are the numbers to call in case there is a need for those infected Political News In what could be the nail in the coffin for the Prayut Chan-o-cha government, reports are emerging that the government is looking to pass a bill that would give them immunity to the blunder they have created in vaccine procurement. Although this is a news item that has been circulating in the social media all weekend, the fact that Move Forward party has come out to say that it could be true is a big deal. One only needs to remember what happened to then Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra who had passed the ‘Amnesty Bill’ to absolve her brother Thaksin of any wrongdoing that prompted the major protest in 2014 that lead to the coup by General Prayut. https://www.thaienquirer.com/31004/government-plans-amnesty-bill-to-absolve- vaccine-acquisition-decision-makers/ The opposition parties are gearing up take the decision by the judiciary on Friday afternoon that hacked the Prayut Chan-o-cha’s ‘FAKE News’ emergency rule decree saying that the move by the government was in breach of the constitution, to the next level. Both the Pheu Thai party and the Move Forward party are looking to petition the decree to be investigated for further action which if accepted could possibly lead to all the way for Prayut to be prosecuted by the Supreme Court. Chusak Sirinin, deputy leader of the Pheu Thai party, said that the case of the Civil Court ordering temporary protection is an indication that Gen. Prayut had acted unlawfully. This he said, means that he must be considered in the Supreme Court's Criminal Division for Persons Holding Political Positions. This move can be undertaken by submitting a complaint through the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), if the NACC investigates the grounds for a criminal offense then it will send a prosecutor to submit a case to the Supreme Court of Political office, and if there is a baseline, it is a serious violation of ethics, then the matter will go to the Supreme Court. Pheu Thai said that it was drafting a petition that will be signed by MPs from the opposition parties to submit the NACC this week. Rangsiman Rome, deputy secretary-general of the Move Forward party, said this week the party would gather evidence to make a petition against the NACC against Gen. Prayut as well and if the judiciary take matters into consideration then as per the norm, General Prayut must stop performing duties immediately. To make life tougher for General Prayut, Sudarat Keyuraphan, who set up a new party – Thai Saang Thai (Thais build Thailand), came out to say last night on Clubhouse that the party was looking to sue Prime Minister Prayut for his mismanagement of the country. Sudarat said that she would welcome all members of the public to join the filing of the case and hopes to file the case by the end of this week. Sanhaphot Suksrimuang, Deputy Spokesman of the Phalang Pracharat party (PPRP) has raised the issue of a possible cabinet reshuffle. Sanhaphot said that the situation with COVID-19 that has spread severely causing some people to lack confidence in managing the situation, so they asked General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense to consider changing the position of minister in the administration of the new government by switching some of the positions. He suggested General Anupong Paochinda, Minister of the Interior, to be Minister of Public Health. because of the decisiveness of the military can order to control the spread of coronavirus proactive infection testing allocating vaccines while Anutin Charnvirakul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Health can be more appropriate to be the Minister of Interior because Anutin’s father Chawarat Charnvirakul, had previously held this position and they would be able to convey work experience. Yuthaphong Jaratsathien, MP Maha Sarakham province and Deputy Leader of the Pheu Thai Party announced the progress of submitting a motion for a no-confidence debate against the government on August 16 that the people who will be submitted for a no- confidence debate are Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Anutin Charnvirakul, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Health Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan, Deputy Prime Minister as the original mastermind tor of submarines in Thailand, when he was the defense minister, there was a lot of procurement information from the Ministry of Defense. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense approved the name of Gen. Supot Malaniyom (Tor Tor 22), Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. as secretary- general of the National Security Council (NSC) instead of the retiring General Nattapon Nakpanich and prepared to bring the name to the next Cabinet meeting (Cabinet) and Gen. Prayut prepare for an annual meeting of the Board of Directors which according to the schedule must send the dart to be transferred by August 16. Nattawut Saikua, the former leader of the Red shirt movement or the United front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), came out to set up a new network - Lai Prayut (Chase out Prayut) on Facebook, that on August 10 there will be another Car Mob of young people. As for the next mission of the network and this would be a meeting to prepare for a major Car Mob along with Hyde Park. This Car Mob planned for August 15th would be a nationwide move as a way to push for the change that is needed. After Saturday’s protest Sunday saw yet another smaller but non-violent protest which saw some of the former ‘Salim’ supporters. The new mar mob protest was organized by Thanat Thanakitamnuay (Luk Nat), whose family-owned Noble Development Plc (NOBLE), a former People’s Democratic Reform Council (PDRC).
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