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THAILAND’S EMERGENCY STATE Struggles and Transformations
Michael K. Connors
Thailand’s political landscape in 2010 was dominated by the ravine-like political division over the rules that define the acceptable exercise of power. Just as yellow- shirted protestors of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) had staged a four- month “civic uprising” in 2008 against what they claimed was an illegitimate proxy government of the self-exiled Thaksin Shinawatra, so in 2010 red-shirt protestors from the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship — Red All Over the Land (UDD)1 — rebelled against a government they claimed was a puppet of the bureau-aristocratic establishment, what they called the amaat. They occupied major intersections in Bangkok from mid-March to 19 May and called for the army to abandon the government. In 2010, a river of blood ran through the political division. Fatal clashes between red shirts and the Royal Thai Military left over ninety people dead and thousands injured. Previous episodes of mass protest and repression — such as those in 1973, 1976, and 1992 — have come to define new political eras. It remains uncertain as to whether the same may be said of the April-May killings, or if those events are part of a series, as yet unfinished, of increasingly unpredictable political struggle. The clashes highlighted the deadly trajectory of a contradictory politics that has emerged since the 2006 coup d’état that deposed Thaksin Shinawatra from office.2 These politics are characterized by antagonistic and hybrid political forces that, in practice, undermine their declared democratic objectives. Since the early 2000s, Thailand’s protracted battles over desirable regime form has seen incumbents use state apparatuses in instrumental fashion against political rivals, robbing Thailand of the stability of a loyal opposition that trusts ruling governments to govern within agreed boundaries.3 Each successive phase sees this approach
MICHAEL K. CONNORS teaches politics and development studies at La Trobe University, Australia.
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intensifying as the stakes get higher, space for compromise narrows, positions become irreconcilable, and a combination of intrigue and street politics determines fates of governments and oppositions. For the moment though, predictions of civil war have been proven wrong.4 This chapter traces the struggle as it unfolded during 2010. It also touches on humdrum issues of corruption, party politics, and the economy, relating the significance of these developments to the broader politics of regime battles. But first, some comments on the major actors that shaped politics in 2010. By the end of 2010 the coalition government headed by the Democrat Party’s (DP) Abhisit Vejjajiva had been in office for two years. This was made possible by a December 2008 Constitutional Court ruling to dissolve the pro- Thaksin People’s Power Party (PPP), then the governing party of a coalition government. Military machinations, deals, and existing party and factional rivalries led to minor parties and some former PPP MPs switching allegiance, allowing the formation of a DP-led coalition government.5 As much a party of order as of elite liberal ideas of freedom, the DP claims to want to return Thailand to its liberal-democratic trajectory of the 1990s — once it has dealt with unrest. Yet the DP depends on the parliamentary weight of old-style money politicians in its own ranks and that of its coalition partners to stay in power, inviting upon it the PAD’s excoriating censure for prodigious levels of corruption. Moreover, the DP pragmatically pacts with a resurgent military that demands and receives extra- budgetary doses, and the statist-conservative political establishment surrounding the palace. Together, these forces view the red-shirt movement with alarm and fear. They recoil at the possibility of a Thaksin-influenced palace on the passing of ailing King Bhumiphol.6 The red shirts’ actions and dissident discourses have tied popular aspirations for economic well-being, political equality, and representation to the fate of an authoritarian leader (Thaksin). Less a social movement and more a political conglomeration, the UDD is also informally tied to the opposition party Pheu Thai (PT). That nexus entails the mutual mobilization of support bases in the provinces. There is also significant overlap of local politicians and vote canvassers and local UDD cadre. Moreover, by way of its leaders’ connections the UDD finds sympathetic support in the police, the bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent sections of the military. The social composition of the red-shirt movement markedly differs by proportion to that of the significantly more urban-based and middle class yellow- shirted PAD, although both sides have support across the class spectrum. Reds tend to be relatively poorer than the “generic” yellow supporter. The former
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tends to work or run businesses in the informal or provincial sector while the latter are more likely to work in the formal sector.7 Neverthesless, the UDD and its predecessors have always had some support among the professional middle classes in Bangkok. Also, while popularly referred to as a movement of the poor, commentators are right to point out the post-peasant and farmer-entrepreneur social base to the red movement, and its provincial lower middle class feel.8 Five years ago Thirayut Bunmi astutely noted that Thaksin’s populist policies were largely directed at an emergent petty capitalist class.9 This is not to say that there are not many supporters of Thaksin and the movement among the poor. The leadership of the UDD is multilayered, with provincial leaders and district leaders running semi-autonomous organizations that raise funds and political consciousness, host radio shows, publish papers, run red businesses, and which facilitate attendance at UDD rallies. At the upper level are well-known political cadres such as Jarun Dittha-apichai and Weng Tojirakarn. Most important are the powerful orators, the “three amigos” Jatuporn Prompan, Natthawut Saikua, and Veera Musikhapong. The trio gained heightened prominence in 2008 while hosting the weekday television show “Truth Today” broadcast on public television, from which they relentlessly attacked the post-coup judicial order and the “party of dictators”, the DP.10 The UDD’s protest form mirrored that pioneered by PAD in 2006 and again in 2008.11 Political rallies were broadcast as political entertainment to red-shirt supporters across the nation. At these broadcast rallies and through social media the UDD, also following PAD, employed popular music formats, venomous-speech, rhetorical analysis, and shock exposes contributing to what Pravit Rojanaphruk — speaking of both colours — calls “vigilante” media.12 At various rallies UDD members playfully brandished plastic foot-stompers to applaud endless speeches lambasting the amaat, perhaps a signal of red-shirt contempt for assumed social superiority as the foot is considered the basest part of the body. At the very least, red shirts gave a very political edge to longstanding pop-cultural mocking of the ersatz aristocratic culture that pervades official life and high society.
Mobilizing Ideas and Forces After being routed in the Bangkok clashes of April 2009, the UDD regrouped and consolidated its position, holding periodic rallies, most notably on the third anniversary of the 2006 coup, when the government invoked the Internal Security Act. A constant UDD theme was double standards in the administration of justice. In 2010 the UDD made this up-close-and-personal when approximately 10,000–20,000
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protestors travelled to Khao Yai Thiang forest reserve to protest against Privy Councillor Surayudh Julanont’s illegal holiday home there. This targeting of phu yai (literally “big people”), unthinkable three years earlier, was just one example of the red media’s constant exposé of suspect financial interests of anti-Thaksin elements. Surayudh’s house was demolished and investigations commenced on over thirty other illegally occupied plots.13 The UDD has undoubtedly played a part in a new awareness of inequalities and double standards, leading to a mood dubbed taa sawang, or enlightenment, meaning that the organization of power and interest by the rival elite is visible and the need for democratic struggle is understood.14 During late 2009 and early 2010, the UDD steadily built up protest infrastructure throughout the northeast, with fundraisers bagging millions of baht. Political education schools in non-violence and democracy were held in several hundred locations educating thousands of cadres, while elsewhere some UDD leaders made incendiary speeches telling red shirts to meet violence with violence.15 Anticipating a late February Supreme Court decision to seize frozen assets from the Thaksin family (46 billion baht were seized), and buoyed by the success of its actions against Surayudh, the UDD swung into action by declaring 14 March as the day of its long expected march on Bangkok. It called on PT politicians to mobilize thousands of their constituents. They and grass-roots leaders and political activists succeeded in mobilizing at least several hundred thousand (some claim over half a million). The initial intent was to mobilize a million people and see the government dissolve into thin air. Red-shirt leader Jarun told the New York Times, “Our aim is to topple the government, force them to make a choice between suppressing us and stepping down.”16 Despite government-ordered roadside checks and the invoking of the Internal Security Act, the march on Bangkok was momentous. From 12 March thousands entered the city in the backs of pickups and buses, waving flags, blaring out music and speeches. There was an expectation of change, buoyed by the friendly reception from Bangkok residents. Gathering on historic Ratchadamnoen Road, the UDD demanded an immediate dissolution of Parliament and fresh elections. For two weeks red shirts moved around Bangkok, performing symbolic protests such as pouring 1,000 litres of protestors’ blood at Parliament and the Prime Minister’s house, who had fled to military barracks. Red shirts visited troops encamped in temples and schools calling on them to return to barracks. In a conciliatory mood, the military agreed. The mobilization was partly an attempt by elements closely aligned to Thaksin to force an election or change of government and to reinstate the 1997 Constitution. This would dissolve all the legal and political changes imposed after the coup of
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2006. But it was not Thaksin’s fate alone motivating action, even if that proved a powerful source of energy and resources; rather, an aggrieved membership feeling robbed of its electoral voice in 2006 and 2008 was giving notice to an old establishment that it could no longer impose its will.17 Indeed, while selective in its presentation of instances of double standards, the UDD expanded social understanding of the decrepit state of the rule of law in Thailand. The government offered talks in late March, of which two were televised. Many observers hoped for compromise and a negotiated political transition. Thailand’s prominent advocate of non-violence, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, epitomized such yearning: “It was a time-stopping moment, very unprecedented. You really saw people with profound political differences coming together and engaged in a conversation in a civilised manner.… It shows how Thai society is maturing to resolve political conflicts.”18 Set against persistent commentary on the possibility of civil war and with a sinister bombing campaign under way throughout Bangkok, settlement proved chimerical. The negotiations broke down over setting an election date. The UDD sought parliamentary dissolution within two weeks. The government offered a nine-month deadline. The situation deteriorated. The UDD moved its main camp to the glitzy shopping zone of Rachaprasong. A red-shirt leader explained, “We are here because this area is a symbol of the Bangkok elite. We want to show them that they cannot rule without consensus of the people.”19 When red shirts stormed Parliament on 7 April, the government declared a state of emergency, handing significant power to the military to restore order. In response, the UDD regrouped and extended its control over the shopping district and other sites and positioned itself for a long stand-off. Protestor numbers had already declined from the several hundred thousand that marched on Bangkok on 14 March to an oscillating day-night hard core of perhaps 10,000–30,000. The mood switched to high expectation of violence. Control of major intersections was forfeited to red-shirt marshals who waved traffic hither and thither. From the stage, UDD leaders declared the government illegitimate and called for the return of the 1997 Constitution and for the army to join them, noting that the “tomato” police already had. Red shirts were despatched to different locations to carry out various tactical missions, easily defying the state of emergency. Pirate radio mocked government censorship, and alternative SMS networks emerged to counter the closure of UDD’s main network.20 As the conflict intensified, tactics hardened and protestor ranks thinned. On 9 April some UDD leaders, expecting a crackdown, ordered the occupation of the Thai.Com office, in order to televise events via its People Channel station,
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which had been shut down. After clashes with the military, red shirts successfully occupied Thai.Com for several hours before being expelled. The focus moved back to Rachaprasong, where on 10 April riot police, ordered to close down the protest site, entered tense negotiations with protestors. Police then withdrew, cheered and waved by protestors.21 Events took a different turn at a short distance from the Democracy Monument on Ratchadamnoen Road. Military forces charged with retaking the area from the UDD eventually engaged with unknown armed forces situated within proximity of the red shirts — the so-called “men in black” or “Ronin”. The fighting left five soldiers and over twenty civilians dead. Here finally was the kind of death toll and suppression that, arguably, some red-shirt hardliners and opportunists hoped would potentially trigger massive political change, as it had in the past. But it didn’t. While the UDD paraded bodies of the dead and denounced the government as murderers, international reaction was muted precisely because of the mysterious presence of apparently pro-red men in black. Focus moved to the presence of hardline elements in the red-shirt movement with which the central leadership had previously publicly split. In March, figures such as General Kattiya Sawasdiphol, known as Seh Daeng, and General Panlop Pinmanee had expressed frustration at the core leader’s strategy of protests — stating that this would not lead to victory.22 Also on the margins were several civilian leaders of militant factions of the red-shirt movement such as the loosely formed Red Siam group. The latter had been alienated from the mainstream red movement since organizational realignment took effect in July 2009. Still, associates of the more radical stance such as Seh Daeng and other militants freely moved among the protests and organized retired paramilitary rangers to act as guards for the red shirts. There was, reportedly, also tension between these guards and other red- shirt guards. A popular figure among red shirts for his maverick and tough-guy image, Seh Daeng was accused of organizing a secret paramilitary element of the red shirts, although he denied knowledge of the “Ronin”. Uncompromising and seemingly seeking confrontation, Seh Daeng’s prominence grew after the 10 April clashes. He constantly claimed the support of and communication with Thaksin. Perhaps with figures such as Seh Daeng in mind, the government continually attacked the presence of “terrorist” elements at the protest sites. For weeks, a cartoonish cat and mouse game continued between UDD leaders and reluctant police seeking to execute arrest warrants. The game was most famously captured in the pictures of paunchy UDD leader Arisman escaping through a hotel window as yet again the ineptitude of the police was aired on TV to popular hilarity. From the Rachaprasong stage leaders reported constant telephone contact with supportive police as if to say that the pantomime of attempted arrest
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would continue, as indeed it did. But underneath the songs and comic routines was a deadly serious intent: to poke fun at the hollowness of government power and to trigger its replacement. Over time, the red shirts poked this stick ever more provocatively. Scenes on the streets of Bangkok arguably recalled the red summer that rocked Europe in 1848, when popular masses, armed militias, and intellectual clubs sought to stamp their agenda on the euphoria for change, daily challenging the authority of the state. With sporadic acts of violence breaking out, including a grenade attack on anti-red-shirt protestors at Silom Road on 22 April, the UDD moderated its stance and proposed a House dissolution in thirty days followed by elections in sixty days. The offer was rejected. In early May the Abhisit government offered elections for 14 November 2010 (conditional on there being political peace) and a Roadmap to Reconciliation that included social and economic reform and an independent probe into the April events.23 In an atmosphere of increasing troop mobilization, the UDD leadership conditionally accepted, demanding a House dissolution date and no amnesty for the April crackdown. Abhisit indicated dissolution would occur between mid and late September and that there would be no amnesty, but a split emerged in the UDD leadership. Veera, most supportive of the road map, disappeared from the stage, leading to mixed signals about the UDD’s intentions. Negotiations got bogged down in specifics. The UDD leaders’ acceptance of the road map was reportedly foiled by Thaksin and allies, who sensed that the government’s fall was imminent. The reasons for rejection were various. If implemented the road map would still provide an opportunity for Abhisit’s coalition government to control military and police promotions lists. Key personnel placements could diminish the scope of action taken by any newly elected PT government, as was discovered in 2008 when the military refused to move against PAD’s occupation of Government House and Suvarnabhumi Airport. The Bangkok Post had in late March explained UDD and PT concern about a late 2010 House dissolution: “The Democrats expect reciprocal benefits from the appointment of General Prayut … [also] the Internal Security Operations Command, with an annual budget of more than 8 billion baht … can be a key instrument to canvass for the Democrats during the election campaigns.”24 Facing this prospect and still wounded by the inability of pro-Thaksin governments in 2008 to take decisive action on constitutional amendment and legal annulment, militants within the UDD and its elite backers decided to go for broke. Seh Daeng announced that Thaksin opposed ending the rally, intriguingly claiming that Thaksin supported a new leadership team after reports that some UDD leaders had entered secret negotiations and were willing
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to surrender hard-core red shirts to the authorities.25 Thaksin noted via Twitter that there was no firm dissolution date as part of the road map, and applied pressure privately and through social media, indicating his preference for rejection: “Today, brothers and sisters who come to rally can see further than the leaders. They ask for justice and democracy. It will be very difficult for anyone to decide for them, without their consent.”26 By 12 May the road map was dead. Killings, which had punctuated protests, now accelerated. On 13 May Seh Daeng was assassinated. The next day the government declared that it would forcibly end the protests, finally accomplishing this in violent and controversial operations lasting until 19 May. These operations claimed over fifty civilian lives; most notorious was the killing of six people inside a Buddhist temple that had been declared a safe haven for children and women. And despite the brutality of the troops who shot protestors and the burning of dozens of shops in Bangkok and some provincial town halls, the government survived. Thailand’s state of emergency had morphed into an emergency state that was intent on the elimination of any threat to its security. The historic scripts of violence and change of government failed to eventuate. The rival sides blamed each other for the violence. International human rights lawyer Robert Amsterdam was retained by Thaksin to publicise the latter’s innocence and the issue of state violence. His predictably partisan report was partly effective in suggesting crimes of state had been committed, but paid advocacy is always selective.27 Various statements issued by government agencies about terrorism and a movement to overthrow the monarchy were less effective, especially denials of military shooting of unarmed protestors. The precise truth of the March-May period will be difficult to establish. Nevertheless, plentiful evidence generated by professional and citizen journalism suggests that the Thai military exceeded international standards on crowd control and that soldiers shot and killed unarmed protestors.28 The provenance of the men in black and other violent elements, whose presence may have played a part in provoking the military’s unprofessional and disproportionate response, is less certain, although the employment of violent means by UDD-associated forces appears evident.
Aftermath On 22 December the government finally lifted the state of emergency in Bangkok and surrounding provinces, and invoked the Internal Security Act, empowering the Internal Security Operations Command to oversee security issues. By year’s end, most red-shirt leaders were still in prison, or in hiding. First they were held
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without charge under the conditions of the 2005 Emergency Decree and later charged with terrorism. Hundreds of less prominent red shirts were imprisoned — some as protest bystanders, some as alleged instigators of militant acts, or some for simply violating state of emergency measures such as curfews and assembly. Red media, banned since the state of emergency, began to re-emerge by year’s end, as did small and medium sized symbolic red-shirt rallies. As part of its reconciliation efforts — somewhat contradictory given the state of emergency and press censorship — the government set up major reform initiatives chaired by veteran liberal royalists, Anand Panyarachun and Prawet Wasi, promising to rethink Thailand’s wide-ranging inequalities. The two were central to reform processes in the 1990s and highly influential.29 Possibly a reform process from above may emerge from these committees in order to win social stability and a more cohesive society, but it is equally possible they will function as a smokescreen while the core red-shirt movement is dismantled by legal, ideational, and repressive means. The government also appointed a Truth and Reconciliation Committee that has been cautiously critical of the government and the judicial process. It is not empowered to effectively compel testimony from state agencies. The committee reports that by year’s end the military had yet to provide operational plans used during the crackdown.30 The committee has pushed the government on providing bail assistance to hundreds of red-shirt protestors who remain on remand. But the pains and twisted accounts of what happened in April and May are not going away easily. For example, The Department of Special Investigations has failed to issue any definitive report on the events, despite being charged with investigating the killings. One of its interim reports casts disproportionate blame on the red shirts and the men in black for eight out of twelve deaths investigated. The DSI was inconclusive as to the culprit in the remaining four deaths.31 The secrets of state and possibly those of the armed militia may rob the dead of an honest reckoning. Before the April and May violence UDD leader Weng noted, “This is a united front — meaning we have to co-operate where we can co-operate. What we can’t co-operate on, we put aside.”32 One of those differences was the use of violence and clearly the issue continued to haunt UDD doves. The inability to deal with this was revealing. The organizational structure of the UDD with informal lines of authority running to Thaksin suited a movement with contradictory objectives. While the UDD was formally a pro-democratic movement with a centralized leadership, at crucial moments charismatic intercession could trump organizational principles. As far as its elite backers were concerned, UDD needed organizational ambiguity so that its lines of authority were simultaneously obscure and powerful
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when necessary. Reflecting on these problems some time after the events, Thida Thavornseth, who became chairperson of the UDD in December 2010, noted, “Dr Weng said of armed elements let the police arrest them.… I told him ‘you must be careful you are not assassinated by these elements’.… We do not need to have an armed force embedded with us because they make it difficult for us, at that time we expelled them … but they did not go away.”33 In the same interview she openly described debates within the UDD over whether armed struggle was a plausible strategy for the movement. Some clearly thought at least some form of violence was warranted.
Into the House The parliamentary arena has been marginal to the politics of the emergency state and the street politics of the UDD. However, there were interesting developments in the formal political realm. In late November a bill to amend the Constitution passed its first reading in a chaotic joint-sitting of Parliament, with a partial boycott by PT. If adopted, as seems likely, the government-sponsored bill would replace the current system of 400 multi-member constituencies with a system of 375 single-member constituencies and the current 80 regional party-list seats with 125 single party-list seats; a change that seems to mirror the competing needs of the fractious coalition government. The minor coalition parties strongly supported single seat constituencies, which would allow them to focus resources instead of spreading them thinly through big multi-member constituencies. Most importantly, the increase in party-list seats is expected to benefit the Democrat Party. In the 2007 election the Democrat’s list vote almost matched that of the People Power Party. In the same parliamentary session, a motion sponsored by 70,000 citizens and proposed by a UDD-related organization to effectively bring back the 1997 Constitution did not pass, but won the support of PT MPs and some coalition government party members.34 Since coming to office the Abhisit government has portrayed itself as a pro- poor reforming government, introducing accelerated land reform, free schooling, and higher minimum wages, against business opposition. In a bid to expand the tax base it has proposed progressive land taxation. Other reforms include a small monthly allowance for the aged and assistance for workers in the informal sector who are excluded from the social welfare fund. These reforms anticipate an expansion of social welfare provisions and are an attempt to trump Thaksin’s legacy.35 Those who see this as recent copycat electoral welfare ignore that in 2005 the DP went to elections with similarly “populist measures”, trying to outdo
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Thai Rak Thai.36 A permanent shift has occurred in government responsiveness to popular grievance as a direct consequence of the contentious politics of the last decade. On a negative note, one DP insider informed this author that despite increased budgetary allocations to villages and districts, the bureaucratic lines of authority and disbursement are such as to effectively recentralize local budgets. This has provided a great source of grievance to the political class at the provincial and district levels, which in part has also expressed itself in the red-shirt movement. In late 2010 the government declared that it would move to decentralize and expand local budgets over a seven-year period.37 Regardless of this rash of policies, the government looks to be sunk by the dead weight of its allies. Despite taking action against ministers found to be corrupt (three have fallen in two years), Abhisit’s ability and apparent desire to act decisively, especially in the affairs of the powerful and lucrative Ministry of Interior, is greatly limited by his party’s fears that coalition partner Bhumjai Thai Party, which controls the Interior, would abandon it. This alliance of convenience has granted the government durability, but at the cost of reduced credibility in terms of “good governance”. The greatest quasi-crisis facing the DP in 2010 was the possibility of dissolution by the Constitutional Court as a consequence of alleged electoral malfeasance. During the April protests the Electoral Commission forwarded two cases to the court, having come under fire for double standards by the UDD. Ruling on a technicality on 29 November and 9 December, the Court dismissed the cases because the Electoral Commission had not followed due process. For the Democrats this was salvation by technicality; for the red shirts this was yet again the shooting-gun of double standards. The smoking-gun came earlier, when videos were uploaded to YouTube showing discussions about the cases between a court official and a DP MP. The gulf was apparent between the protective barrier of technical rulings for the governing party and the full wrath of the law against red shirts and pro-Thaksin parties.38 The opposition party PT was beset by factional strife, weak leadership, and infighting during 2010. It largely played second fiddle in the first half of the year to the UDD. Thaksin seemed keen to keep the PT functioning as an opposition but eager not to allow a single force to dominate, perhaps having suffered after the rise of Newin Chidchob’s faction in 2008 (which defected to help the DP form the coalition government) and having reflected on how Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej had proved to be his nominee in name only. Regular leadership quarrels and issues of party structure were reported in the press, accompanied
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with reference to ritual visits to Thaksin in exile or phone conversations.39 PT remains under his influence, but not absolute control, a result of alleged financial support and because of his electoral drawing power. As a prominent PT politician noted, “I don’t see any disadvantage in offering Thaksin as our selling point. We should regard this as us selecting the right product. Other products would not be worth the investment.”40 Such marketing could include a Thaksin relative assuming the PT helm. PT did strike some solid political notes during 2010. Its members worked to expose various corruption scandals and irregularities in the government’s stimulus package. PT’s biggest achievement was that it remained intact despite the lure of well-compensated defection. Most notably, despite accusations of terrorism, PT fielded an imprisoned red-shirt leader in a Bangkok by-election in July, receiving 40 per cent of the vote, although the party fared poorly in December by-elections, claiming only one of five seats in contention.41
This is Not Corruption Several prominent corruption scandals visited Thailand in 2010, but the GT200 bomb detector scandal is of especial delectability, even by the standards of those practised in the arts of public robbery and barefaced denial. The scandal illuminates enduring flaws in Thai justice: impunity for the corrupt, indifference to those gravely affected, a moral discourse of intention and virtue mobilized to detract criticism, and an underlying threat not to dig too deeply. Beginning in 2005, hundreds of GT200 devices were purchased by the military at inflated prices. The vast majority were purchased after the coup of 2006.42 They have proven to be little more than empty plastic boxes with an aerial attachment. An explosives expert described the equipment thus: “Speaking as a professional I would say that is an empty plastic case.”43 The GT200 detector is used by the Thai military and police, most notably in the Malay-Muslim south of Thailand where, in 2010, the continued insurgency against central Bangkok rule claimed over 500 lives. The Nation reported that hundreds of insurgent suspects have been arrested and placed in occupational retraining camps based on GT200 detection of explosive chemicals.44 Human Rights Watch estimates that 10 per cent of detained suspected separatists were being held on the basis of GT200 readings. 45 Abhisit cancelled further orders, but the military justified continued usage, bolstered by positive reports from the celebrity forensic scientist Porntip Rojanasundand.46 Porntip is often called upon for impartial and fearless comment
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and findings in a crime and security environment prone to corruption and framing. In this case she took the side of the military. She was reported in Matichon newspaper as stating that the Forensic Science Institute would still use the GT200 and that while the GT200 device was not a scientific instrument it could still be useful: “the most important variable [in its use] was the operator, and that the Institute could still use it effectively”. This view was affirmed by a sergeant in the Thai army who reported that when he had a bad night’s sleep the device did not work well, but it worked impressively when he slept well. Fortunately he explained that on bad days he would not use the device. He added, “You must not be hungry, feel wanting to relieve yourself in the toilet otherwise the GT200 will not work.”47 Former army chief General Anupong Paochinda fronted a news conference and attacked critics of the GT200, asking in a bullying tone if they had malign intent. He backed continued usage of the empty plastic boxes.48 The case is now with the auditor’s office. Few expect convictions or the recouping of the 1 billion baht expended. As if written for a satirical show on corruption in Thai state agencies, the GT200 is also a case study in the politics of untruth in Thailand. In 2010 the country was 78th on the Transparency Corruption Perception Index, perceived more corrupt than its ranking at 59th in 2005.49
“Going Forward”: Thailand’s Economic-Political Nexus Among the bloodletting and gloom of 2010 one minor miracle stands out — despite the political turbulence the Thai economy continued to do relatively well, although tourism suffered significantly.50 The government has declared that it seeks to promote internal consumption and shift from single-minded export-led growth, which it argues cannot address wealth disparities. Currently, trade accounts for approximately 70 per cent of GDP.51 Nevertheless, with the country benefitting from a rebound in exports and the inflow of foreign capital, economic growth was upgraded to 7 per cent in 2010 from a contraction of 2.2 per cent in 2009. 52 More good news for business came in September when the Central Administrative Court overturned a stunning 2009 decision to suspend seventy-six government-approved projects in the Ma Ta Phut Industrial estate following complaints about the health of residents living nearby. Business irritation about Thailand’s investment climate led the government to forge ahead, in alliance with business groupings, to meet the court’s requirements to lift the suspensions.53 Having achieved that, the underlying concerns about health and
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well-being of people and the environment appear to have been given a cosmetic makeover. In July 2010 the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand ruminated on Thailand’s good economic standing despite the slowdown in global growth in the preceding two years. He then moved to the question of domestic political instability: “Finally, we have risks relating to how Thailand’s political situation will evolve going forward” and noted the short-term impact caused by political disruption. Somewhat optimistically the Deputy Governor saw positive trends in Thailand’s foreign investment record despite Thailand’s incoming foreign investment having slowed relative to its neighbours. Thailand’s economic standing has suffered as a result of political instability and foreign investors view the country ever more cautiously. This may have political ramifications. Enduring political instability can shake up systems. Key players are likely reassessing their positions and thinking beyond piecemeal constitutional amendments so far in play. As Thai strategic thinkers and planners think about recalibrating the political-economic mix, they may note that systems of authoritarian developmentalism in China and elsewhere, or the limited democracy of Singapore and Malaysia, are not especially disadvantageous to capitalist development. Anticipated political reform born of the protracted crisis need not be in a liberal direction, or if it is it may be a form of liberal guardianship. The chaos and trauma associated with the contentious politics of 2010 has probably given ballast to the cause of limiting and remoulding the electoral democracy that Thailand has enjoyed since the 1990s and interrupted by the 2006 coup. It does well to remember that the moderate social thinker Prawet Wasi supported an upper house of sages in debates leading to the 1997 Constitution. These ideas were cast aside in the optimism about electoral and liberal democracy that partly animated the 1997 constitutional debates. But those ideas have made a comeback in some form. The now half-appointed senate resulting from the military sponsored 2007 Constitution allows for the “wise and aged” establishment to influence the legislative direction of Parliament and the independent agencies of state. Sondhi Limthongkul’s call for a form of corporatism or selectocracy made in 2006, but elaborated in PAD protests of 2008, may be gaining support. The bellwether for this is surely the DP. And movement can be detected. Sounding like Lee Kuan Yew, and with the smell of a smouldering Bangkok still on his suit, Thai Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij, speaking in Japan, wearily noted the fondness for demonstrations in Thailand and referred to Thai “democrazy”. He praised those countries that had non-democratic political systems but which ensured some redistribution of wealth and opportunity. The direction of these comments was clear: “If there is
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a lesson for Asia … the lesson might be that open, competitive and relatively equal access to resources and opportunities is more important than the need to follow strict western models of democracy.”54 Whether this signifies the end of the 1990s tentative consensus that elite forms of liberal democracy are good for Thai capitalism remains unclear. Since the mid-2000s that consensus has been suspended, a victim of ongoing regime battles. Certainly the geopolitical pull of an economically dominant China (Thailand’s second-largest trading partner) and the presence of relatively successful models of non-Western forms of controlled democracy will erode the strength of that consensus, as has the emergence of the security state within Thailand. Domestically, with Thailand’s establishment facing the prospect of further instability and even of being overthrown, the pressure to modernize conservative forms of “Thai-style democracy” may prove compelling.55
Notes 1 On the renaming of UDD to distinguish it from the more radical “Redsiam” group see, “Weera phae N.P.C. prap khrongsang mai” [Veera announces new structure of UDD], Prachatai, 10 July 2009. The radical wing opposed a royal petition seeking clemency for Thaksin. 2 See “Thailand’s ‘Good Coup’: The Fall of Thaksin, the Military and Democracy”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, no. 2 (2008). 3 See Michael K. Connors, “Liberalism, Authoritarianism and the Politics of Decisionism in Thailand”, Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (2009): 355–73. 4 See for example the widely cited article by Jaermsak Pinthong, “Roa kamlang yuu nai yuk songkram kanmuang!” [We are in the middle of a political war], Naewnaa, 28 December 2009
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8 This discussion draws from two draft papers I am grateful to have viewed: Naruemon Thabchumpon and Duncan McCargo, “Behind the 2010 Thai Redshirt Protests: Not Just Poor Farmers”, 2010; Somchai Phatharathananunth, “Rural Transformations, Democratization and Popular Resistance: The Emergence of the Rural Redshirts in Northeast Thailand”, 2010. 9 Thirayut Bunmi, “Wikro Sangkhom Thai yuk Thaksinuwat” [Analysing Thai society in the era of Thaksinisation], Matichon, 6 January 2003. 10 This was during the tenure of the pro-Thaksin Samak government. See Michael K. Connors, “Thailand’s Media and Law Wars: The Hijacking of State Media”, Sovereign Myth, 5 August 2008
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22 “Hardliners Expelled after Damning Peaceful Approach and Calling for New Leaders”, Bangkok Post, 18 March 2010
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37 Field notes, 7 July 2010; and see “PM Sets Decentralization Plan”, Bangkok Post, 19 December 2010
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51 “Back From the Brink”, Emerging Markets, 10 October 2010. 52 See Sakulrat Montreevat, “Economic Outlook: Thailand”, in Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 2011–2012, edited by Michael J. Montesano and Lee Poh Onn (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), pp. 166–71. 53 Daniel Ten Kate, “Thai Post-Coup Legal Maze Delays Foreign Investment”, Bloomberg Business Week, 24 September 2010
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