New Government in Thailand Struggles to Defeat the Insurgency
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FEBRUARY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 2 New Government in in 2007. In July of that year, the Thai monarchy, he pledged to implement army chief, General Anupong Paojinda, greater civilian oversight. Abhisit spoke Thailand Struggles to launched his own “surge” in order to of the Democrat Party’s deep ties to the Defeat the Insurgency suppress the violence. Following the south, their traditional stronghold. drafting of a new constitution and the He reiterated the failed pledges of the By Zachary Abuza restoration of democracy in December Surayud regime to engage in samanchan, 2007, a government comprised of or reconciliation. “My basic assumption since the september 2006 coup in Thaksin’s former Thai Rak Thai Party is that you will never have reconciliation Thailand, attention has been focused on emerged under Samak Sundaravej, re- unless there is justice,” he said before the country’s rapid political turnover branded as the People’s Power Party his one-day trip there in mid-January. and instability. Yet the Malay-Muslim (PPP). Fearful of another coup, Samak “The same principle applies to the insurgency in the country’s three and his successor, Somchai Wongsawat, south.”3 This does not bode well for the southern-most provinces of Pattani, had a completely hands off policy in south and suggests that little progress Yala, and Narathiwat has continued the south, letting the military have full will be made under the leadership of unabated. The new government in control. Both offered no resistance to not the Democrats in the coming years; Bangkok has stated that resolving the only the military’s massive budgetary they still fail to see the insurgency insurgency is one of its top priorities, expenditures, but two waves of major for what it is, not acknowledging the and it has spoken of the need for weapons acquisitions, the vast majority goals of the insurgents to establish an reconciliation and social justice. The of which having little to no value in independent Islamic state. In five years, insurgents, unconcerned about who is in combating an insurgency.1 With no the insurgents have refused to negotiate power in Bangkok, have continued their civilian oversight, the Royal Thai Army or even enter into talks with the campaign of violence with no end in escalated their counterinsurgency government; for them, there is nothing sight. This article addresses Thailand’s efforts, but at a tremendous cost to to reconcile. political turnover, provides an analysis human rights, including the alleged of the violence in the south, and finally systematic use of torture on detainees.2 Analysis of the Violence offers a review of new policies that the Violence in 2008 was down considerably government has initiated to quell the When Abhisit came to power in from the peak in 2007. According insurgency. December 2008, he quickly announced to the Thai Journalists Association, that resolving the insurgency, now there were 1,056 violent incidents in Political Turnover entering its fifth year, was a top priority which 546 people were killed and 1,075 On December 15, 2008, the Thai for his government. He pledged to wounded, 47% lower than the 2007 Parliament elected a new prime minister, overhaul the administrative structure figure (1,056 killed and 1,992 wounded). Abhisit Vejjajiva, the fourth person to and streamline the chain of command There was an annual average of 1,956 hold the post in a year. The backroom in the south. Unconcerned about the violent incidents between 2004-2008. dealings, combined with the actions of a possibility of a coup since he had Civilians comprised 77% of the dead, pro-monarchy and activist judiciary, as the full backing of the military and the remainder government officials and well as the support of the military and security forces. Of the 1,056 violent monarchy, ended a political stalemate 1 The Royal Thai Army rewarded itself with a significant incidents in 2008, 741 of them were that has hobbled Thailand since budget increase following the September 2006 coup. In gun attacks, 218 bombing attacks, 37 February 2006. Yet, in the three years of December 2006, it announced major arms purchases arson cases, 35 cases of attacks on state elite political machinations in Bangkok, worth Bt7.7 billion. The purchases included Swedish property and a number of uncategorized 4 there was little attention paid to the Gripen jet fighters, Ukrainian armored personnel carri- incidents. Security officials cited the insurgency that has plagued Thailand’s ers, Chinese surface-to-surface missiles, and submarines, dramatic decrease in violence as signs three majority Muslim provinces of hardly the weapons systems needed to combat an insur- of their improved counterinsurgency Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat since gency. This was followed with a second wave of arms efforts as well as the weakening of the January 2004. The insurgency has left purchases worth $191.3 million in September 2008. This militants. Yet the Thai government failed more than 3,500 people killed and twice round included a Singaporean built amphibious frigate, to acknowledge the secessionist aims that number wounded. It has led to a Russian anti-aircraft missiles, as well as Israeli arms. In or Islamist ideology of the insurgents, breakdown of social services, law and January 2009, the RTA announced another wave of arms naively contending that the insurgency order, and the de facto ethnic cleansing imports, although these purchases are more oriented for was solely about social justice. of Siamese Buddhists from much counterinsurgency. They include six Russian-made Mi- of the countryside. Large swaths of 17 helicopters, nearly 100 South African-made armored Furthermore, despite the lack of southern Thailand have been, in effect, personnel carriers, and 80 Ukrainian APCs and assault attention to resolving the conflict by ungoverned territory. rifles. “Cabinet Nod for B7.7bn to Buy Arms, Equip- the country’s leaders, it remains a drain ment,” Bangkok Post, September 26, 2007; Patrick Winn, on the government’s coffers. A leading The September 2006 coup that ousted “Thailand Plans $191.3M Arms Purchase,” Defense News, scholar of the insurgency, Professor Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra September 12, 2008; and Patrick Winn, “Muslim Insur- Srisomphob Jitrphiromsri, has argued was an opportunity to reverse the gency Triggers Thai Military Spending Blitz: Military insurgency’s gains. While interim Prime Shores Up Attack Helicopters, APCs and Assault Rifles,” 3 “Thai PM Launches Review of Emergency Law in Minister Surayud Chulanont committed Defense News, February 2009. South,” The Nation, January 15, 2009. inordinate time and resources to quelling 2 Amnesty International, “Thailand: Torture In The 4 Veera Prateepchaikul, “Situation Improves in Deep the insurgency, violence actually peaked Southern Counter-Insurgency,” January 13, 2009. South,” Bangkok Post, January 22, 2009. FEBRUARY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 2 that since January 2004 the government police, seven soldiers, three rangers, and two representatives of the National has spent more than Bt109 billion ($3.1 seven village defense volunteers and Economic and Social Development Board billion) to quell the violence, and predicts 42 civilians. The attacks include the and the Budget Bureau. It is hard to see that the government may have to spend beheadings of two rangers, the 27th and how this new council will bring change: three times that amount annually over 28th decapitations in the past five years. ministers of line agencies already had the next five to ten years.5 Since mid-December, 97 people have purview over the southern provinces; been wounded, including 15 police, 44 the south has just never been a priority Thai officials do not consider the fact that soldiers and five rangers. Twenty-four for them. In both these moves, the violence is down simply because much bombs were detonated and seven more prime minister said that the new groups of what the militants sought to achieve bombs either failed to go off or were would “not duplicate the tasks of the in the early stages was accomplished. defused.7 As one policeman noted, “The Internal Security Operations Command More than 20% of the region’s 300,000 killing sprees in Yala have been less (ISOC) Region 4,”11 which means the Buddhists have fled, while countless frequent since last year, but there have military remains firmly in charge, with more have evacuated their farms to the been more victims in each incident.”8 negligibly more civilian oversight. safety of the cities.6 Since early 2004, While the rate of more than one death and two wounded per day is not In terms of policies, Abhisit articulated exorbitantly high, it is unsustainable. “less military-focused strategies,” “The insurgents are clearly The rate is near the 2006 average, when explaining that “it makes no sense to be capable of escalating the the violence started to spiral out of running the provinces under continuous control. The rate is unlikely to go down application of the emergency decree. rate of violence, but have because Thai security forces continue to At the moment, we have actually also calculated the ‘right’ be deployed statically. martial law there. We also have the new security law. We should be aiming amount to achieve their Most of the killings have been shootings. at lifting these special laws.”12 Yet on short-term goals: drive While the militants in this period have January 20, the cabinet voted to extend not arsoned schools or attacked economic the emergency decree for another three away Buddhists, make the targets such as cell phone towers, or months, the 14th consecutive extension region ungovernable, and gone after Buddhist clergy as they have since October 2005. in the past, this is not uncommon. When eliminate political rivals one analyzes the violence during the If Abhisit wants to make his imprint on while developing a parallel five-year period, attacks on different the insurgency, there is no better place targets come in waves, often in response for him to begin than with a review of the authority structure in the to government countermeasures and detainee policy and the judicial process.