Building Resilience Together: Military and Local Government

BUILDING RESILIENCE TOGETHER MILITARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION FOR CLIMATE ADAPTATION

MARIA MCCOLLESTER | MICHELLE E. MIRO KRISTIN VAN ABEL

C O R P O R A T I O N Cover design: Peter Soriano Cover image: Adobe Stock/sherryvsmith / Gettyimages/ozgurdonmaz

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© Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation Overview global climate change effects, at home and abroad, that may challenge its military readiness,11 stretch Identified by security experts as a “threat multi- its resources, distract from its missions, or affect its plier”1 and a “threat without threateners,”2 climate ability to respond to multiple, simultaneous crises change crosses all physical and political borders. It is that may also arise from climate-related conflict.12 inherently complex, highly uncertain, and global in U.S. military installations are often co-located in scope, posing a unique challenge to infrastructure, or near civilian facilities and share infrastructure, communities, and security in the United States and personnel, and resources, including water and power, throughout the world. Moreover, scientific consen- with these local governments. These installations are sus indicates that climate change and its effects on thus highly dependent on the resilience and viability humans and the environment will worsen by 2040 of infrastructure and services provided by their sur- and beyond.3 To prepare for and build resilience rounding communities. As a consequence, the read- to climate change—including more-frequent and iness of installations can be degraded by the effects more-intense extreme weather events, rising sea lev- of climate change off-base—including road closures, els, increasing temperatures, and changing precipi- power loss, property damage, and health effects— tation patterns—governmental, military, and private that affect the mobility and availability of staff and entities will need to adapt to these effects.4 contractors, support services, and logistics.13 Such climate adaptation starts with planning. To assess how collaboration might build commu- Climate adaptation plans anticipate climate changes;5 nity and U.S. military resilience to climate change and direct financial, human, and natural resources; and to support communities and installations considering strengthen infrastructure systems. Climate adap- whether to pursue long-term, regional resilience, this tation plans are often conceptualized, written, and research aims to answer the following two questions: implemented by individual governmental, military, What role can collaboration play in military and local and private entities. However, siloed planning can government climate resilience planning, and what lead to inadequate investment or ineffective policies organizational attributes would enable local gov- when neighbors plan for different futures or follow ernments and military services to collaborate more different planning paths but experience the same effectively on such climate planning efforts? climate hazards. In this pilot study, we answer these questions by Climate adaptation planning can, instead, be examining the case of the Hampton Roads region fortified through collaboration and coordination of Virginia, a coastal region that is home to one of between neighboring entities—governmental, the largest concentrations of military facilities and military, and private—that share infrastructure personnel in the United States. Hampton Roads systems, personnel, and natural resources.6 Research recently hosted a collaborative sea-level rise planning is increasingly focused on the beneficial role that pilot project that included representatives from local collaborative processes can play in improving climate governments and the military. Hampton Roads thus resilience7 and bolstering the efficacy of adapta- serves as an illustrative case for the broader problem tion strategies.8 A growing number of collaborative of how critical local and U.S. military infrastructure climate planning efforts,9 largely among U.S. cit- within the United States and around the world can ies, counties, and local and state agencies, further adapt and become more resilient to climate change’s demonstrates that regional entities realize they must effects. work together to adapt effectively to climate change. Through our research, we found that collabo- The U.S. military can also benefit from engag- ration, generally, is beneficial to improving regional ing in these types of collaboratives. As of 2017, capacity to deal with climate change and provides the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) managed the flexibility needed to address complex challenges 4,793 military installations in the United States and amid multiple participants. We also uncovered com- around the world.10 This geographic reach makes mon themes contributing to the success of climate it likely that DoD will experience a wide range of resilience collaboration among regional stakeholders

1 Abbreviations government-military coordination on environmental CNA Center for Naval Analyses planning and management. We then present our case study of collaborative climate planning in the DoD U.S. Department of Defense Hampton Roads region and include an analysis of FWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service expert opinion solicited from climate change prac-

HRPDC Hampton Roads Planning District titioners in the region. Finally, we conclude with Commission thoughts on the role of collaborative climate planning between local government and military entities. INRMP Integrated Natural Resource Management Plan

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Climate Change: A Threat to Change Military Installations IPP Intergovernmental Pilot Project The national security effects of climate change can be NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization organized into three broad categories: geostrategic, regional, and military operations and readiness.15 NDAA National Defense Authorization Act While all three are critical to national security, we ODU Old Dominion University chose to focus on the last category to add to the con- REPI Readiness and Environmental Protection gressional and military inquiries on the role of climate Initiative change in military readiness and operations pursued over the past few years.16 In the 2018 National Defense SERDP Strategic Environmental Research and Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress reaffirmed Development Program that climate change is a “direct threat to the national USFWS U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service security of the United States.”17 The law recognized multiple instances of climate-induced effects upon that are generalizable and applicable to other areas, U.S. military installations, ranging from the potential especially those with a significant military presence.14 for the Air Force’s Marshall Islands radar installation From these findings, we provide insights that can to be underwater within two decades to the fact that “a help foster the conditions and mechanisms for suc- three-foot rise in sea levels will threaten the operations cessful collaboration: of more than 128 United States military sites, and it is possible that many of these at-risk bases could be 1. Implement a regional, intergovernmental col- submerged in the coming years.” The act called for the laborative approach to climate change planning Secretary of Defense to produce a report within a year 2. Establish concrete common goals in the initial of the law’s passage on the vulnerabilities of military phases of collaborative arrangements installations to climate change over the next 20 years 3. Secure strong commitments from leaders and and mitigation needed to ensure installation and mis- stakeholders to the collaborative’s success, sion readiness.18 goals, and implementing measures In response to this requirement, DoD released a 4. Create durable lines of communication and report in January 2019 that outlined climate-related information-sharing among collaborators and events that have affected selected installations and with the public estimated the projected incidence of these types of 5. Identify and secure funding streams and events 20 years into the future. Limited in detail, the establish financial management processes. report described the results of a survey that asked 79 In the next section, we discuss recent congressio- mission assurance priority installations to report and nal and DoD examination of climate change’s effects project five types of climate-related events: recurrent on military installations. Following, we provide a defi- flooding, drought, desertification, wildfires, and nition of collaboration and an example of successful thawing permafrost. The report stated that recurrent

2 flooding, drought, and wildfires are the most sig- Approximately 33 percent of the 78 Air Force sites nificant current and potential future climate events within two kilometers of the coastline also expe- for the 79 installations. The 79 installations included rienced effects from flooding, including six major many from the Hampton Roads region, including Joint installations and multiple critical communications Base Langley-Eustis, Naval Station Norfolk, Naval and radar sites. For example, the rock seawall pro- Air Station Oceana, Naval Support Activity Hampton tecting Alaska’s Cape Lisburne Long Range Radar Roads, and Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads– Station’s northwest coastline deteriorated over the Northwest. The report highlighted that the greater past decade due to tidal and storm-driven wave Hampton Roads region is “one of the most vulnerable action. The gravel airstrip protected by the seawall to flooding military operational installation areas became unusable, forcing the Air Force to spend in the United States.”19 It included brief anecdotes $46.8 million to replace the 5,450-foot wall.25 of individual site experiences and short discussions of how a changing climate harms operations and mission execution, for example, recurrent flooding Collaborative Planning for affecting submarine squadrons and telecommunica- Climate Change 20 tions at Naval Base Guam. The report also briefly Collaboration Defined covered different DoD methods for building resiliency on installations both already in place and planned Over the past few decades, governments at all levels for the future, including implementing installation have been turning to collaboration with other stake- master planning, design, and construction standards holders to address the inherently complex and long- and conducting research to enhance resilience. For term challenge of a changing climate. For this study, instance, DoD’s Strategic Environmental Research we reviewed a selection of the scholarship on collabo- and Development Program (SERDP) began a project ration to define the broad term within the context of to “detect and assess drought response of sensitive climate change and identify approaches that appear riparian forests to drought stress” to better understand best suited to the challenge.26 Richard Margerum, an the potential impact of drought upon installations in expert in environmental management and planning, desert conditions.21 provided the definition we believe addresses the type DoD also issued a report in January 2018 on of collaboration needed for climate change planning: the results of a 2015 survey of more than 3,500 U.S. “Collaboration is an approach to solving complex military installations about their concerns regarding problems in which a diverse group of autonomous climate change and installation readiness.22 About stakeholders deliberates to build consensus and half of the installations reported they had already develop networks for translating consensus into experienced climate change–related effects, includ- results.”27 Margerum states that when addressing ing drought, wind, extreme temperature, non–storm complex planning questions, a long-term, ongo- surge flooding, flooding attributable to storm surge, ing relationship between entities is implied.28 With or wildfire.23 Airfields, transportation infrastructure, multifaceted planning efforts, such as climate change energy infrastructure, training and range facilities, planning, Margerum contends that stakeholders and water and wastewater systems were reported as “face complex problems with unclear data, changing most affected.24 conditions, and unclear intervention strategies. This Of particular interest to our research, the survey often means there is a need for ongoing arrangements asked targeted questions regarding the effects of spe- during implementation to respond to new informa- cific types of climate-related events, including coastal tion, make adjustments, and manage adaptively.”29 flooding. A number of installations identified coastal flooding from storm surge and non–storm surge as a concern. In the Navy, 45 percent of 292 sites within two kilometers of the coastline experienced effects from storm surge and non–storm surge flooding.

3 Choosing to Collaborate: Costs and Federal Support for Environmental and Benefits Climate Planning Collaboration

Choices about whether or when to collaborate are Collaborative and beneficial arrangements between shaped by the complexity and understanding of the different levels of government, especially within the problem, the number of stakeholders, the persistence environmental realm, already exist in many places.33 of the problem, the costs and benefits of the proposed One relevant example is the six-decade-long coop- collaboration, and the demands of decisionmakers eration between military installations, the U.S. Fish for solutions. As their understanding of a problem and Wildlife Service (USFWS), state natural resource increases, decisionmakers must weigh whether col- agencies, citizens, and environmental groups to laboration will improve problem solving or increase maintain natural resources on military bases, as transaction costs and interfere with decisionmaking mandated by the 1960 Sikes Act.34 and implementation. Many of the sources we reviewed The success of the collaborations resulting from conclude that collaboration is most useful in man- the Sikes Act can be seen in the Integrated Natural aging complex problems that cross organizational Resource Management Plans (INRMPs) implemented boundaries and affect a greater number of individuals, across the country. Since the passage of the Sikes Act, groups, and organizations.30 Collaboration becomes more than 340 military installations have collabo- a critical means of creating opportunities for stake- rated with federal, state, and local agencies to develop holder involvement. Including multiple representatives INRMPs and conduct projects that include natural from different groups and organizations and ensuring resource assessments, species and habitat monitor- adequate representation across affected groups helps to ing, forestry and rangeland management, adaptive ameliorate contention that arises when only one group management, and native habitat restoration. For or a few specific groups are represented.31 instance, on Marine Corps Base Camp LeJeune in Complex problems tend to persist over long North Carolina, Sikes Act projects “restored longleaf periods of time and across jurisdictional boundar- pine habitat on 521 acres, and enhanced endangered ies. Collaboration becomes a structured means of red-cockaded woodpecker habitat on 2,170 acres planning for adaptive actions to be taken over time, of upland pine. This decreased military training providing a channel through which stakeholders and restrictions and simultaneously restored the dwin- government representatives can continue to inter- dling red-cockaded woodpecker population.”35 In act and respond to problems as they arise and shift. another example, projects increased the population However, collaboration brings trade-offs in the form of three endangered or threatened species on Naval of both costs and benefits that should be considered Base Coronado near San Diego, California.36 During by potential participants before forming a collabo- congressional testimony in 2013 for the reauthoriza- rative. This is especially true because not all collab- tion of the Sikes Act, then–Acting Assistant Deputy oratives are successful. The costs of collaborations Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and include time, money, and staff. Enough people need Environment John Conger captured the overall suc- to be willing to participate in the collaborative, and cess of the collaborations when he stated, the participating organizations may require them to For more than 50 years, the Act has proven work additional hours and on a voluntary basis. The instrumental in helping our installations coor- benefits of collaboration include the opportunity to dinate with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service share and optimize limited financial resources, the (USFWS) and State fish and game agencies to ability to benefit from the knowledge and expertise develop many cooperative plans and projects of fellow participants from different organizations, . . . to successfully manage our Nation’s natural and the hope of better outcomes than each individual resources for both military mission and long- organization could achieve alone.32 term stewardship objectives.37 This example shows how collaboration is helping to address the complex issue of long-term

4 stewardship of public lands. Our research shows that climate change also appears to fit the type of Not only does climate problem that most benefits from collaboration. Key military reports on the subject also support collab- change exhibit the oration in this realm. For instance, the 2016 DoD Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan, in part characteristics of a geared toward updating guidance on regional climate change planning efforts, stated how the department problem that lends intended to work with others to address climate change.38 The department also touted the steps it itself to collaboration, had already taken to better coordinate with other governmental entities, showing that it considers but military leadership collaboration to be an important part of successfully also recognizes addressing climate change.39 Of specific significance for our research, the the applicability CNA Military Advisory Board’s most recent report on climate change and national security cited the and importance Hampton Roads region as an example of how collaboration will be necessary for climate change planning of collaboration to moving forward: planning for climate DoD realizes that the sea level rise will impact not only the Hampton Roads installation, but change. also the surrounding community. Put simply, DoD may modify roads and bridges, seawalls, piers, runways, and other mission-critical agencies, including the military services, on prepar- infrastructure on its installations, but the ing for anticipated sea-level rise. Our intent in using roads and bridges off base that are used by this case study is to understand the process that the military commuters will also need to be entities went through to collaborate, the successes evaluated for potential sea-level-rise impacts and challenges they encountered, and lessons learned and modified as needed. The same holds true that might inform similar future efforts in collabora- for water systems, local airports, local schools attended by military dependents, and other tive climate change planning. state and local infrastructure. As a result, mitigation solutions cannot be developed and implemented by DoD alone. DoD will need to Case Study: Hampton Roads, work with the Commonwealth of Virginia and Virginia the Hampton Roads–area local governments to The following sections explain why we chose the develop a comprehensive strategy.40 Hampton Roads region as our case study due to its Thus, not only does climate change exhibit relevance for both climate change and national secu- the characteristics of a problem that lends itself to rity, describe the background on and lessons learned collaboration, but military leadership also recognizes from the IPP, and provide overall insights and con- the applicability and importance of collaboration siderations from our research. to planning for climate change. To understand how such collaboration might work in a practical setting, we chose to examine the case of Hampton Roads, which recently conducted an Intergovernmental Pilot Project (IPP) between local governments and federal

5 Hampton Roads Military Installations The southeastern corner of the Commonwealth of world. According to a military expert panel report Virginia is collectively known as the Hampton Roads from 2018, the commands within the Hampton Roads region. The region includes the cities of Chesapeake, region affect “U.S. strategic objectives in the Pacific, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, the Middle East and North Africa, and Europe.” * Suffolk, and Virginia Beach and is pictured below in The same report states that “if significant portions of Figure 1. the Hampton Roads infrastructure, including Naval The region’s military installations (including Station Norfolk, were regularly inundated, as is pro- Joint Base Langley-Eustis [Air Force and Army]; Joint jected under a number of scenarios for the years 2035 Expeditionary Base Little Creek–Fort Story [Army to 2100, the impediment to force deployments and Navy]; Fifth Coast Guard District; U.S. Marine for critical Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific Corps Forces Command; Naval Station Oceana; war-fighting and humanitarian operations—many Naval Medical Center Portsmouth; and Naval Station of which are tied to core strategic goals of the United Norfolk) participate in a wide variety of mission States—would be significant.”† sets that directly connect to operations around the

FIGURE 1 Hampton Roads Infrastructure Vulnerable to Sea-Level Rise

SOURCE: CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change, 2014, p. 25. Used with permission. NOTE: Reference Sea Level is measured in a geocentric reference frame, relative to the center of the Earth.

* Center for Climate and Security, 2018, p. 43. † Center for Climate and Security, 2018, p. 23.

6 Relevance of the Region to Climate In the region, recent planning documents reflect and National Security Concerns the scientific consensus that sea levels will continue to rise by between 0.49 meters (1.61 feet) and Hampton Roads is a coastal region of Virginia with 2.3 meters (7.55 feet) by 2100.47 Sea-level rise can lead more than 1.7 million people and critical commercial, to coastal erosion and coastal tidal flooding, perma- industrial, and military facilities, including the largest nent inundation of coastal lands and communities, naval base in the world and a major port. The region and seawater intrusion of groundwater and surface has the largest concentration of military facilities and water. Trends of increasing precipitation intensity and personnel in the United States. According to a military volume are likely to continue,48 which will exacerbate expert panel report, the military presence in Hampton coastal and urban flooding. Together, increases in the Roads is “essential for overall military readiness and a magnitude and frequency of precipitation events and 41 range of critical operations.” heightened sea-level rise will likely lead to more fre- Naval Station Norfolk supports the entire U.S. quent flooding of roadways, disrupted traffic, limited Atlantic fleet. It berths 64 ships and 36 aircraft mobility, loss of coastal land area, declining property squadrons and is one of DoD’s key supply centers. values, and property damage to homes and businesses. Joint Base Langley-Eustis contains most of the F-22 Military installations could experience increases in force, and its Distributed Common Ground Station operations and maintenance expenditures; damage to sustains worldwide operations with intelligence, critical base infrastructure, such as runways or docks; surveillance, and reconnaissance planning. More than and loss of personnel readiness. 100,000 military and 40,000 civilian personnel serve at Furthermore, the region could experience commands that represent all branches of the mili- increases in the frequency of tropical and extratrop- tary and their facilities, including the North Atlantic ical storms,49 as well as increased wind speeds and Treaty Organization's (NATO’s) Allied Command rainfall rates associated with these storms.50 Some Transformation, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. studies project a 33-percent increase in the number Fleet Forces Command, the U.S. Air Force’s Air of snowstorms for the Hampton Roads region.51 Combat Command, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Extreme heat events could increase,52 with the num- Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine ber of days above 95°F53 increasing and average water Command.42 Former Secretary of Defense Leon temperatures rising 2°C to 6°C.54 While storms could Panetta, speaking of the Hampton Roads region, said, lead to widespread damage and disruption, tem- “simply put, this region houses perhaps the greatest perature changes could lead directly or indirectly to 43 concentration of military might in the world.” human health problems, higher energy consumption, Hampton Roads’ economy and security are tied disrupted coastal ecosystems,55 and algal blooms. closely to its coastline, which is already experiencing Communities across the region are grappling the daily effects of climate change, including sunny with how to adapt to existing changes and lessen the day flooding from sea-level rise and increases in impacts of future climate change. The majority of 44 extreme precipitation events. The effects of climate efforts have been unique to a single entity, and, in change reach military installations in two principal some cases, within those entities, hazard mitigation ways: (1) when critical assets and operations within planning has been done in isolation from other rele- a base are flooded or otherwise disrupted, and (2) vant departments or partners. For example, the City when access to bases is impeded by weather events, of Norfolk developed a Norfolk Resilience Strategy56 and service members who live in neighboring citiesor and Norfolk Vision 10057 independent of other juris- towns, or necessary supplies and equipment, cannot dictions in the region. reach installations. The combination of the proximity Collaborative efforts to address climate-related of critical infrastructure assets to the coastline, the issues have occurred through the Hampton Roads 45 nation’s highest rates of sea-level rise, and the size Hazard Mitigation Plan58 and the Hampton Roads Sea of the region’s population has led Hampton Roads to Level Rise Preparedness and Resilience IPP.59 Yet, for be cited as the second largest population center in the the region, the challenge of agreeing on the magnitude United States at risk from sea-level rise.46

7 of climate impacts, prioritizing investments, and com- broadened to a “whole of community” approach, with municating across entities has hindered cooperation. representation from DoD, federal agencies, the White In our exploration of whether and how collab- House, the Commonwealth of Virginia, multiple orative efforts between military and civilian enti- regional localities, and other local stakeholders. The ties have or could overcome such challenges, the steering committee convened representatives from the Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard, Virginia Department of Resilience IPP is the subject of this case study for Transportation, City of Norfolk, City of Portsmouth, a number of reasons. First, the IPP included local, ODU, and many others.62 federal, civilian, and military agencies, and thus The IPP relied primarily on time and resources provided insight into a multilevel intergovernmental volunteered by participating organizations. process. Second, the IPP completed its official work Participants attended meetings and produced work in 2016, allowing us time to interview participants on their own time due to a lack of official funding. As while the experience was still fresh in their minds.60 the designated convener, ODU supplied staff, com- Third, two of the experts interviewed had partici- munications, and event management support. The pated in other intergovernmental efforts on related project did not receive independent funding during environmental topics. Thus, the IPP allowed us to its first phase, while grants from private foundations examine an area directly affected by climate change provided a small amount of funding for working today and in the future, with a significant military groups to complete their research during the second presence, and with a recent experience in collabora- phase. The IPP’s final report noted the difficulties tion that could provide insight for similar efforts. presented by this lack of funding and recommended that future efforts ensure a dedicated source of mon- 63 Collaboration in Hampton Roads: etary support. The IPP’s organizational structure consisted of a Sea Level Rise Preparedness and steering committee, supporting working groups, and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot advisory committees. The steering committee sup- Project plied strategic direction from members representing Background local, state, and federal governments, as well as private entities. The steering committee signed a charter in The Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness October 2014, creating the majority of working groups and Resilience IPP began in 2014. It was selected by and advisory committees.64 The IPP comprised the the White House and DoD as one of six regional pilot following working groups and advisory committees: projects proposed under President Barack Obama’s executive order entitled “Preparing the United States • Working groups for the Impacts of Climate Change.” The region Ȥ Legal featured a wide variety of entities extending beyond Ȥ Infrastructure local governments and was the only pilot project of the Ȥ Land use planning (dissolved in December six proposed to have a community convener external 2015) to the direct participants, Old Dominion University Ȥ Citizen engagement (ODU). The project sought “to create a framework Ȥ Public health or template for regional intergovernmental strategic • Advisory committees planning that could be used outside of the region, and Ȥ Economic impacts to implement that integrated strategy in Hampton Ȥ Private infrastructure Roads, VA creating an effective and efficient method Ȥ Municipal planning for planning holistically for sea-level rise and flood- Ȥ Senior leadership 65 ing.”61 Encompassing the goals delineated for the Ȥ Science White House and DoD pilots, the participants imple- The working groups formed after the passage of mented a “whole of government” approach, which the charter, nominating chairs or cochairs to serve as

8 leaders and representatives for the individual groups during cross-group meetings.66 Nearly all of the Building a collaborative working group and committee chairs still active at the end of the IPP held positions at one of three local around an educational institutions: ODU, William & Mary, and the Virginia Institute of Marine Science. Each acknowledged, critical working group formed action plans and determined scopes for its work, meeting to discuss topics and problem encourages conduct necessary research. The IPP final report noted that participation in and frequency of meetings the active and for working groups varied throughout the effort and largely depended upon the availability and level of sustained participation engagement of participants.67 of relevant stakeholders. Halfway through the project, the steering committee, federal liaisons, working group and advisory committee chairs, and key stakeholders took part District Commission (HRPDC), continue the collab- in a full-day strategic planning session. The session orative work established by the IPP with a permanent provided the opportunity to assess the progress made staff and source of revenue. The resolution charged during the first year and establish a plan forward for the HRPDC with determining whether an indepen- the second year. After this assessment, the steering dent authority or further joint agreement would be committee began meeting on a monthly basis and necessary to implement plans developed by the col- established a formal timeline for achieving the goals laborative.71 However, after review and consideration of the project by the end of the second year.68 of the resolution, the HRPDC decided it could not Each of the working groups presented an individ- sign the resolution, as its members believed actual ual set of recommendations based upon their collec- implementation of planned actions should remain tive knowledge, research, and work conducted during with local jurisdictions and not a new regional the IPP. Consequently, the committees’ and working entity.72 Therefore, the overall recommendations groups’ recommendations focus upon the specific made by the resolution were not formally endorsed at topic and efforts of each group, and how these could the close of the IPP. continue within the region after the conclusion of the IPP. 69 Working group and committee recommenda- IPP Lessons Learned tions ranged from sharing data through a common To identify lessons learned from the IPP in terms of database between localities, by the Economic Impacts collaborative planning efforts, we interviewed nine Advisory Committee, to the development of specific participants73 who represented the different constit- planning standards, from the Private Infrastructure uencies present within the project: military/federal, Committee. Additionally, all of the working groups local, and regional.74 The following sections cover the and committees endorsed the idea of continuing the lessons we gleaned from these interviews, based upon collaborative by inviting all members of the IPP to be what worked well during the effort and what chal- involved in ongoing activities and the establishment lenges and barriers the participants faced. The final of a follow-on entity that would formalize the rela- section provides overall insights and considerations 70 tionships created during the IPP. Our research here derived from our research. essentially aims to expand upon this overall recommendation to understand how Hampton Roads and What Worked Best other regions can work together in a collaborative We asked the interviewees what they thought worked setting on climate change issues. best during the IPP and what they would recommend The final IPP recommendation was that a cur- for future collaborations. Their responses included rent regional entity, the Hampton Roads Planning agreement over the importance of the problem at

9 Diversity of Stakeholders By having a wide variety Including a diverse set of stakeholders in a collaborative ensures that different perspectives will be of participants, the brought to the problem at hand. Our interviews highlighted the fact that the IPP included a broad and IPP benefited from the diverse range of stakeholders, which was not necessarily true of similar efforts in other locations. As one knowledge and skill interviewee stated, “for the diversity of stakeholders, the IPP was incredibly successful. Other intergov- sets of individuals who ernmental pilot projects involved one base and one city. This one did more than that.”78 By having a wide might not otherwise variety of participants, the IPP benefited from the have been brought knowledge and skill sets of individuals who might not otherwise have been brought together to address together to address the the problem. problem. Support of Political Leadership Political leadership and buy-in can help ensure the success of a collaborative. During the IPP, the hand, the diversity of stakeholders involved, the support and endorsement of local political lead- backing of political leaders, the participation of an ers proved critical for the continuation of the pilot impartial convener, and opportunities for regular over its two-year span. Broader political leadership interaction between collaborative participants. support, especially from state and federal leaders, helped to spur the effort at the outset of the IPP. As Collective Recognition of the Problem’s Significance noted above, the IPP clearly had support from the Building a collaborative around an acknowledged, contemporaneous administration, serving as one of critical problem encourages the active and sustained the six pilot projects initiated by President Obama’s participation of relevant stakeholders. According 2014 executive order. Additionally, Senator Tim to our interviews on the IPP, officials reported that Kaine held a bipartisan event on the significance of most people in the Hampton Roads region recog- climate change to the region during the first month nized the need for action on sea-level rise and climate of the IPP. Actions and events by such leaders showed change due to their location and significant military committed and potential participants the political presence. Interviewees noted that it was surprisingly importance of the pilot.79 easy to get individuals to participate in the project. They affirmed that getting “people to come to the An Impartial Convener table” was not difficult.75 Despite a lack of funding, The IPP featured an impartial convener, ODU, which interviewees stated they were able to find relevant, played host to the pilot throughout the two years. educated experts and officials willing to commit time This unique aspect of the collaborative proved criti- to the effort. Officials also observed how impressive cal to the IPP’s functioning, serving as one of the best it was for organizations and individuals to remain features of the IPP, and thus our interviewees stressed involved in the pilot project for so long.76 One the benefits of including such an actor in future col- interviewee noted that since sea-level rise affects the laborative efforts. The officials we spoke with high- military, and the military provides such a strong base lighted that ODU provided a central hub for sharing for the local economy, supporting the effort simply and prioritization of information that otherwise made sense.77 might have proven difficult.80 Not only does having an impartial convener prevent any one participant from seemingly having more power than the others,

10 but such a convener can also supply a neutral location connections for the success of collaboration. Since at which participants can meet. The mere presence many organizations and persons may be involved in of a neutral location during the IPP put contributing the effort, these basic relations drive the overall coop- officials at ease and allowed them to build a stronger erative.86 This, however, was cited by interviewees sense of collegiality.81 as an obstacle because a significant amount of time was needed to build these relationships. In addition, Regular Interaction the level of engagement varied among participants, Collaborations often bring together individuals depending upon their perceived benefit of taking who do not know one another or have never worked part in the effort. This made equal participation together in the past. Consequently, collaborative across the working groups, committees, and project organizers should ensure opportunities for continued quite difficult.87 interaction between participants. Our interview- Third, interviewees noted the importance of ees emphasized that regular meetings held during including individuals with the power and authority the IPP were important for bringing participants to take action. When stakeholders lacked the ability 82 together on a consistent basis. to make changes and decisions within and for their own entities, participation and interest waned.88 Challenges to Collaboration Fourth, bringing in nongovernmental organiza- Through the course of our interviews, we identi- tions, such as representatives from the private sector, fied seven types of challenges or barriers to col- helps projects move beyond basic collaborations laboration:83 stakeholder engagement, leadership, to those that include the whole of the community. governance, funding, communication and informa- However, only select state and private sector repre- tion-sharing, political and cultural differences, and sentatives participated in the IPP, despite the pilot’s goal-setting. desire for a whole-of-community approach. An Stakeholder Engagement interviewee noted with regret that more businesses A key component of climate planning collabora- and state entities did not participate in the pilot tives is the continued engagement of stakeholders and believed more involvement from these types of throughout the duration of the effort. IPP partic- organizations would improve future collaborative 89 ipants reported four challenges with stakeholder efforts. engagement. Leadership First, interviewees asserted the importance of Strong leadership is crucial for the success of any recognizing what is needed to get participants to the collaboration.90 Since collaborative efforts require table and to keep them involved. This was of special the interaction of so many different parties, effective significance for the IPP, since it required voluntary leaders need to be continually engaged to ensure the participation. Knowing when, how, and under what consistent input of diffuse participants. Interviewees circumstances participants would meet helps to noted that top leaders had limited time for the project produce continuity, builds the relationships neces- and changed jobs or roles during the two-year pilot. sary to keep them coming to meetings, and ensures Since leadership often determined the level and dura- progress.84 However, this was not always straightfor- tion of commitment by an organization, the rotation ward. Interviewees cited challenges to stakeholder of individual leaders greatly affected the institutional engagement in the IPP from determining whom to knowledge and level of commitment provided by that work with in the military and ensuring a continued organization. Additionally, progress made under one commitment from the military establishment, due leader would often require starting anew with his or to changes in personnel as military members rotated her replacement.91 through their assignments.85 Second, interviewees also noted the importance of interpersonal relationships and of one-on-one

11 Governance challenge for the IPP, as it was never independently Collaborative efforts require entities not only to work sponsored outside of the administrative support together but also to work within the governance provided by ODU.93 In addition, the size and relative structures of their respective institutions. Prior to the economies of the cities posed some challenges, as IPP, Hampton Roads, like many regional authorities discussions over power and funding inevitably circled and governments, often addressed problems in a around which city had enough financial strength to siloed manner with each organization or jurisdiction fund mutually beneficial projects and programs.94 acting on its own. Different agencies worked on their individual plans and implemented solutions inde- Political and Cultural Differences pendently, and there was no governance structure for Agreement on the goals, metrics, and implementa- collaboration. The IPP and other similar efforts thus tion of collaborative efforts requires working through needed to build these channels from scratch. One a variety of perspectives. Political and economic other specific governance barrier occurred due to the differences among cities participating in the IPP inclusion of federal participants in the IPP. Federal caused difficulties between participants seeking to representatives could not vote on local decisions and come to agreement on such topics as the anticipated 95 could only participate in discussions and provide range of sea-level rise. Some entities proved hesitant vocal input or support. Thus, future collaboratives to acknowledge the importance of climate-related can benefit from developing organizational struc- issues, particularly due to a desire not to overstate tures and recognizing any limitations on participa- the problem and overly concern constituencies. This tion due to local, state, or federal regulations.92 limited the action that the participants agreed upon as they struggled to find a common base from which Funding to work in these instances.96 One interviewee noted Having a dedicated funding source can provide logisti- that there were some expected cultural differences cal and administrative support, enable a stronger com- between the main types of organizations involved. mitment from participants and leaders, and support For example, some cities elected to plan for rates of longer-term efforts through dedicated facilities and sea-level rise at the low end of scientific projections, staff to host and organize the collaborative’s meet- rather than at the middle or upper ranges, often due ings and activities. However, funding proved to be a to political and cultural views on climate change.97

Communication and Information Sharing Collaborative climate planning efforts often require the sharing of data, information, and models. In the Some cities elected to IPP, multiple interviewees stated that such sharing plan for rates of sea- proved difficult at times. Military installations were unable to disclose some information, such as specific level rise at the low end usage of critical access roads, because of national security concerns or restrictions, while private indus- of scientific projections, try participants needed to protect proprietary interests.98 One interviewee expressed frustration that lack rather than at the of information—for example, on how flooding affects military installations on a daily basis and the num- middle or upper ranges, ber of personnel affected by sea-level rise—impeded understanding of the magnitude of the problems often due to political being faced by the region.99 External communication beyond direct stake- and cultural views on holders and to the public helps to further ensure climate change. the duration and impact of a collaborative effort.

12 Interviewees highlighted the need for outreach 3. Climate change planning can be centralized meetings to discuss progress and gain input.100 One under, and be the sole priority of, one orga- official noted that “steadfast engagement and a com- nization, rather than one of many initiatives munication plan to the public [are] critical.”101 within multiple agencies.106

Early Goal-Setting Establishing concrete common goals is essential in the earliest phases of collaboration. For Stakeholders in collaborative efforts should identify collaboration to work, everyone must agree on the and share clear, measurable, and common goals. tangible problem, or set of problems, being addressed Interviewees stressed the importance of determin- and the desired outcomes. Knowing the problems ing such goals, ideally from the outset of the effort. and goals to be addressed by the effort not only Getting buy-in from all parties provides a basis from establishes common ground but also aids in forming which the collaboration can form and ensures that relationships and a common language on the topic, everyone is on the same page from the beginning. especially between civilian and military entities. Failure to do so early on delayed action during the Concrete goal-setting can also provide participants IPP, and interviewees believed successfully estab- with the evidence they need to encourage their orga- lishing goals could have improved the pilot’s overall nizations’ continued participation, which may prove outcomes.102 especially useful during transitions in leadership. Collaboratives should secure funding and Insights and Considerations establish financial management processes. Administration and participation can suffer with- We derived the following insights from both our out front-end and continuing funds for necessary case study covered in this section and our broader staff, facilities, and materials. Dedicated funding research for other officials and organizations seeking encourages stakeholder participation and allows for to use collaboration to enhance their climate change longer-term collaboration. Participants may consider 103 planning efforts: cost sharing based upon size and economic capability For installations and local governments seek- and seek external sources of funding from state, fed- ing to collaborate, a regional, intergovernmental eral, and nongovernmental sources.107 Collaboratives collaborative approach to climate change plan- should also designate a specific manager for the ning could provide a number of advantages. The funds, whether that be one of the participating mem- level of collaboration required will depend upon the bers, a third party, or a newly established organiza- specific situation and the determinations made by tion. Once the collaborative has secured funding for .104 governmental entities However, in some instances, itself and has produced goals and plans, additional a formal regional entity dedicated to climate plan- financial support may be needed to enact its initia- ning may prove to be the most durable option. Such tives. This type of funding will likely come directly entities could be authorized through federal, state, from participating organizations or state and federal or local agreements, and in partnership with public, funds. 105 private, or nonprofit partners. The primary benefits Leaders and stakeholders need to commit to of such an approach are threefold. the collaborative’s planning process and goals. 1. An established entity provides the consistency Leaders and stakeholders must be willing and able to needed to maintain and implement both a attend regular meetings, conduct necessary research long-term collaborative and resulting plans. and related tasks, and provide the administrative 2. A formal entity can facilitate fundraising and and funding support that will enable success in the the establishment of a dedicated staff commit- planning process and follow-through to implemented to achieving climate resiliency, rather than tation. This includes ensuring continuity of support relying on volunteer efforts that may falter through transitions in personnel and leadership, with administrative and political turnover. especially within the military. Members of leadership

13 committees and working groups must have the U.S. cities and local governments are now engaged authority to vote on initiatives, represent their in an unprecedented reappraisal of the resilience of organizations in decisionmaking processes, and take their critical infrastructure in the face of long-term action on decisions that address the collaborative’s changes to their region’s climate, including more-fre- goals. If voting or representation is limited, as in the quent or more-intense extreme climatic events. case of military and federal participation in local Many vital U.S. military installations are located governance, priority should be placed on including in or around these communities. The installations these representatives and their input in every other depend on a wide array of professional and technical possible forum. labor and services as well as the critical infrastruc- A sustained and inclusive communication ture—such as roads, electric power, and water—that strategy is vital to building trust-based relation- their local governmental entities provide to support ships essential for successful collaboration. Our operations and readiness. research highlighted three aspects of communication Facing these circumstances, local government critical to collaboration: and military authorities no longer have the luxury 1. Creating formal, established channels of of ignoring the threats to their mutual viability or communication among all types and levels of following their own independent paths. At the same stakeholders allows for the kind of consistent time, while collaborative planning is unobjectionable interaction required to build relationships. to promote, it is surprisingly difficult to do and even 2. Collaborative efforts should provide mecha- more difficult to do well. It requires a large number nisms for sharing data and information, either of disparate organizations—military and civilian, through a central clearinghouse or through public and private, local and regional—to come standardized channels. While sharing of together over the course of months and even years, certain data may be difficult due to national converge on a set of common goals, secure funding, security concerns, priority should still be develop a mutually agreeable plan, and then estab- placed upon sharing information that does lish and empower multiple organizations to act in not pose a security threat. concert. 3. Communication with external entities and When entering into these collaborative regional the general public facilitates critical input and planning processes, local government and military buy-in from the community. This is espe- entities may have different motivations, but they are cially important for climate change planning bound together by their mutual interest in main- efforts, which require the approval of local taining sustainable and resilient communities. U.S. constituencies. military services are focused on national security and ensuring their readiness to respond as security challenges arise. Cities and localities strive to pro- Concluding Thoughts mote economic growth and safeguard the well-being of their citizens. Still, they share responsibility in A changing climate presents near- and longer-term planning jointly to mitigate the highly uncertain, challenges to communities in the United States and complex, and pervasive challenges that a changing throughout the world. What was an abstract con- climate already poses now, and which will only be cern as recently as a decade ago has now become a magnified by 2040 and beyond. reality—and one that will worsen over time. Many

14 Appendix A: Climate Planning variety of methods and channels available for orga- Collaborations in the United nizations to coordinate among themselves, depend- States ing on the goals and objectives of particular efforts. These examples help to highlight the different types Through our research and interviews with partici- of collaboration that occur, from the formal, volun- pants in the Hampton Roads IPP, we identified other tary intergovernmental agreement of the Southeast collaborative efforts actively working to address Florida Regional Climate Change Compact to the environmental challenges within the United States. looser, voluntary participation of organizations The existence of such efforts shows how communities within the Charleston Resilience Network. have realized that they must work together if they hope to tackle complex climate planning topics. The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change relatively small number of current climate collabora- Compact tives also highlights the fact that these arrangements The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change are still fairly novel compared with other environ- Compact began in 2010 among Broward, Miami- mental management collaborations. The initiatives Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach counties for the we identified include: purpose of arriving at a common set of sea-level • Bay Area Regional Collaborative (California) rise scenarios and coordinating climate change • BayCAN (California) adaptation and mitigation activities. The compact, • Capital Region Climate Readiness adopted in 2009 and 2010 by each of the partici- Collaborative (California) pating counties, requires each county to work in • Central Coast Climate Collaborative close collaboration to develop joint legislative policy (California) statements on proposed climate and energy policies, • Charleston Resilience Network (South and a regional climate action plan. The counties each Carolina) promised to commit the needed staff and resources • Eastern Shore of Virginia Climate Adaptation to the effort to ensure that the compact continued Working Group (Virginia) and was implemented effectively. The effort has since • King County-Cities Climate Collaboration expanded beyond the four counties to include other (Washington) stakeholders, such as local municipalities, the South • LARC: Los Angeles Regional Collaborative for Florida Regional Planning Council, South Florida Climate Action and Sustainability (California) Water Management District, and the Florida chapter • North Coast Resource Partnership of the Nature Conservancy, to name a few.108 Since (California) its inception, the compact has issued two regional • Puget Sound Climate Preparedness climate change plans. The first Regional Climate Collaborative (Washington) Action Plan (RCAP), published in 2012 with a five- • San Diego Regional Climate Collaborative year planning horizon, provided recommendations, (California) implementation guidelines, and best practices for • Sierra CAMP (California) climate change adaption and mitigation. The com- • Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change pact issued the second RCAP in 2017, recapping the Compact actions taken since the first climate plan and lessons • Western Adaptation Alliance (Nevada, Utah, learned from the first plan’s implementation.109 Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas) To provide a sense of the extent of existing cli- Charleston Resilience Network mate collaborative efforts, we highlight two of these In contrast to the Southeast Florida Regional Climate initiatives: the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact and the IPP, the Charleston Change Compact and the Charleston Resilience Resilience Network is a completely voluntary net- Network. Scholarship on collaboration stresses the work of private and public sector organizations in the

15 Charleston, South Carolina, region. The network’s Interviews mission is to “foster a unified regional strategy and In conducting interviews with Hampton Roads offi- provide a forum to share science-based information, cials, we first identified categories of individuals we educate stakeholders, and enhance long-term plan- wished to speak with and then derived our list from 110 ning decisions that result in resilience.” The net- the list provided within the IPP’s final report. To work consists of an organizing committee, advising acquire perspectives from a wide variety of partici- members, partnering organizations, and participat- pants, we included representatives from the following ing organizations, allowing different levels of partic- categories in our proposed interviewee list: military ipation and commitment from entities. The network (Navy), city government, regional organizations, and holds a number of events throughout the year seeking academia. We then selected individuals from the IPP to build opportunities for coordination efforts to contact based on their background and on input 111 toward resilience to climate change. The network from our RAND Corporation advisors. We initially also brings together member and participating orga- contacted approximately 15 representatives and nizations to apply for funding for climate- and resil- received ten responses to those inquiries. Of those ten ience-related projects. The network, represented by responses, we conducted eight interviews with nine the South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, received individuals (one interview included two participants) grants from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric during a four-week period in fall 2018. Administration and the Department of Homeland The scope of our interviews was limited due to Security’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan time and resource constraints, but we managed to Security and Resilience Challenge for coastal infra- include at least one representative from each of our 112 structure projects. four categories. We conducted the interviews using a semistructured interview format, to enable us to Appendix B: Methodology make some comparisons across the interviews but also build in some flexibility to follow the direction Literature Review of the discussion. Our interview protocol included We performed searches using Google and Defense questions on the interviewees’ backgrounds and Technical Information Center search engines, as expertise; their experiences as participants in their well as DoD, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, respective collaboratives, including questions on SERDP, and Norfolk, Newport News, and Hampton their motivation for joining the collaborative, the city websites. Our initial searches focused on successes and challenges of the collaborative, and region-specific research, plans, and planning frame- the lessons they learned and recommendations they works related to climate adaptation, sea-level rise, would make to others; and short follow-up questions and hazard mitigation. We then expanded the search on any additional insights they could share based to higher-level state and federal government docu- on any other participation in intergovernmental ments, as well as integrated frameworks with broader collaboration, as relevant. We additionally employed application to intergovernmental planning and follow-up questions based on the information shared defense land use planning. We created an annotated by each individual interviewee, as needed. The bibliography referencing key points from each doc- interviews were conducted by phone; two individuals ument, the goals of the study or plan, the outcomes, from the research team always participated, with one and data relevant to this study. Literature was cate- leading and the other taking notes. The interviews gorized according to the following types: academic each lasted an hour on average. The interview notes literature; government reports and defense materials; formed the basis of our discussion within the report resilience, adaptation, and hazard mitigation plans on the Hampton Roads case study (in addition to our and planning frameworks; and public tools and data. extensive literature review) and were coded by topic, including benefits to collaboration, challenges to collaboration, lessons learned, and recommendations.

16 Appendix C: Climate Change The 2010 QDR responded to the requirement as a National Security Threat included in the 2008 NDAA by examining climate and Its Implications for Military change impacts on national security from two Installations perspectives: first, how a changing climate would affect the operating environment, roles, and missions Government and Expert Recognition of for the military; and second, the possible effects of Climate Change as a National Security climate change on facilities and military capabilities. Threat The report envisioned geopolitical impacts of climate change, noting that climate-induced natural disasters Climate change began to be widely recognized as a and other events could lead to additional conflict and national security threat in official circles early in the the need for more humanitarian assistance, poten- 21st century. In 2007, the CNA Military Advisory tially straining other mission-critical assignments. Board, consisting of 11 retired generals, admirals, The report recognized the vulnerabilities of instal- and commanders, issued a report entitled National lations and critical infrastructure, especially those 113 Security and the Threat of Climate Change. The located along U.S. coastlines, and called for efforts to report was the first to characterize climate change adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change. It as a “threat multiplier,” describing climate change also recommended a more comprehensive assessment as a legitimate and serious threat and imploring the of U.S. military installations’ vulnerabilities.118 national security community to consider its potential Building on these reports and laws, DoD released 114 impact on security broadly moving into the future. its Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap in 2014.119 It marked “the first time that such an elite body of The Roadmap addressed the potential impacts of military leaders expressed their concern over the climate change on DoD and national security. The 115 security implications of climate change.” Aimed Roadmap stated that DoD would be “integrating primarily at both a broad national audience and at climate change considerations into our plans, oper- DoD and military leadership within the services, ations, and training across the Department so we its recommendations included integrating climate can manage associated risks.” It set three main goals: change into national security strategies and assessing “(1) identify and assess the effects of climate change the effects of climate change on military installations upon the department, (2) integrate climate change 116 over the next 30 to 40 years. considerations across the department and manage That same year, Congress adopted the CNA associated risks, and (3) collaborate with internal and Advisory Board’s first recommendation. In the external stakeholders on climate change challeng- 2008 NDAA, passed in 2007, Congress required that es.”120 To provide concrete guidance and policy on the climate change assessment be included in the next incorporation of climate change into DoD’s National Security Strategy and National Defense business and planning, the department issued DoD Strategy. In these key documents, Congress directed Directive 4715.21, Climate Change Adaptation and DoD to “(1) . . . assess the risks of projected climate Resilience, in January 2016.121 The directive desig- change to current and future missions of the armed nated responsibilities among department and service forces; (2) update defense plans based on these assess- heads to carry out the three goals identified within ments, including working with allies and partners the Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap to build to incorporate climate mitigation strategies, capac- resilience across the department.122 In September ity building, and relevant research development; 2016, DoD released its Strategic Sustainability and (3) develop the capabilities needed to reduce Performance Plan, which stated the department’s future impacts.” Congress also required the next commitment to reducing its impact on the envi- Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to consider the ronment. The report recognized climate change “capabilities of the armed forces to respond to climate as posing multiple challenges to national security 117 change.” and called for improving installation resiliency

17 and efficiency as a critical component of continued new challenges that did not exist before. The sec- sustainability.123 ond category focuses on how climate change affects regions differently, thereby creating unique challenges Climate Change Implications for that must be addressed to meet each of those specific needs. The third category relates to the ways in which Military Installations climate change affects the operations and capabilities Climate change implications for national security can of the U.S. military. Climate change presents multiple be organized into three main categories: geostrategic, types of challenges to military operations and capa- regional, and military operations and readiness.124 bilities, making it more difficult to carry out and meet Geostrategic implications represent the ways in which the missions of the armed services. Climate change climate change acts as a threat multiplier by increasing directly influences the military’s readiness, infra- tensions that already exist, such as increased instability structure, personnel, and logistics in a variety of ways. in regions with constrained access to water resources Table C.1 provides examples of the ways in which that is anticipated to become worse due to climate climate change may challenge military operations and change. Climate change can also serve as a catalyst for capabilities.

TABLE C.1 Potential Climate Impacts on Military Operations and Capabilities

Operations and Logistics and Capabilities Personnel and Training Infrastructure Supply

Mission Training areas: Change in access to Infrastructure: On military installations Logistics: Impact of fulfillment: training areas/ranges; increased damage and within surrounding communities may transportation and Altered ability and consequent repair to training lands be impacted by changing weather patterns distribution of goods to successfully and areas and events, including: and material; altered carry out missions • Transportation facilities availability of natural due to increased • Water/wastewater systems resources such as occurrence of • Headquarters buildings water extreme weather • Information systems • Energy structures Military Training opportunities: Reduced number • Fueling infrastructure readiness: Capacity of days available for training due to various • Heating, ventilation, and air to be prepared weather conditions: extreme heat/cold, conditioning systems to meet assigned dry/drought conditions leading to wildfires • Roads missions and inability to train with explosives, • Bridges extreme storms and heavy rain, increased • Parking flooding due to elevated sea levels and • Sewage systems precipitation • Training/testing lands • Command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (radars, towers, etc.) • Environmental restoration sites • Historical/cultural resources • Rail lines • Cooling/heating costs Supply: Impacts upon space for—and storage, inspection, and maintenance of— goods and material

18 Table C.1—Continued Operations and Logistics and Capabilities Personnel and Training Infrastructure Supply

Force Personnel access: Ability to get to base External partners deployments: from surrounding communities and suppliers: Capabilities for Effects of weather on operations overseas private suppliers to may be affected by military installations, increased extreme both in production weather patterns and distribution and events due to strategic capabilities of bases, especially those in coastal areas

Dispersed forces: Personnel support: Ability of civilian and Capability to military employees to provide support meet national functions on daily basis security missions as forces address more frequent natural disasters/ emergencies; account for otherwise occupied forces in total force structure

Natural resources: Lands and resources relied upon by installations impacted by extreme weather Emergency services: Ability to protect life through the maintenance and support of hospital, clinic, and emergency operations centers Airfield operations: Ability to sustain landing and takeoff of aircraft Water services: Ability to provide port and pier services for water- based vehicles SOURCES: CNA Military Advisory Board, 2014; Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program, Assessing Impacts of Climate Change on Coastal Military Installations: Policy Implications, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2013; Center for Climate and Security, 2018.

19 Notes For more on defining military readiness, see Russe Rumbaugh, Defining Readiness: Background and Issues for Congress, Wash- 1 Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Military Advisory Board, ington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2017. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, Alexandria, 12 Va.: CNA Corporation, 2007, p. 3; U.S. Department of Defense DoD, 2017, pp. 7, 9. (DoD), Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Washington, D.C., 13 Typically, about 70 percent of an installation’s working popu- March 2014, p. 8. lation will live off-base, making access to the base critical for its 2 Gregory F. Treverton, Erik Nemeth, and Sinduja Srinivasan, day-to-day functioning. Threat Without Threateners? Exploring Intersections of Threats to 14 In developing these recommendations, we acknowledge that the Global Commons and National Security, Santa Monica, Calif.: localities and the military may have different perspectives on RAND Corporation, OP-360-SGTF, 2012. long-term climate change planning based on their respective 3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate constituencies and missions. Military services, in some cases, Change 2014 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers, 2014. may shift their missions and capabilities based upon the need to adapt to changing strategic requirements, climate change or 4 Adaptation measures seek to enhance the long-term resilience other environmental conditions, or other causes. Local govern- of human systems and make them less vulnerable to climate ments do not have the option to relocate, except in the direst of change. According to the IPCC, climate change adaptation is circumstances. Consequently, perspectives and levels of interest focused on the consequences rather than the causes of climate in collaboration will likely differ. However, for the purpose of change; “adaptation is defined as adjustments in human and this research, we assume that installations in the case study will natural systems, in response to actual or expected climate stimuli maintain their missions and capabilities in the region. While or their effects, that moderate harm or exploit beneficial oppor- some missions could be shifted elsewhere, we also assume that tunities.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hampton Roads installations will remain in place and could be “Climate Change Impacts,” webpage, 2018; IPCC, 2014. granted new missions and capabilities in the future. 5 Climate adaptation plans can either be stand-alone docu- 15 These three categories were derived from those presented ments or integrated into other critical planning processes, such within CNA Military Advisory Board, 2007. as land use plans or hazard mitigation plans. 16 Since the beginning of the 21st century, several reports 6 IPCC, 2014. issued by the federal government and national security experts and practitioners have identified climate change as a threat to 7 The Rockefeller Foundation's 100 Resilient Cities project national security. For a review of those reports, see Appendix C. defines urban resilience, for example, as “the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a The pending bill for the Fiscal Year 2020 National Defense city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds of chronic Authorization Act (NDAA) includes a section that directs mil- stresses and acute shocks they experience” (100 Resilient Cities, itary installations to address installation resilience within their “What is Urban Resilience?” webpage, undated). In a broader master plans. This includes assessing multiple factors, ranging regional context, resilience can be generalized to mean “the from risks and threats of “extreme weather events, mean sea level ability of a social, ecological, or socio-ecological system and its fluctuation, wildfires, flooding and other environmental condi- components to anticipate, reduce, accommodate, or recover from tions” to vulnerabilities in assets and infrastructure, to agree- the effects of a hazardous event or trend in a timely and efficient ments with external entities for maintaining or enhancing base manner,” as defined by the IPCC, 2014. resilience. See U.S. House of Representatives, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, H.R. 2500, July 12, 2019. 8 Jan Corfee-Morlot, Ian Cochran, Stephane Hallegatte, and 17 Pierre-Jonathan Teasdale, “Multilevel Risk Governance and Public Law 115-91, National Defense Authorization Act Urban Adaptation Policy,” Climatic Change, Vol. 104, 2011; Neil for Fiscal Year 2018, December 12, 2017. Congress affirmed W. Adger, Nigel W. Arnell, and Emma L. Tompkins, “Successful statements made in previous laws and governmental reports; see Adaptation to Climate Change Across Scales,” Global Environ- Appendix C for a discussion of these laws and reports. mental Change, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2005; Joern Birkmann, Mat- Work conducted and support provided by the Union for thias Garschagen, Frauke Kraas, and Nguyen Quang, “Adaptive Concerned Scientists and the Center for Climate and Security Urban Governance: New Challenges for the Second Generation aided in the inclusion of the climate change provisions in the of Urban Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change,” Sustainabil- 2018 NDAA. See Union of Concerned Scientists, The US Military ity Science, Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2010. on the Front Lines of Rising Seas, Washington, D.C., 2016; and Center for Climate and Security, Military Expert Panel Report: 9 See Appendix A for examples of existing collaborative climate Sea Level Rise and the U.S. Military’s Mission, Washington, D.C., planning entities. September 2016. 10 DoD, Base Structure Report—Fiscal Year 2017 Baseline, 18 Pub. L. 115-91, 2017, Section 335, pp. 1357–1359. Washington, D.C., 2017, pp. 7, 9. 19 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 11 The Congressional Research Service identified two princi- and Sustainment, Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the pal meanings of the term military readiness, one broad and the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., January 2019, pp. 4–6 other narrow. We apply the broad meaning of military readiness and Appendix. they identified, which states that readiness describes “whether 20 military forces are able to do what the nations asks of them.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, 2019, pp. 5–10.

20 21 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and laboration in Environmental Governance, Northampton, Mass.: Sustainment, 2019, pp. 10–16. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. 28 22 While the report does not provide a list of the specific Margerum, 2011, pp. 6–7 installations, locator dots on maps in the report show that at least 29 Margerum, 2011, p. 9. some of the installations included in the report are located in the Hampton Roads region. See Office of the Under Secretary of 30 Some examples of the sources that discuss the benefits of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Climate- using collaboration for complex problems include Agranoff, Related Risk to DoD Infrastructure Initial Vulnerability Assess- 2012; Robert Agranoff, “Managing Collaborative Performance: ment Survey (SLVAS) Report, Washington D.C.: U.S. Department Changing the Boundaries of the State?” Public Performance & of Defense, 2018, pp. 3–6. Management Review, Vol. 29, No. 1, September 2005; Bardach, 1998; Annie Bennett and Jessica Grannis, Lessons in Regional 23 These climate impacts are those considered in Office of the Resilience: Case Studies on Regional Climate Collaboratives, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Climate Center, January 2017; Logistics, 2018. Non–storm surge flooding is defined in the report Barbara Gray and Donna J. Wood, “Collaborative Alliances: to include flooding of facilities and assets due to rain, snow, sleet, Moving from Practice to Theory,” Journal of Applied Behavioral ice, and river overflow. Storm surge flooding is conceptualized Science, Vol. 27, No. 1, March 1991; Mark T. Imperial and Derek as coastal flooding due to the rise in water from a storm event. Kauneckis, “Moving from Conflict to Collaboration: Watershed The impacts of sea-level rise on coastal DoD infrastructure were Governance in Lake Tahoe,” Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 43, included in the study’s survey, but the results of this portion of Fall 2003; Beth E. Lachman, Susan A. Resetar, and Frank Camm, the survey are not included in the report. Military Installation Public-to-Public Partnerships: Lessons from 24 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Past and Current Experiences, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Cor- Technology, and Logistics, 2018, pp. 1–2. poration RR-1419-A/AF/NAVY/OSD, 2016, Linden, 2002; Rich- ard D. Margerum and Cathy J. Robinson, eds. The Challenges 25 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, of Collaboration in Environmental Governance, Northampton, Technology, and Logistics, 2018, pp. 10, 17–18. Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016; Ray McPadden and 26 There are multiple definitions and considerations of the term Richard D. Margerum, “Improving National Park Service and collaboration that inform and support the definition we selected. Nonprofit Partnerships—Lessons from the National Trail Much of the literature on collaboration refers to a 1998 definition System,” Society & Natural Resources, Vol. 27, No. 12, 2014; and provided by public management scholar Eugene Bardach that Jeffrey D. Straussman, “Focusing on Collaboration Techniques,” collaboration is “any joint activity by two or more organizations Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 23, intended to increase public value while working together rather No. 4, October 2013. than separately.” Russell Linden describes collaboration as 31 Margerum, 2011, pp. 10–11. when “people from different organizations (or units within one 32 organization) produce something together through joint effort, Linden, 2002, p. 7; Margerum, 2011, pp. 6–11. resources, and decision making, and share ownership of the final 33 In addition to the example cited in the text, the research team product or service.” (Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work investigated a number of other regional collaborative arrange- Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftmanship, ments, including the Readiness and Environmental Protection Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998, p. 8; Russell Initiative (REPI) and the Integrated Regional Water Management M. Linden, Working Across Boundaries: Making Collaboration Plans in California—which include the engagement of civilian Work in Government and Nonprofit Organizations, San Fran- and local military entities—and regional examples, such as the cisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 2002, p. 7) Charleston Resilience Network in South Carolina and the South-

Definitions of collaboration tend to be rather broad, and east Florida Regional Climate Change Compact. Previous RAND understandably so, as collaboration encompasses a wide variety research on the REPI program specifically highlights the benefits of potential actions between a wide variety of potential actors. of the REPI collaboratives to military participants, including Collaboration can vary from informal interaction between mem- better community relations, better relationships with external bers of different agencies to formal agreements between entire organizations, and improved internal communication and rela- organizations. Robert Agranoff, a scholar of intergovernmental tions. See Beth Lachman, Anny Wong, and Susan A. Resetar, The relations and management, provides a useful framework to show Thin Green Line: An Assessment of DoD’s Readiness and Environ- four possible levels of collaboration: “minimal engagement, mental Protection Initiative to Buffer Installation Encroachment, intermittent interaction; minimal engagement, regular interac- Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, MG-612-OSD, 2007. tion; maximum engagement, intermittent action; and maximum engagement, regular interaction” (Robert Agranoff, Collaborat- 34 The Sikes Act directed the Secretary of Defense to plan, ing to Manage: A Primer for the Public Sector, Washington, D.C.: develop, and maintain natural resources on military installa- Georgetown University Press, 2012, p. 14). tions. The restrictions placed upon installations due to safety and security often mean that large tracts of land go relatively 27 Richard D. Margerum, Beyond Consensus: Improving Collabo- untouched and thus serve as ideal habitats for fish, wildlife, and rative Planning and Management, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, plants. The Sikes Act sought to protect these habitats by encour- 2011, p. 6. For a concise overview of collaboration as a concept, aging the strategic management of these resources through see also Richard D. Margerum, “Introduction: The Challenges cooperative agreements among DoD, FWS, and state agencies. of Collaboration in Environmental Governance,” in Richard D. In 1997, amendments to the act required DoD installations with Margerum and Cathy J. Robinson, eds., The Challenges of Col- significant natural resources to develop Integrated Natural

21 Resource Management Plans (INRMPs) in coordination with 45 Relative sea-level rise is defined as the combined effects of the other agencies. This cooperation often includes local entities, land subsidence from groundwater pumping and post-glacial ranging from interested citizens to related environmental groups sinking in the earth’s crust, flat topography, and sea-level rise. like the Nature Conservancy. The plans must be kept up to date, 46 with agencies required to reconfirm their commitment to the Steinhilber, Whitelaw, and Considine, 2015. plans every five years with a formal review. The fact that the 47 Raymond G. Najjar, Christopher R. Pyke, Mary Beth Adams, Sikes Act requires collaboration contributed to the collaborative’s Denise Breitburg, Carl Hershner, Michael Kemp, Robert How- continued success and implementation. Without a legal require- arth, Margaret R. Mulholland, Michael Paolisso, David Secor, ment and continued oversight by congressional committees, Kevin Sellner, Denise Wardrop, and Robert Wood, “Potential this collaborative effort might have faced similar challenges to Climate-Change Impacts on the Chesapeake Bay,” Estuarine, other, more voluntary endeavors, such as the Intergovernmen- Coastal, and Shelf Science, Vol. 86, No. 1, January 2010; Virginia tal Pilot Project (IPP) presented in this research. See Teresa K. Institute of Marine Science, “Norfolk, Virginia Sea-Level Report Hollingsworth, “The Sikes Improvement Act of 1997: Examining Card, 2050 Projection,” database, undated; Ben McFarlane, the Changes for the Department of Defense,” Air Force Law Coastal Resiliency: Adapting to Climate Change in Hampton Review, Vol. 46, 1991, pp. 112–113 and 118–119; and U.S. Fish and Roads, Hampton Roads, Va.: Hampton Roads Planning District Wildlife Service, “Legislative History of the Sikes Act,” webpage, Commission (HRPDC), July 2013. October 2015. 48 Najjar et al., 2010; Travis Madsen and Nathan Wilcox, When 35 U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 910, Sikes Act Reautho- It Rains, It Pours: Global Warming and the Increase in Extreme rization Act of 2013; and H.R. 1080, To Amend the Sikes Act to Precipitation from 1948–2011, Baltimore, Md.: Environment Promote the Use of Cooperative Agreements and to Amend Title America Research & Policy Center, 2012. 10 U.S.C. to Facilitate Inter-Agency Cooperation in Conservation 49 Programs to Avoid or Reduce Adverse Impacts on Military Read- Najjar et al., 2010. iness Activities, hearing before the Subcommittee on Fisheries, 50 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, What Climate Change Wildlife, Oceans, and Insular Affairs of the Committee on Natu- Means for Virginia, Washington D.C., 2016. ral Resources, Washington, D.C., March 21, 2013, p. 5. 51 Madsen and Wilcox, 2012. 36 U.S. House of Representatives, 2013, p. 8. 52 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016; HRPDC, Hamp- 37 U.S. House of Representatives, 2013, p. 8. ton Roads Hazard Mitigation Plan, Hampton Roads, Va., January 38 DoD, Strategic Sustainability Performance Plan FY 2016, 10, 2017. Washington, D.C., September 2016, p. ES-5. 53 L. M. Carter, J. W. Jones, L. Berry, V. Burkett, J. F. Murley, 39 “DoD also made major strides in developing processes to J. Obeysekera, P. J. Schramm, and D. Wear, “Ch. 17: Southeast address climate effects on a regional basis, collaborating with and the Caribbean,” in Climate Change Impacts in the United surrounding communities and local and state governments to States: The Third National Climate Assessment, U.S. Global identify ways to leverage one another’s capabilities and become Change Research Program, 2014. more resilient together. As the effects of a changing climate 54 Najjar et al., 2010. continue to affect today’s perception of normal and the ability to carry out the DoD mission, it is critical that the Department have 55 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2016. in place appropriate planning processes” (DoD, 2016, p. 32). 56 City of Norfolk, Norfolk Resilient Strategy, Norfolk, Va., 40 CNA Military Advisory Board, National Security and the October 2015. Accelerating Risks of Climate Change, Alexandria, Va.: CNA 57 City of Norfolk, Norfolk Vision 2100, Norfolk, Va., November Corporation, 2014, p. 25. 22, 2016. 41 Center for Climate and Security, Military Expert Panel Report: 58 HRPDC, 2017. Sea Level Rise and the U.S. Military's Mission, 2nd ed., Washing- ton, D.C., February 2018, p. 43. 59 Additional collaborative planning in the region includes the American Flood Coalition, which includes stakeholders from 42 Center for Climate and Security, 2018, pp. 43–44; Matt Virginia, Florida, and South Carolina (American Flood Coali- Connolly, “Hampton Roads, Virginia, and the Military’s Battle tion, “About Us,” webpage, undated), and the Hampton Roads Against Sea Level Rise,” Briefer No. 27, Center for Climate and Military and Federal Facilities Alliance, which does not focus Security, October 14, 2015; Hampton Roads Chamber of Com- solely on climate resilience planning (Hampton Roads Military merce, “Our Military,” webpage, undated. and Federal Facilities Alliance, “About Us,” webpage, undated). 43 Leon Panetta, “Secretary of Defense Speech,” speech delivered Emily Steinhilber, Maura Boswell, Carol Considine, and Larry to Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce, Hampton Roads, Mast, Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and Resilience Va., October 19, 2012. Intergovernmental Pilot Project Phase 2 Report: Recommenda- tions, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned, Norfolk, Va.: Old 44 Emily Steinhilber, John Whitelaw, and Carol Considine, Dominion University, 2016, p. 10. Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and Resilience Inter- governmental Pilot Project Phase 1 Report: Accomplishments and 60 The research for this project began in 2017 Lessons Learned, Norfolk, Va.: Old Dominion University, 2015. 61 Steinhilber et al., 2016, p. 10.

22 62 Steinhilber et al., 2016, pp. 16–17. 82 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S3, university official famil- 63 Steinhilber et al., 2016, pp. 16, 20, 32; Steinhilber, Whitelaw, iar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018. and Considine, 2015, p. 11. 83 We asked Hampton Roads officials about challenges they 64 Steinhilber, Whitelaw, and Considine, 2015, pp. 12–13. faced in collaborating with other entities. While the final report 65 Steinhilber, Whitelaw, and Considine, 2015, p. 13. on the IPP provides some discussion of barriers within each of the working groups, lessons learned often revolved around the 66 While our research here focuses on the collaborative process specific topic area (economic, infrastructure, etc.), rather than that unfolded during the IPP, more information on the topics broader considerations of collaboration. We add to conclusions and issues covered by each of the working groups can be found already described in the IPP’s reports by primarily focusing on in the IPP’s reports. See Steinhilber et al., 2016, and Steinhilber, participants’ experiences with collaboration. Our goal in our dis- Whitelaw, and Considine, 2015. cussions with IPP participants was to broaden their experiences 67 Steinhilber et al., 2016, pp. 19–22. to be applicable beyond the Hampton Roads region to other cases and regions interested in pursuing collaborative efforts. 68 Steinhilber et al., 2016, pp. 17–20. 84 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change 69 For a full list of the recommendations from each of the work- planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S4, retired Navy official ing groups and committees, see Steinhilber et al., 2016, pp. 62–71. familiar with the IPP, August 13, 2018; Interview S5, city official familiar with local government–military collaboration, August 70 Steinhilber et al., 2016, pp. 62–71. 14, 2018; Interview S8, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, 71 Steinhilber et al., 2016, Appendix C-1. August 30, 2018. 72 Steinhilber et al., 2016, Appendix C-2. 85 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S3, university official famil- 73 We conducted eight interviews with nine individuals, where iar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S8, one interview included two participants. For more information, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, August 30, 2018. refer to Appendix B. 86 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change 74 Regional representatives included those from the Hampton planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S4, retired Navy official Roads Region Planning District and ODU as the project’s official familiar with the IPP, August 13, 2018; Interview S5, city official convener. familiar with local government–military collaboration, August 75 The IPP’s Phase 2 report notes that some participating 14, 2018; Interview S8, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, organizations tasked individuals from their organizations with August 30, 2018. participation in the project. See Steinhilber et al., 2016, p. 16. 87 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change 76 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S3, university official famil- planning, August 6, 2018, and Interview S2, city official familiar iar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S8, with land use planning, August 7, 2018. retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, August 30, 2018. 88 77 Interview S2, 2018. Interview S7, city official familiar with local government– military collaboration, August 27, 2018. 78 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change 89 planning, August 6, 2018. Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S3, university official famil- 79 Interview S3, university official familiar with climate change iar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018; and Interview planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S4, retired Navy official S8, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, August 30, 2018. familiar with the IPP, August 13, 2018; Interview S7, city official 90 familiar with local government–military collaboration, August Interview S3, university official familiar with climate change 27, 2018; “Kaine, Rigell, Scott, Wittman Host Sea Level Rise planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S7, city official familiar with Conference in Norfolk,” press release, Senator Tim Kaine News, local government–military collaboration, August 27, 2018. June 30, 2014. 91 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change 80 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S3, university official famil- planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S2, city official familiar with iar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S8, land use planning, August 7, 2018; Interview S4, retired Navy retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, August 30, 2018. official familiar with the IPP, August 13, 2018; Interview S5, city 92 Interview S4, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, official familiar with local government–military collaboration, August 13, 2018. August 14, 2018. 93 Interview S4, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, 81 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change August 13, 2018. planning, August 6, 2018; and Interview S4, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, August 13, 2018. 94 Interview S2, city official familiar with land use planning, August 7, 2018; Interview S3, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018.

23 95 While our interviewees emphasized these types of challenges multijurisdictional collaboration needed for climate adaptation that arose between the cities involved in the collaborative, and planning. additional RAND research highlights some of the challenges that 107 As of July 2019, one such funding option is DoD’s Office of have occurred between civilian and military entities involved in Economic Adjustment federal funding opportunity for col- partnerships. See Lachman, Resetar, and Camm, 2016. laborative installation and civilian coordination and planning 96 Interview S3, university official familiar with climate change (“Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary: Announce- planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S7, city official familiar ment of Federal Funding Opportunity,” Federal Register, Vol. 84, with local government–military collaboration, August 27, 2018; No. 150, July 30, 2019). Interview S8, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, August 108 Sydney Menees and Jessica Grannis, Lessons in Regional 30, 2018. Resilience: The Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Com- 97 Interview S4, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, pact, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Climate Center, January August 13, 2018. 2017, pp. 1–4; Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Com- pact, “What Is the Compact?” webpage, undated-a. 98 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change 109 planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S3, university official famil- Menees and Grannis, 2017, pp. 9–10; Southeast Florida iar with climate change planning, August 8, 2018; Interview S5, Regional Climate Change Compact, “What Is the RCAP?” web- city official familiar with local government–military collabora- page, undated-b. tion, August 14, 2018. 110 Charleston Resilience Network, “Our Mission,” webpage, 99 Interview S2, city official familiar with land use planning, undated-c. August 7, 2019. 111 Charleston Resilience Network, “Who We Are,” webpage, 100 Interview S4, retired Navy official familiar with the IPP, undated-d. August 13, 2018; Interview S7, city official familiar with local 112 Charleston Resilience Network, “NOAA Resilience Grant,” government–military collaboration, August 27, 2018. webpage, undated-b. 101 Interview S7, city official familiar with local government– 113 CNA Military Advisory Board, 2007. military collaboration, August 27, 2018. 114 CNA Military Advisory Board, 2007, p. 6. 102 Interview S1, university official familiar with climate change planning, August 6, 2018; Interview S2, city official familiar 115 CNA Military Advisory Board, 2014, p. i. with land use planning, August 7, 2018; Interview S7, city official 116 CNA Military Advisory Board, 2007, pp. 44–48. familiar with local government–military collaboration, August 27, 2018. 117 Public Law 110-81, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, January 28, 2008, p. 290. 103 Due to the multitude of complex issues facing governments and stakeholders, several of these recommendations may also be 118 DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., applicable to other transboundary problems. February 2010, pp. 84–86. 104 Collaborations are built upon relationships between indi- 119 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Energy, Installa- viduals and entities that take time to mature and develop. Some tions, and Environment, 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Road- regions may have rich, existing collaborations or regional col- map, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, June 2014. laboratives that could be leveraged for regional climate resilience 120 planning efforts. Some examples include Joint Land Use Studies, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Energy, Installa- Sentinel Landscapes, and the REPI Program. tions, and Environment, 2014, Foreword and p. 1. 121 105 Support for such agreements from the federal government, DoD Directive 4715.21, Climate Change Adaptation and especially through statutory requirements to collaborate, could Resilience, Washington, D.C., January 2016. further ensure the continued engagement of all stakeholders. 122 DoD Directive 4715.21, 2016, p. 3. 106 Such centralization of planning and decisionmaking could 123 DoD, 2016, p. ES-5. be of particular benefit in states and localities in which existing 124 governance structures may impede the type of multiagency and These three categories were derived from the organization of CNA Military Advisory Board, 2007.

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28 Security 2040 in hydrology and water resources engineering from the This report is part of a RAND initiative to envision critical University of California, Los Angeles. security challenges in the world of 2040, considering the Kristin Van Abel is a senior technical analyst at the effects of political, technological, social, and demographic RAND Corporation whose research covers energy and trends that will shape those security challenges in the com- environmental policy, Arctic policy, critical infrastructure, ing decades. The research was conducted within the RAND national security, and strategic and long-term planning. Center for Global Risk and Security. Recent work includes developing frameworks to assess energy assurance across Air Force installations and evaluate The RAND Center for Global Risk and energy resilience investments; examining the potential implications of changes in international Arctic activities for Security U.S. defense strategy and energy security; and identifying The Center for Global Risk and Security works across the potential gaps in Coast Guard Arctic capabilities. RAND Corporation to develop multidisciplinary research and policy analysis dealing with systemic risks to global security. Acknowledgments The center draws on RAND’s expertise to complement and expand RAND research in many fields, including security, We gratefully acknowledge the time and input from local economics, health, and technology. A board of distinguished experts on climate planning and military installation man- business leaders, philanthropists, and former policymakers agement in the Hampton Roads region. We are particularly advises and supports the center’s activities, which are increas- appreciative of Debra Knopman for her in-depth recom- ingly focused on global security trends and the impact of mendations, guidance, and support throughout the research disruptive technologies on risk and security. For more infor- and review process. We also thank Jordan Fischbach and mation about the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security, Jennifer Moroney for their advisory roles, as well as Susan visit www.rand.org/international/cgrs. Resetar and Sherri Goodman for their thorough and valu- able reviews of this work. Funding Funding for this report was provided by the generous con- tributions of the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security Advisory Board. Support for this project was also provided, in part, by the fees earned on client-funded research.

About the Authors Maria McCollester is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation whose educational and professional experience coalesces around institutional and organizational development, coordination, and culture, especially within the Executive Branch and military; program evalu- ation and assessment, both within and outside of government; and legislative and regulatory analysis. Her research interests include Executive Branch and federal agency administration, foreign policy, environmental policy, national security, bureaucracy, and the legislative process. Michelle Miro is an engineer at the RAND Corporation. She specializes in long-term water resources planning and management, with a particular focus on climate-resilient water planning, natural disaster recovery in the water sector, and transboundary water management. She has a Ph.D.

29 About This Report planning approaches by beginning to collaborate and work As part of the RAND Corporation’s Security 2040 Initiative, together. this research report describes a critical global challenge that This research is intended to support local government and will shape the security landscape over the next 20 years: military officials who may be considering reaching across contending with and preparing for the effects of climate their jurisdictional borders to more comprehensively plan for change. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the effects climate change within their regions. This could include city of climate change on communities and regions, as well as managers, urban planners, stormwater practitioners, base on the populations and activities among and within them, commanders, and military civil engineers. We aimed to pro- governments at all levels will need to be involved. Within vide supporting evidence for such individuals, who already the United States, many governmental entities, from cities to understand the cross-boundary nature of climate change and counties to military services, have already begun to prepare who seek both justifications and methods for working with for and directly address climate change’s impacts. The U.S. regional partners to build resilience. We use the case of the Department of Defense and its military services have also Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and Resilience begun to incorporate climate-related considerations within Intergovernmental Pilot Project, initiated in 2014, to lend their strategic documents and for their extensive network of insight into how these collaborations could be structured installations across the country. to ensure that local government and military interests are The resilience of these communities and installations reconciled and addressed. does not lie neatly within designated jurisdictional borders. As part of RAND’s Security 2040 Initiative, this research Communities are dependent upon how their neighbors, is meant to inspire and spur future in-depth research on which include local military installations, also choose to collaborative climate change planning. Due to the nature of adapt to climate change. Likewise, military installations these exploratory projects, our scope is limited by design. require the communities on which they depend for trans- While we were able to capture only a relatively small number portation, resources, and personnel to equally contend with of interviews and focus primarily on only one case study, the and plan for climate change. Military installations and findings of this work can still prove useful for those consid- communities are coexisting and codependent entities, rely- ering implementing collaborative efforts. In particular, we ing on mutual infrastructure and resources to support their conclude that collaboration can help co-located entities better respective functions. Yet, due to the federal structure of plan for climate change; yet, the lack of widespread collab- the U.S. government, governmental entities often focus on oration on climate change planning shows that challenges building climate resilience only within their own jurisdic- continue to impede its effective implementation. Thus, by tional boundaries, where they logically and legally have the looking at a past effort through targeted interviews, we authority to act. To more fully and effectively bolster their sought to more clearly identify the barriers faced, as well resilience to climate change, local governments and military as which of the stakeholders’ efforts worked best, to better entities will need to shift their current separate climate inform and prepare collaborators in the future. C O R P O R A T I O N

As part of the RAND Corporation’s Security 2040 Initiative, the authors of this report explored a critical global challenge that will shape the security landscape over the next 20 years: contending with and preparing for the effects of climate change. Within the United States, many governmental entities, from cities to counties to military services, have already begun to prepare for and directly address climate change’s impacts. The resilience of these communities and installations does not lie neatly within designated jurisdictional borders. Communities are dependent on how their neighbors, which include local military installations, choose to adapt to climate change. Likewise, military installations require the communities on which they depend for transportation, resources, and personnel to contend with and plan for climate change. Military installations and communities are coexisting and codependent entities, relying on mutual infrastructure and resources to support their respective functions.

To explore this challenge, the authors reviewed and analyzed relevant literature, assessed other instances of intergovernmental collaboration, and applied the case of the Hampton Roads Sea Level Rise Preparedness and Resilience Intergovernmental Pilot Project to examine the role of collaboration in military and local government climate resilience planning. They found that collaboration between military services and local governments improves collective capacity to address climate change, and they provide insight into the attributes of effective joint planning. While limited in scope by design, the findings of this work are useful for those considering collaborative planning efforts and are intended to inspire future in-depth research on collaborative climate resilience planning.

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