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Home , Elite party, Liberalism in Serbia, Movement of Socialists, Yugoslav Left, Zoran Lutovac

Südosteuropa 63 (2015), no. 4, pp. 596-617

nEw EconoMic ELitES in SERbiA

MILICA VESKOVIć ANđELKOVIć

Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia

Abstract. Based on the findings of empirical research conducted in 2012, the author analyzes the orientation of the economically dominant stratum of the emerging capitalist class in Serbia towards the political parties which stood for election that same year. In addition, survey data from 1997 and 2003 was used, which was collected as a sample of the economic elite. This data is compared with a sample on other citizens, collected in the same years, in order to compare the political orientation of the emerging capitalist class and the rest of the population. Furthermore, the author analyzes the influence of factors such as gender, age and ownership structures on the political orientation of the economically elite.

Milica Vesković Anđelković is a Research Assistant at the Institute for Sociological Research at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Belgrade.

Introduction

Methodologically, the present paper draws on Charles Wright Mills, who studied American society in the middle of the 20th century and came to the conclusion that the economic, political and cultural elites could be regarded as homogenous groups.1 Taking prior knowledge into account about the unity of the ruling class’ characteristic of Serbian society,2 the hypothesis to be proven is the following: The economic, political and cultural elites in Serbia, differentiated according to basic social subsystems, are tightly connected and interdependent in terms of mutual control and support, and they are unitary when it comes to making decisions that not only influence the promotion of their interests, but are also significant for the entire Serbian society and the international politics of the country. The first section of the paper includes a brief historical overview of mutual relations within the ruling class of Serbian society from the period of the socialist

1 Č. Rajt Mils, Elita vlasti, Belgrade 1998; cf. the original Charles Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York 1956. 2 Mladen Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam. Nastanak novih klasnih odnosa u Srbiji, Belgrade 2011 . Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 597 system, through the period of ‘“blocked” and “unblocked” transformation’,3 to the establishment of the current form of capitalist relations. The focus is thus the interrelationship of elite groups of different social systems in Serbia, including systemic thresholds which are relatively extensive. The second section analyzes survey data from 2012 on the political orientation of the economic elite. Party affiliations are examined as the most reliable means of showing political orientation. For comparison, data collected in 1997 and 2003 are used whenever possible. In the third section, the impact of potentially relevant factors (age, gender and ownership structure) is analyzed, based on the ownership structure of companies managed by respondents, their connection with the political elite, and active participation in the political life of Serbia through parties. The concluding section examines ideological identifications in terms of a ‘left-right’ scale of political orientation.

The Economic Elite and Political Life

Of the differing concepts of ‘elite’ that exist,4 the definition used for this paper pertains to a structural approach according to which ‘holding dominant institutional positions is a criterion used for separating members of the elite from other parts of the society’.5 The great importance of this group for Serbia’s political life has manifested itself in historical events that characterize the establishment and shift of social systems, such as the socialist state after the Second World War, its collapse in the late 1980s, and the subsequent transition to a capitalist order, which has yet to be sustainably consolidated. Monitoring and analyzing relationships within the ruling group reveals the power relations among various strata, which have been changing over time and with the change of the social system, as well as their emergence, grouping and regrouping, all dependent on conditions characteristic of a given historical period. In the socialist period, the members of the ruling class ‘who had political control over society, at the same time had key economic roles’.6 The fusion of political, economic, and cultural social subsystems, controlled by higher strata of the ruling class of collective owners—nomenklatura (the predominant if not exclusive party at the time being the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, KPJ), brought about homogenized action in the entire social system. Members of the ruling class ‘who had (contingently speaking) political control over the society, played at the same time key eco-

3 Mladen Lazić, Uvod, in: Mladen Lazić, ed, Ekonomska elita u Srbiji u periodu konsolidacije kapitalističkog poretka, Belgrade 2014, 9-35. 4 Cf. Mladen Lazić, Elite u postsocijalističkoj transformaciji srpskog društva, in: Mladen Lazić, ed, Račji hod. Srbija u transformacijskim procesima, Belgrade 2000, 21-64. 5 Lazić, Elite u postsocijalističkoj transformaciji srpskog društva, 22. 6 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam, 38. 598 Milica Vesković Anđelković nomic roles (also contingently speaking) of the global command planning’.7 Given that the top layer of this class had an absolute control over the social system and that it played an active role in maintaining (and later changing) the social order, distinguishing the concept of class from the concept of elite is theoretically necessary but it practically does not apply to a socialist order. In addition, a lack of autonomy of basic social subsystems results in a unity of the elite as a systemic feature of socialism: ‘The attempt to differentiate between parts of the elite (by strictly separating economic and cultural elite from the political one and by increasing their autonomy) was a consequence of—but immediately afterwards a factor in—a systemic crisis.’8 In the postwar period in Serbia, a key role was played by a single elite group—the nomenklatura, i.e. a small number of individuals who made decisions related to the entire society, from those relevant to the military, to culture and economy, in accordance with political objectives, that is, in order to maintain their own positions. Even though the transition from socialism to capitalism differed from country to country, it can be stated that Serbia’s transition differed more radically. In Eastern Europe, the collapse of state socialism in the late 1980s and the introduction of liberal democracy, with a multiparty system and a capitalist market economy, resulted in the relative autonomy of the social subsystems and thus in a differentiation between the economic, political and cultural elites. This mode of social production was modeled on the West and introduced almost overnight, mainly by intellectuals who often were members of the communist party in their respective countries. The politicians who took control set up a market economy and started to implement privatization. They seized the opportunity to develop the new system in line with their own interests, by converting the organizational and political resources they had during socialism into economic capital. In Serbia during the 1990s as well as during socialism, around two- thirds of the economic elite or their closest relatives held important political positions.9 Other enterprises were sold to foreign companies and investment funds. The privatization of these enterprises, also controlled by the state, was accompanied by numerous scandals about which the media comprehensively reported. Only a small number of capitalists emerged as a result of small and medium-sized enterprise growth, yet having remained in the shadow of other, larger owners of capital. The process of privatization, in which the political elite was both seller and broker, has resulted in casting a shadow of doubt on the newly emerging capi-

7 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam, 38. 8 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam, 44. 9 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam. Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 599 talist class. Proponents of privatization have argued that the manner in which it is carried out is not the most important thing, as the market will regulate itself. The success of competent owners, they argued, will contribute to the develop- ment of the entire society.10 However, owners who had accumulated capital by political means as opposed to economic competence have not disappeared. Indeed, the emergence of political competition created a need for political parties to receive support of large capitalists. Thus, in spite of the (formal) separation and autonomy of the economic and political subsystems, a symbiosis of politically and economically dominant social strata continues to coexist. During the first years after the demise of socialism and the ‘import’ of capitalism, Serbia developed without genuine domestic capitalists, and the rise of big business occurred mainly by converting political privileges of the former nomenklatura into economic capital. The delayed or ‘blocked transformation’11 during the war years of the 1990s benefited these actors to strengthen their positions. However, after completing the ‘primitive accumulation of capital’, the regime of Slobodan Milošević pursued a risky foreign policy that led Serbia into conflict and international isolation—a policy which no longer benefited the newly emerging capitalists. Viewing the Milošević regime, which in its earlier years had been a prerequisite for the accumulation of capital, increasingly was seen as an obstacle to achieving interests, which led the economic elite halt its decade-long symbiosis with the regime: ‘[From] 2000 [onwards], the economic elite of private owners (the emerging capitalist class) has backed the opposition parties for the first time strongly and more or less as a whole, supporting their election campaign as well as their non-institutional activities, refusing to provide assistance to the regime in power and attempting to neutralize the forces that supported/maintained the regime (repressive apparatus, criminalized groups, etc.).’12 The overthrow of the long-term rule of the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS), the successor to the former Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), brought about a ‘normalization’ that saw Serbia re-introduced into international politics and the global economy. As becomes clear, the top layer of Serbian society has displayed the ability to work jointly even under changed circumstances. Certainly, its unity in the contemporary system differs from the socialist period. And the most significant difference is the fact that nowadays there can be a differentiation within this

10 Boško Mijatović, Privatizacija: Modeli, iskustva i izazovi za Srbiju, in: Božidar Raičević / Danilo Šuković, eds, Ekonomske teme: Ekonomska stvarnost SR Jugoslavije (Republike Srbije), Belgrade 2002, 267-280. 11 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam, 68. 12 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam, 65. 600 Milica Vesković Anđelković unity with respect to support for different political parties. As a consequence, the class’ observed homogeneity might be challenged by such options.

Political Affiliations of the Economic Elite

The survey conducted in 2012 focused on the extent to which the economic elite is politically affiliated, and to which parties.13 Also, what percentage of the economic elite has supported democratic procedures, e.g. by exercising their right to vote, was investigated.14 And finally, how do the results compare with data collected from other citizens? The data on party affiliation were obtained on the basis of respondents’ answers to the question which party represents their interests best. The chart presents general political affiliation (i.e. without specifying parties) and voter turnout of the economic elite, with a comparative overview of affiliations of citizens and their voter turnout, according to official data from the Republic’s Election Commission (Republička izborna komisija, RIK). Also, the chart presents the official data of elections in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2012 and 2014,15 which was used for comparative analyses. The data presented in Table 1 indicate a higher percentage of politically affiliated representatives of the economic elite, and that the electoral activity of the economic elite is also higher, compared with other citizens. Secondly, the percentage of electoral turnout of the economic elite is higher than the percentage of party affiliation of this stratum. The former confirms the hypothesis that members of the upper class are politically affiliated to a greater extent than members of the lower classes.16 This fact is hardly surprising, given that representatives of the economic elite as a rule have an above-average level of education, mostly live in cities, have a greater social capital and thus access to a greater amount of information, which enables them to perceive more clearly a way to achieve their interests. Furthermore, not only among representatives of this stratum but also among other citizens, a considerable difference is ob-

13 All information about methodology, data and the surveys are provided in Mladen Lazić’s introduction to his special issue. 14 Srećko Mihajlović, Političke stranke u izborima za politički parlament, in: Vladimir Goati, ed, Partijski mozaik Srbije, Belgrade 1997, 42-68. 15 This text was written after the 2014 elections. Hence, there was a necessity to compare survey data collected in 2012 with the results of the elections of 2014. 16 Ksenia Northmore-Ball, Increasing Turnout Inequality in Post-Communist Eastern Europe. Economic Disengagement or a Progression to Normalcy?, paper presented at the EPOP Conference in Oxford 2012, https://www.hse.ru/adm/_/data/2012/10/08/1247181294/ Paper%202%20Turnout%20Decline%20in%20Post4.pdf. All internet references were accessed on 17 November 2015. Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 601 servable between the percentage of political affiliation and that of those who exercised their right to vote. It would be useful, yet is beyond the scope of this paper, to analyze in detail how individuals decide to participate in elections even if they do not identify with a suitable party. Instead, the following section focuses on the political orientation of the economic elite, as expressed through their political party affiliation. Since it is our intention to interpret the obtained data in relation to the sociopolitical context, Table 2 presents a comparative overview of results of the last survey, as well as the survey results from 2003 (there are no suitable data for 1997), while Table 3 presents official data of elections in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2012 and 2014 . As can be observed from Table 2, almost all major parties (with the exception of the LDP and the SNS) that received support from representatives of the economic elite in 2003 also got support from this stratum in 2012, although to a different degree.17 It is noticeable, however, that there was a decline in support for the parties of the former Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija Srbije, DOS) movement,18 which received the greatest support in the 2000 election (Table 3.). The Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS), even though it had the largest support base compared with competitor parties, lost more than half of its supporters, while the Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokrat- ska stranka Srbije, DSS) received just under 5% of the votes from the economic elite, down from 22.5%. The initial strong support for DSS can be explained by the fact that at the time of the 2003 survey, this party was the governing party, in coalition with the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski pokret obnove, SPO), New Serbia (Nova Srbija, NS), and the G17+, as well as supported by the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS), with the DSS’ president, Vojislav Koštunica, as

17 In the case of the aforementioned two parties, this is quite understandable, since the LDP was founded in late 2005, and the SNS was formed in 2008 from the ranks of the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS). 18 The Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija Srbije, DOS) was formed at the beginning of 2000 as a coalition composed of nineteen parties and organizations that were in opposition to the governing SPS. In the general election to the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federalna Republika Jugoslavija, FRY), the elections for the local self- government of Serbia and the early presidential election, held simultaneously in September that same year, this coalition gained a narrow victory over the ruling coalition led by Slobodan Milošević’s SPS and the Yugoslav Left (Jugoslovenska Levica, JUL), the party headed by Milošević’s wife, Mirjana Marković. The presidential candidate of the DOS, Vojislav Koštunica, who was also the leader of the DSS, one of the members of this coalition, won a victory over Milošević in the presidential election. The government at the time refused to acknowledge the victory, which it finally did after a mass demonstration on 5 October 2000. After the defeat in the national election, the government resigned, so early parliamentary elections were held in late 2000, after which the DOS won a majority in the national parliament. This coalition fell apart in 2003, when the DS decided to run independently in early parliamentary elections. 602 Milica Vesković Anđelković

None Other

(Serbian Radical – 10 .5 know 2 .43 15 .92 4 .22 11 .14 Does not Parties of Parties minorities Socijalistička partija Srbije answer want to want LDP

not exist Other Does not Srpska radikalna stranka (G17+) - not exist not exist not exist not exist (Liberal-Democratic Party) (Liberal-Democratic Party) ties Parties Parties of minori SRS URS (Democratic Party of Serbia); SPS – LDP 3 .05 8 .60 7 .66 27 .61 11 .46 19 .21 28 .12 Liberalno demokratska partija (G17+) (Serbian Progressive Party); SRS – 24 .04 – 4 .61 5 .51 6 .53 4 .56 11 .19 48 .35 – 2 .01 3 .04 3 .36 3 .18 10 .06 not exist SRS URS Demokratska stranka Srbije not exist not exist not exist not exist not exist not exist 50 .032 .5 50 67 .0 .5 5781 .0 19 .9* 42 .1*

Srpska napredna stranka 34 .32 (United Regions of Serbia); LDP – (Democratic Party); DSS – DS DSS SPS DOS SNS SPO DS DSS SPS SNS Ujedinjeni regoni Srbije boycott boycott Demokratska stranka 1997 2000 . – – 13 .76 64 .09 2003 12 .58 17 .72 7 .61 The position of the respondentEconomic elite Citizens Affiliated Year Unaffiliated Year Voted Did not vote 2012 22 .06 6 .99 14 .51 2014 11 .73 4 .24 13 .49 2003 36 .3 22 .5 1 .6 – 0 .5 9 .9 – – 5 .4 23 .6 2012 16 .7 4 .9 3 .7 2 .5 – 2 .5 6 .8 0 .6 5 .5 6 .8 1 .9 50 Source: RIK, available at www.rik.parlament.gov.rs, accessed on 26 april 2014. Source: RIK, available Table 1. Table Political orientation and voter turnout of the economic elite with a comparative overview o f the citizens and their turnout in 2012, %. previous affiliation of Table 2. Political Table orientation of the economic elite—comparative overview of the last survey results , as well as the survey results from 2003, in %. Source: Survey of the economic elite, 2012. Source: Survey Apri l 2014). at www.rik.parlament.gov.rs, 26 website of the RIK (available * Data downloaded from the official Table 3. Offical data of elections in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2012 and 2014, %. Table Source: Survey of the economic elite, 2003 and 2012. Source: Survey *DS – Party); URS – Party); (The Socialist Party of Serbia); SNS –

Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 603

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604 Milica Vesković Anđelković

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100 .0 16 .8 4 .5 3 .8 2 .5 2 .5 7 .1 11 7 1 .9 48 .7 Nation- x x x x x x x x Right-wing Centre Left-wing Centre Right-wing Idelogical Idelogical and political identification Left-wing Ideological-political identification Total Source: Survey of the economic elite, 2012. Source: Survey Table 7. Classification of political parties in Serbia on the left-right scale. Table Source: Survey of the economic elite, 2012. Source: Survey Table 8. The influence of personal ideological and political identification on orientation, in %. Table Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 605 head of the government. This result is hardly surprising, given that a substantial portion of the sample were managing directors and members of the managing boards of public enterprises that had been appointed by the government. This will be discussed in the proceeding section. Nevertheless, considering the fact that the DSS has not been in power since 2008, and after the 2014 election (Table 3) was not even represented in parliament, a drastic drop in the number of its supporters among the ranks of the economic elite is to be expected. Moreover, the marked nationalist and exclusivist orientation of this party, along with anti-Western stances, defying the fact that for many representatives of the emerging capitalist class progress/growth is dependent on cooperation with the European Union, has led to a significant decline in support. The strongest coalition party within the DOS, the Democratic Party, in 2003, along with the DSS, had a strong support from the economic elite. The survey was conducted shortly after the DS lost power, so this fact affected the results two-fold. In the period preceding the survey, the DS had undoubtedly a significant influence on the formation of the senior management of state-owned enterprises. At the time when the research was conducted, the new ruling party had not placed their people in managerial positions, thus it makes sense to as- sume that some of the cadres of DS were still in positions they had previously taken up, while they did not want to or could not cross over into the winning camp. Therefore, and also because of the high hopes that some of the members of this stratum still pinned onto this party, which was perceived as a bearer of a new (geo)political, economic and a societal direction in general, compared with the Milošević period, the DS had the strongest support of the economic elite. When it comes to the DS, it is also evident that support for this party dropped in 2012, a period in which it technically speaking was still in power. The survey was conducted in the period when the new government was not yet formed and when it was not yet known until the last moment whether the SPS would enter into a coalition with the DS or the SNS. The assumption of a slow transfer of supporters to the SNS, due to a hunch that they would soon be in power, can be dismissed because the support for this party from among the respondents was insignificant (only 2.5%). The explanation goes as follows: (1) there was an overall disillusionment with the parties of the former DOS; (2) the lower support for the DS was a consequence of the economic crisis, which seriously affected the economic elite, who objectively or subjectively blamed the government led by the DS; (3) turbulence and disappointment within the DS itself, as a consequence of the shock to the unexpected defeat of Boris Tadić in the presidential election. A surprising result is the very weak support for the SNS, given the strength of this party and its potential key role in the government in formation. This is explained by the fact that in the period of collapse of the old government and the formation of the new one (when the research was done), it was still unclear 606 Milica Vesković Anđelković with which party the SPS would enter into a coalition. However, such a weak support for the largest opposition party (Table 3), even from members of the private sector whose positions generally do not depend on the current government, is surprising. The data presented in Table 2 shows that in 2003 there was almost equal support for the governing parties at the time (the DSS, the SPS and the URS, totaling 34%) and for the strongest opposition party, the DS. Support for the opposition coalition had been even stronger in 1997, according to data obtained in the survey conducted back then.19 The coalition ‘Together’ (Zajedno)20 received support from as many as 45.4% of the economic elite, while the governing left-wing coalition (SPS and JUL) received 35.6%. However, quite the opposite happened to the SNS. In order to understand these results, one must bear in mind that this party was relatively new and formed from the ranks of the SRS, which was considered to be extremely nationalist and anti-European. The sudden advocacy of liberal values and integration into the European Union by the SNS created distrust among members of the economic elite. Furthermore, for a relatively long period of 12 years (since 2000) the SRS had not participated in government, so it was unable to ‘push’ its supporters in the economic sphere, or to be a magnet for existing members of this stratum. However, given that the SNS has remained consistent with its program in relation to the EU since it came into power—that is, there has been no discontinuity regarding the pro-Western course supported by a significant part of this party—it should also be said that its members and supporters (or of its coalition partners) now mostly are at the helm of public enterprises. Finally, the SNS received an absolute majority of votes in the 2014 election (Table 3) and thus has the ‘allure of a winner’. Con- sidering that the SNS represented the majority after the elections 2012 it can be assumed that a higher percentage of the economic elite support the party now (but not significantly higher, because supporters of this party mainly belong to the lower class) in the new circumstances. Membership of a political party represents a more reliable indicator of the political orientation of respondents, or even a stronger political identification.21 Given the fact that Serbia, according to data collected in the survey conducted in several countries in 2003, is considered to be a society with a high percentage of members of the economic elite who are also members of a political party,22 the results of this survey will be compared with data from the last survey (2012), as

19 Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam. 20 This coalition was formed before the 1996 election when it won at the local level, which was the first political defeat of Slobodan Milošević in Serbian elections. The coalition ‘Together’ already fell apart in the following year, just before the parliamentary election. 21 Siniša Atlagić, Partijska identifikacija kao determinanta izborne motivacije: teorijske kontroverze i problemi empirijskog istraživanja, Belgrade 2007. 22 The results have been obtained by comparing data collected within a survey on Stratification and value change in the period of social transformation, which was conducted Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 607 well as from the survey conducted in 1997. Unfortunately, in the 2003 survey respondents were not asked to specify the party they belonged to. Consequently, Table 4 simply shows membership in a political party for this year without any further details, while the party membership of members of this stratum is given based on data from the 2012 survey. First of all, it can be noticed that the percentage of party membership within the economic elite of Serbia has declined substantially compared to the 1990s. Secondly, according to research results from 2012, only 6.7% of the respondents from this stratum were members of one of the governing parties (DS and SPS), while membership of the governing coalition (SPS and JUL) was reported by 21.1% respondents during the rule of Slobodan Milošević in the 1997 results. The end of the last century was marked by the first years of ‘unblocked transformation’,23 which implied a greater degree of democracy and market liberalization. Nevertheless the remains of the socialist system, embodied in the SPS and its satellite party JUL (whose president was Mirjana Marković, Slobodan Milošević’s wife), exerted such an influence that there was still a very strong awareness of the need to be close to the ruling political elite in order to protect one’s position. Additionally there was also a need to complete the unfinished conversion of organizational and political resources into economic capital. On the other hand, the fact that non-privatized enterprises whose representatives were included in the sample, were still predominant in the economy, opened up a possibility of appointing members of the governing party to managerial positions directly, and to a great extent. On the basis of these data, it can be argued that not only the unity of the economic and political elite, the two dominant strata of the emerging capitalist class have become more fragmented, but also that such unity formally is almost non-existent, considering that a great number of representatives of the economic elite has remained politically uninvolved. However, membership of a political party is not the only criterion for the existence and nature of interconnections within a social group; hence the analysis needs to go further. Now, it can be summed up: based on the comparative overview of data collected in the surveys in 1997, 2003, and 2012, the political affiliation of representatives of the economic elite in terms of their support for the current political parties during this decade and a half has dramatically declined, and even more so with regard to party membership. Although a great number of respondents, as many as 81% of them, still decided to support the democratic procedure and vote in the 2012 election, only 50% identified with a political party that represents their interests well. When it comes to political identification, in terms of within a broader project SEESSP (South East European Social Survey Project) in the period from November 2003 to January 2004 in six Southeast European countries. 23 Mladen Lazić, Promene i otpori, Belgrade 2005, 126. 608 Milica Vesković Anđelković membership of a political party as the most reliable criterion for affiliation, the situation is similar: the number of representatives of this stratum in the ranks of political parties has decreased.

Factors That Influence the Political Orientation of the Economic Elite

Political orientation includes a number of factors that influence individuals, but also the entire class to which these individuals belong. First of all, they see a reflection of their interests in the program and activities of a given party. Although warnings are justified that there are no universal models and that different groups behave differently with regard to their political orientation. Even the same individual may orient herself towards different political options depending on her current situation. Yet attempts to identify models that would represent predominant patterns for explaining political orientation still seem to be justified. One of the first models which was developed in literature, is an explanation of political orientation according to a sociodemographic model, which was shaped by researchers at Columbia University in the United States of America in the middle of the last century.24 In the study The People’s Choice, published in 1944, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet developed a line of thought according to which class affiliation, age, gender, place of residence, among other factors, influence the orientation and the ultimate decision of voters.25 Since in the sample of the survey conducted in 2012 there were very few respondents who did not live in a city (only 1.2%), or respondents without university or college education (5.5%), attention here is focused on gender, age, and the ownership sector. The first noticeable aspect in the survey findings (2012) is that the percentage of politically unaffiliated women is lower than the percentage of unaffiliated men. Such data are contrary to those theories that suppose that women are less politically active and affiliated than men. According to Lipset, gender has been considered a relevant factor by a large number of theorists of political orientation.26 The hypothesis about a greater political affiliation of men is based on a drastically lower level of education among women until recently, as well as on the traditional division of jobs into ‘male’ and ‘female’ ones. However, due to the specific characteristics of the surveyed population, whose social position gener-

24 Atlagić, Partijska identifikacija kao determinanta izborne motivacije. 25 Paul F. Lazarsfeld / Bernard Berelson / Hazel Gaudet, The People’s Choice. How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign, New York/NY, London 1968 (orig. 1944). 26 Seymour Martin Lipset, Politički čovek, Belgrade 1969; cf. the original Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics, Garden City/NY 1960. See also Andre Blas / Louis Massicotte / Agnieszka Dobrzynska, Why is Turnout Higher in Some Countries than in Others?, Elections Canada, March 2003, http://elections.ca/res/rec/part/tuh/TurnoutHigher.pdf. Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 609 ally requires a high degree of social engagement as well as higher education, the data on the higher level of affiliation of women are in fact little surprising. There is a slightly higher percentage of party affiliated female members of the economic elite (a total of 18.3% in the sample) than their male colleagues, while a greater degree of active membership has been observed among males. On the other hand, when it comes to party orientation, men are oriented towards almost all political parties, unlike women, whose orientation is more centered, while a majority support for the DS was observed in representatives of both genders. However, formally the differences in the percentage of affiliation are too slight to be able to draw the conclusion that gender significantly influenced the political affiliation of our respondents. Age as an influencing factor reveals a similar pattern, when it comes to the diversity of party orientation of the economic elite. The only difference can be noticed in the oldest representatives: they are only members of one party—the Democratic Party. It should be added, though with a warning of potential bias due to the small number of respondents, that this group showed the highest degree of non-affiliation and the lowest percentage of active membership. Nev- ertheless this was to be expected, in addition to clearly defined interests, and a developed habit of participating in politics arising from the length of their voting experience. As for the party orientation, it should be mentioned that the DS received the greatest support from members of all ages, but the older the respondent, the lower the support. This result might be a consequence of the older generation’s affiliation with the SPS during the 1990s, as well as with their ideological orientations, running contrary to the politics of the DS. However, given that in the research period (as well as in the period preceding it) the DS was the governing party, it is not surprising that most of the respondents are oriented towards it. Its dominant position at the time can also explain the support of a large number of the youngest representatives of the economic elite, who were in the period of career advancement and still dependent on political support (if their position was not inherited). A significant percentage of the DSS supporters were middle-aged. The representation of this party in parliament from 2000 to 2014, should not be disregarded either, and it can help to explain the high percentage of support. The position of the DSS until 2008 was favourable for better positioning of its members and supporters in the economic sphere, or for strengthening connections with already established members of the economic elite. Popularity of the DSS among members of this stratum has decreased, but it has not disappeared totally. After 2008, the DSS was no longer attractive in terms of interests to those members of the younger generation who are driven primarily by careerist motives, but not all of those who had already entered and survived in the ranks of this stratum based on opportunistic motives had given up on their adopted political views. 610 Milica Vesković Anđelković

Studying age as a potential factor in political orientation of the economic elite indicates certain regularities that can be primarily explained by political circumstances in the period in which respondents strengthened their economic position. Although certain regularities in the orientation of respondents can be identified with respect to age and position of the party, it can be observed that the parties with the greatest support receive this support from all age groups. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that there is generally a significant influence of the age factor on political affiliation. Finally, the advancement of the Democratic Party with regard to the political orientation of the economic elite deserves closer attention, given that it was the governing party at the time of the survey. Its advantage of more than 10% (although it has decreased compared with previous years), in comparison with other political parties, requires explanation. It can be found in the still important role of the state in the economy, which implies a high degree of dependence, even if it is indirect, of the economic elite on the governing party. A change of government in Serbia almost invariably leads also to a change of the management of public enterprises, so the strong orientation to the DS at the time of its rule has been ‘instrumentally-rationally motivated’.27 Since this concept is understood in line with Weber’s definition of instrumental-rational action, which is characterized by an actor negotiating between different means of achieving a goal, it is not surprising that representatives of the stratum holding managerial positions in public enterprises have largely oriented themselves to this party, expecting personal benefit. The situation in private companies is somewhat different: a change of government does not imply a change of management. However, here too, policies (internal and external) pursued by the state determine business activities to a great extent. Good relations with the European Union, for example, or with Russia, openness to cooperation with international companies, create a favorable climate for increasing the profit of private companies. It is therefore expected that the political orientation of representatives of the private sector focus on policies of international cooperation. On the other hand, certain privileges and concessions in the competitive struggle with other local or foreign companies can not only ‘aid’ the political orientation of owners and managing directors of private companies, but it can also motivate them to help a suitable political party come to power. In Serbia this happens mostly through party financing, thus bringing back personal interest as a factor in political orientation. In the

27 Zoran Slavujević, Politički marketing, Belgrade 2005, 99; cf. Christopher J. Fleury / Mi- chael S. Lewis-Beck, Anchoring the French Voter. Ideology Versus Party, Journal of Politics 55 (1993), 1100-09; Ronald Inglehart / Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Party Identification, Ideological Preference, and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics, in: Ian Budge / Ivor Crewe / Dennis Farlie, eds, Party Identification and Beyond, London 1976, 243-273. Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 611 private sector, such orientation does not need to be towards the governing party, but towards any party deemed favorable for the business relationships already established. Thus, the analysis suggests a greater degree of orientation of the management of public enterprises to the governing party, while orientation of the management of private companies need not be determined by the composition of the governing coalition (Table 5). Most of the managers were not a member of any party, especially respondents who managed private companies. There is an even greater percentage of unaffiliated, regardless of whether they are party members or not. As expected, the overwhelming majority of senior managers in the sector of public and mixed ownership enterprises (with the exception of those unaffiliated) were oriented towards the governing coalition: DS, SPS and United Regions of Serbia (Ujedin- jeni regioni Srbije, URS). Considering that the SPS has remained in power after the change of government, it is assumed that its supporters, especially members, have continued to benefit from it. Furthermore, although the economic elite in the private sector have been mostly affiliated with the governing parties, they are to a considerably less extent affiliated than those in the public sector. On the other hand, it can be noticed that only a very small number of private sector elites are members of a political party, which confirms once again their relative autonomy from the governing party. These results are compared with data collected in the surveys from previous years, to analyze further the connection between the politically and economically dominant strata, depending on the ownership sector the economic elite belong to (Table 6). As the comparative data reveal, in the1990s, during the rule of the SPS and the JUL, the economic elite in the public sector held on tightly to the governing political parties, which enabled them to convert resources to strengthen their positions. This is particularly noticeable among senior managers in public and mixed enterprises, who considerably differed in the percentages of those oriented towards the governing coalition, especially party members, and those who were not. In the private sector such difference is slight, but it is once again predominantly in favour of the governing parties. At the end of Milošević’s rule, the political elite that had helped the new capitalist class to emerge, had become an obstacle to strengthening the latter’s position, so the overwhelming majority of the economic elite started to side with the opposition, which finally brought about, with the assistance of the West, a change of government. However, the results of the 2012 survey do not indicate that the political inclinations of the economic elite have continued to diversify since. Interestingly, especially in the state sector, the data rather suggest that this group has been gradually solidify- ing once again, politically. 612 Milica Vesković Anđelković

Political and Ideological Identities of Representatives of the Economic Elite

Since the 1970s, a number of scholars have argued that the ideological dimension is of critical importance for determining political behaviour.28 However analysis of the influence of this factor in Serbian society from the outset is faced with problems that might undermine the reliability of conclusions. There have been ambiguities and variability, not only in Serbia, of the very concepts ‘the left’ and ‘the right’ over the past 25 years since the fall of state socialism. Cor- respondingly, a certain chaos can be observed in many political scenes. Thus, the conceptual meaning of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’ needs to be discussed before attempting to classify Serbia’s political parties on this scale. After the emergence of the concepts of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’ in France in the late 18th century, they have evolved. They are concepts of ‘temporal character’,29 in the sense that their content has changed throughout different historical pe- riods. During the first century of their creation, it was relatively clear who was left and who was right, and relevant factors in determining this were attitudes towards cultural, political, national and socioeconomic matters. Generally speaking, a right-wing position implied a marked advocacy of private property and a liberal market system. On the other hand, a left-wing position largely meant support of the primacy of class over the national question, as well as inclinations towards a certain state-control of the economy and support of a redistributive justice system, both socially and legally. In the cultural domain, left-wingers were characterized by their insistence on the freedom of thought, and right-wingers by their adherence to tradition and authority of the church. Since, the 1980s, however, these concepts have lost much of their original meaning. With the end of the bipolar world order in 1989, the collapse of the European state socialist systems and the seeming disappearance of any viable alternative to capitalism, there has been a drastic shift in ideology and politics to the right of the spectrum. The neoliberal concept of the capitalist organization of society has become almost unanimously accepted, while left-wing parties, in line with this trend, have largely abandoned the idea of equality and redistribution. Alternatively, one could say: ‘Contemporary right-wing parties advocate market liberalism that is based on private property, restriction of all kinds of social benefits, restrictive immigration policies, globalism as an ideological platform and hegemony in international relations […]. They no longer have an open class approach, but like left-wing parties,

28 Atlagić, Partijska identifikacija kao determinanta izborne motivacije, 56. 29 Srećko Mihajlović, Levi i desni ekstremizam u Srbiji, in: Zoran Lutovac, ed, Ideologija i političke stranke u Srbiji, Belgrade 2007, 193-222, 205. Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 613

or like all parties in general, they act from a position of representing interests, goals and values they aim for as general as possible, or as global as possible.’30 As far as the cultural domain is concerned, in the era of global secularization in both the former state socialist countries as well as in the capitalist western states, the marked past polarity between the respect for the authority of the church and the commitment to freedom of thought has lost a large part of its former importance in the context of the right-left division. In eastern Europe, old divisions, for some time, were compensated by a new one, i.e. by the left’s concern about the protection of minorities (not only ethnic minorities) and the right’s prerogative to choose one’s own lifestyle, as well as committed to maintaining more traditional customs, and spoke in favour of more mono- lithic societal notions. However, this has increasingly been blurred, and what used to be characteristic of the left-wing has become widely accepted also by many of the right-wing. All in all, the pendulum has swung to the right on the socioeconomic level, with the left-wing being only slightly more moderate in this domain. In fact, economy today is taking place more or less against a back- ground of the former ideological determinants of the right-wing. At the same time, however, in the broad domain of culture, left-wing values have shown to have some sustainable effect. Such a mutation of the original divides between these concepts, along with the victory of capitalism and neo-liberalism on a global level, has created confusion in classifying political entities. The result is the disappearance of the sharp contradiction between these concepts and the introduction of a ‘conciliatory’ centre. In addition, in countries that did not know democracy after 1945, the left-right (self-)identification has largely been a question of a different tradition. In Serbia, the attitude towards the right or the left on an individual level has been largely defined on the basis of sympathy and antipathy towards the guerrilla movements in the Second World War, the post-1945 political system, as well as the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars during the 1990s. This makes for several idiosyncrasies. The long-term socioeconomic crisis and growing poverty, the global neoliberal context, as well as the redistributive expectations of a considerable number of citizens resulting from habits acquired during state socialism, have led to a situation in which almost all relevant parties in Serbia address social matters in their respective party programs and media appearances. Usually, they turn to highlighting the need of improving the situation of the most marginalized citizens, in social terms. To be sure, they all support the neoliberal concept of economy. The result often is a schizophrenic, demagogic, if not programmatic

30 Uroš Šuvaković, Dileme tradicionalne dijalektičke dihotomije političkih partija na levicu i desnicu u savremenom društvu, Srpska politička misao 30, No. 4 (2010), 29-52, 41. 614 Milica Vesković Anđelković socioeconomic mishmash, which more euphemistically might be classified as the political centre, contrasting the existing extremes at both ends. In addition, the constant discourse of the ‘national question’ since the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia has affected the ways in which political entities tend to be committed to addressing the national interests of Serbia and the Serbian people. Bearing all these caveats in mind, Table 7 classifies Serbia’s current political parties along the left-right scale on the basis of their programmatic principles and the rhetoric of their representatives, including the criterion of attitudes towards the nation-state and the socioeconomic question. Coincidentally, the left-wing and the right-wing in contemporary Serbia can be viewed in such a way that the characteristics of the right-wing are defined as a pronounced nationalist and sovereignty-oriented approach, as well as an extremely neo-liberal concept of the economy, while in contrast to it, the left-wing is characterized by the inter- nationalist (or, depending on the value framework, the mondialist) and even non-national stance and a redistributive attitude towards the socioeconomic sphere. While this sounds pretty straight forward and unsurprising, it can be observed that there are several parties in Serbia with marked left-right internal contradictions, depending on whether the nation-state or socioeconomic criterion is being emphasized. As noted above, the fact is disregarded here that the economic component is often just a centrist amalgam of social demagogy and neo-liberalism. Several parties turn out to be ‘right-wing’ in one respect and ‘left-wing’ in another, attesting to the actual blurredness of these categories. The two parties with the highest score in the 2012 election (Table 3), the DS and the SNS, belong to the centre, while the third relatively large party, the SPS, could be classified as right-wing with respect to the attitude towards the national and state questions, and left-wing as regards the socioeconomic ones. However, as it was the party in power, judging by its practical action, this is all rather relative, as it could be said that it represented a rather centre-right position with respect to the national and state question, while its leftist positions concerning socioeconomic issues are even more centered, i. e. centre-left. In the scheme, the SPS was finally classified as belonging to the centre. In fact, most parties prove to have amorphous positions rather than stances that can be clearly crystallized, ideologically speaking. The other governing party at the time, for example, the URS or G17+, belonged to the centre with respect to the national question, while the way in which it treated the economic one in its program, was right-wing. This in turn was in direct conflict with the demagogic, and in many respects redistributive, rhetoric of its leading representative. Hence, in the scheme, also this party ended up as being positioned as a centrist party. Among the opposition parties, which could refrain from modifying their programmatic orientation out of practical power constraints, even greater deviations to the right and the left can be observed, very often to two opposite Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 615 sides when it comes to the same party. Thus, for example, in the program of the Movement of Socialists (Pokret Socijalista, PS)—which is listed here because of the political orientation of some respondents, albeit a few—there is a combination of a markedly nationalist orientation with an extremely leftist ideology with regard to socioeconomic issues. This party is not the only one in this respect. In a different way, also the LDP features extreme discrepancies, as it is classified as markedly non-national left-wing when it comes to the national question, but features perhaps the purest right-wing program and rhetoric regarding socioeconomic issues. Some other relevant opposition parties, such as the SRS, the DSS and Dveri Movement (Pokret Dveri) show, with some nuances, an extremely nationalist, right-wing orientation, while in terms of economy they reflect a rather confusing, centrist conglomerate of attitudes, so characteristic of the Serbian political scene. Given this confusion, it is all the more important to point out that members of the economic elite (and also other citizens) who, in the surveys, opted for a specific party, did classify themselves as left- or right-wing with a considerable degree of certainty. In fact, also the parties attach importance to this division in their communication with voters. Thus it seems legitimate to pay due attention to this matter (Table 8), and all the more so as the tendency to classify parties as left- or right-wing is characteristic also of those members of the economic elite who are not party affiliated. A large majority of respondents considered themselves as belonging to the political centre. As for party affiliation, those members of the economic elite who located their views in the centre were predominantly oriented towards the Democratic Party, which can indeed be classified as centre-left, with all the caveats set forth. When respondents saw themselves as left-wing and opted for a party, given the fact that the highest number of them is unaffiliated in terms of a political party, they usually opted for the SPS. However, what seems surprising as regards the affiliation of these respondents is the support they gave equally to the DSS, the LDP, and the URS, considering the extreme nationalist ideology of the former, but also the marked advocacy of a liberal market system characteristic of the latter two parties. Self-identified left-wingers established different priorities as a basis for their affiliation. For some, an open and friendly attitude towards the people who used to live with Serbs in the former Yugoslavia seemingly was most important, which is the case with the LDP. For others, the synonym for left-wing remains the centralized state of the socialist period, which many people perceive as ‘Tito’s Yugoslavia’. And regardless of other ideological views of the DSS, they recognize the nation-state course of this party as a possible path towards yet another centralized state. Similar ‘creatively packaged’ ideological variations apply to those who identify as right-wing, yet belong to various political par- 616 Milica Vesković Anđelković ties. From the above, it can be concluded that it is impossible to fully explain the party orientation of respondents with their political and ideological orientation. This is a consequence of several factors: too blurred are the meaning of the concepts ‘left’ and ‘right’; too amorphous is the introduction of ‘centre’ as a conciliatory position; too pronounced is the party demagogy as well as the really difficult situation of many citizens, for which representatives of the economic elite have a feeling, as it turned out when examining their value orientations.31 And finally and not least, too compelling is the importance of the national question as well as the political and ideological changes the parties themselves have undergone. Although some regularities have become evident through the classification, interestingly almost all parties were supported by several party-affiliated respondents, and regardless of where they classified themselves in terms of the left-right division. Each party saw at least one supporter among the respondents, whether they (self-)declared as ‘left’ or ‘right’ or ‘centre’. This illustrates the extent of the prevailing confusion in the context of Serbian political party divisions.

Conclusion

The survey results deviate to a considerable degree from the initial hypothesis about the unity of Serbia’s economic and political elite. Had it been fully confirmed, the respondents would not have shown a lack of party affiliation to the extent revealed. Their lack of party affiliation supports the view that they left open the possibility of cooperation with any party that may come to power. Secondly, on the basis of the results, it cannot be concluded either that there is a unity of the top of the ruling structures. If it existed, we would see an absolute majority of politically affiliated representatives of the economic elite who are oriented towards the governing parties at the time, the DS and the SPS. The analysis shows that the political orientation of the economic elite is largely undetermined and that there is no party in the political arena of Serbian society that represents only their interests, which further raises the question of whether the thesis on the existence of a political split based on class divisions can be sustained. Due to an insignificant influence of most theoretically potential factors on both political orientation and on ideological identification, the political orientations of the Serbian economic elite result very fluid and inconsistent. Only the influence of the ownership structure of the company proved to be a somewhat significant factor in political orientation. The vast majority of the senior management members of public and mixed enterprises sided with the governing parties, with the exception of the 2000 election, when even senior

31 Cf. Jelena Pešić, Changes in Value Orientations Among of the Economic Elite During the Postsocialist Transformation. Economic and Political Liberalism in Serbia, in this issue. Political Orientations of the Economic Elite in Serbia 617 managers of public enterprises sided with the opposition to the regime of Slo- bodan Milošević. However, as they were surveyed in 2003, when the political elite had changed both in terms of parties and personnel, it would not even be correct to draw the conclusion that the economic elite then was independent from the governing political structures. What is characteristic of the economic elite in Serbia is a large number of politically unaffiliated (but not abstaining) individuals, a considerable disper- sion of support for the current political parties and a small percentage of actual membership of political parties. It seems that, apart from a higher turnout in the elections, there is not a single segment that separates this stratum with respect to political orientation from members of lower social strata. Judging from the data and analysis, it could be easily said that a relative separation between the economic and political subsystem is in sight, which is likely to be completed at the same time as when economic privatization will be fully achieved. Public and mixed economic sectors are still heavily influenced by the ruling political circles, as evidenced by daily reports on the replacement of members of the old economic elite and the appointment of members of the new one to positions in state owned enterprises. On the other hand, based on the data presented here and their comparison with the further course of events—very weak support for the SNS, which however has become a major factor in the government—the conclusion could be drawn that the surveyed stratum did not have a great influence on the formation of the present government. However, this conclusion needs to be relativized in mind of the asymmetry of power in the government’s ranks, or the fact that the richest individuals often play a much greater role in government formation than other members of society. Such mechanisms cannot be made evident based on survey research, no matter how representative the sample.

coRRESPondinG AuthoR Milica Vesković Anđelković University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute for Sociological Research, Čika Ljubina 18-20, 11000 Belgrade. Email: [email protected]