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MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics ISSN: 2318-0811 ISSN: 2594-9187 Instituto - Brasil

Novakovic, Aleksandar; Dostanic, Dusan The anti-capitalist mentality and ill-fated transition: case of MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy Law and Economics, vol. 6, Esp., 2018, pp. 589-620 Instituto Ludwig von Mises - Brasil

DOI: 10.30800/mises.2018.v0.563

Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=586364252004

How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System Redalyc More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America and the Caribbean, Spain and Journal's webpage in redalyc.org Portugal Project academic non-profit, developed under the open access initiative MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia ISSN 2318-0811 Volume VI, Special Issue 2018 : 589-620

The anti-capitalist mentality and ill-fated transition: case of Serbia

Aleksandar Novakovic* Dusan Dostanic**

Abstract: This paper aims to show how the legacy of socialism with a human face represents a far more serious obstacle for the postsocialist transition than the heritage of rigid socialism. This is because an amalgamation of the perception of the autochthonous character of socialism accompanied by the perception of its soft, human face, creates an anti-capitalist mentality (Ludwig von Mises) that leaves an enormous impact on the long-term understandings of the concepts of individual, society, state, and reforms. This sort of mentality is deeply entrenched in Serbia, where a full-scale process of “debolshevization” has never been initiated. The continuity with socialist legacy is apparent in key segments of the ill-fated transition: political, institutional, economic, symbolical, and no less moral.

Keywords: Anti-capitalist mentality, debolshevization, soft and rigid socialism, transition, free-market

A Mentalidade Anti-capitalista e a transição mal sucedida: O caso da Sérvia

Resumo: Este artigo pretende mostrar como o legado do socialismo humanizado representa um obstáculo muito mais sério para a transição pós-socialista do que a herança do socialismo rígido. Isso ocorre porque uma fusão da percepção do caráter autóctone do socialismo acompanhado pela percepção de sua face humana suave cria uma mentalidade anticapitalista (Ludwig von Mises) que deixa um enorme impacto nos entendimentos de longo prazo dos conceitos de indivíduo, sociedade, estado e reformas. Esse tipo de mentalidade está profundamente arraigado na Sérvia, onde um processo em escala de “desbolchevismo” nunca foi iniciado. A continuidade com o legado socialista é aparente em segmentos-chave da malfadada transição: política, institucional, econômica, simbólica e não menos moral.

Palavras-chave: Mentalidade anticapitalista, desbolchevismo, socialismo suave e rígido, transição, livre mercado

Classificação JEL: P20, B24, O52

* Aleksandar Novakovic, PhD. Research Associate at the Institute for Political Studies, [email protected] ** Dusan Dostanic, PhD. Research Associate at the Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade [email protected] https://doi.org/10.30800/mises.2018.v0.563

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Introduction communist dictatorship have determined the subsequent transitional path toward Post-communist transition scholars democracy and . have not accorded due attention to the Within the literature, if at all, “soft distinction between the legacies of soft and socialism” is treated through the idea of rigid communism in transitional change. Yugoslav socialism, its “” between The reason behind this is understandable. capitalist West and communist East and Transitology seeks to explain the character, the idea of “nonalignment movement”, scope and pace of the changes from a state workers’ self-management and partial of a centrally-planned economy and political economic liberalization during the seventies authoritarianism towards one of democracy (HOFFMAN; NEAL, 1962; RUSINOW, 1977; and a market-oriented economy (LINZ; LYDALL, 1984; DENITCH, 1990; PEJOVICH, STEPAN, 1996; DOBRY, 2000; BALCEROWICZ, 1990, LAKIĆEVIĆ, 2013; 2014). 2002). Therefore, the most vivid and This was perceived as a “modernizing”, historically dominant form of communism “enlightened” and “liberal” version of has been selected as the starting point of socialism that permitted various kinds of the analysis: Soviet-type socialism, present – an experience allegedly unfamiliar paradigmatically behind the Iron Curtain. to the rest of the communist world. In fact, This brand of communism represents the some Soviet satellite countries experienced archetype of the centrally-planned economy a milder kind of communism too when a and the system of political oppression which totalitarian cramp weakened enough to render new democracies so enthusiastically distanced preferable life conditions. Understandable, themselves from. But what about the so-called this fact never gained much prominence “soft-socialism” and its legacy? How can we among the population of those countries. The locate its significance in our understanding whiff of came through benevolent of post-communist transformation? acts of the great patron and not as a result of It is difficult to answer this question, since autonomous actions by the satellites. it is assumed that it is not an issue in the first No systematic investigation has been place and even less a problem. That is, the performed on the influence of the legacy soft socialism is not the problem, rather, it is of this kind of socialism to the transitional presupposed as something good or at least economies of former Yugoslavia1. Actually, the lesser evil. The true evil is rigid socialism. And indeed, for the people who lived 1 An illustrative example is a study by Milica Uvalic behind the Iron Curtain that really was regarding Serbia’s transition, where she tried to explain why Serbia, after the “good starting position not a dilemma. For them it was certainly in 1989, has encountered substantial delays in carrying preferable to live under some socialist rule forward the main objectives of the transition to a that seemed to be more moderate than under and multiparty democracy.” She argues that transition in Serbia was slowed down by a hard stick of Stalinism. Without questioning internal and international constrains. However, the this, we want to investigate how positive life influence of socialist legacy was not discussed in the experiences under allegedly more liberal book. In fact, Yugoslav socialism was briefly depicted as “market socialism” which was more favorable version of socialism in comparison with than socialism in other Eastern European countries negative life experiences under stronger (UVALIC, 2010, p.2-20).

Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | [email protected] MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia 591 Aleksandar Novakovic & Dusan Dostanic much of economic literature on the Serbian accompanying consequences it spontaneously transition has focused on the period produced. Factors such as rigidity or softness after 2000 (BEGOVIĆ, 2005a). This might of a certain order and its ideology and the represent a serious obstacle to the objective perceptions about the autochthonous and evaluation of transitional performances of externally imposed ideology or system must ex-Yugoslav states, especially Serbia, since a be considered as well. positive representation of the quality of life These conceptual considerations should and economical accomplishments of Tito’s illustrate how different combinations of survived the bloody dissolution factors may explain diverse transitional 2 of the state . performances. A mixture of softness and Thus, it is important to see to what extent autochthony is peculiarly detrimental for these reminiscences of the communist past transitional societies having in mind its have influenced the mind and spirit of the impact on economic, institutional, political, transitional man, his general understandings moral and symbolic transition. To paraphrase of society, economy, religion and tradition, his , we can say that soft socialism views of the relationship between individual is the most dangerous conceit (HAYEK, 1992). and society, as well as his attitude toward pre- The transitional experience of Serbia, communist and communist past. In a word, a country traditionally proud of the it is important to investigate and elucidate “achievements” of Yugoslav socialism (also the specific “mentality” of an ordinary man called “Titoism” after ) should that defines his understanding of society and confirm this conclusion. Here, the peculiar survives and is conveyed into a different time form of socialism with a human face produced and historical context, becoming either an a long-lasting and deeply entrenched obstacle or an asset of the new era. Thus, mentality that has erected a barrier to social the main question of our paper could also and economic improvement. be formulated as follows: How does a certain type of socialism affect the mentality of a It is beyond any doubt that this mindset transitional man? composed only one aspect of the wider To answer this question, it is necessary to phenomenon that Ludwig von Mises called expand the mainstream analysis that usually “anti-capitalist mentality” (MISES, 2016), applies only to rigid communism by including although the peculiar phenomenon that Mises soft socialism into the analysis with all the investigated originated from capitalist states. For it is one thing, obviously, to speak of anti- 2 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted capitalist animosity within a capitalist country (SFRJ) of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and and a wholly different thing to speak about Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and the Socialist Republic of Serbia was one of them. SFRJ was the phenomenon under a socialist regime. created in the communist revolution and civil war in Joseph Schumpeter notably explained (2010) 1944. Josip Broz Tito ruled as life-long president until how capitalism breeds the seeds of its own his death in 1980. Serbia was the largest Yugoslav republic, with the Yugoslav capital city in Belgrade. demise, but what happens when the seeds are, The collapse of SFRJ began in 1991 when Slovenia in fact, deeply rooted foundations? Is there announced its independences and soon Croatia a reverse process possibility that naturally followed the example. Those events were a prelude to the long and bloody Yugoslav dissolution that end leads to capitalism just as the one that leads with the in November 1995. to socialism?

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To accomplish our task, we need to employ transition (that followed). If we now change elements of historical and theoretical analyses. the perspective and employ criteria of short This is necessary insofar as the subject matter and long-term cost and benefit to assess the of investigation encompasses the historical impacts of different versions of socialism perspective of the past political order and on transitional performance, we reach the still live legacies that it had produced. following conclusion. Although “socialism Our considerations begin with an with a human face” carries considerable short- introduction of a basic dichotomy between soft term benefits for the population living under and rigid socialism, which is then followed such a regime, its long-term positive effects are by another conceptual pair, namely the one more questionable. The mentality in question of home-grown and externally imposed becomes more polluted. The rigid form of socialism. This should distinguish four communism, on the other hand, although groups of different historical relationships disastrous for the population that live under toward socialism and bring to the fore the its rule, has long-term (transitional) benefits. Serbian (Yugoslavian) combination of soft The mentality in question is healthier and less and autochthonous socialism. In the next polluted. The price paid by the population step, the widespread myth, promoted by living under its strong hand is high but the intellectuals, of the successfulness of Yugoslav prospect for a better future, once the transition “third way” is analyzed. Further, it is shown starts, is much brighter than in the second 4 how such intellectual legacy hindered a fresh case . transitional . Finally, the paper concludes The second is the factor of autochthonism. presenting the reasons and symptoms of Here we imagine the idea of home-grown transitional failure by all key parameters socialism on the one hand, and the externally (political, institutional, economic, moral and imposed one on the other hand. This is of the symbolic) 3. greatest importance for understanding the reasons that lead some countries to rush into radical change as well as the motives of other 1. Two Dichotomies – Conceptual ex-communist countries for ignoring more Considerations radical and far-reaching reforms. Examples of autochthonous socialism are evident in The first, very simple and intuitive, is the the cases of Yugoslavia and Russia, while factor of ideological rigidity. It states that the in almost all other cases communism was more rigid the communism (was), the more imposed by the argument of Soviet tanks5. successful the transition (that ensued). And in reverse, it says that the more moderate the 4 Here we must clarify that this conceptual division, communism (was) the more uncertain the just as almost all other theoretical insights and considerations, is supported by some value-added 3 It should be noted here that the conclusions of the assumptions that help to create the division in the following considerations can be in large part applied to first place. The core ingredient of these assumptions is all other republics of the former Yugoslavia, although the firm conviction that , , the transitional performances of those countries are , good traditions, universal religion, and very different. One recent example for this parallel diversification of political power are fundamental can be seen in Prijon (2017). The extension and the elements of civilization. primary goal of this paper do not allow us to engage 5 One interesting example represents the case of Enver in this broader topic now. Hoxha’s Albania which became a communist country

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Obviously, these factors represent just Thus, we have the dichotomy of soft/ partial and incomplete explanations of the hard communism and the dichotomy of investigated phenomenon; they should autochthonous/imposed communism relating not be understood as ultimate keys for the to time (t), where t stands for the specific time, elucidation of the transitional processes. namely, the beginning of the transition, and in Rather they should be perceived as aspects the relation to the variable (v) where v means that can and usually do influence transitional the degree of detachment from the socio- political heritage of communism. We will see change. The pace and manner of the change that if things are presented like this, “rigidity” is the subject of the specific historical context means greater detachment from communism determined by numerous factors – political, at a specific time t( ), while “softness” means cultural, historical, economic – but that 1 lesser detachment from it (at time t ). On the does not mean that historical contingency 1 other hand, at time t1, “autochthony” comes should be perceived as the final arbiter naturally with less resistance to communism, here. Although social phenomena are fluid while “imposition” consequently means and intertwined, it is nevertheless possible greater detachment from it (see graphics 1 and to grasp some major traits in the manner 2 at the end of the second part of the paper). that can further our understanding of the Let us now take an additional step phenomenon under investigation and thus and make further possibilities noticeable explain what can otherwise be perceived as by bringing the different aspects of our a myriad of unrelated events and facts. dichotomies into the relation.

Let us observe the following dichotomies a) If we conjunct rigidity and autochthony, we based on the notions of rigidity and notice that the latter naturally tends to mitigate autochthony related to the specific historical the former. A perception of home-grown period and the degree of detachment from socialism, especially when accompanied by the symbolical, moral, political, economic the perception of its successfulness tends to and institutional legacy of communism – the lead to a relativization and diminishing of process that can be called debolshevization6. the negative aspects of rigidity. This is seen in the case of Russia where national pride in not through direct but through indirect Soviet military the “accomplishments” of the Soviet era, first assistance, through the stretched Yugoslav hand which seems to have greatly contributed to the Communist and foremost its contribution to the crushing Party of Albania consolidation during and after the of Nazism and becoming a world superpower, war. have made it almost impossible for this society 6 By the term "debolshevization" we assume a to strive for some external social and political comprehensive break up with all segments of the communist past of a certain country, whether in its paradigm. Unlike the satellite countries, institutional, legal, economic, moral or symbolic form. neither Russian policy-makers nor the This also includes the process of lustration as was public accepted the inevitability of transition practiced in some East European countries as well as criminal prosecution against the people involved in enthusiastically; they rather understood it as various molestations during communism. Within the a natural (geopolitical) disaster that should literature that treats post-socialism there is a similar be taken care of with any possible means but narrower concept of “decommunization” used by Pejovich (2001). However, it is related just to the until the system regained its optimality. In economic aspects of dealing with the communist past. part, they blamed western democracies for

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the situation, and when the expected level communism, although the process of political of (financial) understanding from the West and conomic liberalization was noticeable fell short, the feeling of animosity toward in these countries during the last phase of the western political paradigm intensified as communism’s dying out8. the transition went into disarray. The same On the Estonian example we can see logic might be employed in the analysis of how this urge for debolshevization combined the case of Albania, where there was both a with a clear reform agenda might bring cohabitation of rigidity and a perception of far-reaching results in just two years (1992- 7 home-grown socialism until the very end . 1994). The reform package (LAAR, 2002) b) If we now observe the second possibility, consisted of radical changes in the monetary a combination of rigidity and externally sector that stabilized domestic currency imposed ideology, we will see that this (the introduction of the currency board); possibility is the most preferable in terms of a large-scale liberalization of the economy transitional aims. The conclusion has been (which caused a huge influx of foreign direct corroborated with plenty of experience of investments); prompt privatization and tax ex-communist countries from all around revolution (introduction of a flat tax rate). All Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe. those reform activities were followed by the The successful examples of the Czech building of the rule of law, which provided Republic, Poland, Hungary, the northern investors and other market actors with a Baltic “transitional tigers”, especially Estonia, necessary business security. demonstrate that the strong animosity toward Even in this successful case, things externally imposed ideology combined did not go smoothly. Estonian reformer, with the rigidity – which was its trademark liberal-conservative, Mart Laar was forced all around Eastern Europe, pushed those to leave office after just two years. The similar countries toward a radical breakup with faith hit famous Polish reformer Leszek the socio-economic and symbolic legacies of Balcerowicz after implementation of what was dramatically called a shock-therapy. 7 It seems that the modern Albanian state was consolidated with the rule of Enver Hoxha and Nevertheless, Poland was the only European his ideology of national-communism. Hoxha’s Union country that in 2009, after the shock dictatorship was marked by extreme autarchy and wave of world economic crises hit Europe, isolationism towards both the capitalist West and the communist East, and most importantly its ideological avoided the recession (PIATKOWSKI, 2015), father, Tito’s Yugoslavia. See Glenny (2012). This and Estonia today is ranked as seventh in the contributed for the strengthening of the perception world and the third of 44 European countries of national independence, self-sufficiency an statehood on the Heritage index of economic freedoms – “achievements” that even US Albanian emigration accepted as such as Glenny remarked (2012, p.569). (HERITAGE, 2018). In both cases the change Both the legacy of communist institutions and the was irreversible, and it would not have been prescriptions of the older society were too inimical possible in the first place if there were no to the democratic pedigree of the new institutions that needed to be created. This factor might explain need for debolshevization. in some degree the pitfalls of Albanian transition, which was doomed to “descent into lawlessness” 8 In fact, those countries in many respects did not (JEFFRIES, 2002, p. 4) and even the short phase of significantly (or at all) lag behind Yugoslavia in terms anarchy in 1997 after the state crumbled following of socialism with a human face. This was especially the collapse of pyramidal schemes. visible in the last decade of communism.

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The push was strong and the enthusiasm reconciliation over a more strictly undertaken high, even though the same line of success debolshevization process (DIX; REBEGEA, was not observable everywhere. Neither do 2010). And in Bulgaria the need had not “the infamous” cases of Bulgaria (where the been so strong, especially after the Party communist Hydra cut its own head to survive successfully scapegoated Todor Živkov and managing to successfully remain in power), showed understanding for a milder form Romania (where the population could not of debolshevization (STOYANOV, 2017), straightforwardly make a speedy recovery thus pouring some fresh blood into the old from the totalitarianism of Ceausescu) and communist veins. Slovakia (where the crawling authoritarianism c) We see the third solution as a partly of Vladimir Mečiar captured the transition) theoretical and partly historical possibility. bring this logic into question. Unlike the case However, essentially it is just a theoretical of Yugoslavia, and especially Serbia, at the possibility because one could hardly find any outset of the transition those countries have communist country where communism was experienced a real need for moral, symbolic, imposed externally while simultaneously institutional and political detachment from being “liberal” from the outset. Everywhere the communist past, but the process was to in the East we see totalitarian – Stalinist – some extent stalled and prolonged due to beginnings, but things change with evolution specific circumstances. to “post-totalitarianism” and especially the It is of primary significance to make it last phase of the communist era9. clear that the first condition of successful In the final decade of communism we can reforms is present in those cases where the see how opposition movements in those states process of debolshevization has been fulfilled. became ever stronger while the control of the But to have debolshevization underway one Party authority became less firm and rigid. has to primarily have a need for it. Some This is especially evident in the case of Poland, countries came to terms with that need more Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, countries that successfully than others. The reason why can be subsumed into this fourth category other factors did not conjoin to make it for as well, if we just observe a factual kind of successful stories in later cases as in the case communism in those countries at this specific of more admirable examples is not of concern timeframe. As ideology ran out of fuel and here, for if the minimal criteria for the success the USSR became weak due to its internal of transition is the ideological, political and problems, opposing voices became stronger economic disconnection with the communist 9 past, then it becomes clear that this is just In spite of the unsuccessful mutinies of the Polish October (1956), the Hungarian Uprising (1956) and the a necessary but by no means a sufficient Spring (1968), all suppressed in cold blood by reason for the effective transformation. Nor Soviet forces and their branches, the wheel of time is there a clear-cut division between cases in could not be stopped; a tacit compromise was made that enabled a slow but still noticeable liberalization in which the state longed for debolshevization those countries. The “compromise” reflects variations and ones in which the state did not. There of what Linz and Stepan call “early”, “frozen” and was a strong need for lustration in Romania, “mature” post-totalitarianism (LINZ; STEPAN, 1996, p. 42) and since Yugoslavia experienced a totalitarian of course, but the bloody overturn of the phase (from 1944-48) it could be subsumed under their Ceausescu regime gave priority to national conceptual division too.

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and less subject to brutal reprisal10. Here, in and colonization of areas ethnically cleaned the more figurative sense of the words, we can from resident Germans and Italians12. speak of a type of communism that is both Fundamentally, pre-war market-oriented liberal and yet externally imposed. Apart from privately-owned economy with a functioning that, this conceptual possibility represents price mechanism was violently replaced just a self-contradictory idea inapplicable to with a centrally planned economy with the Soviet-style imperialism11 and totalitarianism. state (the Party) as the main “owner over the means of productions” and arbitrary price 2. The Yugoslav mixture mechanism. But this model soon collapsed due to internal dysfunctionality. The fourth possibility (d) represents the The economic downfall coincided with combination of softness and autochthony. political misunderstandings with Stalin that We found this to be the most harmful for the culminated in expelling Yugoslavia from mind and spirit of post-communist man. The Cominform in 194813. The evolving crises case of Yugoslavia and consequently Serbia behind the Iron Curtain was carefully overseen represents its vivid example. Historically, by western capitalist states who determined to softness has been associated with “workers help this divorce pass smoothly, particularly self-management” while the autochthonous in the financial sense of the words. character of Yugoslav socialism with the The introduction of workers’ self- Partisan war (RUSINOW, 1977, p. 61). management (WSM) in 1950 marked the second phase which consequently led to 2.1 Softness the softening of communism in Yugoslavia. On the ideological level, WSM represented The economic history of communist a proclamation that communism will not Yugoslavia has two main phases (SIRC, 1979; be abandoned in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the RUSINOW, 1977). The first, that followed move was justified by the necessity to embrace immediately after the end of War (1945-6), was even more of ideological orthodoxy. It meant marked by a Stalinist commanded economy, retreat from Lenin and Stalin to Marx14. On large-scale nationalization of privately- the economic level, it represented the gradual owned assets, collectivization of agriculture abandoning of central planning. But crucially, 10 And if we, again, compare those countries with 12 Yugoslavia’s soft socialism, we will see the striking For the history of the ethnic Germans annihilation advantage that those countries had compared to this by Tito’s communists, see: Österreichische Historiker- country where no serious opposition existed, where Arbeitsgemeinschaft Für Kärnten und Steiermark dissidents were silenced and bribed, and where society (1992) and Wildmann et al (1998). For the Italians was unmotivated for any substantial change of the ethnic cleansing, see: Ballinger (2002). socialist regime. Having this in mind, we can rank 13 Glenny even claims that Yugoslav revolutionary the case of Yugoslav communism in the “frozen” communism surpassed its Stalinist role-model: “To variation of post-totalitarianism rather than in the disprove the claim of revisionism, the leadership in mature phase. Belgrade decided instead to speed up collectivization, 11 But this is quite possible for a “benevolent imperium” demonstrating that it was not Yugoslavia but Soviet – if there are any such under this label – that leaves Union and its allies that had strayed from the path of enough space for personal freedom to stay intact Stalinist orthodoxy” (GLENNY, 2012: p. 546-7). (, customs and traditions as well as 14 Namely, to the Marx’s idea of “free association property ) and taking care to minimally burden of producers” firstly proposed by Milovan Djilas its subjects. (DRACHKOVITCH, 1982, p. 354).

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WSM was just a political and economic a private property-based economy of any survival tactic (WILSON, 1980) in a time of significant form practically did not exist15. serious crisis. Liberalization came as readiness to The regulatory changes from 1950 initiated receive vast amounts of foreign financial the formation of workers councils (radnički aid16, trade, and imports from the West; it saveti) firstly with just an advisory role and presupposed decentralization based on later, from 1963, with operative functions “social property” 17, tax reforms as well as (LYNN et al., 2000a). The introduction of WSM more liberal practices to work in and travel marked the beginning of a process of erosion to Western European countries18. Also, the of the once monolith socialist ownership, consumer goods market was more open than without, however, seriously endangering in other socialist countries. the Party’ s role in the economic life of the Although this opening had helped country. communist Yugoslavia to survive and prolong WSM was and stayed until the very end its lifespan, the experiment with “workers a contradictory endeavor. “Self-management democracy” completely failed. The lack of was powerless in face of either the bureaucratic plan or the market” (SAMARY, 1995, p. 61). 15 Apart from so-called “STR” (Serbian: samostalna Full implementation of a market mechanism trgovinska radnja) meaning “independent trade enterprises” reserved for small crafts and trades and a change to private property would introduced after the initial large-scale Leninist inevitably lead to the demise of socialism, centrally-planned economy failed. Like the owl of while the retreat to complete bureaucratic Minerva, the institution of private property was introduced at the very end of Yugoslavia, with the control would diminish its humane guise. reforms of Ante Marković (1989-1990), but that was Kuehnelt-Leddihn prophetically speaks on too late for the gloomy destiny had already started the destiny of Yugoslav socialism at the time unfolding. 16 of its apogee: During the first phase of WSM (from 1951), the communist regime had welcomed an annual inflow of 100$ million in foreign financial aid SIRC,( 1979). Revolution always remains a possibility 17 (though in a totalitarian state a fairly remote Introduced in 1953 as a kind of ownership that belongs neither to the state nor to the working people, one), but from an evolutionary viewpoint but to “society”. Yugoslav workers were not owners of socialism is always a dead-end street. the factories, but the factories were owned by “society”. Yugoslavia now experiences this difficulty. If The main idea was that the workers would eventually you have the two long legs of free enterprise build the sense of higher cause, and work for society you can run; with the short legs of socialism and not for themselves primarily (SIRC, 1979, p. 73). you barely walk; but with one long and one In reality, the property was de facto owned either by “alienated” communist managers or by the Party, and short leg you fall on your nose. (1974, p. 210). the workers rational response was “you cannot pay me how little I can work”. In short, what was called social Thus, one should overestimate the property (or ownership) demonstrated the pitfalls of liberalization achievements of Yugoslav “the tragedy of commons”. communism, let alone call them “laissez-faire 18 However, not everyone was able to obtain that passport. For example, Tito’s regime did not want socialism” as, for example, does Rusinow to release the families of political emigrants which (1977, p. 138-191), although they brought were held as hostages, and UDBA (the communist about some elements of a more open and secret police UDBA – Uprava državne bezbednosti) was able to put a ban on the issuance of passports. decentralized economy. First of all, until the Police and UDBA also deprived many people from very end of Yugoslavia’s existence as a state, passports for political reasons.

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functioning price mechanisms (prices were with staggering inflation and unemployment, determined largely arbitrarily19) prevented although the latter was partially mitigated socialist firms to organize production by exporting working force. Work abroad in rationally. The firms miscalculated real western countries for some 20% of the whole market needs, producing too much or too little working population (outside agriculture), commodities, usually without the knowledge which comprise roughly 1 million people21, of what is to be produced at all20. was systematically organized and promoted The first phase of WSM (1950-1964) was by the state: marked by high inflation and unemployment Yugoslav ‘guest workers’ in Central Europe, (DRACHKOVITCH, 1982). But the second and particularly in Western , phase (from 1965-1972) brought even became an important factor in the political more difficulties. The newly introduced and economic calculation of the Yugoslav decentralization of economic factors was and recipient Governments. So far as the Yugoslav were concerned, it was better that not followed by changes in the ownership such people should find work abroad than structure, which as a consequence additionally that they should stagnate in the villages at contributed to the practice of irresponsible public expense, and their remittances in management. The enormous indebtedness hard currency were a useful item for the during the 1970s followed as a result (OECD, Yugoslav foreign exchange budget. On the 1989; 1990). other hand, the large-scale manpower export was a poor advertisement for the Yugoslav When the golden era of foreign aid socialist model (WILSON, 1980, p. 176). donations passed, Yugoslavia was left with the option to take loans only on commercial bases. The system final failure coincided with Market simulation made things even worse the death of its life-long president22: with the transfer of state investment funds to By the end of 1980 Yugoslavia’s foreign the banks organized as self-management units debt totaled $16 billion (about 90 percent (DRACHKOVITCH, 1982). This had opened with Western countries); Inflation rate in the door for the policy of comfortable and November was 36 percent and rapidly uncontrolled borrowing. As a consequence of rising; unemployment stood at 13 percent; these and many other shortcomings Yugoslav the economy was plagued by persistent economy showed symptoms of great illness, shortages of practically everything from medicines to edible oil to coffee and 19 Ljubo Sirc illustrates this with the words of detergents; petroleum imports increased communist economist Krasovec: “planners used to by more than $1 billion; about 700.000 tons establish endless lists of requirements for industry, transport, mining, etc. in physical terms, without 21 Work abroad went on at such a large scale that Sirc taking any notice of prices. All they had to match described it as an “exodus” (1979, p. 199). them with were figures for the so called 'capacities', 22 Eminent publicist Pero Simić found that already possible output of industrial plants, frequently by the early 70's Kardelj expressed worries among not connected with each other. The best that such the inner circle of communist top-level officials that balancing could possibly achieve was consistency of Yugoslavia’s communist experiment came to an end plans, but certainly not optimality” (1979, p. 8). See economically (SIMIC, 2011). This was even recognized also Rusinow (1977, p. 177). by some authors with a favorable view of socialism 20 As Sirc observed, socialist’ firms produced: in Yugoslavia: “Self-management as a social and “abnormally large stocks of all kinds of machinery, and economic system that the country was implementing especially agricultural machinery, at the beginning was already running to the end of its limits by the of the 1950s” (1979, p. 4). late 1960’s” (JAKIR, 2005, p.138).

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of wheat had to be imported; nearly 1,800 political organizations. Organized by Party enterprises were operating in the red, with members who generally held important an aggregate loss of $725 million; and despite positions in those outside organizations, improvements over 1979, the balance of the aktiv had a tremendous degree of payments was negative by some $2 billion. influence over internal enterprise policy. Stagflation, Yugoslav style, had indeed set (PRYCHITKO, 1991, p. 67). in. (DRACHKOVITCH, 1982, p. 376). On the other hand, workers were also Since the Yugoslav socialist model, at reluctant to manage the enterprise. first glance, was not as brutal as that of other Eastern European countries, it was widely Workers tend to lack real interest in believed that the transition in Yugoslavia or managing the enterprise. In fact, as Egon Serbia should not be as radical as it was in Neuberger and Estelle James have argued, workers would rather not take responsibility Poland or the Czech Republic. It was also for decision-making, because decision- a wide-spread belief that Yugoslav “soft making is too risky. Good decisions may socialism” was some kind of an advantage in bring about higher incomes, but they may transition, because Yugoslavia allegedly had also bring about greater expectations by the a long tradition “in market-oriented reforms” Party and thus greater responsibilities in and “some form of economic democracy” the future. Moreover, bad decisions hurt (UVALIC, 2010, p. 14, 20-21, 29). immediately. Workers therefore tend to fall into routine (PRYCHITKO, 1991, p. 67). However, this belief was utterly wrong. All so-called economic reforms were Practically, they were only interested in ideologically inspired and supervised, partial the wages and current profit sharing. “Bitter and superficial (MARSENIĆ, 2003), because conflicts of interest appear over the issue of the most important institutions like private how much profit should be handed over to property, free market, the rule of law, and the workers for personal consumption and political pluralism were not introduced. how much should be ploughed back into the Consequently, all these “economic reforms” enterprise for investment” (PRYCHITKO,1991, were futile, because no real market economy p. 68) 24. can be based on “social property” and economic calculation was impossible23. It “Soft socialism” and self-management would mean a market without independent, created a particular kind of anti-capitalist autonomous actors, who are accountable for mentality. The most important legacy their actions. of self-management was a mentality of unaccountability that always emphasized In reality, workers enjoyed far less rights without acknowledging the connection autonomy and power in the self-management between rights and duties. Self-management system then it was believed. was more an obstacle than an advantage The Communist Party in Yugoslavia has (BEGOVIĆ, 2005, p. 438-439). managed to maintain a great degree of For example, a wage was seen as a right, power within the enterprise. One avenue of even when it was unearned. It was understood power is found in the aktiv, which is a crucial link between the enterprise and other socio- as a category which was independent from the efficiency of an enterprise and its 23 As theoretically demonstrated by Mises (1990 [1920]) and Hayek (1940). 24 Similar conclusions can be found in Lynn et al. (2000).

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performances. Another so-called right was the true manifestation arose for the first time in right to work, which was also understood not the world of communist reality. as a negative freedom (freedom from), but as Jeronim Perović observes that a positive freedom (freedom for). It practically meant that the state was obliged to provide Tito-era accounts suggest that Yugoslavia jobs for everyone. In general, workers were had been pursuing its own course toward socialism from the first days of the partisan prone to believe in communist propaganda, resistance in 1941, not just since 1948. To according to which they alone were producers varying degrees, this version has been of values, and all other professions were seen accepted by many Western scholars writing as less important. about the Tito-Stalin split (2007, p. 34). At the center of this mentality there was a passive individual, armed with his rights The story goes further claiming that the and entitlements given by the paternalistic Yugoslav example of socialism demonstrated state. It meant that personal responsibility the possibility for a real and viable solution was actually delegated to the “higher level that would elevate itself above the extremes of decision-making”. In such a context, of the world of rigid communism and the the connection between freedom and world where unhampered market forces responsibilities25, as well as the connection dehumanized all aspects of humanity. The between acts and consequences was broken. myth had to be accompanied by its official Unsuccessful firms were frequently protected “philosophical upgrade” known as the “Praxis from bankruptcy and their losses were simply school” led by eminent Yugoslav Marxists “socialized”. of the time such a Mihailo Marković, Milan Kangrga and Gajo Petrović27. 2.2 Autochthony It is crucial here to stress that the perception of the autochthonous character The myth that the brave communists of communism is not necessarily in line (partisan guerilla) under the leadership with historical truth. In Serbia’s case, of Communist Party of Yugoslavia communism was established with the help (Komunistička partija Jugoslavije – KPJ) of the Soviets, although the prevailing opinion crucially contributed to the liberation of Serbia among the population today is that it was from the clamps of fascism is still widespread an autochthonous movement and ideology and unquestionable. originated from the special dedication and It implies that communism was not struggle of Yugoslav communists under Josip imposed externally, that it was internally Broz Tito28. created and that later, in the confrontation with the “left deviations” 26 of Stalinism, its the territories that were allegedly liberated from Italian occupation forces (LAMPE, 2000, p. 214; SHEPHERD, 25 This had morally destructive consequences, because 2012, p. 152). part of the population was too ready to trade its 27 On Praxis School of Philosophy see Marković; political, moral and economic freedoms as well as Petrović (1979). its personal autonomy for questionable economic 28 “Popular support for the regime also derived from security and some material gains. the much deeper roots of communist ideology in 26 The term refers to the praxis of red terror and mass Yugoslavia, since communism was not imposed from killings of civilians (representatives of the “class the outside as in CEE, but through the grass-roots enemy”) by Tito’s partisans in 1942 in Montenegro, in revolution during World War II” (U VALIC, 2010, p. 30).

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Both the character of the final military operations and the phase of terror directed against “the enemies of the revolution” that followed speak about the nature of so-called liberation. In the famous dispatch from the 5th of July, 1944 (SIMIĆ, 2011, p. 130-193), Tito asked Stalin for help to “solve the issue of Serbia” where “the positions of the King’s supporters are being strengthened in every possible way” by England. Tito offered rich financial compensation in return. The call for help was understandable. Tito’s partisans were Graphic 1: Four possible combinations of beaten by the royalist forces of general Draža rigidity, softness, autochthonism and externally imposed ideology at the time of the beginning of Mihailović while attempting, unsuccessfully, transition. to enter Serbia in March and April 1944 Source: Prepared by the authors (VUCKOVICH, 2004; SCHMIDER, 2010, p. *А being case a), B case b), [C] being only theoretically 186). Only after the Soviet army of possibly possible, stands for case c) D for case d) over 200,000 Ukrainian soldiers together with rapidly mobilized “antifascist” Bulgarian units entered Serbia did the partisans make their “own way” to Serbia, that is, on the Soviets’ accomplishments (LANE, 2004, p. 91). What has been since then called “liberation” and still celebrated annually was in fact just the switch of the colors of totalitarianism – red replaced black. The phase of “liberation” that ensued represents the bloodiest phase of terror29 that even overshadowed terrible Nazi crimes during the occupation. In contrast to the still prevailing myth, these events clearly reflect the fact that, Graphic 2: Relationship between as historian Leslie Benson remarks, “Serbs did debolshevization with three possible cases at not choose communism either, as the strength the time of the beginning of transition (t1) of the Chetnik movement demonstrates” Source: Prepared by the authors (2001, p. 87). Historian Srđan Cvetković compared and 29 Koštunica and Čavoški have shown that in the 1944 presented data that shed new light on the – 1949 period, particularly in the first three years infamous beginnings of Yugoslav socialism. (1944 – 1946), the foundations were laid down for a new communist order in its Bolshevik form. They Based on “the number of executions without conclude that later revisions in everyday politics did trial in the first months after liberation by make some cosmetic changes, but the foundation the revolutionary authorities in Serbia and remained the same. During those early years, Yugoslav Yugoslavia” he states that… “the regime was communists were far more radical and ruthless compared to other communist parties across Eastern incomparably more repressive than anywhere Europe (KOSTUNICA; CAVOSKI, 2011). else in Eastern or Western Europe”. Having

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presented all the data concerning Western a conventional wisdom largely supported and Eastern Europe, he concludes that: by intellectuals31, especially neo-communist Serbian historians32. according to all indicators, the number of those killed in Serbia is at least twice as The paradigmatic example of this attitude high as those killed in the country with the comes from a contemporary author who second highest number, Bulgaria, while in writes: comparison to France, and particularly the rest of Europe, the number of those killed It is easily forgotten that the SFRJ economy at the end of the war runs from twenty to was the most liberal and perhaps the most even several hundred times higher. If we successful among the socialist countries. also count the indirectly killed, i.e., civilians Although devoid of a market form of killed in camps and prisons (approximately property, a managerial economy was created an additional 35,000 in Serbia), the share which could not be destroyed and looted of those killed per one million inhabitants without a war. That great self-sufficiency would grow to over 10,000, which would of the economic sphere in opposition to constitute an infamous European record. the political state was the most significant (CVETKOVIĆ, 2016, p. 95) 30. generator of war, due to the fact that the newly formed state elites succeeded in Thus, it is important to underscore the imposing private interests on the political state through a mixture of nationalism and difference between a home-grown ideology/ demagoguery, but could not make this movement and the myth of a home-grown profitable in the economic sphere without ideology/movement. A specific type of waging a war… The main cause of the war socialism only began to develop after 1948, was a form of government that could not be but up to that moment the Yugoslav Stalinist established in any different way. (VRKATIĆ, phase had already completed its revolutionary 2009, p. 240). mission. The class enemy – Serbia’s bourgeoisie, national intelligentsia, pre-war A lot of wording would be needed to monarchist institutions, democratic elections analyze all the conceptual and logical flaws and the free market – was annihilated. and mix-ups present in the above quotation. If we put aside the confused usage of the term “liberal” the most important point is that 3. The intellectuals while the author praises those factors that and Communism according to him brought about unprecedent economic development in the communist Yugoslav socialism with a human world (although “devoid of a market form of face was and still is widely perceived as property”), he at the same time paradoxically successful not only because it brought sees in them the main reasons for the failure emancipatory relief to a population which, prior to the revolution, lived a life full of 31 Many people and especially intellectuals passionately misery, poverty and backwardness, but also loathe capitalism (MISES, 2016b). The situation in because of its economic accomplishments universities is alarming. Orthodox Marxism cloaked in many forms of political philosophy, sociology and that spurred industrial, technological and anthropology is still firmly entrenched. Apart from infrastructure modernization. This has been the university, the Serbian intellectual scene is also generally left wing. 30 Regarding communist brutality see also (RAJIĆ, 32 Evident in the works of: Petrović (2001), Popović- 1991). Obradović (2008), Stojanović (2009), Milosević (2017).

Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | [email protected] MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia 603 Aleksandar Novakovic & Dusan Dostanic of the state. The further provocative statement that also simultaneously this paranoid consists in the thesis that even a small amount negation of the world, since the People’s of , as a consequence of Liberation War is the zenith of the history of our world, our involvement in the world: economic decentralization (although “devoid Tito is a worldly man. (KONSTANTINOVIĆ, of property”) inevitably produces social 1996, p. 6) 35. inequalities, and consequently leads to nationalism and war. This resembles Stalinist The idea is simple. History before WWII rhetoric and contempt toward freedom and was mostly local and unimportant, and only diversity of life, no matter how small and the “anti-fascist struggle” and “People’s fragile that freedom was in Yugoslavia. In Liberation War” had universal meanings. the opinion of Vrkatić, and similar authors, Logically, every attempt to demythologize Yugoslavia was not destroyed by its structural that war and Partisan movement was seen as deficits, artificial ideology of “brotherhood “revisionism” and “anti-anti-fascism”. Thus, and unity” and failed economy of workers’ the collapse of communism is interpreted self-management, but with the help of market as a reaction and a historical fallback, or forces. a return to pity localism, “pre-historical The following quote paradigmatically age” or a “rebellion against the world”. For illustrates the intellectual climate among the Konstantinović, the decomposition of the vast majority of intellectuals at the beginning People’s Liberation War is “the demolition of of the transition: the world”. So, if socialism means anti-fascism and progress, privatization and capitalism are At last, and all that monstrous, and systematic, synonyms for backwardness and fascism36. negation of the People’s Liberation War33, which reached its delirium in the killing Even more, this attitude of glorification of Tito in downtown Tito’s Užice34 – isn’t is also noticeable in intellectual history, that is, in the forgeries of communist and neo- 33 The “People’s Liberation War” or “People’s Liberation communist historians and theoreticians. Their Army” (Serbian: Narodnooslobodilčka vojska) is one of the chief notions of communist mythology and history has two claims: first, that apart from was the official communism era nomenclature for the socialist thought in all its variants, nothing communist guerilla in Yugoslavia. The purpose of such else worth mentioning ever existed in the terminological coinage was to conceal the ideological aspect of the movement (the social revolution) and history of ideas and ideologies in Serbia. to imply that the population overwhelmingly chose Second, that even the indigenous social this movement and its cause over the alternative, democratic tradition of Svetozar Marković monarchist and pro-western one. is just a prelude to and a natural phase in the 34 Referring to the removal of Tito’s bust from the city of Užice that took place in 1991. Although that 35 was a sporadic and in fact an ad hoc measure of Exactly the same phrase was used by Latinka Perović debolshevization caused by the specific context (2008). It is not an accidental word choice, and the (apart from some municipalities of Belgrade, that connection between Tito and the world is much was the only city in Serbia where the anti-communist deeper. Serbian globalists and advocates of one-world opposition won in the 1991 local elections), this is still ideology are united by Titoism see Lompar (2013). perceived by a vast majority of intellectuals, not only 36 Some historians are so radical that they depict the of leftist orientation, as a blasphemy to the narrative entire Serbian history as a history of Serbian fascism. of the anti-fascist and modernizing tradition of Serbia. According to Petrović, Serbian fascism is older than 2015 saw initiatives by some political parties and its Italian or German counterpart. It is not only the intellectuals to return the bust to the central city first, but a long-standing one as well, because it came square where it once stood (BLIC.T, 2015). back after the fall of communism (PETROVIĆ, 2015).

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development of thought that had its apogee The unfortunate consequence of this in the ideological orthodoxy of the KPJ. is that Serbian liberals or even libertarians In their histories of political thought have a benevolent view of communism, 37 authors such as Marković (2009a) and especially its “modernizing” and “anti- Simeunović (2000) deliberately weave a fascist” components, thus having been veil of ignorance over the rich and in many unable to understand why the process of respect quite remarkable classical liberal and debolshevization is of crucial importance conservative thought in Serbia, especially from for any post-socialist society. Some of them the second half of the 19th century unto early are ready to glorify certain communist leaders 20th century. The names of great theoreticians, for their alleged and openness, thus perpetuating communist myths about writers, economists and ministers of finance Yugoslav “authentic and autochthone such as Stojan Novaković, Milan Kujundžić socialism” 38 and “socialism with a human Aberdar, Vladimir Jovanović, Živojin Perić, face”. Even they are prone to supporting left- Kosta Cukić, Čedomilj Mijatović… – are wingers in terms of politics of “affirmative completely omitted from this neo-communist action”, “politics of recognition”, “gay historical and theoretical narrative. Some marriages”, “multiculturalism” and so on. of these, by the late 19th century, cultivated economic thought in the line of classical The most striking example is definitely Latinka Perović. Although she defined herself liberal tradition. To this day but a few authors explicitly as “some mixture of liberal and researched this tradition (MIJATOVIĆ, 2008; leftist” (2008, p. 118) it is widely believed 2017; MILJKOVIĆ, 2001; TRKULJA; POPOVIĆ, that she is the most prominent advocate of 2001). liberalism in Serbia. Nevertheless, she is much How far the intellectual forgery went is more a representative of neo-communist most evident when Marković (2009) attached ideology behind the veil of liberalism. This a “utopian character” to the Serbian social is not surprising for she was a high-ranked democratic tradition (MARKOVIĆ, 2009, member of the communist regime (Secretary p. 1) although the Yugoslav communists of the Central Committee of the Communist proclaimed this tradition as the most League of Serbia) during late 60s and early dangerous enemy to be obliterated first in 70s. This is a very important moment because the revolution. Furthermore, during WWII, it is believed that she was a “liberal” within all Serbian social democratic parties joined the communist regime. Even if we disregard the royalist movement of general Mihailović, the fact that no real liberalism was possible most notably its eminent representatives such under the totalitarian regime, it is still as Živko Topalović who in 1944 became one strange the understanding of “liberalism”, of the key ideologues and supporters of the movement (SUBOTIĆ, 2011). But these facts 37 It is rather puzzling to see libertarians who defend the autocratic regime and its suppression of all were erased and modified immediately after basic in the name of technical progress and WWII in a Soviet-style rewriting of history “modernization”. One should ask what the concept which created the myth of a long historical of “modernization” means in that context. aspiration and struggle of the South-Slavs 38 Perović argues that communism and Tito’s regime were in accordance with Serbian political culture, and for the ideals of social justice, equality and that this is the reason why there was no resistance to solidarity understood in utopian terms. his regime in Serbia (PEROVIĆ, 2008).

Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | [email protected] MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia 605 Aleksandar Novakovic & Dusan Dostanic keeping in mind that at the time she never characteristic of 20th century liberals such as raised her voice for the , Ludwig von Mises or Friedrich A. von Hayek. for instance. Not even when university professors were prosecuted and sentenced 4. Without a Fresh Start to prison (such as Mihailo Đurić). Actually, during that period “liberal communists” were Thus, post-communism did not have, banning journals and they could be hardly in fact, the possibility for a fresh start in distinguished from hard-core Stalinists. For the detachment from communism. No example, in one week in 1971 four newspapers institutionalized tradition outside of the were banned. This is how Titoist “liberalism” communist one existed nor the much-needed was functioning. In reality, the story about resistance to it (as it was the case in numerous “liberal” wing among the Serbian communists Soviet satellite states)40, so there was no is another myth, for those “liberals” were meaningful point of departure for the Serbian by no means more liberal than those who transition. That was quite understandable and belonged to the doctrinaire wing (LOMPAR, even rational having in mind the described 2012, p. 30-94). Not only that Perović was a history of devastating mythologization. Since communist back in these days, but even a great many good things has already been now she glorifies Tito as a positive figure achieved in communist times by the wits and (PEROVIĆ, 2008, p. 76-77), his regime and hands of people alone, why should anyone its alleged modernization, claiming that this was “our historical maximum” (2008, p. 77) strive for something that is just externally and that this kind of system was not only imposed, for some other patterns of behavior, compatible with liberalism, but also a way experiences or reform blueprints? towards liberalism (PEROVIĆ, 2008). Paying a On the other hand, looking back and little service to liberalism Perović still wages searching a more distant past – the long- war against the “Serbian nationalism”, concept forgotten era of capitalist and traditionalist of the national state, Church, traditional Serbia – a solution for the present challenges culture, like she did in her communist days. was perceived as an anachronic and Being the most distinguished representative, dangerous move just because everything great Perović was not an isolated case. However, was already achieved in the “glorious days” she and her ideological advocates who hide of Yugoslav socialism. All of the previous their neo-communism under the layer of self- historical, political and intellectual legacy proclaimed liberalism are actually creating was perceived as retrograde insomuch it intellectual and moral confusion in the public did not contribute for the development of discourse. Same as in communist times, the socialist thought. Even more, there was (and opposition is thus transformed into the enemy still is) a consensus over the positive values of the state39. 40 It is a rather strange type of liberalism, “Yet the resistance to Stalinism in the Balkans went largely unnoticed because it lacked coordination and considering the strong anti-communist was centered on the countryside and not in cities like Berlin and Budapest. Furthermore, since the collapse 39 Also, she advocates welfare-state and says that of communism in 1989, the archives have revealed transition was a regression regarding the labour that Stalinism in the Balkans was applied with much legislation (PEROVIĆ, 2008). In a way she repeated greater brutality than even western scholars have Vrkatić’s thesis that the material achievements of the previously assumed” (GLENNY, 2012, p. 551-552; socialist state were unmade by the war in Yugoslavia. PEROVIĆ, 2007).

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of Yugoslav communism that gathered such Czechoslovakia during the Velvet Revolution43. different and even mutually confronting Yet, the radical break with communism must figures (both Slobodan Milošević and the be deep and comprehensive. For a successful progressive intellectuals who opposed him transition, the importance is not solely on in almost everything else) political parties institutional (economic and political) change, and civil society groups under the banner like introducing a multiparty system, but a of “neo-communism”. The Serbian political symbolical and a moral change as well. It elite, whatever side it came from, believed means acknowledging the simple fact that that one must not neglect the achievements the communist regime was a dictatorship; of Yugoslav socialism in the spheres of art, that it was illegitimate and violently imposed; that the socialist experiment was impossible culture, emancipation, worldviews, and, very and that it was a mistake all along, which important, the economy. This, and not the cannot be mended through “reforms” or paradigm of “neoliberal” reforms41 was the new management as well as that society main “reform” blueprint for the elite at the can be cured only through liberating itself beginning of the transition42. The transition from socialism and its destructive legacy; and reforms were conceived as an adaptation that all those who intellectually advocated of democracy within the framework of the Tito’s regime cannot play any part in Serbian “progressive” socialist legacy, a discourse of economic, political and moral regeneration “anti-fascism”, or Yugoslav socialism. (BASTA, 1999, p. 114-119). It also means Thus, we see how the first precondition establishing a continuity with the pre- for a successful transition is a radical break communist past and the country’s pre- with socialism and its heritage. However, communist traditions on the institutional as the “radical break” does not necessarily well as on the symbolic level. mean a violent break. In fact, it could be In Central and Eastern Europe, we have both radical and peaceful, as it was in former seen that when that break with communism was more radical and deeper, the transition 41 As erroneously thought by Upchurch and to democracy was more successful. The Marinković who claim that “Successive governments since 2000 have pursued orthodox neoliberal policies” opposite is also true. When the break was (UPCHURCH; MARINKOVIĆ, 2011, p. 235) and many not so clear and radical the transition was other Serbian authors Golubović (2004); Gavrilović; long, hard, painful and with a lot of setbacks. Ivanović (2011); Josifidis et al, 2010; Smiljković (2011), and Kovačević (2012). For an interpretation that calls So, on one side there are countries like the into question the dominant perspective see Novaković Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, and (2012a; 2012b). on the other side there are countries like 42 On the other hand, politicians and opposition parties Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. Serbia, as from the “right” – in most cases, in fact, the products and branches of the communist secret police UDBA, well as other former Yugoslav Republics, or Milosevic’s DB (Državna bezbednost) – also played belong to the second group. The reason for into the neo-communist field. They also followed this is the fact that Serbia never made a clear the course of neo-communist policy, and although (institutional, symbolic and moral) break with perceived as retrograde followers who could be of use here and there as bogeyman endangering neo- communism, self-management or “socialism communist orthodoxy, they embodied neo-communist understandings of social organization as well, 43 “Actually, the exceptional feature of post-communist especially its economic ideas. Simply put, capitalism transition in Central and Eastern Europe is its relative remained an “unknown ideal” equally for both sides. lack of violence” (BALCEROWICZ, 2002, p. 24).

Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | [email protected] MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia 607 Aleksandar Novakovic & Dusan Dostanic with a human face” as it was called. In the socialism becomes inescapable, something words of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Serbia like a fatum or a destiny. This narration is also continued to “live by lies” (SOLZHENITSYN, morally corrupt because it tends to depict 2004) and failed to establish a connection with Titoism as a well-intended mistake, and not as its own identity. something completely negative. Thus, instead The reasons for this are numerous, of repentance this narration seeks excuses including the old narrative of the authenticity for the communist misdeed. Therefore, the and originality of Yugoslav socialism. Serbian transition was paradoxically more an Thus, when socialism is believed to be an attempt to preserve continuity with socialism integral part of the national tradition, the than an attempt to do the opposite. national character and the Serbian political culture, the transition has already lost its 5. Without Radical Change meaning, because this belief blocks the transition from socialism to democracy and a) Economic transition. Those false ideas about capitalism, and by fostering a specific anti- socialism, the past and the meaning of the capitalist mentality it redefines the meaning transition had terrible consequences for of transition to transformation from one form the Serbian economy. The narrative of the of socialism to another, which is supposed authenticity of socialist culture has fostered a to be better and more efficient44. However, peculiar fear of capitalism and its institutions, it must still be a type of socialism, because because the transition was seen not as a when perceived as part of national culture way to heal society but as an attack on the 45 44 Almost all politicians in Serbia advocate some national character . So it had to be slowed sort of . For example, in 1989 Slobodan down, or some new model of socialism had to Milošević spoke about economic and political reforms, be invented and introduced. As a result, the debureaucratization, and paid lip service to the market, but only in the context of a “socialist and democratic process of restitution (denationalization, or state” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 1989, p. 307-317). Although he was reprivatization as it is sometimes called)46 in the first socialist official in Eastern Europe who was Serbia is still incomplete, as well as privatization supporting pro-market reforms, he still claimed that market doesn’t mean returning to capitalism and that 45 it is compatible with socialism (MILOŠEVIĆ, 1989). In many cases privatization, the market economy, Later he was proposing a “Swedish model”. On the and transition itself were seen other hand, Zoran Đinđić, who was an opposition as something foreign and imposed on reluctant leader at the time, was envisioning a reform model populations by international institutions. However, resembling the German welfare state. In 1990 he argued the role of foreign institutions in the Serbian transition against the “neoliberal” shock-therapy, claiming that is too complicated an issue to be discussed here. in socialist countries there is no direct connection We would only like to emphasize that part of the between political democracy and the market economy, Serbian population perceived the transition as and that those two institutions tend to block each something foreign and imposed from outside, and other (ĐINĐIĆ, 2013, p. 198-207). According to Đinđić, that this perception was deeply rooted in the myths the transformation of a socialist economy to a liberal, of Yugoslav socialist authenticity and the Serbian market economy was only possible through some socialist tradition. form of dictatorship. Thus, his solution was a version 46 Denationalization is important not only for economic, of “enlightened” state interventionism. Then it must but even more for moral reasons, because the victims of not be surprising that his reformist strategy (2000- communist nationalization and collectivization should 2003) was social-democratic (MIJATOVIĆ, 2005a, p. be compensated before the privatization process. 22). On the other hand, radical left-wing groups were Everything that was taken by that state should be ready to silence every liberal voice by labelling them given back to the rightful owners and their relatives a “liberal extremist” (MARKOVIĆ, 2011, p. 215-222). and that would be an act of moral redemption.

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itself. In this sense, the basic preconditions to instrumentalize privatization for their own for a successful and efficient market economy political purposes. (private property and free competition) are Actually, almost all major political parties still very much in their infancy. The many at the time were proponents either of the large state-owned enterprises (above all in the model of employee shareholding or voucher electricity, communications, and natural gas privatization, and the orientation towards sectors) are still not restructured or privatized. employee shareholding has its origin in the In 2016 there were still 556 enterprises with old spirit of self-management. It was believed some 90,000 employees that were supposed that this model was politically less painful. to be privatized. However, by 2016 only 47 of The new 2001 law sped up the privatization them were privatized successfully (, process, but that time a new method was 2017)47. used – selling by tender for big enterprises The situation is even worse when we pay and auction sales for small and middle ones. However, privatization stopped again for a year attention to a number of various models of in 2004 owing to the new government having privatization that were in use during those some doubts regarding the legality of the years. privatization of some companies. Moreover, The early form of privatization in the government appointed a man with an Yugoslavia/Serbia dates back to 1989. The overt socialist economic understanding as federal law was soon replaced with a new head of the Privatization Agency who even one, which was more restrictive. The process prided himself with stopping the process was practically stopped from 1994 to 1997 (MIJATOVIĆ, 2005b). Thus, the greatest when the new law was passed, and a new progress in terms of privatization was made wave of privatization had begun. in the period from 2001 until 2004. Although However, those privatizations were all a large part of the public enterprises was on a voluntary basis, which means that a privatized, the process is not over yet, and relatively small number of companies were a new law regulating this issue was passed privatized (MIJATOVIĆ, 2005b). By the end in 2014. of 2000 less than 10% of public capital had It seems that the leading idea behind been privatized. The model of employee privatization was not the transformation of shareholding was used, on the grounds ownership (from social property to private that it would be fair if employees became property) and a movement from a socialist shareholders, because they were the ones economy towards a free market economy with who created those enterprises. On the other a growing share held by the private sector, but hand, it also had political implications, a preservation of the socialist economy as long because it was a way for politicians in power as it was possible under the new conditions. Then the concept of “social property” was 47 Such a slow and painful privatization was motivated kept in the Serbian Constitution until 2006. not only by ideological, but also by practical, political Even today, the state is the largest employer reasons. Politicians in power tend use these state- 48 owned enterprises as a tool in their own political in Serbia . struggle, or for a preservation of the socio-political status quo. In that way companies are degraded to a 48 Since 2000, every new government doubled the level of social services. number of public servants and public company

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Regarding property rights, Serbia has an the past three years, government spending adequate body of laws, yet the enforcement of has amounted to 44.5 percent of total output property rights through the judicial system (GDP)” (HERITAGE, 2018, p. 363). On the can be very slow. other hand, heavy regulation and a low level The second precondition, free market of business freedom impacted the private economy, namely free competition is also sector in a negative way. Due to the heavy still underdeveloped. For example, the state regulations, a large number of services is still plays an important role in the Serbian still obtained almost exclusively from the economy, largely through ownership in state (pensions, health care, social services, big “unrestructured” enterprises, public education, art and culture). Even the largest companies, subsidizing loss-making public sport clubs are still waiting to be privatized. companies (such as RTB Bor, or Resavica) The agricultural market (market of goods, and, most importantly, through the policy capital market, and labor market) is also of subsidizing foreign investments49, thus still underdeveloped and thus inefficient interfering in the free-market mechanisms (PEJANOVIĆ; MILOVANOVIĆ, 2017). in a most blatant way. One can say that the A high level of the government policy of active state subsidies is the backbone intervention usually offers an opportunity of Serbian economy. This also means that for corruption. According to the Corruption the rule of law, as a rule of abstract, general Perception Index, Serbia occupies the 77th and negative rules (HAYEK, 1998) is largely place (out of 180) with a score of 41 points constrained. Even worse, the transitional (TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2017), government from 2001 to 2004 was known for which makes it one of the countries with the its practice of ruling by decrees. Once again, most corrupted public sector in Europe. At the this stems from a socialist understanding same time, on the Heritage index of economic of the economy and the role of the state freedoms (HERITAGE, 2018c) Serbia is ranked which is supposed to provide jobs and create 80th in the world, and 37th among 44 European companies as well as prosperity in general, countries, which means that its score is below and that is only possible through top-down the regional average. commands. This means large government b) Political and institutional transition. There was spending and heavy bureaucratization. “Over also no clear discontinuity at the political level. employees. In 2014 out of 1.7 million employees in At the beginning of the transition some authors Serbia, around 700.000 were public-sector employees (Mihailo Marković for example, who was one and this trend is still not over. Also, there are over 200 of the leading members and ideologues of quasi-state agencies, none of which existed before 2000. These agencies are dealing with all sorts of things, the ex-communist Socialist Party of Serbia) from regulation of sea traffic – although Serbia has no argued against the multiparty system, sea – to the attraction of foreign investments through advocating some kind of pluralism without heavily subsidizing them. In the period between 2006 and 2016 Agency for Foreign Investments and Export political parties (“nonpartisan pluralism” or Promotion of the Republic of Serbia (SIEPA) gave “nonpartisan democracy”) (SUNDHAUSSEN, away 500 million of through subventions for 2014, p. 282). Although those plans were soon 314 projects, and 90% of that sum went to foreign investors (FILIPOVIĆ; NIKOLIĆ, 2017). discarded under public pressure, the general 49 This has been perceived as the prime example of idea of continuity was very much alive. So, neoliberal economic policy in Serbia. in both post-communist Constitutions (1990

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and 2006) Serbia was defined as a republic, the Church was prevented from playing an and the communist-imposed autonomy for important role as a moral authority at the the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, time of the transition53. and Metohija was maintained. Both issues On the personal level, in its early phase, represent continuity with the communist the Serbian transition was led by a “reformed” political and legal order and discontinuity communist party (Socijalistička partija Srbije with pre-communist political life. Practically – SPS), which tried to preserve the socialist two very important issues such as form of legacy as much as possible54. On the other government and territorial organization hand, the Serbian opposition consisted mostly were simply unreflectively inherited of left-wing dissidents, (ex) Trotskyists and from the socialist structure. Furthermore, unrepentant Titoists (or their descendants). the renewal of pre-communist political Those two groups changed places in 2000, institutions (such as the monarchy), as it however without much effect on the general was proposed by Solzhenitsyn (in the case debolshevization of the country. Both sides 50 of Russia) and other conservatives, was were unaware of the nature of institutions, and 51 never seriously considered . Late and never- they shared the same political voluntarism, ending restitution diminished the strength disrespect for religion, church, tradition and of civil society, most importantly the role of rule of law. They also had scientism and traditional Churches, which received their in common. In politics, the 52 rightful properties rather late (in 2006) . Thus, security services, culture and the media, the 50 We are referring to Solzhenitsyn as an example of a old nomenklatura was not replaced by new firm anticommunist and a man who suffered greatly people, but continued holding its positions. in an attempt to expose communist crimes. Thus, Similar things were seen in almost all his moral authority was considerable. During the 1990s he was suggesting that following the collapse Central Eastern European countries: of communism, Russia should reembrace its own religion, history, culture and tradition. In that context First, the old ruling elites have remained intact in August 1991 that was seen as a chance for Russia, and stand ready to profit electorally from unfortunately a lost one. In 1998 Solzhenitsyn was the dissatisfaction of part of the population still claiming that the revival has to come from the (which dissatisfaction, paradoxically, is likely tradition of the country (SOLŽENJICIN, 1999). He to be greater than the economic desolation also suggested that after overthrowing communism wrought by those old elites while in power). “it would have been logical to re-establish the legal order from 1916” (SOLŽENJICIN, 1999, p. 13). Second, the newly emerging capitalist class is likely to include some members of the 51 Perhaps it could be argued that even some political proponents of the monarchy at the time were not quite honest about their intentions. As soon as they realized back to medieval times, were not renovated until that monarchism would not bring them new voters, the 1990s. some of them quickly disregarded the whole idea. 53 This issue is an important one not only because the Others were caught in personal quarrels with the heir Church plays a role in a civil society, but also because to the throne and gave up their initial monarchism. the Serbian Orthodox Church through the centuries On the other hand, the old communists and their was the guardian of Serbian traditions, culture, history henchmen were doing everything they could in order and higher moral values. During history the Serbian to ridicule the idea. After some time, monarchism was Church played a vital role in the life of the Serbian not an issue any more. people. So even in transition the Church was supposed 52 One must not forget that the Serbian Orthodox to provide moral guidance to the people. Church was savagely ravaged during the Communist 54 For example, the 1990 Serbian Constitution reign (JOJIĆ, 2002). Also, many monasteries which maintained the concept of “social property”. The whole were desecrated during the war, many of them dating idea is rather foreign to the very idea of transition.

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former elites, a circumstance that tends to democratic orientation was the Democratic reduce the legitimacy of the whole capitalist Party (Demokratsa stranka – DS) with its transition and may fuel attacks by a sector partners. It is important to emphasize that of the former opposition against the sector many of the leaders of DOS and even DS currently in office. Such conflicts within the former opposition are good news for the were also ex-communists, (ex) Trotskyists forces of the old regime. (BALCEROWICZ, and unrepentant Titoists or even ex-coalition 2002, p. 25-26). partners of the SPS. Many of them have started their political carriers within the However, the situation in Serbia is even League of Communists. In 2012 the Serbian more complicated, keeping in mind that Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka almost the entire political, economic and – SNS) came to power. Although that party cultural elite consists of ex-communists or had no coherent ideology, its politics is their descendants – ideological as well as characterized by adventurism, autocracy, biological (LAZIĆ, 2016). voluntarism and demagogy. Regardless of An important characteristic of Serbian this ideological mess, it is certain that this is ill-fated transition is a chronical lack of a not a conservative or . Moreover, conservative-liberal party. Not only that no the SNS and its leader (ex-President Nikolić such party was in power during the Serbian as well as his successor Vučić) are voluntarily transition, but even in the opposition there embracing many elements of Titoism and was no major conservative-liberal force Yugoslavism and they are using socialist (DOSTANIĆ, 2015). This can be used as rhetoric and symbols. However, there were a symptom of a deep entrenchment in parties which, like the Democratic Party of socialist myths, worldview and reasoning. Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije – DSS) As the appearance of a conservative-liberal or the (Srpski option is conditioned by the radical break pokret obnove – SPO), declared themselves with socialism in all of its forms and by a as right-wing parties, but they cannot be detachment from the socialist way of thinking. characterized as liberal-conservatives, As a matter of fact, the Serbian political scene because too often their economic policy was is dominated by socialist, progressivist and neither conservative nor liberal. Sometimes it constructivist narratives and ideas. was opportunistic and sometimes undefined Until 2000 the ruling party was the and often in fact socialista (DOSTANIĆ, 2015). Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the direct The phenomenon of left-wing domination descendant of the League of Communists of is detectable also in terms of the redefinition Serbia. Although the SPS needed coalition of standard political concepts. For example, partners none of these parties was conservative the term “right-wing” is being generally or liberal. As a direct descendent of the understood as something “reactionary” communists, the SPS was doing everything to and “evil”, thus associated with “fascism” preserve socialist legacy as much as possible. in contrast to the term “left-wing”, which In 2000 a broad coalition (Demokratska became synonym for everything “good” opozicija Srbije – DOS) came to power. and “progressive”. The same can be said However, the dominant orientation of about their constructivist and progressivist that huge coalition was left-liberal. The interpretation of the concept of “reforms” embodiment of that left-liberal and social- which are usually understood as destruction

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of all traditions, and a constant change, and moral sphere. At the symbolic level the similar to the concept of the “permanent narrative of an authentic socialist culture, and revolution”. So, reforms are identified as of a “soft socialism” with a “human face”, had “good” while “historical traditions” are seen even worse consequences. Actually, there as an obstacle, which means “reactionary”. was no break at all at the symbolic level. Like in communist times, reforms are directed Instead, the socialist symbols continued to from above towards a clearly defined goal live through popular culture. That continuity (which is usually EU membership)55. The can be seen even in the context of national result is, like in communism, the imposition symbols. Then the traditional pre-communist of an order56. national anthem and coat of arms were not This socialist mentality is so strong to be reinstated until 2004. Between 1990 and that even some conservative parties are 2004, newly created symbols were simply flirting with socialist rhetoric in economic decreed from above. Although they contained terms. It is significant that, unlike other some old, traditional elements, those elements transitional countries, which usually saw a were intentionally redefined58. The same can broad anti-communist coalition in the first be said for the Serbian armed forces, whose free election, the opposition in Serbia was traditional insignia were reintroduced in 2006. deeply fragmented and unable (or unwilling) An important facet of this symbolic to form a firm anti-communist bloc. Anti- sphere is the treatment to the victims of the communism, which was an important part communist regime, who are still ignored of Serbian pre-war society, predominantly or marginalized. For example, there is no accepted as value and integral part of state memorial for the victims of the communist policy, has survived solely among some dictatorship. However, Tito’s memorial center radical right-wing groups. is maintained and financed from public c) Transition at the level of symbols. When writing Serbian political life is still burdened by Yugoslavism, about the transition, many authors emphasize nostalgia and myth of “brotherhood and unity”. Many the political and economic aspects of a broader politicians and intellectuals are still looking favorably at Yugoslavia and Yugoslavism, even if they employ institutional transition (BALCEROWICZ, different terminology such as “region” or “regional 1995). This approach is of course legitimate, cooperation”. However, this “region” includes only but it neglects the importance of a symbolic57 ex-Yugoslav countries, while all other neighboring states are omitted.

58 55 It makes no difference if this goal is defined as “EU Concerning the national anthem, the lyrics were membership”, “total equality” or “classless society”. altered, because the original version contained the words “Serbian king” and “Serbian crown”. With the 56 There is usually an apocalyptic and catastrophic justification that contemporary Serbia is a republic undertone of “alternativelessness” attached to it. “Only and thus does not have its monarch or crown, those if we do this and if we do it now our future will be words were replaced with the words “Serbian lands” secured”. Thus, the usual phrase is that “the EU has and “Serbian glory”. At the same time, the crown as a no alternative”. If the goal is defined in those terms, symbol of a monarchy was kept on the national coat it means that there is no place for a normal political of arms and national flag. Even greater confusion can discussion or political pluralism. be seen in the example of the Vojvodina provincial 57 In the case of Serbia this symbolic sphere is important symbols, where a newly created flag and coat of arms in the context of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and were adopted 2002. However, in 2014, the traditional the need to establish its own distinct identity, which coat of arms and flag were also adopted. Thus, is possible only through reconnection with a pre- Vojvodina has two official flags and two official coats Yugoslav past and its reaffirmation. Unfortunately, of arms.

Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | [email protected] MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia 613 Aleksandar Novakovic & Dusan Dostanic funds59. This fact gets even more important never prosecuted for the things he did during when one has in mind how active were the the heyday of communist terror. He never communists in destroying a large number regretted his crimes and to the last days of of the monuments (in Smederevo, Kraljevo, his life mocked the victims of the communist Kragujevac or Niš) after the war (RAJIĆ, 1991) regime and their descendants. Here follows dedicated to the Serbian soldiers from the a notorious quote of his: First World War of King Alexander I60. Many of those monuments were not reconstructed We had no mercy, we were cruel because after the official fall of communism in Serbia. we cleaned the garbage... So, this was like I was a god. There were no regulations, and On the other hand, in almost every village you could judge and decide on your own. there is a small monument or a bust which What am I to do and how can I come to glorifies partisan struggle. peace with someone whose brother I have Also, no communist official was ever held killed? (BLIC, 2009). accountable for the crimes of the regime. The infamous case of the Yugoslav secret On the other hand, the communist police chief of staff (Odeljenje za zaštitu revolution is still celebrated, while all anti- naroda – OZNA), responsible for the postwar communist forces are depicted as criminals, revolutionary terror and warden of communist traitors and fascists. Thus, the old Manichean concentration camp “Goli otok” Jovo Kapičić, view of the national past is perpetuated. This who was directly and indirectly responsible has deep political consequences, because for the mass killing, torture, intimidation and the communist guerilla struggle had been deportation of political enemies after the war, a key source of political legitimization for lived a long and prosperous life in the new communists. So, no real transition is possible democratic Serbia (he died in 2013) and was without a historical reconsideration of WWII, the civil war in Serbia and the communist 59 The Serbian state is far more interested in the revolution. None of which occurred. Just as preservation and renovation of communist monuments in the case of communists, the communist than in the preservation of older monuments from the Serbian national pre-communist history. Communist revolution period is still seen as the pinnacle memorials are more important than Serbian national of Serbian history61. traditions and history even for the present government. Regarding monuments, one must also take into The opening of the communist secret account the general communist megalomania. This service archives (Uprava državne bezbednosti means that communist monuments are usually large, UDBA) and of all secret files is a separate issue concrete structures with a clear ideological message. They are supposed to signify the importance and with substantial symbolic meaning. However, greatness of communist achievements as well as their those archives and files are still closed for ideological domination. the public, mainly for political reasons. As 60 In some cases, this was done immediately after the such, the names of UDBA’s associates are also war in 1945. Those barbaric acts were not isolated actions, but part of the broader Titoist agenda. Also, hidden from the public. The reason behind this some monuments that survived 1945 were later being that the list of UDBA’s associates would desecrated and neglected. That was the destiny of include numerous intellectuals, politicians, the monument dedicated to the First Balkan War NGO activists, journalists, businessmen, near Kumanovo. The idea was to erase all pre-war traditions and historical memory, and to present actors and writers. the communist struggle as the beginning of the real history. The same type of thinking is still present 61 As the above quotation from Konstantinović (1996c) today (KONSTANTINOVIĆ, 1996). demonstrates.

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At the same time, a huge number of the same can be said for popular culture historians are committed to spreading socialist in general. A large part of popular culture myths about the socialist modernization, renews socialist symbols or glorifies the industrialization, emancipation, liberation, socialist past as a careless and stable period, democratization, security, unity and in contrast to the post-socialist reality. Even brotherhood, and even the Westernization today, popular films are depicting the pre- or Americanization of Yugoslav society62. communist past in accordance with old They still refuse to accept the fact that was communist historiography. In other words, already known in the 1950s, that Tito had popular culture’s socialist narration and its broken-up with Stalin, but not with Stalinism reasoning are kept alive. and that “self-management” in Yugoslavia Two recent series, “Ravna Gora” (2013) under Tito was still a form of communist and “Senke nad Balkanom” (2017) make 63 totalitarian dictatorship . A country where nice examples of the perpetuation of the squares, streets, and schools still carry the communist understanding of national history. name of Tito and other communists has not “Ravna Gora” supposedly depicting the story 64 even begun its symbolic transition . about the formation of the royalist resistance According to Mises, literature played an in WWII, while “Senke nad Balkanom” were important role in building an anti-capitalist planned as a typical crime story situated in mentality (MISES, 2016). In the case of Serbia, inter-war Belgrade. Both series did everything in accordance with the old communist myths 62 An example is the book Coca-Cola Socialism by Radina Vučetić where she writes about “communist of a poor, ugly and sad life in inter-war ideology in a capitalist wrapping” (VUČETIĆ, 2012). society. According to both series, the only Thus, the 1960s are usually regarded as the “Yugoslav beam of light in that gloomy society were spring” and the golden times of Westernization and Americanization of Yugoslavia through “economic the communists, in contrast to the corruption reforms” and “western culture” (LAKIĆEVIĆ, 2013b; and evil of the inter-war bourgeoisie. At the 2014b). same time, old partisan films are regularly 63 “While the dictator could allow a modest pluralism being broadcast on TV stations, even private of ideas within the Party, he could not tolerate any ones. This way, communist myths are spread real moves towards democracy” (GLENNY, 2012, p. 577). On the other hand, the connection between by popular culture. socialism and dictatorship is everything but accidental This mythologization of the socialist (HAYEK, 1944). past through popular culture has its political 64 It can be shown in various examples, such as the recent (2014) naming of two Belgrade streets after consequences. In the sphere of politics, communist partisan commanders (Koča Popović and the parties sometimes deliberately use old Peko Dapčević) (BLIC.K, 2014). Both of them played communist symbols, such as the celebration important roles during and after the war, so both of of Tito’s birthday e Socialist party of Serbia them can be associated to communist crimes. Yet, according to Minister Vulin those men were heroes (SPS) is best known for its utilization of (NOVOSTI, 2014). At the same time, some other streets Tito, partisan heritage and the communist in Belgrade are named after dissident, anti-communist period. They use a wide range of communist writers such as Borislav Pekić (BLIC, 2016), which makes this street-naming policy even more puzzling. as well as partisan symbols such as Tito’s Somehow, names of perpetrators and victims can name (BLIC.D, 2015), partisan songs, the stand next to each other, which suggests a deeper red star, the color red, and so on (, bewilderment in the Serbian relationship with their own past, as well as an unwillingness to detach 2016). However, other parties do the same, themselves from the socialist legacy. although not so blatantly. So, for example other

Diagramação e XML SciELO Publishing Schema: www.editoraletra1.com.br | [email protected] MISES: Revista Interdisciplinar de Filosofia, Direito e Economia 615 Aleksandar Novakovic & Dusan Dostanic politicians were ready to proudly underline is not only the crises of economy or an that members of their family were partisan institutional crisis but a crisis of morality. soldiers. Others again were praising Tito and By breaking the connection between freedom his non-alignment policy as in case of ex- and accountability, or by forcing people President Nikolić (BLIC.N, 2014) and President to trade their freedom for a questionable Vučić (SPUTNIK, 2017; DANAS, 2016). Even economic security, communists destroyed parties supposed to be liberal (Democratic moral sense and inaugurated demagogy, Party or Liberal Democratic Party) or even hypocrisy and lie66. In a way Serbia continued right-wing parties (Serbian Progressive Party) to “live by lies”. National traditions and the are more than ready use Titoist or anti-fascist character of Serbian people was darkened rhetoric. It is also popular to praise communist and oppressed during the communist reign; economic “accomplishments”, such as sense of justice, independence and ability for reindustrialization, modernization and so self-organization were marginalized. For too on. However, politicians as well as the long the communist party acted like a moral general public tend to forget that the relatively authority. On the other hand, the narrative high standard and care-free life in Yugoslav about “socialism with human face” which was socialism was a result of enormous borrowing “not so bad after all” fosters moral relativism from the West in 1970s (MARSENIĆ, 2003, even further. In combination with the myths of p. 97-214) which resulted in the default of the partisan’s struggle and liberation in 1945, the Yugoslav state at the beginning of the that moral relativism tends to legitimize and 1980s. So, this is a typical example of selective justify communist crimes, those committed memory and blatant manipulation. during the war, as well as those which were committed after the war. Thus, the borders With the demands for restoration of some between victims and perpetrators are being aspects of communist politics, those feeling blurred. socialist nostalgia seem to drift even further away from reality. This is also the case with demands for a non-aligned foreign policy. Conclusion On the other hand, it is difficult to explain how a state as harmonious as communist Compared to other East and Central Yugoslavia could have dissolved in a bloody European countries, Serbia is far behind in war. In order to answer that question, the debolshevization. It is worth to mention once nostalgic tend to rely on conspiracy theories: more that other countries behind the Iron blaming foreign powers, sometimes national Curtain were actually occupied by Soviets and elites or tough “nationalism”65 in general as that the struggle against foreign occupation a root of all evils, but never the structure of went hand in hand with the renewal of the Yugoslav communism. pre-communist past, national traditions, and debolshevization in general. As we already d) Moral transition. However, the most saw, the same process in Serbia was hindered destructive consequences of communism by a false narrative of “authentic socialism”, can be seen on a moral level. That means as well as by other historical manipulations. that the crisis in post-communist Serbia 66 In the words of Solzhenitsyn: ”the deception and lie 65 However, not all nationalisms are equally to of Communism have coated our consciousness with blame, so Perović explicitly underlines Serbian guilt so many layers that many cannot even discern this (PEROVIĆ, 2008). film over their eyes” SOLZHENITSYN,( 1995, p. 105).

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