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ESSENTIAL FRIENDS AND NATURAL ENEMIES: THE HISTORIC ROOTS OF TURKISH-IRANIAN RELATIONS By Gokhan Cetinsaya*

This article outlines Turkish-Iranian relations since the early 1820s from the viewpoint of the Turkish political and military elite. The author argues that Turkish-Iranian relations have basically been determined by historical, geographic, strategic and cultural dimensions rather than leaders (the or Khomeini), regimes (the monarchy or the ), or ideologies (secular or Islamic).

On examining the history of Turkish- central preoccupation for the Ottoman Iranian relations one finds many parallels government during both the Crimean War for contemporary events and issues, of 1853-1856 and the Russo-Turkish War which show the importance of long-term of 1877-1878. The remarks of Fuad Pasa, geostrategic and cultural issues in one of the chief policymakers, conveys shaping this relationship. These apply to this concern: the and monarchical as well as to the successor regimes. The government of [Iran], which In turn, the problems—and sometimes is in a state of continual disorder solutions—involved give a good sense of and in the grip of Shi’i fanaticism, the underpinnings for contemporary and has always been at one and in future issues between the two countries. agreement with our enemies. After the establishment of the Safavi Even in the Crimean War, she state in Iran during the early sixteenth came to an agreement with Russia century, Ottoman/Turkish-Persian/Iranian and united her ambitions with relations were characterized by hers. The fact that she was unable continuous struggle and numerous wars. to bring her hostile calculations to Power struggles took place over eastern fruition was due to the West’s /Iranian and prudent and vigilant diplomacy. /western Iran. The Ottomans’ focus Today, the Shah’s government of interest was Azerbaijan and the follows in the wake of [Russia]. region, while the Iranians were As long as the Ottoman concerned with Iraq, which contains the government is not occupied holiest sites of Shi`i . This elsewhere, the discredited Iranian prolonged struggle continued in varying government, being impotent, degrees until the end of the First World ignorant and incapable of taking War.(1) any initiative on its own, dares not Following the 1821-1823 war between quarrel with us. However, at the the two countries, and despite Iran’s moment of our first confrontation relative military inferiority, Ottoman with Russia, Iran will take her statesmen considered Iran a potential place among our most military threat, particularly in the event of irreconcilable enemies, due to her a Russian invasion of Anatolia. For this political dependence and, more reason, policy toward Iran remained a important, her blind jealousy, in

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 116 Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations

spite of our cautious and well- demands to the detriment of our intentioned attitude. Fortunately, country, as if placing salt on those the Ottoman government, in wounds, and the territory of Kotur addition to material resources, was added to the territories of also possesses moral possibilities Iran: truly, these are evils to be to contain a country which is neither forgiven nor forgotten.(5) crushed under such a barbarous despotism, faces a series of While in strategic terms Iran was governmental crises, and is ready to side with the Ottoman Empire’s entirely surrounded by Sunnis.(2) enemies, though, elements of the political and religious elite of Iran considered the Fuad Pasa`s prediction proved true. reforms implemented by during For example, one of the core problems in the era to be a model for their bilateral relations remained the question own country, viewing the Ottoman of boundaries. Several Kurdish tribes Empire as a bridge between Europe and inhabited both sides of the Turco-Persian Iran. Iranian bureaucrats who visited the frontier and did not recognize any border. empire often attempted to implement or Both states competed to gain the tribes’ at least recommend similar reforms in loyalty and to establish patronage over Iran on their return home. These people each other’s .(3) After the peace included, for example, Taqi Khan treaty of 1823 failed to solve the problem -e Kabir, Mirza Hosein Khan Moshir and as the process of Ottoman od-Dowleh, and Malkom Khan.(6) At the centralization began, the boundary same time, became a center for question once more came to the fore. As Iranian dissidents, political refugees and a result of Russian and British opposition groups consisting of former intervention, an agreement was finally officials, intellectuals and men of letters. reached in 1847 stipulating that the entire One of the most important and influential border be surveyed by a mixed Persian newspapers of the time, the commission, whose work was finally Ahter, was published in Istanbul.(7) completed in 1865 and the frontier was The center for the Iranian religious confirmed by a convention signed in elite in the nineteenth century was in Istanbul in 1869.(4) another corner of the empire: the Shi’i But this step did not finally resolve the holy places in Iraq--known as the Atabat. issue either. When Iran proved useful to The Atabat became a center for the Shi’i Russia during the Russo-Turkish war of ulama; together with most of the 1877-78, Russia inserted article 60 into important Shi’i mujtahids, a large number the treaty ending the conflict of mollas, akhunds, and students resided which gave the disputed territory of in the Atabat. The Atabat always retained Kotur (near Van) to Iran. Ottoman its primacy as a center of religious observers recorded their disappointment authority, and the role of the Atabat with Iran’s behavior: mujtahids actually increased in Iranian politics in the late nineteenth century.(8) In those dark days, when we had At the same time, a pro-Ottoman group, emerged from the war [with called ‘Pan-Islamists’, emerged in Iranian Russia] with many wounds, and politics, especially among the ulama.(9) faced manifold difficulties at the All these afforded the Ottoman congress [of Berlin], the Muslim government the possibility of exploiting state of Iran, which, in a war ‘moral opportunities’ to influence Iran. considered a jihad, should at least The Pan-Islamic tendency first have been benevolent, if not a emerged in Ottoman public opinion in the helper, came forward with various early 1870s.(10) Followers of this

117 Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) Gokhan Cetinsaya tendency addressed themselves directly to least harming the sacred rights of Iran. For example, a leaflet distributed our padishah and the sultanate, among Iranian pilgrims in the Hijaz which are of more value than my during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877- life. And I deem this within the 78 stated: bounds of possibility. If it becomes apparent that the O people of Iran! You are not Iranians fail to appreciate our among the Imamiye taife conciliatory conduct, act high- (followers of the recognized handedly, and strive to destroy the Imams). The Ehl-i Sunnet just aspirations of the Ottoman (followers of the Sunna) state, then there is no doubt that acknowledge that you are Muslim with God’s help, under the and ehl-i kible (People of the auspices of our padishah, it will Qibla). You in turn acknowledge be easy to compel them to adopt a that they are Muslim and ehl-i correct course.(12) kible. The matters in dispute are points of no importance; the basis Thus, while the Ottoman press and refuge for both parties is the appealed to the Iranians in the name of Holy Qur’an. Is it fitting that you ittihad-i Islam (the unity of Islam or Pan- should remain mere spectators Islamism), the Ottoman mission to the when you observe that for so Emir of in 1877 (in the midst many years up to the present the of the Turco-Russian war) inquired as to Ottoman Empire has been at war ‘which attitude the Emir would take in with Russia? When Russia the event of Iran’s [aggressive] action occupied Hiva, there appeared against the Ottoman state’.(13) rumors that you had helped Russia. If, henceforth, when THE REIGN OF ABDULHAMID II Russia attacks one of her The policy described by Ali Pasa neighbors, you do not assist the seems to have been wholeheartedly victim, but assist the oppressor applied during the reign of who wishes to destroy Islam, our Abdulhamid II (1876-1908/9). In the affection for you will be context of Abdulhamid’s Pan-Islamic destroyed and furthermore we will policy, “moral possibilities” and be unable to look upon you as “material resources” were utilized Muslims.(11) interchangeably. After a short-lived rapprochement in the early 1880s(14) the This new approach toward Iran Ottoman government faced two imminent appears to have become the dominant threats involving Iran in the early 1890s. view, among foreign policy makers as First, this period witnessed a marked well as public opinion, from the late increase in Armenian nationalist guerrilla 1860s onwards. For Ottoman statesmen, activities. The Armenian revolutionaries this was not an idealistic approach as in received help from living the case of public opinion, but a realistic inside Iran and enabled the one. Ali Pasa, the chief policy-maker of revolutionaries to cross the border before the time, explains the approach in the and after their raids, allegedly with the following terms: consent of the Iranian authorities.(15) The second and more significant I do not deny that I really desire to problem was the Shi’i threat emanating win over and make friends of the from Iraq. The Iraqi vilayets of Iranians, instead of permanent and Basra were home to a substantial enemies, without thereby in the population of -speaking Shi’i

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Muslims. They formed the absolute Islam, it is my command as majority of the population in these two Caliph that you…consider at provinces. Furthermore, throughout the length and in detail whether or not nineteenth century, there appears to have a general Islamic union may be been a growth in this Shi’i population at achieved... by abolishing the the expense of the Sunni, largely due to sectarian differences between conversion.(16) To the Ottoman Muslims in some parts of the authorities, the presence of a large and Ottoman empire, and also in some growing Shi’i population in Iraq other places: by, for instance, represented a serious political problem. forming a committee of two or The Shi’is were regarded as potentially three persons each from our disloyal and the growth of Shi’ism among ulama and the Shi’i ulama, the tribal population in Iraq alarmed the eliminating the dissension of sect, Abdulhamid regime in the late 1880s and and thereby overcoming, and early 1890s, prompting the Palace to perhaps entirely removing, the embark upon serious consideration of the influence of the Iranian Shi’i issue. Various measures were taken mujtahids.(18) in order to forestall the growth of the Shi’i sect. A number of commissions The lofty ambition of this initiative is were sent to the region; local officials made clear as Abdulhamid concludes that were asked to write detailed reports on this step would make possible, “as in the subject; some steps were taken in the ” a union so that while “the field of education. However, nothing rulers of Iran continue to govern within substantial resulted from all the effort Iran” they would do so only under the undertaken.(17) caliph’s patronage.(19) During a crisis over tobacco taxes in The implementation of this project 1891-92, the Atabat emerged as an began in early 1894. A working group important opposition center in Iranian was set up under Afghani, which sent politics, and the mujtahids of the Atabat hundreds of letters to prominent Shi’i began to involve themselves in Iranian ulama all over the Islamic world. The internal affairs. This development did not correspondence between Afghani’s escape Sultan Abdulhamid, who seems to Istanbul circle and the Shi’i ulama was have seen the rift between the Iranian brought to the attention of the Shah. government and the Shi’i mujtahids as an demanded the deportation of opportunity to promote a radical program Afghani and his disciples; to bring about a religious rapprochement simultaneously, the Iranian authorities between Shi’i and , and began to use the Armenian question as a thereby extend his own political influence means of pressure, giving a free hand to at the expense of the Shah. His chosen Armenian revolutionaries inside Iran and tool was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who on the border. Facing pressure from the arrived in Istanbul in the summer of Armenian crises in Anatolia and in 1892. Abdulhamid wrote to Afghani: Istanbul, Abdulhamid appears to have been forced to give up his support for It is evident that the remedy [to Afghani`s task. Afghani’s relations with existing problems] will be…the Abdulhamid deteriorated. The former creation of Islamic alliance and remained in Istanbul as a virtual prisoner unity through the removal of until his death in March 1897.(20) conflicts and contradictions The accession of Muzaffar al-Din [between the two Muslim Shah in 1896 brought a new climate to sects]….As [I] am certain that you relations and an atmosphere of mutual desire to achieve the unity of understanding between the Porte and

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Teheran prevailed for a few years.(21) from Bayazid south to Vazne (they would The Shah visited Istanbul in the autumn remain there until 1913).(24) This of 1900 and was treated with respect and weakened the position of the distinction by the Sultan. The early constitutionalist party in Tehran. On 1900s, however, saw a fresh deterioration several occasions, they asked the Sultan in the internal situation in Iran and the to withdraw his troops. Both Iranian and extension of the Atabat’s influence in Young Turkish sources accused Iranian internal affairs. Taking advantage Abdulhamid of helping Muzaffar al-Din of that deterioration, Sultan Abdulhamid Shah to undermine the Parliament’s continued his efforts to gain support position.(25) among the Shi’i ulama both in Iran and Both the Shah and Abdulhamid faced the Atabat. internal challenges from those demanding During this period, the opposition of a limit on their power. In the empire, the the ulama to the Iranian government was Young Turk (Committee of Union and being partly expressed in Pan-Islamic Progress, CUP) opposition was interested ideas, in terms of a Sunni-Shi’a in political developments in Iran and had rapprochement and sympathy toward the some contacts with Iranian Caliph. Abdulhamid established constitutionalists after 1905. Immediately connections with the Shi’i mujtahids in following their revolution of July 1908, Iraq as well as in Iran. Some mujtahids the CUP sent militiamen to Iranian visited Istanbul, and were honored by the Azerbaijan to help Azeri Sultan; some had regular communication constitutionalists in their fight against the with the Sultan and the palace camarilla; Shah.(26) The CUP’s interest in Iranian and some received regular salaries from affairs proved durable: CUP members the Tehran embassy. As a close observer visited Iran to support the constitutional of Iranian affairs, Abdulhamid even made cause on several occasions, while the an offer to the British to use the embassy in Tehran and the consulate at mujtahids to curtail the power of the both played important roles in the clergy in Iran.(22) Although the empire struggle between pro-Shah and pro- broke with the mujtahids of the Atabat in parliamentary forces until 1911. 1904/5, following Russian and Iranian The CUP seems to have inherited diplomatic pressure and suspicions about Abdulhamid’s Pan-Islamic policy toward British contacts with the Atabat, Iran. The best example of this continuity Abdulhamid’s contacts with the Iranian was the harmonious relationship between ulama seem to have continued, as did the the CUP and the mujtahids of Atabat, prevalence of Pan-Islamic ideas among who had been ardent supporters of the Iranian opposition.(23) constitutionalism in Iran. The result of The years from 1905 onwards brought this was that the Atabat mujtahids new dimensions to relations between the proclaimed jihad during both the two states. First, Iran underwent the empire’s war in Libya and the First turbulent events of the Constitutional World War in favor of the Sunni Revolution of 1905-1911. However, .(27) some Shi’i ulama both in Tehran and the When the CUP came to power, it was Atabat continued to maintain contacts or expected that the Turkish army would correspondence with Istanbul. The soon withdraw from the occupied Ottoman ambassador to Tehran, territories over the border in Iran. This Semseddin acted as mediator did not occur however. In light of the between the mujtahids and the Shah. annexation of Bosnia by Austria- Second, from September 1905 onwards, Hungary, the CUP regime was inclined to Ottoman troops occupied a series of persevere with the occupation. It appears disputed territories on the Iranian border, to have had three main reasons for this: to

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 120 Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations give material support to Iranian (Azeri) Ottoman general staff had three main constitutionalists; to help bring about aims toward Iran: a) to induce Iran to side Russian withdrawal from Iranian with the Ottoman government and its Azerbaijan; and to gain advantage and allies in the war, b) to use Iranian strengthen Turkish claims during the territories in order to reach Afghanistan expected negotiations with Iran over the and the Caucasus area for military and border delimitation. But as time went on, propaganda operations against Britain Ottoman governments proved unable to and Russia, and c) to establish a lasting resist Russian and British pressure for an influence in Iran, especially in the end to occupation and a swift delimitation Kurdish and Azeri regions, and to of the border. Faced with growing guarantee Iran’s integrity and sovereignty domestic and especially external after the war.(30) problems, the empire began to make Throughout the war, Ottoman military concessions.(28) and propaganda operations were carried When bilateral negotiations produced out organized around three elements: little result, Britain and Russia intervened regular army units, agents and squads of and convinced the Ottoman government the Special Organization (Teskilat-i to concede a more favorable line to Iran. Mahsusa), and through collaboration with As a result, in the midst of the Balkan German officers and missions. Ottoman Wars, these quadripartite negotiations military operations may be divided into resulted in the signing of the three stages as well: from the autumn of Protocol (November 1914 to May/June 1915; from April/May 1913), in which the boundary line was 1916 to the end of 1916 (or early 1917); described in considerable detail. A new From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March delimitation commission, composed of 1918) to .(31) In November representatives of all four governments, 1914, just before the Sarikamis was charged with confirming the exact campaign, Enver Pasa, the of demarcation. The work of the war, explained his vision in the following commission lasted from January to way: October 1914; the result, however, was never ratified in a formal treaty, due to [Over a map of Iran] Do you the outbreak of the First World War.(29) know what I am thinking? I do By the outbreak of the war, the CUP’s not want to think but to good will towards Iran had ceased to accomplish. To occupy Tehran exist. For one thing, the Shah had with a division of troops, by the defeated the constitutionalists and shortest route! After thereby dissolved parliament. For another, the releasing Iran from Russian CUP leaders were in their turn irritated influence, operations must be by the Iranians’ attempt to take advantage undertaken in Turkistan, of the empire’s critical situation. Afghanistan and against Russia and Britain. By sending THE FIRST WORLD WAR another division via Tabriz to During the First World War, the Allies Daghistan, the Muslim lands of and the struggled for the Caucasus must be set in mastery over Iran. In addition to strategic motion against the Russians, and factors, Turkey also possessed an so the Russian army opposing our ideological motivation. Iran, which was army in the east must be struck populated by a large number of Azeris from behind!(32) and Turkmens, was to be included in the borders of the CUP’s projected pan- When he was asked whether “a treaty Turkish state. Generally speaking, the of alliance was signed with Iran,” Enver

121 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) Gokhan Cetinsaya replied: “It is obvious that Iran cannot in Iraq, Enver Pasa was not to realize his dare to enter into any political dream. This second stage was reflected in commitment with us, as long as she the opening speech of Sultan Mehmed V: remains under Russian influence. First we “One of our aims in this war is to see occupy Tehran, and then make a treaty of Iran, a Muslim and neighboring country, alliance.... I attach great importance to achieve an independent and prosperous this unity. We can bring all Asian life, obtaining all necessary favorable Muslims and Turks into action only conditions for its development and through such a force.”(33) progress, and free from every kind of Though Ottoman forces captured harmful ties.”(37) Tabriz for a short period in early 1915, After the , and the Russians regained control soon after. especially following the signing of the After the victory of Kut al-Amara in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 1918), spring of 1916, Ottoman ambitions in Enver Pasa was determined that the Iran seemed once more to be feasible, and Ottoman state, together with the Enver ordered the occupation of Germans, should have influence in Iran Kermanshah as a first step. According to after the war. Military planning once Enver, ‘It is not enough to save Iran from again came to the fore and the third the Russians and the British during the Iranian campaign was launched. By early war. It is essential to guarantee Iran’s June 1918, Ottoman forces had occupied integrity and sovereignty in the future as Tabriz. At the beginning of October, the well.’(34) In his opinion, in the face of commander of forces in Tabriz received Russian or British aggression in the the following order from Enver: “March future, the Ottoman army could not towards Tehran,”(38) but there was no defend Iran on its own. It was therefore time. The war was already approaching necessary to cooperate with the Germans its end. Istanbul issued orders for the over the question of Iran. In accordance evacuation of Iran even before the with Enver`s orders, Ottoman forces of Mudros. The last Ottoman began to advance into Iran and, at the soldiers evacuated Tabriz in the middle of beginning of August 1916, occupied November 1918.(39) Hamadan.(35) The ultimate aim was to occupy Tehran, and thus to bring the AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR Iranian government officially into the After the war, the balance between the war. two countries shifted in favor of Iran. Enver gave the following order to the Though Iran would remain in a state of commander of forces at Hamadan: internal chaos for several years to come, it did not hesitate to take advantage of Do not stop but advance in the Turkey’s predicament in the international direction of Tehran. After arena. For example, Tehran initiated assuming the functions of the demands to acquire certain territories Shah’s chief of general staff, from Turkey first during the Paris Peace reorganize the Iranian army. After Conference and later at the Sevres bringing this army into a usable conference.(40) Although the British state, it will be necessary to rejected the demands, Turkish public launch campaigns in the Russians’ opinion resented the Iranian initiative. In rear, towards Turkistan, and the Istanbul press, one headline read: perhaps in the direction of “You too, Brutus?”(41) Afghanistan.(36) Reza Khan’s coup in Tehran, in February 1921, marked the beginning of But because of the resistance of the local a new period in the history of Turkish- commanders and later the British advance Iranian relations. At roughly the same

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 122 Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations time, in both countries, two nationalist, anti-imperialist, and open-minded One day we were having a meal soldiers, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) and with a group of friends at Reza Khan/Shah, struggled against Cankaya, at the President enemies both internal and external. They [Mustafa Kemal] of the had a common approach to international Republic’s table. A copy of a politics, especially regarding British telegram was brought and imperialism and its influence in the submitted to him. The president region. It comes as no surprise therefore read this telegram aloud: ‘After that this new climate created a slow but discussion with the Akhunds continuous rapprochement between [mujtahids], the Serdar-i Sipeh and Tehran. During the Turkish [War Minister Reza Khan], has war of independence, both governments judged that the time has not yet sent diplomatic missions and messages of come for a move towards a friendship to each other. The policy of the republic, and has announced this Ankara government in this period was to decision in a proclamation’. give moral support in order to assure Thereupon the Gazi [Mustafa Iranian independence and territorial Kemal] said a few words integrity.(42) Turkey feared the expressing his occupation and dismemberment of Iran as disappointment.(46) a multi-ethnic society by Russia or Great Britain.(43) In any event, the establishment of an But, on the other hand, the Ankara independent state in Iran undoubtedly government was not very comfortable relieved Ankara. Turkey had feared the with Iranian foreign policy. It felt the possibility of ‘a new Iraq’, as one official need to watch Iran very carefully lest that in Ankara put it to a French observer: country align with Turkey’s enemies, as had happened in the previous As you know, we observe Persian century.(44) events day by day, hour by hour. One of the most interesting examples We wanted at all costs to prevent of Turkish “moral support” was Ankara’s Persia from becoming a new Iraq. encouragement for the proclamation of a If England had realized Lord republic in Iran. In spite of Turkish Curzon’s project, this would have efforts, however, the republican project meant that all Asia would pass was not to be realized. When the under British domination. What a Caliphate was abolished by the Kemalist major threat to world peace! That regime in March 1924, the Shi’i ulama in is why we supported Reza Khan. Iran, who had hitherto been in favor of a When we concentrated one republic, suddenly changed sides. They hundred thousand men on the became anti-republican, thinking that the Persian frontier it was as a real motive behind this project was to protection, not a threat, and the undermine the power of the clergy, as had Serdar [Reza Khan] knew this recently taken place in Turkey. Finally, perfectly well. What he needed Reza abandoned the idea and instead before all else was a strong army. proclaimed a new monarchy under his In the end, he needs reliable own .(45) The failure of the foreign support. He can rely on republican project seems to have us. We assisted the nationalist disappointed Mustafa Kemal. As movement in Persia with all our Hamdullah Suphi (Tanriover), one of the strength. We are not going to founding-fathers of Turkish nationalism, cease supporting it when it relates: achieves victory. (47)

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soldier and companion of Mustafa Nevertheless, as soon as the national Kemal, was dispatched in his place to struggles for independence concluded and Tehran.(50) new regimes had emerged in both The difference of opinion between countries, the old problems began to Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasa on the resurface. While Turkey was anxious question of Iran is very apparent in the about Iranian manipulation (or toleration) instructions which each gave to Gerede. of Kurdish (and to some extent Mustafa Kemal said: “Husrev! Your Armenian) nationalism, Iran for its part passport is in your pocket! But I do not was suspicious of Turkish “irredentism” want you to return. I want you to stay in Iranian Azerbaijan and Ankara’s there and be successful in our policy of tutelage of Azeri nationalists.(48) peace and friendship by solving the The key matter after 1925 in Turkish- frontier problem.”(51) Ismet Pasa, Iranian relations was the growing however, took a different approach: and sporadic Kurdish rebellions in eastern Turkey. Husrev! Your position is just like Traditionally, Tehran had never viewed that of the Ambassadors of Great the Kurds (or the Armenians) as a threat Powers who used to send their to its regime; Turkey, however, Dragomans to the continuously demanded that Iran pursue a to dictate their wishes to the hard line policy towards the Kurds, in Grand , after having sent line with that of Turkey’s. Kurdish their fleets to the . rebellions in Eastern Anatolia between There is only one difference: that 1925 and 1930 created tensions in our state sends you, with relations, as Kurdish rebels easily made legitimate right and use of the Iranian frontier and received determination, in order to forestall assistance from Iranian Kurds. In order to the disruption of tranquility at ease these tensions, the two governments home and the formation of a signed a number of frontier and security Macedonia on its frontiers. agreements. But these failed to solve the Therefore you are going to talk to problem. Tension grew and erupted into the Iranian government with a an open crisis during the third Agri mobilised army behind you, ready rebellion in 1930. The Turkish press to move.(52) accused Iran of helping the rebels, both morally and materially. Iran was After nearly two years of arduous requested to put a stop to all rebel activity diplomacy, a border agreement was on her soil.(49) finally reached in January 1932. The In Ankara, two opposite views entire territory of Mountain Agri was to emerged regarding policy toward Iran. be given to Turkey, while Kotur (near While Ismet Pasa (Inonu), the prime Van) would remain with Iran. In spite of minister, and Tevfik Rustu (Aras), the strong resistance by his general staff, minister for foreign affairs, advocated a Reza Shah accepted this unfavorable tough policy, Mustafa Kemal and Ibrahim exchange without any hesitation. For, he Tali (Ongoren), the inspector for eastern had a different consideration in mind: Anatolia, preferred a more moderate policy towards Iran. A compromise was You do not understand me. It is reached: the Turkish ambassador to not this or that hill which is Tehran, Memduh Sevket (Esendal), who important: it is the settlement, was accused of being pro-Kurdish and once and for all, of our frontier critical of Ankara’s Kurdish policy, was disputes with Turkey. The recalled, and Husrev Gerede, a former disagreements between our two

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countries in the past, which have Saracoglu, the minister for foreign always been to the profit of our affairs, was asked by the Republican enemies, must cease, and a People’s Party (RPP) deputies whether sincere friendship based on our “There was any consideration and mutual interests be established initiative by the government for the Turks between Iran and Turkey. If we in Iran,” who had been subjected to are allied and united, I do not fear oppression and `Persianification` by the anybody.(53) Shah’s regime. Saracoglu answered: “It is natural that we consider the Turks in Iran, Relations peaked in 1934 with the without drifting into the war.” According Shah’s visit to Turkey. This successful to a leading RPP deputy of the time, Faik visit was an important milestone. After Ahmet Barutcu, Saracoglu`s concern was protracted negotiations concerning the right, since “whatever the importance of boundary dispute between Iraq and Iran, the Sudetenland for Germany, the Iranian a four-power (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Turks are the same for us. We should not Afghanistan) pact was signed in Tehran be content with expressing our feelings in July 1937. Though Reza Shah openly, but should strengthen those Turks originally had a defense agreement in [in Iran] in their national ideas and mind, what was eventually signed was a actions.”(56) non-aggression pact. The pact, however, Articles in the Turkish press, could not survive the challenge of the pamphlets written by Azeri nationalists, Second World War.(54) and discussions in Turkish public opinion all began to deal with the fate of this THE SECOND WORLD WAR group. In the years that followed the Relations between the two neighbors Turkish decision to give grants to a were ruptured with the beginning of the hundred Azeri students for their Second World War. Each had to deal education in Turkey, Ankara’s demand with its own strategic problems at for the immigration of the pro-German regional and international levels. Turkey Qashqai tribe to Turkey (in order to was highly concerned by the British- protect them from British and Iranian Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941. persecution), and the Turkish In order to ease Turkey’s apprehension, ambassador’s contacts with pro-German the British and Soviet governments sections of Iranian society aroused new assured the Turkish government of their suspicions on the part of the Iranian commitment to safeguarding Iran’s government as well as the allies. Iranian territorrial integrity. But Russian statesmen were inclined to see these involvement in the invasion, and initiatives by Turkey as a continuation of especially Soviet support for Kurdish the CUP policy. In the words of an (and Armenian) separatist activity in its Iranian diplomat to his British occupation zone, gave rise to further counterpart in 1927, “Pan-Turkism dies worry and widespread public criticism in hard in Turkey!”(57) Turkey. Turkey repeatedly warned Britain of the possible fallout from Soviet THE COLD WAR YEARS action in the region, but the British During the Cold War, both countries preferred not to clash with their essential felt threatened by the Soviets and both ally.(55) turned to the West to guarantee their The situation of the ethnic Turks in security. Even before the end of the Iran at this time also appears to have Second World War, Turkey was appeared on the agenda of the Turkish extremely disturbed by Soviet-supported political and military elite. In a separatist activities in Iran. The fear was parliamentary group meeting, Sukru of a familiar nature: that Iran would come

125 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) Gokhan Cetinsaya under Russian control or occupation, or disturbed by his foreign and domestic disintegrate, as a result of the policy. Ankara feared that the political encouragement given to Azeri and and economic instability, especially Kurdish nationalism. Encirclement of during the era of Prime Minister Turkey by the Soviets and its satellites Muhammad Mussadegh, could lead to a constituted a `nightmare scenario` for Communist takeover; and, for that Ankara, which explains why Turkey no reason, openly sided with Britain and the longer objected to Tehran’s policy West against him. Mutual vilification in towards Azeri Turks or Qashqais, as well the press of both countries was a as why Ankara did not show any recurrent feature of this period.(60) sympathy for the Soviet-supported Friendly relations between the two ‘republic’ in Iranian Azerbaijan.(58) governments were resumed after the fall Despite the climate of rapprochement of Mussadegh in the summer of 1953. in the early years of the Cold War, it took Turkey, as a NATO member, became almost a decade for the neighboring states very important for Iran, which was still a to develop their political, economic and, militarily weak and strategically to some extent, military relations. Turkey, vulnerable state. Iran joined the Baghdad while trying to obtain Western security Pact in November 1955 because of guarantees for itself, did not incline to Turkey’s special initiative and insistence, any military, security or political dealings despite U.S. objections, and in opposition with Iran. Ankara was aware that Iran to her traditional policy of neutrality.(61) was politically vulnerable and militarily But neither the Baghdad Pact nor its weak, and hence had little incentive to successor, CENTO, met the Shah’s develop such relations. Thus, in 1949, expectations. He told the American Muhammad Reza Shah proposed to the ambassador that “America treats Turkey Turkish ambassador that they develop a as a wife, and Iran as a concubine.”(62) defensive alliance. Turkey’s reply was a The Turkish government of Adnan cautious one: “The is Menderes attempted to convince suspicious enough of NATO as it is; any American statesmen to meet some of the arrangements between Turkey and Iran expectations of Iran, at least at a symbolic would only irritate Moscow still further. level, so that the pact might survive. Besides, without U.S. participation, the Ankara even proposed the creation of a pact would not have any force.”(59) “CENTO Command”, which would take Subsequent events vindicated this stance. control of the divisions east of the A defense pact including Iran was only to Iskenderun-Samsun line. This proposal be realized in the mid-1950s, following a was made over the objections of some change in U.S. global strategy. members of the Turkish general staff and Political rapprochement also moved the foreign office. forward at a slow pace, and was initially The Turkish military takeover of May concerned with mainly symbolic matters. 1960 marked a watershed in relations. This was mostly due to events taking The Shah, although he at first acclaimed place within Iran. The rising tide of the coup because of his deep anxiety over nationalism, neutralism, and the Menderes’ projected visit to Moscow in Communist party in Iranian politics in the July 1960(63) soon became wary of the late 1940s hampered relations. Iranian new government’s different view of Iran nationalists did not hold Turkey in high and CENTO. In their first manifesto, the esteem but regarded Ankara as a tool of coup leaders proclaimed: “We believe in Western imperialism. For its part, Turkey and are loyal to NATO, and we are loyal was very apprehensive about the to CENTO.” This proclamation was developments leading to the Musaddik followed by a new policy of premiership in 1951, and was highly rapprochement toward the Arabs initiated

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) 126 Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian Relations by the Turkish foreign ministry, and anti- and Alevi regions of Anatolia. All these CENTO attitudes in Turkish public gave rise to heated polemics and mutual opinion. Furthermore, the new accusations in the Turkish and Iranian government abandoned the project of the press.(65) CENTO Command. This ambiguous Beginning with the years 1973-74, the situation, however, lasted only two years. equilibrium between the two countries From mid-1962 onwards, relations began continued to shift. Following the oil to improve once again. High-level visits crises of 1973 and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, and mutual friendly remarks intensified; a Turkey faced severe financial difficulties, number of projects were reactivated and an American arms-embargo and several treaties signed. The pinnacle was international isolation, while Iran became the establishment of an organization for a rich, militarily strong and strategically economic, technical and cultural important country in regional politics. cooperation, called Regional Cooperation Although the Shah, expressing his for Development (RCD), in July 1964, by concern to Washington, was critical of Turkey, Iran and . In creating this the arms-embargo and supported the new body, the three states de-emphasized Turkish cause in Cyprus, he was the security aspect of CENTO.(64) nevertheless content with the change in In the second half of the 1960s and the relative power situation between early 1970s, however, a number of issues Turkey and Iran, and sought to turn it to led to renewed tensions. First, the Shah his advantage. His rejection of Ankara’s continued to express his dissatisfactions requests for cheap oil and other needs of regarding CENTO, despite efforts by the Turkish economy led to resentment post-1963 governments in Ankara, among the Turkish political elite.(66) especially the Demirel governments from 1965 onwards, to placate him in this THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND regard. Second, Turkish public opinion, ITS AFTERMATH and especially the growing left, became Following the Islamic revolution in increasingly critical of the Shah’s Iran, it was generally thought by dictatorship. The critical language of the outsiders that Turkish-Iranian relations Turkish press toward the regime in Iran were bound to suffer a severe downturn was a source of irritation to the Shah. due to Turkey’s strong secular and pro- Third, a large number of Iranian dissident Western stance. However, contrary to students living in Turkey received expectations, the same patterns of conflict support from the Turkish Left. Fourth, and collaboration in relations continued Turkey was anxious about the Shah’s as ever, and trade relations even reached support of Iraqi Kurds and repeatedly their peak in this period. warned him concerning the possible From the outset, Turkey accepted and results of such support for both Turkey officially recognized the new regime and and Iran itself. At a time when Iraqi- refused to contemplate intervening Turkish relations were progressing against it. There are several explanations rapidly, and inevitably straining relations for this: First, the Bulent Ecevit between Iran and Turkey, Ankara tried government, in line with its foreign and several times to mediate between domestic policy, had been consistently Baghdad and Tehran on the issue of the critical of the Shah and the CENTO Shatt al-Arab river forming part of their alliance. They were therefore pleased to border. Fifth, Turkey was apprehensive witness the emergence of an about the Shah’s attempt to establish “independent” and “non-aligned” Iran. patronage over Turkish Kurds and Second, the Turkish military and political Alevis; the Turkish authorities believed elites, as after World Wars One and Two, that he had sent emissaries to the Kurdish were apprehensive about the

127 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) Gokhan Cetinsaya disintegration of Iran as a result of civil Turkey as a friend…Since the day war. Such a scenario could lead to the Yavuz Sultan Selim defeated possibility of Soviet control of Iran, or a Shah Ismail Safavi, Iran has Kurdish separatist movement. Turkey watched for a chance to take therefore closely observed the policy of revenge on us. Naturally, Shi’i- the new regime towards Kurdish Sunni [antagonism] lies at the disturbances in Iran following the roots of this desire for revenge. I revolution. Third, a weakened and have told Ozal, from time to time, isolated revolutionary Iran would be a that he should never trust Iran, good trading partner for Turkey’s Libya and Syria, and that the bankrupt economy. Last but not least, administration of these three Turkey was pleased to see that Iran had countries did not view Turkey in a lost its prestige, power and capacity in friendly way. But I could not regional politics, as the pendulum swung convince him. He always sees the once more in favor of Turkey. All these matter from a point of view of factors played a part to varying degrees in trade, and tries to establish the development of relations between friendship with Iran and Libya to secular, Western-oriented Turkey and an unnecessary extent.(68) Islamic, anti-western Iran. This article does not cover relations CONCLUSION and Turkish policy after the Islamic A historical survey of Turkish-, a subject that merits a relations shows two main trends. One is separate study.(67) However, in general, the political, economic (and to some it may safely be asserted that existing extent military) cooperation which may patterns of conflict and collaboration in be traced from the Sadabad Pact, via the Turkish-Iranian relations continued in the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, RCD and ECO. years that followed. Relations revolved The other is a trend of disagreement and around the same topics, with ups and strife, which generally emanated from downs: border issues, minorities (Kurds, differences concerning minorities (Kurds, Azeris, and Armenians), trade and Azeris, and to some extent Armenians) commerce, and ideological/cultural and oppositionists (generally Iranians issues. In other words, geopolitical, living in Turkey). While mutual geostrategic and geoeconomic factors economic interests have always once more determined the course and constitued an important factor, and have nature of relations between the two states always served as a factor militating despite strong negative factors deriving toward compromise in relations, from the revolution. ideological/cultural matters in different One group followed the path of Ali forms (Westernized versus Oriental, Pasa and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, while different nationalisms, democracy versus another adopted the view of Fuad Pasa dictatorship, secularism versus Islamism) and Ismet Inonu. Turgut Ozal headed the have caused friction throughout the “doves,” while Kenan Evren, leader of period under examination. the military takeover and Turkish foreign policy toward Iran and later president of the republic, remained a the Turkish political and military elite’s hawk. A glance at Evren’s comments on view of that country have deep roots, at Ozal’s first formal visit as prime minister least in modern history, regardless of the to Iran in 1984 should make this point Islamic revolution in Iran. Looking back clearly: over the last 150 years of history, one can distinguish a number of recurrent themes: Ozal returned today from boundary problems, Armenian, Kurdish Tehran…Iran has never looked to and Azeri nationalisms, Great Powers’

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(Britain, Russia/USSR and U.S.) relations and R.L. Chambers (eds.), Beginnings of with Iran and Turkey, Iranian Modernisation in the Middle East: The oppositionists living in Turkey; Iranian Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University covert operations in Turkey, Turkey’s of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 119-51; fear of dismemberment of Iran, the fear Anja Pistor-Hatam, “Iran and the Reform of Pan-Turkism on the part of Iran, and Movement in the Ottoman Empire: the role of trade, transport and natural Persian Travellers, Exiles and Newsmen resources. The future of Turkish-Iranian under the Impact of the Tanzimat” in relations is likely to continue to be B.G. Fragner (ed.), Proceedings of the shaped by these same themes. Second European Conference of Iranian Studies (Roma: ISMEO, 1995), pp. 561- *Gokhan Cetinsaya is an Associate 78. Professor at Istanbul Technical 7. See Th. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf- University in the Department of Shahr (eds.), Les Iraniens D’Istanbul Humanities and Social Sciences. (Paris-Teheran-Istanbul: Institut Francais De Recherches En Iran-Institut Francais NOTES D’Etudes Anatoliennes, 1993). 1. See R.K. Ramazani, The Foreign 8. See Hamid Algar, “Atabat,” Policy of Iran, 1500-1941 Encyclopedia Iranica, II, pp. 902-3. (Charlottesville: University Press of 9. See Hamid Algar, Religion and State Virginia, 1966); Stanford J. Shaw, in Iran (Berkeley: University of “Iranian Relations with the Ottoman California Press, 1969). Empire in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 10. For details, see Roderic H. Davison, Centuries” in Peter Avery, Gavin R. G. Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856- Hambly, and C. Melville (eds.), The 1876 (New York: Gordian Press, 1973), Cambridge , VII Ch. VIII. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11. Basiret, No. 2081, 3 Mayis 1877, 1991), pp. 297-313; Gokhan Cetinsaya, transliterated in Gokhan Cetinsaya, “II. “Tanzimat’tan Birinci Dunya Savasi’na Abdulhamid Doneminin Ilk Yillarinda Osmanli-Iran Iliskileri,” KOK Islam Birligi Hareketi, 1876-1878” Arastirmalar, Osmanli Ozel Sayisi (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of (2000), pp. 11-23. Ankara, 1988), p. 118. 2. Engin Deniz Akarli, Belgelerle 12. Ali Riza ve Mehmed Galib, Gecen Tanzimat: Osmanli Sadriazamlarindan Asirda Devlet Adamlarimiz, p. 118. Ali ve Fuad Pasalarin Siyasi 13. Mehmet Saray, Turk-Afgan Vasiyyetnameleri (Istanbul: Bogazici Munasebetleri (Istanbul: Veli Yayinlari, Universitesi Yayinlari, 1978), p. 5. 1984), p. 21. 3. See David McDowall, A Modern 14. See Cezmi Eraslan, “Islam Birligi History of the Kurds (London: I.B.Tauris, Siyaseti Cercevesinde II. Abdulhamid’in 1996). Ilk Yillarinda Osmanli-Iran 4. See Richard Schofield, The Iran-Iraq Munasebetleri, 1878-1882” in Prof. Dr. Border, 1840-1958, III and IV (Archive Bekir Kutukoglu’na Armagan (Istanbul: Editions, 1989). IUEF, 1991), pp. 221-40. 5. Ali Riza ve Mehmed Galib, Gecen 15. See Salahi R. Sonyel, The Ottoman Asrda Devlet Adamlarimiz: 13. Asr-i Armenians (London: K. Rustem & Hicride Osmanli Ricali, I (Istanbul: Brother, 1987). Tercuman 1001 Temel Eser, 1977), p. 16. The Shi’i ulama, through their 115. financial resources, exercised 6. See Hafez Farman Farmayan, “The considerable influence in Iraq, especially Forces of Modernization in 19th Century among the tribal population. It appears Iran: A Historical Survey” in W.P. Polk that through well-established in

129 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September 2003) Gokhan Cetinsaya the cities, and through akhunds (Shi’i 25. See, for example, Ahmet Bedevi mollas who wandered among the tribal Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Ittihad ve population), the Shi’i sect expanded in Terakki (Istanbul: Tan Matbaasi, 1948), the region. See Yitzhak Nakash, The pp. 187-192. Shi’is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton 26. See Halil Pasa [Kut], Bitmeyen Savas University Press, 1994). (Istanbul: Yaylacik Matbaasi, 1972), pp. 17. For details, see Gokhan Cetinsaya, 59-66. Cf. Fethi Tevetoglu, Omer Naci “Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890- (Istanbul: MEB, 1992). This group had 1908” (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, fought with the pro-Shah forces and only University of Manchester, 1994), pp. returned after the March 31 incident 222-80. Cf. Selim Deringil, “The (April 1909). Struggle Against Shi’ism in Hamidian 27. See Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq; Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter- Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi’ism and Propaganda,” Die Welt Des , Vol. Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden: E.J. 30, (1990), pp. 45-62. Brill, 1977). 18. Sultan II. Abdulhamid Han, in A. 28. See Schofield, The Iran-Iraq Border, Alaaddin Cetin and Ramazan Yildiz IV and V. (eds.), Devlet ve Memleket Goruslerim, 29. Ibid. (Istanbul: Cigir, 1976), p. 310. 30. See Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, 19. Ibid. Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver 20. See Cetinsaya, “Ottoman Pasa, III (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, Administration of Iraq”, pp. 222-80. 1972). 21. See Nejat Goyunc, “Muzaffereddin 31. For details, see Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Sah ve II. Abdulhamid Devrinde Turk- Turk Inkilap Tarihi, Cilt III, Kisim 3 Iran Dostluk Tezahurleri” in Iran (Ankara: TTK, 1983), pp. 123-76; Birinci Sehinsahligi’nin 2500. Kurulus Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, IIIncu Cilt: Yildonumune Armagan (Istanbul: MEB Irak-Iran Cephesi (Ankara: Genelkurmay Yayinlari, 1971), pp. 164-5. Basimevi, 1979). Cf. Peter Hopkirk, On 22. PRO, FO 416/18, no.136, O’Connor Secret Service East of Constantinople: to Lansdowne, no. 445 secret, The Plot to Bring Down the British Constantinople, 7 June 1904. Empire (London: John Murray, 1994), 23. Semseddin Bey who served as and W.J. Olson, Anglo-Iranian Relations Turkish ambassador to Tehran for quite a During WW1 (London: Frank Cass, long time (1894-5, 1897-1908) created 1984). these contacts between the Iranian ulama 32. Kazim Karabekir, Birinci Cihan and Istanbul. Semseddin Bey, who was a Harbine Nasil Girdik (Istanbul: Emre, graduate of Mulkiye and had a profound 1994), pp. 419-20. knowledge of religious sciences, was 33. Ibid. known to have close relations with the 34. See Halil Pasa, Bitmeyen Savas, pp. mujtahids. See Ali Cankaya, Yeni 194-6; Aydemir, Enver Pasa, pp. 208-9. Mulkiye Tarihi ve Mulkiyeliler, III 35. For details, see Ali Ihsan Sabis, Harp (Ankara: Mars Matbaasi, 1969), pp. 83-5. Hatiralarim: Birinci Dunya Harbi, III Cf. Arthur H. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in (Istanbul: Nehir, 1991), pp. 204-349. the East (London: Jonathan Cape, 1928), 36. Ibid., p. 333. pp. 272-3. 37. Bayur, Turk Inkilap Tarihi, p. 172, 24. For details, see Sinan Kuneralp, “The dated November 14, 1916. Ottoman Drang Nach Osten: The Turco- 38. See Kazim Karabekir, Birinci Cihan Persian Border Problem in Azerbaican, Harbini Nasil Idare Ettik: Sarikamis, 1905-1912” in Studies on Ottoman ve Otesi (Istanbul: Emre, 1994), pp. Diplomatic History IV (Istanbul: ISIS, 328-9. 1990), pp. 71-6.

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39. For Ottoman policy in Azerbaijan, see unity. What would be the purpose Tadeusz Swietochowski, Russia and of this unity? A political union? Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition For the present, no! We cannot (New York: Columbia University Press, pass judgment today on what will 1995). happen in the future, but for the 40. See Salahi R. Sonyel, Turkish present our goal is only cultural Diplomacy, 1918-1923 (London: Sage, unity of the Oghuz peoples. 1975), p. 8; Schofield, The Iran-Iraq Border, VI, pp. 381-91, 401, 409-15. For Ziya Gokalp, The Principles of Turkism, details, see Gokhan Cetinsaya, “Turkiye- R. Devereux (transl.) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, Iran Iliskileri, 1919-1925,” Ataturk 1968), p. 17. Also see Ismail Arar, Arastirma Merkezi Dergisi, Vol. 48 “Ataturk’un gunumuz olaylarina da isik (Kasim 2000), pp. 769-796. tutan bazi konusmalari,” Belleten, Vol. 41. Zeki Sarihan, Kurtulus Savasi 45, No. 177 (Ocak, 1981), p. 16; Touraj Gunlugu, I (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. Atabaki, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and 230-1. Autonomy in Twentieth-century Iran 42. Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kurt (London: British Academic Press, 1993), Isyanlari 1 (Istanbul: Kaynak, 1992), pp. p. 55. For details, see Gokhan Cetinsaya, 25-7. “Ataturk Donemi Turkiye-Iran Iliskileri, 43. Ibid., p. 42. 1926-1938,” Avrasya Dosyasi, Vol. 5, 44. Ibid., pp. 25-7. No. 3, (Sonbahar 1999), pp. 148-75. 45. For details, see Ramazani, The 49. For details, see Bilal Simsir, Ingiliz Foreign Policy of Iran, pp. 182ff; Cyrus Belgeleriyle Turkiye’de “Kurt Sorunu”, Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: 1924-1938 (Ankara: Disisleri Bakanligi from Qajar Collapse to Rule Basimevi, 1975). Cf. McDowall, A (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 307-319. Modern History of the Kurds. 46. Hamdullah Suphi Tanriover, Dag 50. For details, see Husrev Gerede, Siyasi Yolu, Birinci Kitap (Ankara: Kultur Hatiratim I: Iran, 1930-1934 (Istanbul: Bakanligi, 1987), p. 35. Vakit Basimevi, 1952). 47. Yann Richard, “Kemalizm ve Iran” in 51. Ibid., p. 17. I. Gokalp ve F. Georgeon (eds), 52. Ibid., p. 20. Kemalizm ve Islam Dunyasi (Istanbul: 53. Hasan Arfa, Under Five Arba, 1990), pp. 84-5. (London: John Murray, 1964), pp. 230-1. 48. See Lowell Bezanis, “Soviet Muslim 54. See Ismail Soysal, “1937 Sadabad Emigres in the Republic of Turkey,” Pact,” Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 13, No. 1, Vol. 3, (1988), pp. 131-157; D.C. Watt, (1994), pp. 117-41. Ziya Gokalp, one of “The Sadabad Pact of 8 July 1937” in the founding-fathers of Turkish Uriel Dann (ed.), The Great Powers in nationalism, wrote the following remarks the Middle East, 1919-1939 (New York: in his celebrated work, Turkculugun Holmes & Meir, 1988), pp. 333-52. Esaslari: 55. For details, see Gokhan Cetinsaya, “Ikinci Dunya Savasi Yillarinda Turkiye- Today, the Turks for whom Iran Iliskileri, 1939-1945,” Strateji, Vol. cultural unification would be easy 11 (1999), pp. 41-72. Cf. Selim Deringil, are the Oghuz Turks, that is, the Turkish Foreign Policy During the Turkmens, for the Turkmens of Second World War, (Cambridge: Azerbaijan, Iran and Khwarizm, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. like the Turks of Turkey, belong 126-8. to the Oghuz strain. Therefore, 56. Faik Ahmet Barutcu, Siyasal Anilar, our immediate ideal for Turkism 1939-1954 (Istanbul: , 1977), pp. must be Oghuz, or Turkmen, 234-9.

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57. British Documents on Foreign (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 448, Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 552. Foreign Office Confidential Prints, Part 67. For relations since 1979, see Suha II: Persia (University Publications of Bolukbasi, “Turkey Copes With America, 1985-1997), Vol. VII, Doc.199, Revolutionary Iran,” Journal of South 22.11.1927. Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 58. This did not mean that the concern of 13, No. 1-2 (1989), pp. 94-109; Fuat the Turkish establishment over the fate of Borovali, “Iran and Turkey: Permanent the “Turks in Iran” also ceased to exist. Revolution or Islamism in One Country?” For example, see Graham Fuller, The in Miron Rezun (ed.), Iran at the Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics Crossroads: Global Relations in a of Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), Turbulent Decade (Boulder: Westview p. 200. Cf. Ari Inan, Tarihe Taniklik Press, 1990), pp. 81-93; Henri J. Barkey, Edenler, (Istanbul: Cagdas, 1997), pp. “Iran and Turkey: Confrontation across 394-5. an Ideological Divide” in Alvin Z. 59. Soysal, “1937 Sadabad Pact,” p. 149. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky Cf. Feridun Cemal Erkin, Disislerinde 34 (eds.), Regional Power Rivalries in the Yil: Washington Buyukelciligi, Vol. II, New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran No. 1, (Ankara: TTK, 1986), pp. 122-3. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 147- 60. For details, see Gokhan Cetinsaya, 67; Tschangiz H. Pahlavan, “Turkish- “Turk-Iran Iliskileri, 1945-1997” in Iranian Relations: An Iranian View” in Faruk Sonmezoglu (ed.), Turk Dis Henri J. Barkey (ed.), Reluctant Politikasinin Analizi (Istanbul: Der, Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle 1998), pp. 135-58. East (Washington D.C.: United States 61. See Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa, “The Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 71-91; Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Atilla Eralp, “Facing the Challenge: Post- Defence Policies in the Middle East, Revolutionary Relations with Iran” in 1955-1959” (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ibid., pp. 93-112; John Calabrese, University of Manchester, 1996), pp. “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable 227-46. Relationship,” British Journal of Middle 62. Foreign Relations of the United Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1998), States, 1961-1963, Vol. XVII, p. 593. pp. 75-94. 63. See Mahmut Dikerdem, Ucuncu 68. Kenan Evren’in Hatiralari, Vol. 5, Dunya’dan (Istanbul: Cem, 1977), pp. 7- (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1991), pp. 83-4. See 41; Feroz ve Bedia Turgay Ahmad, also pp. 32 and 469. Cf. Kamuran Gurun, Turkiye’de Cok Partili Politikanin Firtinali Yillar: Disisleri Mustesarligi Aciklamali Kronolojisi, 1945-1971 Anilari (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1995), p. 378. (Ankara: Bilgi, 1976), p. 216; Arfa, Under Five Shahs, pp. 429-30. 64. See Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 339-43. 65. See Cetinsaya, “Turk-Iran Iliskileri, 1945-1997.” 66. See Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi Surecinde Turkiye, 1945-1980 (Istanbul: Hil, 1994), p. 515. Cf. , The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969-1977

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