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ORIGINAL: FRENCH 5Th March. 195A ^Quhqimsmm And EXEMPLAIR F. 6 7 N" COPY ^QUHQiMsmm and" / ORIGINAL: FRENCH . PUBLIC DISCLOSED NATO /DECRgnE-— 5th March. 195A SUMMARY RECORD O-R (54)6 ' Sumnary Record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de" Chaillot, Paris, on Saturday. 2-71 h February. 1954 at 11 a ZmT PRESENT Chairman - Mr. G. Bidault (For Item i) The Lord Ismay (For Items II and III) Mr. A. de S.taercke (Belgium) Mr. N. Hommol (Luxembourg) Mr. L.D. Wilgress (Canada) Mr. M.F. Vigeveno (Netherlands) Mr. J.A. Vestbirk (Denmark) Mr. A. Skaug- (Norway) Mr. H. Alphand (France) Count de Tovar (Portugal) Mr. G., Exintaris (Greece) Mr. M.A. Tiney (Turkey) Mr. G. Pêtursson (Iceland) Sir Christopher Steel (United Kingdom) Mr. A. Rossi Longhi (Italy) Mr. J.C. Hughes (United States) INTERNATIONAL STAFF Mr. H. Van Vredenburch (Deputy Secretary General) Mr. S. FenoaItea (Assistant Secretary General for Political ' Affairs) Mr. R.D. Coleridge (Executive Secretary) .ALSO PRESENT Vice-Admiral R. Dick (Standing Group Liaison Officer) CONTENTS DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Item Subject Page No. I. Statement by the Chairman on the Berlin 1 Conference II* Date of the next Ministerial Meeting 4 III. Photographs and films of the Council . 5 IV. Date of the next meeting 5 . I. STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON THE BERLIN CONFERENCE 1. M. BIDAULT, Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, gave an account of the Berlin Conference of which the main points were as-follows. G-eneral Remarks 2« A leading feature of the Berlin talks was the systematic stone-walling which the Western Ministers experienced throughout the discussion. Contrary to the speculations of the Press regarding a riNew Molotov51 and a "New Look" for Soviet policy,, it was found that, in fact, there was no change in the Soviet attitude as. compared with 1SU7»' It could not even he said that the Berlin Conference made it possible for Ministers to get to know each other since the four Ministers had already met at San Francisco, The conclusion should not however he drawn that no' progress had heen made or' that all hope of progress must he abandoned since, for Asian affairs, a small advance had been made towards agreement in respect of procedure. Even before the Conference one could have assumed how it would develop and its outcome could have been foreseen from the'beginning. It was probably true that Mr. Molotov needed a series of meetings for propaganda purposes; but it had been clear from the outset that he would refuse to take a forward step where Germany and Austria were concerned and woiild aim at obtaining, even at the price of substantial sacrifices, an agreement which would ' prevent the trouble'in the Far East from spreading. NATO and EDC . 3* The Soviet Foreign Minister more than once intimated that he was far less strongly opposed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization than to the European Defence Council which, to quote his own expression, represented NATO "to the nth degree" After bringing all his forces to bear on denigrating the EDC, he.proceeded to put forward his plan for European security which, based on the idea of "Europe for the Europeans", was worthless in an age of supersonic aircraft. Russia herself had.never agreed to the idea of a European Russia as distinct from an Asiatic Russia. Mr. Molotov had manoeuvred on several occasions to influence public opinion, especially in France. A certain number of equivocal statements had been made which, to the simple-minded, might sound as though the USSR would perhaps waive its objections to the Atlantic Treaty. Vfhen questioned on this point, he had kept .on prevaricating. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Germany 3« It was revealed hy the talks on Germany that the USSR was not ready to run the risk of free elections, since they might mark the turning point of Soviet influence in Europe. The Grotewohl Government would be swept away, the disappearance of one satellite government would incite neighbouring countries to follow suit and the whole satellite system would collapse like a set of ninepins. Among other pretexts for not holding free elections, Mr. Molotov argued that the Germans were not to be trusted, since they had brought Hitler into power. He insisted on his view that the West should accept the formation of a single German Government in which the governments of the West and the East would be on an equal footing. In fact, such a government would, "be completely powerless. The USSR would not accept any of the contractual guarantees offered by the West; .what it wanted was to be able to hold on to its existing spheres of influence. Austria • 1 "" ' • 6, The efforts- of the Deputies, who had managed to reduce to five the number of clauses in dispute, and the goodwill displayed by the Western Ministers, who agreed to the settlement of these clauses proposed by the Russians, proved fruitless for they were countered by fresh objections on the part of Mr. Molotov. The USSR made the signing of a treaty with Austria impossible by subordinating it to,a settlement of the Trieste question, and by subordinating the evacuation of Austria to the conclusion of a treaty with G-ermany. 7, Furthermore, the Soviet proposal to rid Vienna of occupation troops - which would have retired to their respective sectors - was really so ill-disguised as to deceive no-one. The bullying which went on when the Austrian Ministers were called to the meeting, was particularly unpleasant. Asia. • - • A' . - 8/ Some progress was actually made on procedure. It was known that the USSR.wanted to bring Communist China into an international conference. It could be assumed that Moscow was unable to meet China's claims itself,, and if Peking was "to enter into negotiations with the West, Russia obviously preferred that : China should not be alone, since she might then find that she would be drawn into some action initiated by China. China must therefore be escorted to any conference, and the USSR was- prepared to acoept any solution that would achieve this.. A five-power conference was proposed, then a seventeen-power one, and finally the Geneva Conference at which twenty powers would be present. The main thing for Russia was to have China present, along with other powers. * • Conclusions -:.- •.'"•••••.••'••'•. 9. At least, the satisfactory conclusion could be drawn that while the situation had not improved, it had not • détériorâted either. The USSR, to quote La Fontaine, had realised that "absence is the greatest of all evils", and that • it had much to gain from conversations with the Western Powers. If the West had fallen in with Mr. Molotov's ideas it would have, had to take part in a series of conferences^in the future. The Soviet , DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED leaders reasoned that a series of conferences would influence public opinion in other countries besides their own; for there was such a thing as public opinion in Russia, even though it had no freedom of expression. in,- M. BIDAULT had himself told the Russian Delegation that it was always making demands without offering anything in exchange, and invited it to put forward concrete proposals. He had stressed that the Western Powers were not calling in question the Eastern bloc, but that in return they claimed the right to take whatever defensive measures they deemed necessary for their own security. •11. It could be said that in this game of poker the Western Ministers had staked everything they had, and more, while.the Soviet Delegation had never put "more than fifty kopecks on the tahle'r. If perhaps the'cold war was "being left behind it was for the unsatisfactory solution of a kind of peevish and provisional recognition of the status quo on "both sides. 12. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, speaking for his Government, thanked the Chairman for so kindly coming to give the Council an account of the Berlin Conference. He enquired whether the three Western Ministers had any suggestions in mind for improving the position of Austria. 13. The CHAIRMAN replied that nothing could be done for the time being except to maintain the status quo. The only proposal put forward was that the troops should be withdrawn from Vienna and quadripartite control discontinued. However, nothing could be changed for the present. The Western Powers would certainly support Austria if it was subjected to threats or intimidation. There had seemed no point in transferring the negotiations of the Deputies to Vienna. Moreover, it had appeared premature to envisage the withdrawal of the representatives of the three ' Western Powers so long as the Soviet representatives remained in the country. 11(.. Replying to another question by the Italian Representative, the CHAIRMAN said that in his opinion, the statement to the Council made by the French Pemanent Representative on 15th January in connection with the Berlin Conference was still valid. On that occasion it had been said that, in- the event of failure of the Berlin Conference, the Federal Government, by virtue of its participation in the EDC, would probably make a statement on its own account guaranteeing the security of the USSR, which would be .supported by the three Western Powers. It had, however, been revealed that the USSR attached no importance whatsoever to contractual guarantees. Nevertheless, the Western'Ministers would always be ready to reopen negotiations to that effect. 15. The BEIGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thanked'the Chairman, on behalf of his Government, for the statemènt he had made to the Council.
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