The Importance of Being Different S the Date for Berlin Fast Ap Question of European Security and One Thing Is Clear
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January 16, 1954 From the London End The Importance of Being Different S the date for Berlin fast ap question of European security and one thing is clear. Both the United A proaches, the problem of German rearmament in the EDC— States and the Soviet Union had " settling public opinion " as to the the very question which has so far conceived of a European settlement prospects of the Big Four Confer bedevilled East-West relations. The in which Central Europe would be ence, is becoming a little too acute French problem in Indo-China is a vast vacuum. The reversal of this for the Western press. After another probably more striking when placed policy on the part of the US came year of many still-born peace pro in the context of this cleavage be soon after Sir Winston Churchill's grammes, the general European pub tween what the State believes and speech at Fulton. That such a re lic continue to take an active and, what the public believes. versal should have taken place was indeed, hopeful interest in interna The Berlin Conference has no indeed a major diplomatic victory tional affairs. It is, therefore, to formal agenda, no conditions, and for Britain, even though Sit Win the task of " preparing public- no limits. From the spate of notes ston was not, at that time, a mem opinion " for the acceptance of a that have passed between the ber of the British Government. Western " decision to break" with Powers concerned, it is, however, Since then. Britain has risen in the Soviet delegation, should the clear that the conference will be stature. latter not show a " readiness to get essentially, if not wholly, concerned More recently, the British atti down to brass tacks ", that the more with the solution of the Gentian tude appears to have been based important sections of the British problem. While the Soviet policy, on the need to fill the void that press has warmed up. It is certain described at length in the many exists in Central Europe, that is, by ly not completely incorrect to as Soviet notes, is clear, the policy of reviving Germany as a continental sume that this work is being offi the Western Powers is uncertain power. Insofar as the United States cially inspired. Even that staid old and, in many cases, ambiguous. are concerned, they have bent their lady of Printing House Square with Some have even found distinct dif efforts towards a European political her ever-permanent '' contact " with ferences in the approach of each of the Foreign Office has not held back the Western countries directly con her punches. The 'Times, in a cerned with the solution of the Ger comment that will remain remark man question. able for its frankness, predicted Probably the Russian note to the that the Berlin Conference of the Big Three Powers on March 10, Big Four foreign ministers would 1952, provides the best exposition not succeed. The Manchester of the Soviet viewpoint. It requir Guardian, though not so brazen, ed, for a solution of the German called upon Mr Eden to treat Mr Ll question and agreement on a Ger Molotov with suspicion there man peace treaty, the withdrawal will be a gloomy suspicion . that of all occupation forces, including Mr Molotov is chiefly to add to the that of the Soviet Union, within troubles of the Western powers." the year of the treaty taking effect, The Economist, while recognising and the liquidation, simultaneously, that it is " no light matter" to re of all foreign military bases on commend scepticism about any con German soil. Germany, in Soviet ference with the Russians, goes view, should be barred from any right ahead in recommending it. alliance aimed at " any Power which That such a hostile atmosphere took part with its armed forces in should be created when for the first the war against Germany". Fur time in some three years the foreign ther, the Potsdam frontiers require ministers concerned are prepared to to be reaffirmed under some mutual meet one another, is, to say the least, security arrangements while Ger unfortunate. But to leave it at that many was to be allowed certain would be to ignore the reasons for national armed forces sufficient for which this hostility has been creat the defence of the country and ed. There has developed over the nothing else. past year, and no doubt 1953 will As against this, the policies of the remain memorable for such a deve United States, France and Britain, lopment, a distinct cleavage in the can only be assessed against the West between the Governments' general post-war background. It essential lines of diplomatic strategy will be remembered that at Yalta, and, the approach of the general for the first time, recognition was public (and in some cases of Parlia given to the existence of two great mentarians) to the subject of in Powers, each with global interests. ternational peace and security. In True, Britain and France were also Britain this cleavage has most still considered to be major political clearly been in evidence in the case powers, but this was more of a con of the Egyptian demand for the vention. From the many interpre British evacuation of the Suez, while tations of what had taken place at in France it has occurred over the Yalta, and subsequently at Potsdam, 61 January 16, 1954 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY federation which, from a military similar to that of the other NATO a resurgent Germany. point of view, require the integra countries. According to Alsop, the This appears the likely context tion of German armed units into US President scotched this alterna in which a solution to the German an all-European army. French op tive " with great firmness ". To the question will be sought. Interna position to either of these has re United States, it was "EDC or tional politics being what it is, the mained inflexible since the end of nothing"—a policy which Dulles Berlin Conference will not be with the war. Mr Joseph Alsop describ described in his subsequent " agonis out a lot of bargaining and hag ed by the French foreign office as ing reappraisal " speech. gling -concessions being made at a a very " talented " man, gave in his The relevance of this story lies in price so that each of the countries syndicated column in the New York its possible differences of ap concerned can aim at coming out Herald Tribune an inside story of proach of the Western Powers at of Conference without anything lost part of the proceedings at the Ber the forthcoming Berlin Conference. or with something gained. In this muda conference on the very ques From the point of view of the situation the West's only opportun tion of German rearmament and United States, there can be no let ity is to win over to its side a united the French attitude to it. Apart ting oil of rearmament under the Germany, if that Germany will re from lis general interest, this story EDC a view diametrically opposed main outside the military environ has wider diplomatic and political to that of Russia. In any case for ment of. NATO and the EDC, implications. the United States, an integrated From the current press comments A p p a r e n t l y , Sir Winston Europe under the political and it is clear that this opportunity will Churchill, moved by reports from economic systems they have espous not be taken. As far as France is Paris that the French Assembly ed since 1949 will entail the cutting concerned, a united Germany, even would not ratify the EDC, suggest down of British influence in Euro if pacific, will always remain an ed that there was no need to be pean affairs in such measure as will economic threat. To the United rigid in dealing' with the problem. equal the rise of America itself as States, this will be against all that What was needed was a good stout a European Power. To Britain, an they have done in the recent past German army and if the French integrated Europe will mean, as Sir and for Britain, it wilt not stop the did not like the EDC, why not Winston most certainly is aware, the road to an integrated Europe (with adopt the alternative of German decline of British independence in Germany necessarily outside it) and national armament within the sofar as it concerns the politics of it will not fill the void in Central framework of NATO---that is Europe. Thus, to counter this pos Europe—the equilibrating factor allow Germany as an independent sibility, we see British polity being which has almost always allowed sovereign power to undertake a governed by the need of a new Britain to remain an arbiter in measure of militarisation in a form Continental Power in the form of European affairs. .