The Geneva Conference of 1954 New Evidence from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’S Republic of China

Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16 The Geneva Conference of 1954 New Evidence from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Introduction by Chen Jian and Shen Zhihua hese Chinese documents, translated below as the Geneva Conference. According to the Archive’s administra- result of an agreement between the Foreign Ministry tion, the documents that have been declassified account for TArchive of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) about 65-70% of the documents that are held by the Archive and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) for the period. at the Woodrow Wilson Center, are of major importance for Differing from the common practice of most Chinese two basic reasons. First, following the formal declassifica- archives in discriminating between Chinese and foreign tion of China’s diplomatic documents, a first in the history researchers—oftentimes documents were only made available of the People’s Republic, the records are being made avail- to Chinese researchers, while scholars with foreign passports able to scholars and students. Secondly, they shed new light were denied access—the Foreign Ministry Archive carries out on the causes, proceedings, and results of the 1954 Geneva a new and much fairer practice by treating all users, Chinese Conference, especially on Beijing’s policies as well as the and foreign alike, in the same way. All documents have been considerations underlying them. digitized and can be accessed at the computer monitors in the Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, along with the pro- Department of Archives’ reading room at the Foreign Ministry. cess of China’s “reform and opening to the outside world,” Researchers are allowed to take notes of the documents and, scholars of Chinese Cold War history have gained new access in most cases, make copies of the documents for a fee (after to source materials unavailable in the past. However, until going through certain approval procedures). recently, the PRC’s diplomatic archives remained closed to Among the documents now declassified, the ones on researchers. In many cases, scholars working on the Chinese China’s participation at the Geneva Conference of 1954 are experience of the Cold War had to rely upon officially or among the most impressive and important. These documents semi-officially published documentary collections. These cover a wide range of issues. In addition to records of ses- documents were released selectively and are often incom- sions of the conference, there are some documents touching plete. In the past ten years, many scholars—including the two upon internal discussions among Chinese leaders—includ- of us—have also tried to access documents kept at provincial ing telegraphic exchanges between Zhou Enlai in Geneva and local archives. However, the documents at these archives and Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and other Chinese leaders in usually are the ones that had been “relayed” by the Chinese Beijing—and between Chinese leaders and their Vietnamese Communist Party leadership to party organs at lower levels, and Soviet counterparts concerning how to form, implement, so they were inevitably limited in their significance, reflect- and, when needed, adjust the strategies and policies of the ing only part of the overall picture of China’s policymaking communist side toward the conference. Among the docu- and implementation. ments are also transcripts of meetings between Chinese lead- China’s laws on archival declassification have established ers and the leaders of Western powers, such as Britain and that government documents, including diplomatic papers, France, and non-socialist and non-Western countries, such as should under normal circumstances be declassified after thir- India, Laos, and Cambodia. ty years. In 2003-2004, the Department of Archives of the Scholars of Cold War history have long believed that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs started the formal process 1954 Geneva Conference occupied a critical position in the of declassifying the documents in its holdings. The first group evolution of the global Cold War. Most important of all, the of documents was made available for public use (including by conference ended the First Indochina War while, at the same researchers from both China and foreign countries) in January time, prepared conditions for the unfolding of the process 2004, covering the period of 1949-1955. In July 2004, the leading to the Second Indochina War (or, as it is more widely Archive further declassified another 5,000 documents from the known, the Vietnam War). 1949-1955 period, including documents relating to the 1954 These documents shed new light on the Chinese experi- Chen Jian is Michael J. Zak Professor of History for US-China Relations at Cornell University and Zijiang Distinguished Visiting Professor at East China Normal University; Shen Zhihua is Professor of History and Director of the Cold War History Studies Center at East China Normal University. 7 Inside China’s Cold War ence at the Geneva Conference, revealing some key aspects of rades finally accepted the 17th Parallel. Beijing’s decision-making and policy implementation before One of the most important reasons underpinning Beijing’s and during the conference. The documents indicate that, from eagerness to reach a settlement on Indochina was, the records a Chinese perspective, the conference provided the PRC with a reveal, the profound concern that the United States would valuable opportunity to appear at a major international forum. otherwise intervene directly in Indochina. Indeed, both in Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in particular paid special atten- Beijing’s discussions with Moscow and the Chinese leaders’ tion to using the conference to announce that the “new China” meetings with the Viet Minh, the possibility of American mili- had emerged as an important actor and prestigious force in tary intervention in Indochina loomed large on the agenda. international affairs. Zhou Enlai thus repeatedly emphasized A large number of the declassified documents demonstrate internally that Beijing had to do everything possible to make that Beijing’s leaders actively used China’s appearance at the Geneva Conference a success. Geneva to establish direct contact with Western powers such The Chinese documents also show that the alliance rela- as Britain and France. Among the documents are the tran- tionship between China and the Soviet Union was quite inti- scripts of meetings Zhou Enlai held separately with Anthony mate in 1954. Indeed, the Chinese experience at the Geneva Eden and Pierre Mendes-France, as well as the telegraphic conference was first and foremost characterized by high-level communications between Zhou and Beijing reporting on these cooperation and mutual support between Beijing and Moscow. meetings. These documents make it very clear that Beijing’s It was Moscow that used the Berlin Foreign Ministers’ meeting leaders viewed these meetings not only as useful for driv- several months before to propose that China should attend— ing a wedge between London and Paris on the one hand and as a central participant—the conference on how to conclude Washington on the other, but also regarded them as highly the Korean War and the First Indochina War. Prior to the valuable for the PRC to be regarded by the whole world as a conference, the Soviet leaders provided the Chinese with all rising great power. The documents also clearly indicate that kinds of advice, assisting Beijing’s leaders to be ready for the Zhou Enlai, head of the Chinese delegation to the conference, PRC’s debut at a major international gathering. The Soviet and played an extremely important role in shaping and handling Chinese leaders also conducted extensive discussions on how Chinese policies at the conference. to coordinate their strategies at the conference, which resulted While there is no doubt that the declassification of Chinese in a joint Chinese-Soviet strategy, especially toward the settle- diplomatic documents represents an encouraging development ment of the Indochina issue. for scholars of Cold War international history in general and During the conference, when the discussions on settling of China’s Cold War experience in particular, gaps between the Indochina issue nearly deadlocked largely because of the scholars’ expectations and research needs and the reality of the Viet Minh’s unyielding attitudes toward such issues as zones archival opening in China continue to exist. The documents now of troop concentration, handling the conflicts in Vietnam, Laos made available to scholars are still limited in content and scope. and Cambodia separately, and withdrawing all foreign troops Some of the limits are caused by the special nature of the from Indochina, the Chinese and the Soviets closely consulted documents held at the Foreign Ministry Archive. Most of the with each other, and jointly exerted great pressure upon their documents kept by the FMA are papers related to the Ministry’s Vietnamese comrades. Consequently, the young Vietnamese own operations and activities. Although not without exception, communists had no other choice but to follow Beijing’s and the documents held at the FMA are generally the ones about Moscow’s advice to accept a peace accord that would divide policy-implementation, rather than about policy-making at the Vietnam—albeit temporarily, it was intended—along the 17th highest level. Therefore, for scholars to construct a more com- parallel. prehensive perspective of the Chinese foreign policy decision- While cooperation and mutual support remained the main making process, it is essential that they should be given access theme of Sino-Viet Minh relations at Geneva, the Chinese doc- to other archives in Beijing—the Chinese Communist Party uments also confirm that disagreement and, at times, tensions Central Archive in particular. developed between the Chinese and the Vietnamese comrades The documents declassified and made available to scholars over their aims and strategies. As indicated by the documents, by the Foreign Ministry Archive only account for 70% of the the differences were mainly over the issues of whether or Archive’s holdings.

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