Public Policy Research Funding Scheme 公共政策研究資助計劃

Public Policy Research Funding Scheme

公共政策研究資助計劃

Project Number : 項目編號： 2016.A8.051.16D

Project Title : A Survey Experiment on Discontent Among the Youth: 項目名稱： Welfare or Politics? 青少年不滿源自福利或政治？一個實驗性問卷研究

Principal Investigator : Dr WONG Yee Hang, Mathew 首席研究員：黃以恆博士

Institution/Think Tank : The University of Hong Kong 院校／智庫：香港大學

Project Duration (Month): 推行期 (月) ： 12

Funding (HK$) : 總金額 (HK$)： 220,368.00

This research report is uploaded onto the website of the Policy Innovation and Co- ordination Office (PICO) for public reference. The views expressed in this report are those of the Research Team of this project and do not represent the views of PICO and/or the Assessment Panel. PICO and/or the Assessment Panel do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report.

Please observe the “Intellectual Property Rights & Use of Project Data” as stipulated in the Guidance Notes of the Public Policy Research Funding Scheme.

A suitable acknowledgement of the funding from PICO should be included in any publication/publicity arising from the work done on a research project funded in whole or in part by PICO.

The English version shall prevail whenever there is any discrepancy between the English and Chinese versions.

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PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH FUNDING SCHEME

“Welfare or Politics? A Comparative Analysis on Support for Redistribution and Political Discontent in Hong Kong” Final Report

Project Number: 2016.A8.051.16D

Project Title: “A Survey Experiment on Discontent Among the Youth: Welfare or Politics?” 青少年不滿源自福利或政治? 一個實驗性問卷研究

Principal Investigator: Dr Wong, Yee Hang Mathew 黃以恆博士

Institution/Think Tank: The University of Hong Kong 香港大學

Project Duration (Month): 12

Funding (HK$): 220,368

(i) Abstract

Young people in Hong Kong present a real challenge to the society, and the society does not seem to understand them very well. On the one hand, their discontent about the current economic environment are regarded as evidence of their lack of competitiveness, unwillingness to work hard, and heavy reliance on government support in multiple aspects such as housing. On the other, the recent social movements demonstrated the dissatisfaction of the youth towards social and political development in Hong Kong. Yet, this was again met with criticisms from the society about their idealism and reluctant to be realistic and make concessions. The two irreconcilable images of the youth exemplify our lack of understanding of their source of dissatisfaction. More critically, is it primarily about material wellbeing or is it politically-driven? It is evident that young people are not content about their current situation and the society in general, but will they be satisfied simply with a better provision of welfare, or only with a more fundamental change in the society? The difficulty in

1 answering question lies in the fact that the two areas are naturally intertwined, and even the young people themselves might not be able to tell the difference. By applying a survey experiment on young people in Hong Kong, this research seeks to understand their real source of discontent and what factors affect their view towards welfare provided by the government. Most significantly, this research aims to suggest potential ways for the government to improve youth policies and achieve good governance.

(i) 摘要

當下的年青人是香港社會的一項挑戰，但社會對年青人的認識十分有限。一方面，年青人對現

時的經濟環境不滿，被認為是他們缺乏競爭力、不願努力及在各方面(如住屋)過度依賴政府的寫照。另一方面，近年的社會運動清楚反映年青人對社會及政治發展的不滿。這卻又被社會各界批評為過度理想化及不願作出現實的妥協。這兩種矛盾的青年人的形象顯示我們對他們的不滿之源未有充份理解。最關鍵的問題是，他們究竟因為物質上的享受或是政治上的訴求不滿？年青人表達對社會的各種不滿，但這會否單單因為增加了福利而減少，還是必須對社會有更深層的改變？因為政治和經濟的緊密關係，這問題毫不容易解答，甚至連年青人自己亦未必能夠清楚分辨。這個研究就是希望透過一份實驗性問卷，探討香港年青人不滿的根源，以及研究什麼因素會改變他們對政府提供的福利的看法。本研究項目希望藉此幫助政府改善青年政策及達

致良好管治。

(ii) Background of research

Youth in Hong Kong are characterised by two conflicting stereotypes both of which convey them as showing stronger signs of political discontent compared to other population sectors. The first image of young people are they are passive players in society who are socially uncompetitive and who heavily rely on government welfare. It was observed that over the years, the city saw a rise in the number of university students and graduates applying for public housing (Ming Pao, 13 January 2015). With a growing divide between the rich and poor and a society faced with problems of worsening inequality, youth discontent with a lack of opportunities and social mobility may increase their demand for government assistance and welfare policies. This is perhaps the reason why young people in Hong Kong are generally characterized by a low level of subjective wellbeing According to a survey conducted by the Central Policy Unit in 2015, among the 15-19 age group, only 14.1% expect a better future personal development, and less than 20% are satisfied with the opportunities in Hong Kong.

2 In contrast, the second image of youth in Hong Kong is very different. This stereotype suggests that young people are quite politically active and take it upon themselves to fight for their ideals, be it democracy, freedom, or a better living environment. As shown by large-scale social movements in recent years, a vast majority of participators were young people which indicates the scale of discontent felt by this population. However, the source of their dissatisfaction is not clear. While such social movements were very much political in nature, it may also have had underlying economic motives. This brings to light the possibility of young people conveying economic dissatisfaction through policy and government opposition. These contrasting images of young people in Hong Kong are at the base of this research as although their demands are very different (materialistic versus idealistic), they demonstrate a common discontent towards the government and/or the society.

To better understand why young people are dissatisfied, and whether the source of their discontent comes from welfare or politics, this research proposes a conceptual framework consisting of three components, building on a study conducted on the general population of Hong Kong by Wu and Chou (2015). First, youth's welfare preference, in other words, the extent to which they support a higher level of welfare provision is identified through the use of a self-administered survey. Findings provide insight on whether young people in Hong Kong are really in need of government assistance as commonly believed, and also identifies the factors which can explain the level of welfare support. Second, the level of discontent towards different areas of governance, namely welfare, opportunities in society, quality of governance, and the system design itself is assessed. This provides a more comprehensive picture in understanding the areas in which young people are most concerned about, and whether it is primarily related to material wellbeing or politically oriented.

However, simply drawing a conclusion from these two sections ignores the implicit role played by political assessment. As respondents are likely to have their attitudes on welfare spilling-over into politics, and vice versa, this study introduces a vignette treatment to unpack the relationship between the two to see if the source of youth discontent has more to do with welfare or politics.

(iii) Summary on policy implications and recommendations

This study provides a deeper understanding on youth attitudes towards politics and welfare in Hong Kong. It aims to assess why young people are allegedly dissatisfied with their government/society and where the source of discontent stems from. The political attitudes of young people reflect their different needs and principles. On one hand, the youth can be viewed from a materialistic and passive perspective in which they rely on government assistance for their welfare due to a lack of social mobility. Another view points towards an idealistic perspective where young people actively

3 participate to demonstrate their ideals. This study seeks to find common factors at the roots of their discontent and whether young people ultimately care more about their personal wellbeing or politics.

Testing this target population on the relationship between welfare attitudes and youth discontent enables policymakers to gain insight into the reasons behind youth demand for government assistance and their dissatisfaction with social and political issues. This project finds that the youth‟s perception of welfare provision is heavily affected by economic ideology, such as whether they feel there is enough social mobility. However, their support towards a specific policy initiative is influenced by political factors. Even if they are expected to benefit from the policy, if they are dissatisfied with the government, they will discount the level of support towards a government-backed policy.

The findings demonstrate that the grievances of the youth is multidimensional, not merely materialistic. Therefore, a reliance on welfare provision cannot be expected to resolve the problem. Instead, it is suggested that the government should focus on improving social relations, (re-)building trust with the youth, and building a consensus across the society. In particular, it is recommended that the existing youth consultation and participation channels should be revamped/enhanced. Specific to Hong Kong‟s housing policy, the government also has to strengthen the employment prospects of the youth as they are inherently linked to the problem of housing faced by the youth.

(iii) 研究項目對政策影響和政策建議的摘要

本研究就香港青年對政治及福利的態度提供更深入的討論。它旨在評估為何年輕人被認為對政府及社會不滿，以及這些不滿源於何處。青年人的政治態度反映了他們不同的需要和原則。一方面，青少年可以從物質主義和被動的角度來看待，因為缺乏社會流動性，他們依靠政府援助和福利來維持生活。另一種觀點則指出，一些堅持理想主義的年輕人積極參與不同的社會活動以展示自己的理想。這項研究嘗試找出一些共同因素根源於他們的不滿，和年輕人最終是更關

心他們的個人福利還是政治。

透過測試這一目標人群對福利態度與青年不滿情緒之間的關係，決策者能夠深入了解青年對政府援助的需求，以及他們對社會和政治問題的不滿。這個研究發現青年對福利供給的看法嚴重地受到經濟意識形態的影響，例如他們是否覺得社會存在足夠的社會流動性。但是，他們對具體政策舉措的支持則受到政治因素的影響。即使他們有望從政策中受益，如果他們對政府不滿，

他們也會降低對於政府政策的支持水平。

4 調查結果顯示青年人的不滿情緒是多方面的，而不僅限於物質的。因此，我們不能指望依靠福利來解決問題。相反，我們建議政府要把重點放在改善社會關係，重新與青少年建立信任，和在社會建立廣泛的共識。特別是現有的青少年諮詢和參與渠道應該重新加強並深化。針對香港

的房屋政策，政府也必須拓寬青年的就業前景，基於這與年輕人所面對的房屋問題有內在聯繫。

(iv) Objectives as per original application

1. To understand the causes of discontent among young people in Hong Kong. 2. To investigate if young people are primarily concerned about welfare, economic development, or political considerations. 3. To examine the effect of values and political views on young people‟s level of personal and social satisfaction. 4. To use an experimental component to analyse the effects of politics on welfare needs and political demands. 5. To inform policy-makers in youth and welfare affairs and political leaders about the situation of the youth and to recommend potential ways to tackle them.

The final project results indicate that all objectives shown in the original proposal have been met and are addressed in the data and results section of this report, as well as the final section on policy recommendation.

(v) Research questions

1. What are the causes of discontent among young people in Hong Kong? Is the discontent driven primarily by socioeconomic background, personal values, or politics? 2. Given the widespread impression that young people are dissatisfied, how strong are the sentiment among university students? 3. How do personal values and political assessments affect young people‟s level of social and political satisfaction? 4. What are the potential implications for policy-makers in youth and welfare affairs and political leaders regarding the current problems encountered by the youth? 5. What are the possible ways for policy-makers in youth and welfare affairs and political leaders to handle the younger generation and alleviate the difficulties they face?

5 (vi) Research methodology

Research was carried out through structured surveys on students at eight universities in Hong Kong. The target respondents were chosen on the basis that they were the most politically involved sector of the population. A total of 1,245 surveys were fully completed and used for the purpose of this study. Survey collection was conducted at eight Hong Kong universities on the following dates: Hong Kong Polytechnic University (10 March 2017), Hong Kong Baptist University (15 March 2017), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (17 March 2017), Lingnan University (20 March 2017), City University (22 March 2017), Chinese University of Hong Kong (24 March 2017), Hong Kong Education University (27 March 2017), and University of Hong Kong (31 March 2017). 160 surveys were collected from each university on average (maximum 240 at Polytechnic University and Baptist University; minimum 60 at University of Hong Kong). A detailed breakdown of the respondents from each institution can be found in the figure and table below.

院校 Institution

香港理工大學 The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 香港浸會大學 Hong Kong Baptist University 香港科技大學 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 嶺南大學 Lingnan University

香港城市大學 City University of Hong Kong 香港中文大學 The Chinese University of Hong Kong 香港教育大學 The Education University of Hong Kong 香港大學 The University of Hong Kong

Survey Date Institution Time Collected 10/3/2017 PolyU 10:30-15:30 240 15/3/2017 Baptist 10:30-13:15 240 17/3/2017 UST 10:30-12:45 200 20/3/2017 Lingnan 10:30-14:00 150

6 22/3/2017 CityU 10:30-13:00 171 24/3/2017 CUHK 10:30-12:30 120 27/3/2017 EdU 10:30-12:30 120 31/3/2017 HKU 11:00 - 12:15 60 Total 1301 Usable Total 1245

At each session, a team of research assistants would approach passers-by near major public areas at each respective campus. After confirming their willingness to participate and student status, they were led to the survey area. They were then shown a consent form containing basic information of the survey including the name of the principal investigator (the author), the purpose of the project, data management, and the confidentiality of their response. In particular, the funding body of the project (Central Policy Unit) was not disclosed to avoid bias in their response. A cash incentive (HK$20) was given to participants after completion so as to increase motivation to participate.

Upon completing the main survey, respondents were finally asked to fill in a form acknowledging the receipt of cash incentives. The form also asked them to recall the vignette treatment they received (they were not allowed to go back to the survey at this point).

受訪者年齡 Respondents' Age 400

350

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250

200

150

100

0 10 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 33 34 37

Respondents were mostly aged 17 to 26, with a negligible number of respondents from above 27 (usually mature postgraduates).Given the focus of this study, respondents aged 27 or above were dropped from the analysis below; including them would not affect the results. Respondents were also

7 viewed as the most concerned with welfare policies considering the average age of those participating in the survey indicated they were about to enter the job force and begin planning their future.

受訪者性別 Respondents' Gender

男 Male

女 Female

Respondents consisted of 55.4% of females which very closely reflected the percentage ratio of female students at Hong Kong universities in general.

Major N % Arts/Humanities 148 11.78 Business 278 22.13 Business/Law 1 0.08 Business/Science 1 0.08 Business/Social Science 4 0.32 Education 104 8.28 Engineering 266 21.18 Engineering/Science 1 0.08 Law 16 1.27 Law/Social Science 4 0.32 Medicine 56 4.46 Science 145 11.54 Social Science 138 10.99

8 Other 94 7.48

The study majors of surveyed respondents are summarized in the table above.

Although this sampling method did not return a truly representative sample of all young people/tertiary students, this was the most cost-effective way to attain a viable sample of tertiary students. In addition, the introduction of the vignette design to investigate how political assessment affected the attitudes of youth ensured that the inferences were still valid, even if the sample was not fully representative of the entire population. The survey design and assignment of groups are represented by the following figure:

Preference for Redistribution

The research methodology was divided into two parts. First, an explanation of youth‟s preference for welfare, that is, the extent to which they supported welfare provision (e.g., government spending on education, health, increase in housing supply)and the extent they were reliant on welfare was determined. The second section assessed their overall level of discontent towards different areas of governance. Finally, an experimental design was used by means of a vignette experiment.

With regard to the first section, youth‟s individual preference for redistribution was the dependent variable in this study. Understanding youth preference for welfare was necessary in order to assess whether young people in Hong Kong were in need of government assistance as was commonly believed, and also to identify the factors which could explain the level of welfare support. As there are

9 variations in preferences for redistribution, three individual-level explanations that were appraised in this study and that also built upon existing literature included self-interest, ideology, and social affinity. This study also incorporated additional variables specifically concerned to Hong Kong including post-materialism, utilitarian familism, attitudes towards immigrants, and social trust. These will be individually explained in sections below with a brief description of how said variables were incorporated into the survey along with their responses. Overall the idea of this section can be represented by section I of the graph below.

In the remainder of this section, the responses of the questions pertaining to each group of factors will be discussed, starting with the general preferences towards redistribution. Hypotheses would also be formulated for subsequent testing.

10 在 1 至 10 的範圍內，請就下列問題明確選出您自己的觀點。（1表示您完全同意左面的陳述；10表示您完全同意右面陳述） On a scale of 1 to 10, please select the numerical point that best represent your preference. (1 = you agree with the leftmost statement; 10 = you agree with the rightmost statement) 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

現時香港的收入差距太小適中太大 The current income gap Moderate Too wide in Hong Kong is too

According to the survey, most respondents stated that they believed the current income gap in Hong Kong was moderately high, with most preferences rated in between “moderate” and “too wide.”

在 1 至 10 的範圍內，請就下列問題明確選出您自己的觀點。（1表示您完全同意左面的陳述；10表示您完全同意右面陳述） On a scale of 1 to 10, please select the numerical point that best represent your preference. (1 = you agree with the leftmost statement; 10 = you agree with the rightmost statement) 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

政府應減少貧富收入差距，例如政府不應注重提升向富裕家庭徵稅及向窮人支援減少貧富差距 The Government should narrow down the income gap The Government should not by, for example, collecting more tax from the wealthy pay effort into narrowing and providing more assistance to the poor down the income gap

Survey responses also showed that most respondents thought the government should narrow the income gap through methods such as tax collection from the wealthy and providing assistance to the poor.

Self-interest One explanation of preference for redistribution is economic self-interest. This adopts the idea that people logically want to exploit their utility. Self-interest assumes that individuals who can gain from welfare the most will support higher redistribution. Studies have shown that those who seek strong support for welfare are often from the lower-class. To measure the effects of self-interest on welfare, this study used two variables which were subjective social class and income. Target respondents were asked which class they belonged to out of 5 options.

人們有時把自己描述屬於工人階級，中產階級或上層或下層階級。你會形容自己屬於︰ Would you describe yourself as belonging to the working class, middle class, upper class or the lower class?

上層階級 Upper class

中產上層階級 Upper middle class 中產階級 Middle class

中產下層階級 Lower middle class 下層階級 Lower class

The majority of respondents identified themselves as belonging to the lower middle-class followed by the lower class, middle class, and the minority identifying themselves as belonging to the upper middle-class. A tiny minority of respondents self-identify as upper class.

12 在香港的收入等級中，1 代表最低收入的組別而 10 代表最高的收入組別，請選出您家庭財政狀況︰ On a scale of 1 to 10, please rate your family's financial situation. (1 = lowest income group; 10 = highest income group) 400

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250

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100

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

最低組別中間最高組別 Lowest income group Middle income group Highest income group

Similarly, respondents were also asked their total household income on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being the poorest and 10 being the richest. These two variables were used as both targeted to measure the effects of self-interest and correlated with each other (r = .57). Most respondents rated their family‟s financial situation in the low to middle income group with the majority as “middle income” group and least respondents at the “highest income” group.

H1a: Those who perceive themselves as coming from a lower class would have a stronger support for redistribution. H1b: Those who perceive themselves as having a lower income would have a stronger support for redistribution.

Ideology The ideology explanation assumes that beliefs about society and economic success explains support for welfare. In a study conducted by Wu and Chou (2015) in Hong Kong, it was found that people viewed poverty not as a problem at the individual level, but at a societal level and argued that social values could explain welfare support. Hong Kong people are suggested to have a "meritocratic ideology" which is the belief that there are enough opportunities for the poor to improve their conditions, and do not always consider societal biased distribution to be "unjust" (Wong et al. 2009). If such a value was adopted by an individual, then his/her support for government-provided welfare would decrease. Therefore, perceptions of economic justice were included as the first determinant of welfare preference. The more one believed the current economic system was fair and just, the lower

13 his/her level of welfare support. Respondents were asked to rate questions on whether competition was seen in a positive light, whether people got rich at the expense of others/through personal growth of wealth, and how satisfied they were about opportunities and social mobility in Hong Kong.

300

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

競爭是好事，激勵人們努競爭是有害的，力工作和建立新的想法會帶出人壞的方面 Competition is beneficial, it can Competition is harmful, motivate people to work hard and it will bring out the dark encourage innovation tendencies of men

According to the survey, most respondents leaned towards viewing competition as beneficial to motivate people to work hard. Least respondents viewed competition as harmful.

14 在 1 至 10 的範圍內，請就下列問題明確選出您自己的觀點。（1表示您完全同意左面的陳述；10表示您完全同意右面陳述） On a scale of 1 to 10, please select the numerical point that best represent your preference. (1 = you agree with the leftmost statement; 10 = you agree with the rightmost statement) 350

300

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

人們要損害其他人財富可以增長所以的利益才可致富每個人都有足夠的 One has to harm others for Wealth can be accumulated, wealth and other personal therefore, there is always enough for everyone

Most common responses leaned words the idea that wealth can be accumulated and is enough for everyone. Least common responses were that wealth resulted from harm and personal gains.

在 1 至 10 的範圍內，您對香港社會所提供的的機會與社會流動力滿意嗎？ On a scale of 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with the options and opportunities for social mobility provided in the Hong Kong society? 350

300

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

十分不滿意一般十分滿意 Extremely unsatisfied Average Extremely satisfied

15 The majority of respondents indicated “average” satisfaction about opportunities for social mobility in Hong Kong with more respondents learning towards “extremely unsatisfied” rather than “extremely satisfied.”

你認為在香港為什麼有窮人？以下為四個可能性，選擇以下你認為最重要的原因︰ Why do you think poverty exists in Hong Kong? Please select the factor you consider as the most important.

運氣不好 Bad luck

懶惰或缺乏意志力 Lazy or lack determination

社會不公 Unjust society

The most common response on why respondents thought poverty existed in Hong Kong was due to the “development of the modern society” followed by “unjust society,” “laziness” and lastly “bad luck.”

H2a: Those who do not believe that competition is beneficial for the society would have a stronger support for redistribution. H2b: Those who do not believe that wealth can be accumulated and sufficient for everyone would have a stronger support for redistribution. H2c: Those who are not satisfied with social mobility provided in the society would have a stronger support for redistribution. H2d: Those who believe that the major reason for poverty is social unjust would have a stronger support for redistribution.

Post-materialism Post-materialism refers to a set of values distinct from materialist ones, such as self-expression and public participation (Inglehart 1997) which may determine why one may support policies against one‟s benefit. This perspective looks at concern from young people about society vis-a-vis their focus

16 on economic considerations. As equality and universality are key post-materialistic values, the more post-materialistic an individual is, the more supportive this person would be towards welfare. Ma (2011) suggests that stronger post-materialist values has resulted in people being more critical of the government. In this study, post-materialism was incorporated into the survey by asking respondents to select what they viewed as the most important goal for society out of a choice of four options.

一個社會可以專注發展很多不同的領域。對於你自己，選擇以下你認為最重要的目標︰ A society can develop many different domains at the same time. Please select the goal that you consider the most important in this process of development.

維持國家秩序 Maintain national order

在重要的政府決策中給予人民更多發言權 Provide more opportunities for citizens to voice their opinions when making important government decisions 阻止價格上漲 Prevent inflation of prices

保護言論自由 Protect freedom of speech

The share of respondents‟ most important choice is shown in the graph above. While the options for more people‟s voices and freedom of speech are the most popular among the respondents, it should also be noted that the other two choices are also often selected. In the empirical section below, both first and second choices are taken into account as a measure of post-materialism. Those who chose “maintaining order in the nation” or “fighting inflation” were considered materialist (score = 0). Those who chose “giving people more say in important government decisions” or “protecting freedom of speech” were considered post-materialist (score = 2).

17 H3: Those who have a higher sense of post-materialism would have a stronger support for redistribution.

Utilitarian familism

Another factor to explain welfare support has to do with the cultural background of Hong Kong. “Utilitarian familism” (Lau 1984) highlights the social structure and political culture of Hong Kong with emphasis placed on material interest and family values rather than social ideals. Combining with their pragmatic (utilitarian) mind-set, these people would rarely seek help from the government as it is viewed as family responsibility to resolve issues such as social problems. Therefore, reliance on family or kinship should also affect how an individual sees the optimal level of welfare from the government. The more one believes family, instead of the government, should provide for its members, the lower his/her level of welfare support would be. Adding other background factors (e.g., age, gender, student status), it is suggested that these values determine the preference for welfare of young people. Respondents of the survey were asked to number their agreement of this on a scale of 1-10. They were also asked on a scale of 1-10 whether they agreed individuals should rely on the government for help or be responsible for themselves.

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家庭應照顧有需要的成員政府有責任照顧所有人 Families should be responsible for taking The Govenrmnet has the care of other family members in need responsibility to care for all its citizens

Most respondents indicated preference in between “family responsibility” and “government responsibility” when it came to who should be most responsible for caring about the needs of

18 individuals. This suggests that most respondents viewed both family and government as having somewhat equal responsibility to care for citizens.

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 政府應承擔更大責任滿足所有人的要求人們應自己承 The Government should bear 擔更多責任 greater responsibility in satisfying People should bear greater the requests of its citizens individual responsibility

Most respondents leaned towards the view that the government should bear more responsibility in satisfying the requests of its citizens rather than the responsibility being the people‟s.

H4a: Those who believe that the government (instead of the family) is responsible for taking care of the people would have a stronger support for redistribution. H4b: Those who believe that the government (instead of individuals) is responsible for taking care of the people would have a stronger support for redistribution.

Social Affinity Social affinity explains welfare preference through intergroup dynamics. It argues that individuals show preference and favouritism to their in-group and tend to view out-group members in a negative light. The relationship to welfare support is that, overall, support decreases when there is a group distinction and recipients are viewed as members of an out-group (Harell et al. 2016). However, when people on welfare are from the same ethnic background, more support is shown (Luttmer 2001). This coincides with Hong Kong‟s growing anti-immigrant response to the government‟s policy of promoting closer ties with mainland China. Therefore, if welfare is seen to benefit the out-group more, this would result in a decrease in support for welfare by the in-group. In the survey, social affinity was assessed by asking respondents to point out who benefitted most from social welfare in Hong Kong on a scale of 1-10.

19 在 1 至 10 的範圍內，請就下列問題明確選出您自己的觀點。（1表示您完全同意左面的陳述；10表示您完全同意右面陳述） On a scale of 1 to 10, please select the numerical point that best represent your preference. (1 = you agree with the leftmost statement; 10 = you agree with the rightmost statement) 250

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在香港，社會福利社會福利被大多被香港人享用新移民享用 In Hong Kong, most social welfare Most social welfare benefits are enjoyed by locals benefits are enjoyed by new immigrants

The most common response as to who enjoyed the most social welfare benefits was in between “locals” and “new immigrants” with a slightly higher number indicating new immigrants were the main beneficiaries.

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 一般來說，大部份與人打交道人都可以信任必須很小心 In general, most We have to stay vigilant people can be trusted when interacting with others

20 The most common response leaned towards the view that people must stay vigilant when interacting with others. This suggests there are low levels of trust perceived by the respondents.

H5a: Those who perceive that welfare benefits are enjoyed by locals would have a stronger support for redistribution. H5b: Those who have a higher level of social trust would have a stronger support for redistribution.

Assessing Youth’s Discontent

The second section of the research methodology assessed youth discontent towards different areas of governance namely welfare, opportunities, quality of governance, and the system design itself. This could help understand the areas that young people were most concerned about, and whether it was primarily related to material wellbeing or politically oriented.

Four questions were asked to assess the extent of the respondents' level of satisfaction: (1) Their level of satisfaction towards the level of welfare provided by the government (2) the opportunities and mobility offered by the current economy and society, (3) the quality of governance, and (4) the quality of the political system. These four indicators covered different areas over which young people were allegedly dissatisfied about. With these responses, the survey served as a "regular" instrument in assessing the relationship between welfare attitudes and youth discontent and could find whether or not their view towards society was correlated to their demands for welfare.

21 在 1 至 10 的範圍內，你對在香港整體提供的社會福利（如醫療、住屋）滿意嗎？ On a scale of 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with the overall provision of social welfare benefits in Hong Kong (e.g. healthcare, housing)? 300

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十分不滿意一般十分滿意 Extremely unsatisfied Average Extremely satisfied

According to the survey, most respondents were unsatisfied with the overall provision of social welfare benefits in Hong Kong. Remarkably, no respondents were fully satisfied with this aspect of governance.

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十分不滿意一般十分滿意 Extremely unsatisfied Average Extremely satisfied

22 The most common response was “average” satisfaction about opportunities for social mobility provided by the government.

在 1 至 10 的範圍內，您對現時香港政府管治質素滿意嗎？ On a scale of 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with the governance of the current Hong Kong government? 300

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十分不滿意一般十分滿意 Extremely unsatisfied Average Extremely satisfied

The majority of respondents indicated “average” to “extremely unsatisfied” responses about the governance of Hong Kong. This question is deliberately worded in a vague manner for the respondents to interpret what "governance" means for them. It prompts them to assess the area of governance that they are most concerned about.

23 在 1 至 10 的範圍內，您對現時香港政治制度的質素滿意嗎？ On a scale of 1 to 10, how satisfied are you with the current political system of Hong Kong? 300

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十分不滿意一般十分滿意 Extremely unsatisfied Average Extremely satisfied

Similarly, most respondents were “average” to “extremely unsatisfied” with the current political system. This is perhaps expected in the view of mass social movement and some social instability, especially among the youth, in recent years.

Experimental design

In order to understand the implicit role played by political assessment from these two sections, a between-subjects vignette treatment was used as respondents were likely to have their attitudes on welfare spilling-over into politics, and vice versa. This vignette design was used to see the change in the support for welfare by comparing the groups with or without the treatment (e.g., would their support of a policy decrease if they were told that the current government was planning to improve on welfare).

Aside from seeing if it could effectively disentangle youth demand for welfare from their dissatisfaction in politics, the vignette treatment was also incorporated to address issues that arose with the design of this study. For example, simply looking at youth dissatisfaction could have led to the likelihood of obtaining an inconclusive answer as young people may not have been happy about both the economic and political situation in Hong Kong.

24 Economic considerations could also have been easily carried over into the political arena and affecting people‟s political participation. The potential to isolate the two effects was a strength of this research design. While this referred to an unconscious spill-over from politics to welfare, the process may also have been consciously utilized. In a similar vein, the second problem was a potential bias in self-reporting. In survey research, it was well-established that respondents may have given socially desirable answers (Mutz 2011), leading to inaccurate results. For example, respondents who were dissatisfied with the government might have expressed their discontent in every area of evaluation; vice versa for those who were supportive of the government. Therefore, after the standard sections of the survey, the last component of the research design incorporated this vignette treatment to investigate how political assessment affected the attitudes of youth.

Near the end of the survey, each respondent was shown one of the following three statements: Control: “According to a study in 2011, 40.5% of young people expressed concern about housing issues.” Treatment 1: “According to a study in 2011, 40.5% of young people expressed concern about housing issues. One of the policy objectives of the government led by C.Y. Leung has been to increase the supply of public housing.” Treatment 2:“According to a study in 2011, 40.5% of young people expressed concern about housing issues. Pro-democratic politicians have frequently lobbied the government to increase the supply of public housing.”

The vignette treatment was followed by this question, “On a scale of 1 to 10, do you agree that the government should increase the supply of public housing?” (10 = strongly agree) to assess how much they had been affected by the treatment.

The assignment of respondents to control/treatment groups (i.e., which version of the vignette they received) was sequential: the first, fourth, and seventh respondents were assigned to the control group; the second, fifth, and eighth respondents received treatment 1; and the third, sixth, and ninth respondents received treatment 2, and so forth. If the number of responses within each group is sufficiently large, the sequential assignment of treatment is a valid way to randomize responses, and the average attributes across the three groups should be equalized (Babbie 2013). With more than 400 respondents in each group, randomization performed quite well, as the three groups were statistically indistinguishable in terms of sex, age, household income group, and subjective social class.

25 (vi) Results

Starting with simple correlational patterns, there are strong negative correlations of three variables against measures of welfare support. These were self-interest, social mobility, and individual responsibility. It was found there was a lack of consistent significance of competition, wealth growth, family responsibility, and post-materialism. Unexpectedly, it was also found that views shared by respondents on the belief that immigrants are beneficiaries of welfare indicated a positive correlation with welfare support. Social trust, gender, and age did not seem to be associated to the outcome in a consistent manner.

Gov. should Support for Inequality too reduce welfare high inequality expansion Subjective social class -0.18*** -0.15*** -0.15*** Perceived income group -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.10*** Competition is bad -0.04 -0.17*** -0.03 Wealth enough for everyone 0.04 0.09*** 0.01 Social mobility -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.30*** Family responsibility -0.05* -0.03 -0.03 Individual responsibility -0.22*** -0.42*** -0.19*** Post-materialism 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.03 Welfare benefitting immigrants 0.09*** 0.05 0.10*** Social distrust 0.03 -0.03 0.03 Female -0.07** 0.00 0.04 Age 0.05 -0.01 0.01

However, bivariate correlations do not always show the full picture, as there might be omitted confounders affecting the relationship. Turning to regression results, it can be said that the models have a good fit, explaining up to a quarter of the variations in the outcome variables (adjusted R2 0.12-0.24). To start with demographic factors, age was not associated with any measures of redistributive preference. Although studies have found age to be a predictor of welfare support, this study focuses on young people within a narrow age range, which can potentially explain the lack of strong impact. Female respondents are less likely to think that inequality is high, but display a stronger preference for welfare expansion.

26 Gov. should Support for Inequality too Dependent variable: Support for redistribution reduce welfare high inequality expansion Self-interest Subjective class -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.16* (0.058) (0.060) (0.089)

Ideology Competition is bad -0.036 -0.17*** -0.059 (0.027) (0.029) (0.042)

Wealth enough for everyone 0.049** 0.077*** 0.034

(0.023) (0.024) (0.036)

Social mobility -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.35***

(0.026) (0.027) (0.040)

Reason for poverty: Bad luck -0.49* 0.26 0.039

(reference: modern social development) (0.27) (0.28) (0.41)

Laziness -0.10 -0.44*** 0.12

(0.14) (0.15) (0.22)

Social injustice 0.27** 0.10 0.21

(0.11) (0.11) (0.16)

Family responsibility -0.017 -0.011 0.00032

(0.025) (0.026) (0.038)

Individual responsibility -0.13*** -0.37*** -0.19***

(0.025) (0.026) (0.038)

Post-materialism 0.078 0.076 -0.14

(0.078) (0.081) (0.12)

Welfare benefiting immigrants 0.020 -0.019 0.040 Social affinity (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) Social distrust 0.011 0.0077 0.026

(0.024) (0.025) (0.037)

Demography Female -0.19** 0.078 0.30** (0.095) (0.099) (0.15)

Age 0.027 -0.035 0.0084

(0.028) (0.029) (0.043)

N 1,245 1,245 1,245 Adjusted R2 0.131 0.238 0.117 ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.1. OLS regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not reported.

Regarding the self-interest argument, subjective social class has a significant negative effect across all models. Relative to those from the lower class (self-identified), those who come from the middle and upper classes (again self-identified) did not see inequality as a serious problem, and did not think that the government should try to reduce it. They were also less supportive of welfare expansion. In both

27 bivariate correlations and regression models, both variables are significant and in the negative direction. It is true that for my group of respondents, those who perceive themselves as better-off would be less likely to think that inequality is too high, or that the government should remedy the situation. H1a and H1b can be confirmed.

Ideologically, satisfaction with social mobility and perceptions of individual responsibility were significant. As expected, both carry a negative impact on welfare support. The other two variables for economic liberalism (the nature of competition and people getting rich) were significant in some, but not all, models. Also, their effects were the opposite of the hypothesized direction, casting doubt on the relevance of these ideas to welfare support. The dummy variables for the reason for the existence of the poor also demonstrated inconsistent effects. The only consistent and significant factor among ideological variables about economy is the perception towards social mobility in Hong Kong. This confirms H2c but does not support H2a, H2b, and H2d.

Family responsibility (vis-a-vis the government) and post-materialism were insignificant in all models (although post-materialism was significantly correlated with two of the outcome variables it became insignificant once other factors were controlled for in regressions). On the other hand, individual responsibility (again vis-a-vis the government) was significant and robust in the hypothesized direction across all available tests. H3 and H4a are not supported whereas H4b can be confirmed.

Finally, neither social affinity measure attained significance across all models. Although the perception that welfare benefits immigrants was significant in two correlations, it was not associated with redistribution preference once controls were included. These results do not provide support for H5a and H5b.

Another key research puzzle was the tension between welfare and politics. After receiving the vignette treatment, the three groups of respondents did not demonstrate a significant difference. The post-treatment measure of support for public housing was very similar, and the mean values for the three groups (control, treatment 1, and treatment 2) were 7.69 (SD,1.97), 7.60 (1.92), and 7.65 (2.03), respectively.

To further assess the dynamics, a measure of satisfaction with governance quality was used (10 = very satisfied). It is expected that the vignette design works best (i.e., reducing support for welfare policy associated with an unpopular government) for those who are most dissatisfied with the government. With the use of interaction regression models, the following figure plots the predicted values of support for housing policy by the version of treatment the respondent received. Those who received treatment 1 did not always report a lower support level, but political satisfaction was the conditioning

28 factor. According to the figures, the level of policy support was lower for those who were less satisfied with the government (<4) and who received treatment 1 about the government actions. In contrast, for respondents who were satisfied with the government, receiving the same treatment 1 heightened their support for the same policy. The pattern for the control and treatment groups was the opposite.

8.5

Treatment 1 (Government) 8

Control + Treatment 2

7.5

Predicted Support for Public Support for PredictedHousing 7

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Satisfaction with Quality of Governance

(vi) Discussion and Interpretation

This section discusses the patterns of results identified in this study, and interprets them in light of the research design. The self-interest argument suggests that people from the lower classes would more strongly support redistribution (thus housing policy), which is strongly supported by my results. People who think they are relatively well-off (in terms of social classes or income) tend to support redistribution less. Despite the fact that this result is strongly supported in the literature and fits with the impression of the practical nature of Hong Kong people, it is interesting that it also applies on my sample of university students. Above all, they are not solely dominated by their idealistic considerations but also have their material, practical desire of self-enrichment. As I will elaborate below, this importantly suggests that the government should not shy away from assisting young people in improving their economic well-being simply because a vocal group of young people exists.

29 Ideology about the society is also argued to have a role in one‟s welfare support. Among the potential factors of preference for competition, the zero-sum nature of the economy, perceptions of social mobility, and reasons for poverty, only perceptions of social mobility is found to have a strong explanatory power. This result carries particular significance among the youth as it most clearly underlies the idea of economic liberalism in Hong Kong for them. The opportunity for upward movement in the social ladder is crucial for them: if there are ample chances, they would prefer less government assistance, and vice versa if chances are lacking. More than anything else, their own prospect upon graduation might have a key impact behind this finding. The management of these expectations would determine the views of the youth towards the government.

As discussed, the "utilitarian familism" argument posits that the Chinese values of family might overshadow the role of government in caring for the needy in the society. My results are not favorable for this theory for two possible reasons. First, the initial introduction of this explanation was in the 1980s and 90s under a very different social and political background. The validity of this value might have faded with the passage of time, to say nothing about the generational change. Second, as my sample contains young people with most respondents not yet in their early-20s, it would be unrealistic for them to develop a strong sense of family and kinship. Unfortunately this study contains nothing that can allow me to explore which of these (or both) is the real reason behind. On the other hand the view of individual versus government responsibility is a strong predictor of redistribution preference, which fits with the more individualistic outlook of young people as compared to the entire population. As a consequence, the weakness of the value of post-materialism in explaining welfare support might be surprising. However, it is noted that my group of respondents display a strongly materialist tendency in the tests of self-interest above, which corroborates with the lack of a result here. It is further emphasized that the link between post-materialism and welfare support is less direct than the set of expressionist and individual values.

The social affinity argument suggests that the more one perceive the welfare benefits the out-group, the lower is him/her in support for welfare as the in-group. However, it is found that the perception of immigrants‟ share of benefits was not associated with redistribution preference. This result is somewhat surprising given the current social atmosphere in Hong Kong. Several reasons can be provided. First, the in-group/out-group divide might be secondary to other more dominant factors. Supplementary analysis (not reported) shows that this is indeed the case. For example, dropping individual responsibility and social mobility (both significant) would render perception of immigrant benefits significant (at p<0.05). This provides preliminary evidence that the social affinity thesis is not false, just less prominent as compared to other explanations. Second, despite the general social atmosphere in Hong Kong, university students might have the insight to recognize that welfare is not a zero-sum game between locals and new immigrants, especially when the government is constantly

30 running on a surplus. Third, the spill-over effects of politics might not directly translate into perceptions about others‟ material well-being. That is, young people might not associate qualifying for welfare with their political persuasions. However, except the limited evidence provided for the first explanation, these possibilities cannot be confirmed/rejected in the current research. Uncovering the real reasons requires more in-depth qualitative work, such as interviews or focus groups, which would be interesting for future studies.

Finally, turning to the puzzle of the interaction between political evaluations and policy evaluations, the graph of housing policy support and satisfaction with governance demonstrates a key divergence between two groups of people: those who were given the information cue that the policy was associated with the government and those who were reminded otherwise (the control group and treatment 2). Those who received treatment 1 has a positive association between governance satisfaction and policy support; and vice versa for the other group. In other words, if the respondent is supportive of the government, he/she would be more supportive of the policy if the policy was framed as a government initiative. The opposite would hold for those who were not supportive of the government or received alternative information cues. Taken together, this divergent pattern shows that politics matter: who promotes the policy, and whether an individual has favourable views towards the promoter, can dictate the level of support he/she has towards an identical policy.

(vii) Public dissemination

Project findings were discussed in a talk titled "Inequality and Governance of the HKSAR" at an academic conference held at C966, Jockey Club Tower, the University of Hong Kong, on 11 November 2017. The conference was attended by local/international scholars, faculty members, students, and members of the general public. Upon publication of the project results in an academic journal (manuscript currently under review), it is planned that the project findings will also be reported in op-ed articles in local newspapers.

(vii) Policy implications and recommendation

Employment and Housing Problems in Hong Kong Although the general unemployment rate of local teenagers is not high, most of them are suffering from the predicament of slow increase of salaries and stagnant promotion of upward social mobility. Despite receiving higher education under the popularization of education, the phenomenon of diploma inflation illustrates that many teenagers are unable to receive much higher salaries in the labour market. Perceptions of social mobility underlie the idea that economic liberalism explains welfare support in Hong Kong, whereas the Government is always asked to offer more opportunities for

31 teenagers to further cultivate their skills and unleash their potentials. The dual pressure of employment and housing has distorted youth development, including university graduates who should have the ability to compete in the economy. For example, public housing nowadays attracts a lot of highly educated applicants. In 2015, 34% of the non-elderly one-person applicants had post-secondary education or above (SCMP 16 November 2015). To obtain an edge in the application, some university graduates even devised some "strategies" such as working for several part-time jobs but not a permanent contract; obtaining salary in cash; and keeping the balance in bank accounts low. These distorted behaviours highlight the plight of the housing problem in Hong Kong.

In the past decade, Hong Kong‟s development of new land has been stagnant. Hence, the living conditions of local residents have become increasingly overcrowded and the rent of residential properties has been on the rise. Some teenagers also deliberately give up the chances of further promotion and development in exchange for the qualification of applying for public housing estates, which is sometimes criticized as irresponsible behaviour through getting down the ladder of social mobility voluntarily. The former Chief Executive C.Y. Leung has repeatedly emphasized publicly that he will actively increase the supply of land in response to public housing demands, especially as housing policy is always his top policy agenda. Some concrete directions include proposing reclamation sites, changing original land uses, developing land plots surrounding country parts, and even looking for vacant spaces in original housing lands to build single residential blocks.

Achieving a Consensus in Hong Kong Society Different teenagers always attempt to safeguard their own vested interests, fight for their rights, and lobby support for their own standpoints. Diverse or even opposing opinions are existing among and within stakeholder groups in a pluralistic society like Hong Kong. It becomes very difficult to find a common ground to engage in rational and constructive dialogues. This research demonstrates clearly that a "good" policy (housing) would be faced with very different receptions, depending on one‟s political persuasions and assessments of the government. This dynamic arguably underlined much of the difficulties faced by the government in the HKSAR era. The Government has to not only devise good and sound policies, but also handle political issues with care, as they would in turn feed back into popular perceptions towards the Government's performances and actions.

In current society, it appears that the most profound challenge facing the Government is the youth. On most issues, the Government and teenagers take extreme positions with competing care and concerns, which creates a huge barrier for overcoming conflicts and achieving a consensus. Instead, if not properly handled, very often social disputes or conflicts would escalate into bigger issues that will weaken the Government‟s legitimacy and credibility, as seen in multiple episodes of government policymaking in the past decade. As there is a lack of trust between the youth and the Government, it

32 would take a very long time for the Government to reconcile the differences and bring about a broad consensus. This may thus result in policy delay and damage to the Government image, which can be concisely summarized as „deliberating without deciding, and deciding without implementing‟ given the intense political atmosphere and even gridlock.

While this appears to be an insurmountable challenge, the findings from this project provides a way of approaching the problem. Instead of treating welfare, youth, and politics as distinct issues/problems as in a bureaucracy, the Government would do well to comprehend the interrelated nature of these components. Even if young people will be attracted by materialistic welfare or benefits, they will not automatically come to endorse any Government initiatives on welfare expansion. It would be less effective, or even counterproductive, for the Government to promote welfare policies on the one hand, and disregard the wider political atmosphere (as perceived by the young people) on the other. However, there is also an optimistic side to the picture. If the Government succeeds in rebuilding trust with the youth, they will indeed demonstrate stronger support towards policy initiatives, as shown in this project.

Youth Support for Welfare Besides the political dynamics behind welfare, this project also highlights the factors affecting youth preference for welfare. While support for more welfare and redistribution is a much-analysed academic concept, the Government may gain some insight in the ways of creating more well- supported policies from the young people‟s point of view. Two groups of factors, namely self-interest and ideology, are found to be the most important predictors of such perceptions. Relative to those who regarded themselves as lower class, those who perceived themselves as coming from the middle and upper classes did not see inequality as a serious problem, and did not think that the government should try to reduce it through welfare expansion. On the other hand, the perceptions that (a) growth in wealth would be enough for everyone; (b) there is a high level of social mobility; and (c) individuals should take greater responsibility for themselves would lead to lower support for welfare. As a result, if the Government is successful in bringing about an equitable growth model which would benefit every sector equally, or improving social mobility, it is expected that the youth will see welfare less of a necessity, or even decrease their reliance on public welfare in general.

Perhaps surprisingly, social affinity, measured as the perception of immigrants‟ share of welfare and the level of social distrust, does not have an effect. Notably, the perception of the extent to which welfare benefits immigrants was not associated with a preference for redistribution. This is quite a shocking observation given the current highly polarized social atmosphere in Hong Kong with heavy emphasis of in-group (such as "local") and out-group boundaries. Although the media often

33 emphasizes the stigma attached to new immigrant welfare recipients, it is not (yet) a big concern for young people, at least in terms of social policies.

Although a detailed investigation can be investigated in the future regarding such interesting observation of the immigrant‟s welfare entitlements, this also highlights something crucial regarding the nature of youth politics. It is commonly acknowledged that ethnic in-groups tend to adopt an unfavourable attitude and stance towards outside groups in societies. In Hong Kong, there are no lack of media reports on the negative sentiments towards the new immigrants when the latter are always perceived as someone who are scrambling for the limited local resources that should be solely enjoyed by locals. Other related social problems include the raising real estate prices, overcrowded malls and theme parks, occupying beds at maternity wards, emptying shelves of infant milk formula and daily products, snapping up taxpayers‟ money, an even impolite and uncivilised behaviours in public areas. There are also worries that their arrivals would reduce the locals' job opportunities and salary levels. Since then, there are many policies implemented to tackled the problems like combating parallel trading, restricting the bringing in of baby formula among cross-border travellers, zero quota policy in hospitals, and the replacement of the multiple-entry permits of Shenzhen residents with one trip per week arrangement. However, these stopgap measures do not bear a consistent policy ideology but merely formulated to provide a short-term fix. The fact that young people do not strongly associate the in-group/out-group divide with welfare might provide a new perspective towards the issue.

A study by Lee, Ng, and Chou (2016) suggests that it is possible that the exclusionary attitude towards welfare allocations can be applied to both immigrants and non-immigrants. Therefore, even if the level of exclusionary attitudes is high in Hong Kong, they should not be seen as evidence of intergroup discrimination. As they may frown upon these applicants merely because of their „„lazy‟‟ personal characters, rather than pinpointing at their ethnic categories, which leads to subsequent exclusionary attitudes. One should note that such problem can also be applied to the locals. To some of the university students, even though they are still discontented with the issue of new immigrants, they acknowledge that such case is only a very small part of the larger social environment in Hong Kong. Therefore, by realising that the root of these policy problems is stemmed from the ineffective local governance, they are pinpointing at the „„event‟‟ rather than the „„people‟‟ per se, implying that the central target for their grievances should always be the government when it comes to expressing their demands and interests. It should take active measures in revamping the in-group/out-group divide, rather than using temporary measures in all policy areas.

Reflection on the Discursive Strategy of the Government

34 One of the central findings in this research is that the grievances of the youth is multidimensional, but not purely political or materialistic. This challenges the dominant narrative in the society that narrowly portrays property ownership and career mobility as the root causes of youth frustration. Despite its economic development. Hong Kong nonetheless also has one of the worst wealth gaps and the highest living cost across developed regions, which often affect one‟s family planning and even choice of future careers. Meanwhile, there is a deep-rooted and widespread conception that teenagers nowadays are troublesome as their material demands are often remain unaddressed, which are then translated into radical and violent actions. Therefore, it might seem straightforward for the government to implement corresponding policies to appease the frustrated younger generations. Some common strategies advocated by the government include developing emerging industries, offering alternative pathways, and creating more housing opportunities. However, based on my research, it would be an oversimplification to narrowly equate such inadequate materialistic possessions with the entirety of unhappiness or dissatisfaction of teenagers. Such strategies might also not be long-lasting solutions as other social and political demands remain unfulfilled.

In this sense, such top-down official view to a certain extent may alienate rather than placate the younger members of society. This is especially the case when both parties stick to their own ideals that they are comfortable with or get used to throughout the years. First, one can observe from the diverse demands as exhibited in the recent social movements. They are rarely related to teenagers‟ personal interests or even social mobility. These increasingly vocal teenagers are instead fighting for ideologies ranging from democracy to justice, cultural conservation, and sustainable development. Therefore, materialistic demand only one of the many pursuits of teenagers. Although the city is always deemed as utilitarian and pragmatic, it is impossible for one to simply conclude that all grievances from teenagers are simply stemmed from such mindset, although these policies might be effective in immediately satisfying teenagers‟ demands or solving their problems. On the contrary, when teenagers are disillusioned with the practice of the government, they would simply view all of its moves with suspicion (as per my finding). In this sense, regardless of the exact nature of these policies, the Government often finds it difficult to obtain the trust and confidence from the general public, especially among the young, when it comes to policy formulation and implementation. Teenagers often find that they have very limited political means to really air their views and make some concrete changes. The lack of ongoing support from teenagers hence hinders the achievement of effective policy-making.

Therefore, the discursive strategy employed by the official parties are considered as insufficient. In particular, the adherence to the materialistic rhetoric by the government also reflects its lack initiation for some breakthroughs and unite the youth. It also points to a more crucial issue that the policy planning of the government, at least from the young people‟s perspective, does not prioritize overall social interest as it often safeguards the status quo and avoids controversial political communications.

35 In this sense, any form of constructive dialogue that can facilitate better understanding, communication, trust, and cooperation between both parties, and can hammer out practical and realistic solutions are avoided. The authorities tend to play down the need to initiate any discussion on the exact demands of the youth. The government‟s initiatives, such as the Youth Commission, would inevitably be seen by the youth as symbolic gestures. This subsequently leads to vicious cycle of radicalism, refusal to communicate, instead of building a rational atmosphere for exchange of ideas.

Enhancing Existing Youth Consultation Channels Following the recommendation above, rebuilding trust and dialogue between the Government and the youth is the key to achieving good governance. Government officials are encouraged to transform their mind-set from being policy formulator to a mediator of different interests, coordinating or even balancing the stakes of all actors above all else. Given that social policies always carry some influence towards teenagers, who are the future pillars of society (and stand to benefit from/bear the costs of the policies), extensive consultation should be implemented such that the policies can be more comprehensive in catering to the diverse needs and expectations of teenagers. Undeniably, whether or not a policy incentive has majority support among the key stakeholders becomes the deciding consideration in the formulation of Government policy. The challenged presented by an „„interest coordination” approach to policy-making is whether the policies so derived can tackle the problems, or whether they will simply limit solutions thereby holding back progress.

Existing consultation channels, such as the Youth Commission, are promising but suffer some shortcomings. Given that only three seats on the body are reserved for young people, it creates the impression that the Government is dealing with the individuals who are inducing the problem rather than solving the problem per se. Therefore, the Government should include more young people representatives from diverse backgrounds into the committee. This does not necessarily mean that more young members have to be recruited, but a composition of members sympathetic to understanding the thoughts and mentalities of youngsters is crucial. The recent lot Member Self- recommendation Scheme for Youth was an initiative in the positive direction, yet the process was still driven by the established interests (including officials and existing members of the Commission). The challenge of diversifying opinions and views in the policymaking process remains a real task for the government.

Establishment of the Youth Parliament in Hong Kong In addition to enhancing the consultative channels, further new avenues of youth participation are recommended. Some argue that the recent social movements erupted because the Government failed to respond to public demands effectively and efficiently, especially those of young people. The Government may consider establishing a youth parliament as an institutionalized platform by drawing

36 on foreign experience, so that young people are offered with a channel with which to make their voices heard and even have real rather than tokenistic influence on policy-making. As evidenced from their keen participation in social affairs in the past decade, most of the young people‟s post- materialistic concerns are not so much about their self-interest but far more on universal values like democracy, justice equality, and sustainable development. This is essential for teenagers to regain trust and confidence towards the Government with low public empowerment under the disarticulated and dysfunctional political institutional system of Hong Kong. If the Government can really understand the demands and expectations of young people, this could definitely reduce their dissatisfaction with society in the long run. A good participation should always be active and enthusiastic, implying that young people should always be spontaneous in expressing their views on different issues and engaging in public affairs.

There is an important risk that policies and debates will be driven by misrepresentations, if conducted solely within some age groups and in exclusion of others. When issues emerge that have a core relevance for young people, they are often tackled from a paternalistic and condescending perspective. It offers the modest impact of increasing the chance of „more vigorous advocacy‟ on behalf of the young through speaking out against misrepresentations of the young as lazy and self- serving, implying that these younger members can function as watchdogs for age-based discriminations when Hong Kong is also practising gerontocracy.

The youth parliament will open a wide range of possibilities through diverse representation, which would facilitate a better understanding and resolution of problems, as well as spur more innovation and originality. The youth parliament allows young people‟s concerns and experiences to be considered and integrated into the genuine processes of design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies, and strategies, especially as they are the crucial stakeholders of the present and the future. Younger generations will have to experience a comparatively higher share of the long-term negative consequences of political short-termism than older generations. This is particularly crucial when young people are often disadvantaged socioeconomically yet politically marginalized. Intergenerational practices and collaborations can play a very positive role in the transmission of knowledge and the development of various problem-solving mechanisms. If collaboration between young and old promotes innovation and efficiency, then the absence of young people in parliaments risks undermining the quality of parliamentary discussions.

This is also a way to acknowledge and emphasise young people as political equals and actors publicly. The absence or underrepresentation of young people in parliament may signal the opposite and create a social meaning of inability to rule. It may contribute to an apolitical self-image of young adults, generate a sense that the young are of lower social, or at least political, status, and reinforce the

37 sense that older people are more fit to rule. Therefore, involving young people in parliament can allow them to be reengaged in politics, that may also affect their involvement in other institutionalised channels of engagement like voting turnout. In the long run, the youth will be empowered to be more socially responsible and civic-minded by the establishment of a youth parliament.

(viii) Limitations of the current study

In spite of the findings listed above, this project was limited in several aspects. First, the sample selection of this study was focused on tertiary students in Hong Kong. One might challenge that it was not a representative group of young people, let alone the views of the general public. Such a criticism is acknowledged. To reiterate, I did not view my sample of respondents as representative of any wider population. Instead, university students were targeted because of their perceived "radicalism" in recent social activities, as well as their imminent entry into the society and the struggle between ideals and practical circumstances faced by them. While there is not a strong reason to presume that the general youth population would be significantly different from university students, this cannot be ascertained without a representative sample of young people in Hong Kong. In other words, although my results have internal validity, it is not generalizable to any wider population. My findings and conclusions are primarily limited by the sample I draw, which can be improved in future studies.

Second, the research design of the experimental component focuses on a particular aspect of governance, namely housing policy. Although the choice was deliberate and somewhat necessary (housing policy should be an area which concerns the youth with great social and personal implications; also a concrete policy area should be suggested to induce realistic responses), it does not cover other policy areas which might display different patterns. Housing policies might also have their own idiosyncrasies driving the results. Whereas other policies might not create such a divergence between supporters and oppositions to the government, it might be challenged that my results were exaggerated.

Finally, given relatively limited time and scope (and resources) of this study, I focused almost exclusively on quantitative methodologies utilizing surveys and data analysis. This is admittedly suboptimal as I can say very little about causal relationships with correlational data. Without interviews or comparable qualitative research, any causal explanations suggested were at best speculative. This is, however, expected given the design and explorative nature of the current project.

(viii) Areas for further study

38 While the respondents in this study were randomly assigned a treatment, resulting in reliable sets of results with internal validity, the overall sampling technique was not random given the consideration of resources, even though a large sample of over 1,200 surveys were gathered (a telephone randomized survey would be very costly with the same number of responses). This is also in view of the project objective that we are interested in the views of the youth, especially university students. It would be fruitful to replicate the study on the wider population and see if the same welfare-politics trade-off exists.

Based on the surveys collected from a large group of respondents, many broad results have been established with the data analysis process. However, the nature of such a research necessarily precludes the formation of more concrete causal relationships. For example, without further research, I was not able to confirm if young people‟s welfare preference was unaffected by the in-group/out- group divide or if they did not perceive the problem this way (as explained in the Discussion section above). A further research relying on qualitative methodologies, such as interviews or focus groups, can go a long way in clarifying a lot of the interesting patterns uncovered in this project.

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