Attacks on Quantum Key Distribution Protocols That Employ Non
Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non‐ITS authentication Christoph Pacher, Aysajan Abidin, Thomas Lorünser, Momtchil Peev, Rupert Ursin, Anton Zeilinger and Jan-Åke Larsson The self-archived postprint version of this journal article is available at Linköping University Institutional Repository (DiVA): http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-91260 N.B.: When citing this work, cite the original publication. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com: Pacher, C., Abidin, A., Lorünser, T., Peev, M., Ursin, R., Zeilinger, A., Larsson, J., (2016), Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication, Quantum Information Processing, 15(1), 327-362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-015-1160-4 Original publication available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-015-1160-4 Copyright: Springer Verlag (Germany) http://www.springerlink.com/?MUD=MP Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication C Pacher1 · A Abidin2 · T Lor¨unser1 · M Peev1 · R Ursin3 · A Zeilinger3;4 · J-A˚ Larsson2 the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later Abstract We demonstrate how adversaries with large computing resources can break Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a par- ticular message authentication code suggested previously. This authentication code, featuring low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) since for each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to send a different message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding collisions of a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication code was introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The- Middle (MITM) attacks against QKD protocols.
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