Japanese Scientists' Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Its

Japanese Scientists’ Critique of Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Its Influence on Pugwash, 1954–1964

✣ Akira Kurosaki

Japan and Pugwash from a Transnational Perspective

In July 1957, 22 scientists from both sides of the Iron Curtain gathered in the quiet village of Pugwash in Nova Scotia to discuss nuclear dangers and ways to establish world peace. This meeting led to the founding of a loose- knit transnational coalition of scientists known later as the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash, for short). During the Cold War, Pugwash provided scientists with a forum to discuss issues related to world peace and security. It also served as an informal communication channel between East and West.1 In 1995, Pugwash, together with its former president and one of its founding members, Joseph Rotblat, won the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to diminish the part played by nuclear arms in international politics and in the longer run to eliminate such arms.”2 As Pugwash’s activities expanded and its participants increased, national groups sprang up in several countries, including Japan. In the late 1950s, the Japanese afﬁliate was created under the leadership of three prominent theo- retical physicists: Hideki Yukawa (1907–1981), who received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1949; Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga (1906–1979), who received the No- bel Prize in 1965; and Shoichi¯ Sakata (1911–1970). The Japanese branch sent scientists to international Pugwash meetings and kept scientists and citizens in Japan informed about Pugwash activities. In 1962, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata also established the Kyoto Conference of Scientists (KCS) in line with

1. On the history of Pugwash, see Joseph Rotblat, Pugwash: A History of the Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1967); and Joseph Rotblat, Scientists in the Quest for Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972). 2. “The Nobel Peace Prize 1995,” 13 October 1995, Nobelprize.org, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel _prizes/peace/laureates/1995/press.html.

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Pugwash. Its seminars and conferences held in Japan became a major domestic activity for the Japanese Pugwash group.3 What made the Pugwash affiliate in Japan distinctive was its firm opposition to the strategic concept of nuclear deterrence. In the 1950s the United States and the Soviet Union were expanding and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Having competed to develop hydrogen bombs in the early 1950s that would be far more destructive than fission bombs, the superpowers undertook the development of new strategic delivery vehicles such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Although the United States maintained its strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, the two countries threatened each other with their ever more capable nuclear forces. Given their deep-seated mutual distrust, negotiated nuclear disarmament became nearly impossible, and a “balance of terror” became an axiom of peace.4 By contrast, the Japanese Pugwash group called for the abolition of nuclear weapons and criticized the nuclear deterrence theory that provided powerful justification for living with nuclear weapons. The complete rejection of nuclear deterrence theory by Pugwash scientists in Japan is notable for two reasons. First, these scientists pioneered a comprehensive critique of nuclear deterrence in Japan in the early 1960s. Their the- oretical contributions marked a new phase in anti-nuclear activism in Japan. After the incident in 1954 when a Japanese fishing vessel known as the Lucky Dragon (FukuryuMaru¯ ) was accidentally showered with radioactive fallout from a U.S. thermonuclear explosion, anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan grew rapidly, encompassing all types of people and groups and coalescing into a nationwide public campaign by the late 1950s. Against this backdrop, the Japanese government began opposing the nuclear arms race and declared a

3. For an overview of the history and activities of the Japanese group, see Hideki Yukawa, Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, and Shoichi¯ Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai o soz¯ o¯ suru tameni: Kagakusha wa uttaeru (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1963); Hideki Yukawa, Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, and Shoichi¯ Sakata, Kakujidai o koeru: Heiwa no soz¯ oomezashite¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1968); and Hideki Yukawa, Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, and Toshiyuki Toyoda, eds., Kakugunshuku eno atarashii kos¯ o¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977). This article is partly based on the author’s published works on the Japanese group, with a focus on its opposition to the concept of nuclear deterrence in the 1950s and 1960s: Akira Kurosaki, “Nihon ni okeru kakuyokushi-ron no tanjo:¯ Paguwottshu kaigi to Nihon no kagakusha,” Dojidaishi¯ Kenkyu¯,No. 2 (2009), pp. 3–20; and Akira Kurosaki, “‘Kaku no kasa’ heno izon ni aragatta Nihon no kagakusha, 1963–1968,” Hogaku¯ , Vol. 76, No. 6 (January 2013), pp. 51–76. Brief descriptions of the Japanese group’s activities are presented in English in Shigeru Nakayama, “The Scientists-Led Peace Move- ment,” in Shigeru Nakayama, Kunio Goto,¯ and Hitoshi Yoshioka, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan,Vol.2,Road to Self-Reliance 1952–1959 (Melbourne: Trans Paciﬁc Press, 2005), pp. 339–341; and Morris Low, Science and the Building of a New Japan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 137–140. 4. Ronald E. Powaski, March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), chs. 5–7.

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non-nuclear weapons policy, which crystallized in 1968 as the Three Non- Nuclear Principles (Hikaku san gensoku) of not possessing, manufacturing, or allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.5 Although popular demand for banning fission and hydrogen bombs was antithetical to the idea of relying on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, even those who wanted to prohibit the bomb had failed to come to grips with the concept of deterrence until Pugwash scientists in Japan formulated a systematic critique of this strategic notion. The other reason the Pugwash affiliate in Japan stood out was its transnational activism; namely, its steadfast opposition to arms control proposals discussed at Pugwash that sought to stabilize nuclear deterrence. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, general and comprehensive disarmament was a major discussion topic at Pugwash meetings. The role of nuclear deterrence in the disarmament process became a contentious issue mainly between U.S. and Soviet scientists. By the mid-1960s, however, influential U.S. and Soviet Pugwash participants accepted the notion that stable mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union had to be maintained to prevent a nuclear war, as well as facilitate arms control and disarmament. Nevertheless, the Japanese Pugwash group continued to criticize the idea of mutual deterrence at Pugwash, as well as in Japan, throughout the Cold War. This article highlights the unique role of Japanese scientists both in Japan and at Pugwash by analyzing the origins and development of their critique of nuclear deterrence and proposing two arguments. First, the distinctive out- look of Japanese Pugwash members emerged out of close contact with their colleagues abroad as well as public opinion in Japan against nuclear weapons and war in general. This confluence of the transnational and the domestic cat- alyzed the conception of a radical alternative to nuclear deterrence theory. Sec- ond, the critique put forth by the Japanese Pugwash group strongly suggests that the consensus at Pugwash was not necessarily accepted by all national affiliates; rather, the nuclear deterrence theory embraced by Pugwash leaders prompted the Japanese members to devise counterarguments. Although pre- vious studies have overlooked the small voice of dissent raised by Pugwash scientists in Japan during the Cold War, this article examines their critique in detail to show that the Pugwash movement was not only a unified front of scientists across borders but also an open forum that facilitated the formation

5. Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichi-Bei kankei: Amerika no kakufukakusan seisaku to Nihon no sen- taku, 1960–1976 (Tokyo: Yushisha,¯ 2006); and Ayako Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 15 (2008), pp. 25–50.

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and exchange of ideas for peace.6 Close analysis of the Pugwash activism in Japan helps us better understand that the transnational scientific movement as a locus of intellectual cross-fertilization in face of the nuclear peril. The article first examines the responses of Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, as well as the Japanese scientific community as a whole, to the danger of nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It also traces the development of Japan’s nuclear weapons policy in order to discuss the political, social, and diplomatic contexts of post–World War II Japan in which the Japanese Pugwash group was formed in the late 1950s. The focus of discussion then moves to the question of nuclear deterrence that became contentious at Pugwash during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Of particular importance was Tomonaga’s critical analysis of nuclear deterrence published in 1961, which became a common starting point for the Japanese Pugwash group. In examin- ing the first KCS statement in 1962 and others made by the Japanese Pugwash group, the article explains how the Japanese members challenged the intellectual hegemony of nuclear deterrence theory at Pugwash in the 1960s and 1970s. The article concludes by reviewing the roles of the Japanese affiliate of Pugwash in Japanese society and at the Pugwash conferences during the Cold War.

Japanese Scientists Confront Nuclear Dangers

The original leaders of the Japanese Pugwash group, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, knew each other well before the advent of the nuclear age. Yukawa and Tomonaga were contemporaries in the same junior high and high schools in Kyoto and at Kyoto Imperial University (KIU). After graduating from the university in 1929, they both continued their studies there. In 1932, Tomon- aga moved to Tokyo to work at Riken (Rikagaku Kenkyujo,¯ the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research) under its chief scientist, Yoshio Nishina

6. Some scholars of international relations and history have studied Pugwash scientists’ activities in support of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transna- tional Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Emanuel Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic communities and their International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 101–145; Bernd W. Kubbig, Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the U.S.-Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty, PRIF Reports No. 44 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frank- furt, 1996); Akira Kurosaki, “Kakuheiki tono kyozon¯ o mosaku suru kagakusha: Pagwottshu Kaigi ni okeru saishogen-yokushi-ron¯ no juyo¯ to Beikoku no kagakusha no yakuwari, 1955–1963-nen,” America Kenkyu (The American Review), No. 42 (2008), pp. 77–97; and Paul Rubinson, “‘Cruciﬁed on a Cross of Atoms’: Scientists, Politics, and the Test Ban Treaty,” Diplomatic History,Vol.35,No.2 (April 2011), pp. 283–319.

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(1890–1951), and in 1941 he became a professor at Tokyo Liberal Arts and Science University. In 1934, Yukawa left Kyoto to become a lecturer in physics at Osaka Imperial University (OIU), and in 1936 he was promoted to assis- tant professor. Three years later, in 1939, he returned to KIU as a professor. Sakata had also been a student at KIU, but in 1933–1934 he had worked with Tomonaga and Nishina at Riken. Later, Sakata assisted Yukawa at OIU and KIU and in 1942 became a professor at Nagoya Imperial University. After the Second World War, the three of them led the field of elementary particle physics in Japan in a friendly rivalry.7 Like most scientists in Japan, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata did not publicly oppose either Japan’s war efforts or war in general during World War II. They continued their own work but did not refuse to engage in wartime military research. Tomonaga participated in the Japanese navy’s military research on the magnetron.8 Yukawa and Sakata were involved in a nuclear bomb research project. In Japan, two nuclear bomb research programs were commissioned by the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. The army project was based at Riken, headed by Nishina. The navy project was conducted at KIU under the leadership of a physics professor Bunsaku Arakatsu. Yukawa and Sakata were members of the latter project.9 Aware of the possibility of producing nuclear explosives, Japanese physicists were still surprised by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nishina, for instance, expected that no country, including Japan, could develop opera- tional nuclear bombs by the war’s end. He claimed he undertook the nuclear bomb project partly as a cover to save promising young scientists from military service and to continue academic research with funds provided by the military. Therefore, despite being ashamed of his inability to fulfill his responsibility as a Japanese subject and nuclear physicist, he was amazed by the scientific achievement of the United States. Just after the nuclear bombings, he was dispatched to Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a member of the

7. Morris Low, “Science and Civil Society in Japan: Physicists as Public Men and Policymakers,” His- torical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1999), pp. 205–215; Low, Science and the Building of a New Japan, chs. 4–5; Tadashi Nishimura, Sakata Shoichi¯ no shogai:¯ Kagaku to heiwa no soz¯ o¯ (Nagano, Japan: Choeisha,¯ 2011); and Yukawa-Tomonaga Seitan Hyaku-nen Kinenten Iinkai, eds., Soryushi-ron¯ no sekai o hiraku: Yukawa Hideki, Tomonaga Sin-Itironohitotojidai¯ (Kyoto: Kyoto¯ Daigaku Gakujutsu Shuttpankai, 2006), pp. 27–76. 8. Eizo Tajima, Aru butsuri gakusha no shogai¯ (Tokyo: Shin-Jinbutsu Oraisha,¯ 1995), pp. 80–81. 9. John W. Dower, “‘NI’ and ‘F’: Japan’s Wartime Atomic Bomb Research,” in John W. Dower, Japan in War and Peace: Selected Essays (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 55–100; and Hitoshi Yosh- ioka, Genshiryoku no shakaishi: Sono Nihonteki tenkai (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1999), pp. 40– 47.

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government investigation team. He witnessed the ruined cities and recognized the new weapon’s unprecedented power.10 During the postwar occupation, Japan was denuclearized from above. In 1946, under the guidance of the U.S. government, the General Headquar- ters of the Allied Powers ordered a total ban on nuclear energy research in Japan. With the approval of the Far Eastern Commission of the Allied Pow- ers, this ban was sustained until the end of the occupation.11 Moreover, as a consequence of the occupation authorities’ censorship, the Japanese remained uninformed about what occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the bombings.12 In 1950, in the midst of the Korean War, the Communist-led World Peace Council circulated petitions in Japan on behalf of the Stockholm Appeal for Peace demanding a complete ban on nuclear weapons, allegedly gathering millions of signatures within a year.13 However, this was an expression of antiwar, rather than anti-nuclear, feelings in Japan. Meanwhile, the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons ended, and the nuclear arms race accelerated. At the United Nations (UN), established in 1946, the international control of nuclear energy became one of the first major topics of discussion. However, negotiations soon came to a stalemate because of disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.14 After the Soviet Union succeeded in developing nuclear bombs in 1949, the Cold War rivals intensified their nuclear arms buildup, pursuing hydrogen bombs much more destructive than fission weapons.15 Moreover, the United Kingdom in- dependently developed nuclear bombs in 1952.16 Without international re- straint, some other countries also pursued nuclear weapons, and the United

10. Yoshio Nishina, “Genshi bakudan,” in Yoshio Nishina, Genshiryoku to watashi: Nishina Yoshio ikosh¯ u¯ (Tokyo: Gakufu¯ Shoin, 1950), pp. 43–44; and Yoshioka, Genshiryoku, p. 47. 11. Toshio Nishi, Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 50–52; and Yoshioka, Genshiryoku, pp. 49, 54. 12. Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied Japan (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1991). 13. Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Move- ment Through 1953 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 45–54; and Fumio Yoshida, “Suttokuhorumu ap¯ıru shomei undo¯ to sono rekishiteki haikei,” in Sadahide Hirokawa and Takao Yamada, eds., Sengo shakai undoshi-ron:¯ 1950-nendai o chushin¯ to shite (Tokyo: Otsuki¯ Shoten, 2006), p. 124. 14. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War (New York: Knopf, 1980). 15. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 16. Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, Vols. 1–2 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974).

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States and the Soviet Union competed to expand and improve their nuclear arsenals. Japanese scientists became increasingly concerned about these international developments. Well aware of the power of nuclear bombs, Nishina, who became a leading commentator on nuclear energy issues in occupied Japan, initially viewed them as a war deterrent but soon began advocating for the international control of nuclear energy.17 In October 1949, together with Arakatsu, he proposed to the Fourth Plenary of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), a national scientist organization established in January 1949, a draft statement calling for international control over nuclear energy in the name of scientists of the only country that had experienced nuclear bombings.18 At that time, SCJ vice president Nishina observed that the nuclear age had entered a new phase after the Soviet Union acquired nuclear bombs, and he believed more public pressure should be placed on U.S. and Soviet leaders.19 By adopting the draft resolution at the plenary, the Japanese scientific community expressed support for international control of nuclear energy.20 Japanese scientists’ support for this statement also reflected their general attitude toward matters related to the military and war. After the war, the United States sought to demilitarize Japan, and, as part of this effort, the Japanese constitution entered into force in 1947.21 Under Article 9, Japan voluntarily renounced armed forces and war. With anti-military and antiwar sentiments widespread in Japanese society, the public generally welcomed the “Peace Constitution,” which became a philosophical source for peace activism in postwar Japan. These were the circumstances in January 1949 when the SCJ issued its first statement expressing Japanese scientists’ remorse for their wartime behavior and pledging to contribute to Japan’s peaceful reconstruc- tion and the promotion of human welfare. In April 1950, the Sixth Plenary of

17. Akihiro Yamamoto, Kaku enerug¯ı gensetsu no sengoshi 1945–1960 (Kyoto: Jinbun Shoin, 2012), pp. 45–46. In addition to Nishina, for instance, another physicist, Mitsuo Taketani, who assisted Yukawa in his research on the meson theory together with Sakata and worked on nuclear bomb research at Riken under Nishina, also expected nuclear bombs to be a war deterrent. Yamamoto, Kaku enerug¯ı gensetsu, pp. 46–47. 18. Taketani also supported the international control of atomic energy. While Nishina favored the U.S. proposal, however, Taketani endorsed the Soviet proposal. Yoshida, “Suttokuhorumu ap¯ıru,” pp. 118–119. 19. Yoshio Nishina, “Genshiryoku mondai no shin-dankai,” Kokoro, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1950), p. 22. 20. Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, ed., Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi 25-nenshi (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, 1974), p. 15. 21. Michael Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origin of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

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the SCJ adopted another statement, this one declaring Japanese scientists’ de- termination not to engage in scientific research for purposes of war. Although U.S. occupation authorities had already prohibited military-oriented research in Japan, Japanese scientists themselves began opposing the remilitarization of science.22 Nevertheless, most Japanese scientists were not inclined to take part in activities against nuclear weapons for several reasons. First, some physicists— Nishina, for example—had ample knowledge of nuclear energy issues, but most Japanese scientists lacked the expertise to do so. Second, Japanese scientists believed that Japan, having lost its sovereignty, had no influence on world affairs. Then, the occupation authorities prohibited nuclear energy research and censored information. Moreover, Japanese scientists faced other pressing problems, such as restarting their own academic research and recon- structing Japan’s academic system. In contrast, a group of U.S. scientists who had worked on the Manhattan Project acted as early as November 1945 to set up the Federation of Atomic Scientists—rebranded as the Federation of American Scientists in February 1946—to influence their government’s policies on nuclear energy and raise public awareness of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.23 In occupied Japan, however, nuclear scientists made no such organized efforts. In East Asia, the Cold War confrontation intensified, and Japan became increasingly involved in the East-West conflict. In 1949, the civil war in China ended with the establishment of the Communist regime in mainland China and the anti-Communist regime in Taiwan. In the Korean Peninsula, a hot war erupted in June 1950, leading to military confrontation between the United States and Communist China. Urged by the United States, Japan com- menced remilitarization after the outbreak of the Korean War and negotiated with the United States to conclude a peace treaty, which was signed by 48 Allied powers but not by the Soviet Union or China. Concurrently, Japan and the United States entered into a bilateral security treaty in September 1951. With the end of the occupation in April 1952, Japan became a member of the West under the aegis of the United States.24

22. Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, pp. 15–16; Shigeru Nakayama, “Introduction: Occupation Period 1945–1952,” in Shigeru Nakayama, Kunio Goto,¯ and Hitoshi Yoshioka, eds., A Social History of Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan,Vol.1,The Occupation Period 1945– 1952 (Melbourne: Trans Paciﬁc Press, 2001), pp. 26–32; and Nakayama, “The Scientists-Led Peace Movement,” pp. 336–337. 23. Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists’ Movement in America, 1945–1947,rev.ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971). 24. Schaller, American Occupation.

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Although the Japanese people generally acquiesced in the remilitarization and the security arrangement with the United States, these two issues caused severe political contention between the conservatives and the progressives. The pro-Western conservative government, under the premiership of Shigeru Yoshida, reluctantly acceded to the U.S. demand for rearmament. The Yoshida government sought the occupation’s early termination, but because Japan as an independent state could not defend itself, Yoshida embraced the multilateral peace treaty and bilateral security treaty with the United States. These actions were opposed by the largest leftwing party, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which championed the Peace Constitution and strongly opposed rearmament. The JSP took a position of nonaligned neutralism, insisting that Japan should not be involved in the Cold War, advocating the conclusion of a peace treaty with all the Allied powers, and opposing the security treaty with the United States.25 After the occupation ended, the Peace Constitution, rearmament, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty remained the most contentious issues related to peace and security in Japan. In this political context, some Japanese scientists participated in peace activities even under the occupation. Aware of scientists’ social responsibility, Nishina joined Heiwa Mondai Danwakai (the Peace Issues Discussion Group), formed by Japanese intellectuals and scholars in 1948. From 1948 through 1950, Danwakai issued three influential statements on the peace and security of Japan, appealing for peaceful coexistence and unarmed neutrality.26 Then, in April 1950, 70 nuclear particle physicists, including Sakata, issued a peace appeal expressing their support for the 1950 Danwakai statement.27 Some scientists who opposed Japan’s rearmament proposed to the SCJ Eighth and Ninth Plenaries draft statements reaffirming Japanese scientists’ determi- nation not to conduct scientific research for war purposes. However, many members of the SCJ believed the scientist organization should refrain from becoming involved in politically controversial matters such as rearmament. Consequently, the proposals failed to gather sufficient support for adoption.28 Unlike Sakata, who was deeply influenced by Marxism, Yukawa and Tomonaga confined themselves to the academic world until the mid-1950s.29

25. Ibid. 26. Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 26–41. 27. Nihon Butsuri Gakkai, ed., Nihon no butsurigakushi (Ge)(Tokyo:Tokai¯ Daigaku Shuppankai, 1978), p. 552. 28. Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, pp. 33–34. 29. On Sakata’s views, see Nakayama, “The Scientists-Led Peace Movement,” p. 336; and Nishimura, Sakata, p. 163.

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During that time, Yukawa flourished as a leading physicist outside occupied Japan. He was invited as a visiting professor to the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) in Princeton, New Jersey, in 1948 and stayed in the United States from 1949 to 1953 as a professor at Columbia University. Meanwhile, Yukawa, the first Japanese Nobel laureate, became a hero to his war-ruined nation. After his return to Japan in 1953, he was appointed the first director of the Research Institute for Fundamental Physics at Kyoto University. After the war, Tomonaga, who, after Yukawa, also spent a year as a visiting professor at Princeton’s IAS, wanted to devote himself to his own scientific research. Out of a sense of responsibility as a well-respected physicist, however, he began working for the promotion of nuclear research in Japan.30 Yukawa and Tomonaga likely shared antiwar and anti-military sentiments with other Japanese scientists, but they remained silent about political and peace issues until 1954. In March 1954, a tragic incident in the Pacific shocked the Japanese. On 1 March, the United States conducted its second thermonuclear test, code- named Bravo, at the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The estimated yield of 15 megatons was much larger than predicted. Consequently, 23 fishermen of the Daigo FukuryuMaru¯ (Lucky Dragon No. 5), a Japanese tuna-fishing boat, were exposed to radioactive fallout outside the danger area designated by U.S. authorities. The fishermen became ill and were hospitalized after their return to Japan. One of them, Aikichi Kuboyama, died in September, ap- proximately six months later. The Japanese public became enraged that their countrymen should fall victim to nuclear weapons for a third time. Moreover, radiation was detected in the FukuryuMaru¯ and other fishing boats that returned from the Pacific, as well as in the tuna they brought, causing panic in Japanese society.31

30. Yukawa-Tomonaga, Soryushi-ron¯ , pp. 77–82. 31. On Japan’s response to the Bikini incident, see Roger Dingman, “Alliance in Crisis: The Lucky Dragon Incident and Japanese-American Relations,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); John Swenson- Wright, Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945–1960 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), ch. 5; Kazuya Sakamoto, “Kakuheiki to Nichi-Bei kankei: Bikini jiken no gaiko¯ shori,” in Kindai Nihon Kenkyukai, ed., Nenpo kindai Nihon kenkyu No. 16 (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994); Hiroko Takahashi, “Daigo Fukuryu¯ Maru hisai to Amerika no taio,”¯ in Gurobaru¯ Hibakusha Kenkyukai, ed., Kakusareta hibakusha: Kensho¯ sabakinaki Bikini suibaku hisai (Tokyo: Gaifusha,¯ 2005); and Akira Kurosaki, “Daigo Fukuryu¯ Maru jiken to Nichi-Bei kankei: Kakuheiki o meguru kyoch¯ o¯ to masatsu no genryu,”¯ Nenpo Nihon Gendaishi, No. 19 (2014), pp. 1– 37. For a useful collection of materials on the Bikini incident, see Yasuo Miyake et al., eds., Shinsoban¯ suibaku hisai shiryosh¯ u¯ (Tokyo: Toky¯ o¯ Daigaku Shuppankai, 2014). Rotblat identiﬁed and published the then-secret design of the hydrogen bomb used for the Bravo shot based on data provided by

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The FukuryuMaru¯ incident greatly affected Yukawa’s life. The crew’s suffering shocked him, making him aware of his social responsibility as a scientist, as well as of nuclear weapons’ imminent danger to humanity. Thus, at the end of March, he contributed to the major Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun an essay titled “Atomic Energy and the Turning Point of Humanity,” in which he stated “as a scientist, I feel my responsibility to think of the problem of ‘atomic energy against humanity’ more seriously. And I feel familiar with this problem, because I am Japanese. This, however, does not contradict my thinking of the problem as a member of humanity.”32 Yukawa felt compelled to think about the danger of nuclear weapons not just as a scientist in the country that had experienced nuclear bombings, but also as a scientist responsible for the welfare of humanity as a whole. Much the same was true of Tomonaga, who, despite his deep-seated desire to confine himself to scientific research, could no longer overlook nuclear weapons’ danger. After the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he had seen reams of scientific data on the effects of nuclear bombs, collected by Nishina at Riken, and decided that such bombs should never be used again. Simultaneously, however, he had an optimistic perspective based on his belief in humanity’s reason. Having made such a great sacrifice, humanity would never, he believed, repeat the mistake.33 The FukuryuMaru¯ incident shook this conviction, greatly distressing Tomonaga. In the summer of 1954, in a Japanese general science journal, he published an essay titled “My Feeling on a Gloomy Day,” expressing his apprehensions about the misuse of nuclear energy and the danger of radiation.34

The Making of Japan’s Nuclear Weapons Policy and Nuclear Deterrence

In the 1950s the United States became increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons for the West’s defense. In 1954 the Eisenhower administration

a Japanese biophysicist, Yasushi Nishiwaki, who participated in radiological surveys of the Fukuryu¯ Maru in Japan. Andrew Brown, Keeper of the Nuclear Conscience: The Life and Work of Joseph Rotblat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 110–112. 32. Hideki Yukawa, “Genshiryoku to jinrui no tenki,” in Hideki Yukawa, Yukawa Hideki Chosakushu¯, Vol. 5, Heiwa eno kikyu¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1989), p. 53. 33. Toshiyuki Toyoda, “Tomonaga Sin-Itiro¯ sensei o shinobu,” Sekai, No. 406 (September 1979), p. 299. 34. Tomonaga, “Kuraihi no kanso,”¯ Shizen, Vol. 26, No. 4 (March 1971), pp. 237–240.

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announced a policy of massive retaliation, the first U.S. declaratory policy on nuclear deterrence. Because this policy presumed U.S. strategic superiority, the United States continued to build up its strategic nuclear forces in competition with the Soviet Union.35 The United States also developed tactical nuclear weapons and began to deploy them in Europe and the Pacific. Furthermore, the strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) incorporated the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to defend West European countries against the Warsaw Pact’s immense conventional forces.36 Contrary to this trend, anti-nuclear sentiment was mounting in Japan, the major U.S. ally in the Far East. The FukuryuMaru¯ crew’s suffering reminded the Japanese public of the bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, the radioactive contamination of fish and the detection of radioactive rainfall in some parts of Japan caused the Japanese public to feel that their daily lives were threatened by nuclear weapons. Consequently, numerous private groups—for example labor unions, women’s groups, religious groups, pacifist groups, academic societies, and many local assemblies of cities and prefectures—called for a ban on the use, production, and testing of nuclear weapons. A grass-roots movement against nuclear and thermonuclear bombs circulated petitions across the country, collecting more than 20 million signatures by the end of 1954.37 With popular anti-nuclear sentiments rising, the mass-based anti-nuclear peace movement was born in Japan. In August 1955 the First World Con- ference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held in Hiroshima. A preparatory committee formed by agreement among various groups in Japan’s anti-nuclear peace movement had organized the event. In September 1955, Gensuikyo¯ (Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs) was established as a nationwide umbrella organization opposing nuclear weapons. Although Socialists, Communists, and labor unions were strong forces be- hind it, Gensuikyo¯ gathered support from individuals and groups across the

35. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 5; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–1961 (New York: St. Martin Press, 1996); and David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 3–71. 36. William W. Park, Defending the West: A History of NATO (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), pp. 104–105; and Gregory W. Pedlow, ed., NATO Strategic Documents, 1949–1969, http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf (accessed 20 July 2016). 37. Osamu Fujiwara, Gensuibaku kinshi undo no seiritsu: Sengo Nihon heiwa undonogenz¯ o¯ (Tokyo: Meiji Gakuin Daigaku Kokusai Heiwa Kenkyusho,¯ 1991); and Eriko Maruhama, Gensuikin shomei undonotanj¯ o:¯ Toky¯ o¯ Suginami no jumin¯ pawa¯ to suimyaku (Tokyo: Gaifusha,¯ 2011).

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political spectrum in the late 1950s.38 During that time, Japan’s anti-nuclear peace movement rapidly developed into a nationwide movement. U.S. nuclear strategy clashed with the anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. After the FukuryuMaru¯ incident, nuclear testing surfaced as a global concern. In Japan, the public demanded a ban on nuclear testing, but the United States continued nuclear testing until the fall of 1958 and also began deploying nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed forces in the Far East to protect regional allies, hoping as well to store nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. The Japanese public, which worried that Japan might be used as a base for U.S. nuclear operations and thus become involved in a nuclear conflict, opposed introduc- ing nuclear weapons into Japan. In the late 1950s, the pro-Western Japanese government was thus caught between the U.S. nuclear defense policies and Japanese public opinion. During this time, conservative rule somewhat solidified in Japan. In the early 1950s, both the conservatives and progressives were fragmented at the National Diet (parliament). Against the backdrop of political rivalry between Shigeru Yoshida of the Liberal Party and Ichiro¯ Hatoyama of the Democratic Party, both parties were reduced to minority ruling parties. The Socialist Party had earlier (in 1951) separated into rightist and leftist Socialist Parties, but in November 1955 the two socialist factions reunited. In the next month, after complicated interparty negotiations, the Liberal and Democratic Parties finally agreed to merge as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).39 The LDP dominated Japanese politics from 1955 until 1993—38 years. Nevertheless, the LDP government could not ignore the public’s anti- nuclear opinion. Japan’s anti-nuclear peace movement had grown into a national movement representing the voice of ordinary Japanese. The progressives were eager to give voice to this anti-nuclear sentiment both at the Diet and in Japan’s anti-nuclear peace movement. Finally, it was not yet clear whether the LDP could hold power for a long time. The LDP government therefore could not allow the progressives to monopolize representation of anti-nuclear sentiment. To do so might undermine conservative rule and, consequently, Japan’s security partnership with the United States.40 The conservatives thus

38. Fujiwara, Gensuibaku; and Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 8–10. 39. Masaru Kohno, Japan’s Postwar Party Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 49–90. 40. Akira Kurosaki, “Amerika no kakusenryaku to Nihon no kokunai seiji no kosaku¯ 1954–60,” in Dojidaishi¯ Gattkai, ed., Chosen¯ hantotoNihonnod¯ ojidaishi¯ (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha,¯ 2005), p. 222.

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realized that to disregard the public’s anti-nuclear opinion in matters related to nuclear weapons would be politically unwise. After the FukuryuMaru¯ incident, the Japanese government had to address nuclear testing. Initially, it responded based on its pro-Western position. The Yoshida government tolerated U.S. nuclear testing as an effort to maintain the balance of power, on which, it claimed, the world’s peace and stability rested. Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki even insisted that Japan, as a member of the West, should cooperate with the United States on nuclear testing. In April 1954 the Lower and Upper Houses of the Diet adopted draft resolutions demanding international control of nuclear energy. However, they did not specifically refer to suspending or banning nuclear tests. These circumstances provided the Yoshida government with a convenient justification for its position on nuclear tests.41 After Yoshida stepped down as prime minister in December 1954, the Japanese conservative government reversed its attitude and began to protest nuclear testing. Because the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain continued atmospheric nuclear tests, public opposition remained strong in Japan. The Japanese government and the LDP found anti-nuclear popular sentiment increasingly difficult to ignore. Consequently, Diet resolutions explicitly calling for a suspension or termination of nuclear tests were occasionally adopted with the support of parties from across the political spectrum in 1956–1958. Yoshida’s successors—Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi—were determined to maintain Japan’s partnership with the United States. Neverthe- less, considering the Diet’s will, the Japanese government repeatedly protested nuclear testing by the nuclear powers. After joining the UN in December 1956, Japan called for suspending and banning nuclear testing.42 Thus, in October 1958, the Japanese government welcomed the tripartite moratorium on nuclear testing by the three powers and the Geneva tripartite negotiations for a nuclear test ban. In the late 1950s, Japan’s non-nuclear weapons policy was formed through discussions in the Diet. In 1955, Prime Minister Hatoyama declared it unconstitutional for Japan to possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, nuclear weapons possession and manufacturing were prohibited by the Atomic Energy

41. Kurosaki, “Amerika no kakusenryaku,” pp. 196–199; and Kurosaki, “Daigo Fukuryu¯ Maru.” 42. Kurosaki, “Amerika no kakusenryaku,” pp. 199–211; Toshihiro Higuchi, “Kakujittken to Nichi-Bei kankei: ‘Kyoiku’¯ katei no seisei to hokai¯ o chushinni,”¯ Kokusai Seiji, Vol. 2003, No. 134 (November 2003), pp. 103–120; and Liang Pan, The United Nations in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policymaking, 1945–1992: National Security, Party Politics, and International Status (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asian Center, 2005), pp. 36–37.

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Basic Law of 1955, which restricted the research, development, and use of nuclear energy in Japan to peaceful purposes. In a speech to the Diet in 1957, Prime Minister Kishi suggested that Japan could possess nuclear weapons, such as tactical nuclear weapons, within the conﬁnes of self-defense forces permitted under the Japanese constitution. The government then adopted Kishi’s remark as the ofﬁcial interpretation of the constitution. Nevertheless, it dared not alter the policy proscribing the possession and manufacture of nuclear weapons.43 In addition, the Japanese government declared itself opposed to allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. In the late 1950s, as the United States deployed tactical and theater nuclear weapons and nuclear- armed forces in Europe and the Far East, the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan became a point of contention. In the Diet, opposition parties pressed the Japanese government to clarify its position. Torn between the United States and popular anti-nuclear sentiment, the Hatoyama government pledged to reject the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. The Kishi government also followed this policy. But these pledges lacked credibil- ity because the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty gave Japan no legal grounds for rejecting the weapons. To allay public anxiety, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed in the 1960 treaty revision to consult before nuclear weapons were introduced into Japan.44 Having announced a non-nuclear weapons policy, the Japanese government maintained an ambiguous attitude toward the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the 1950s and early 1960s. The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower considered nuclear weapons indispensable for the West’s defense, thus providing a U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan and other important allies in Western Europe.

43. Nobusuke Kishi, Kishi Nobusuke kaikoroku (Tokyo: Kosaido¯ Shuttpan, 1983), pp. 309–311; and Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichi-Bei kankei,p.10. 44. J. A. A. Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1968), pp. 88–89; and Kurosaki, “Amerika no kakusenryaku,” pp. 211–219. Since 1960, the Japanese government had explained to the public that the port call to Japan of U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons would be regarded as the “introduction” of nuclear weapons into Japan and would be subject to prior consultation with the U.S. government. Declassiﬁed documents of the two governments, however, reveal that they did not agree on that during the treaty negotiation. Whether and when the two governments secretly agreed to exclude the “transit” of U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons from the subject of prior consultation remains an issue in contention. Yushikisha¯ Iinkai, “Iwayuru ‘mitsuyaku’ mondai nikansuru Yushikisha¯ Iinkai hokokusho,”¯ in Gaimusho¯ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf; Osamu Ishii, Zero kara wakaru kakumitsuyaku (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo,¯ 2010); Sumio Hatano, Rekishi toshite no Nichi- Bei anpojoyaku:¯ Kimitsu gaiko¯ kiroku ga akasu “mitsuyaku” no kyojitsu (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010); Masakatsu Ota, Nichi-Bei “kakumitsuyaku” no zenbo¯ (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo,¯ 2011); and Ryuji Shi- nobu, Nichibei anpojoyaku¯ to jizenkyogi¯ seido (Tokyo: Kobund¯ o,¯ 2014).

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Although the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1951 did not oblige the United States to defend Japan, the revised treaty of 1960 did. The Japanese conservative government declared alignment with the United States to be the foundation of Japan’s security and explained to the public that world peace was maintained by the balance of power between the United States and the So- viet Union. Japanese political leaders and government officials avoided dis- cussing the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan’s security because no formal agreement existed and they did not want to inflame anti-nuclear feeling among the public.45 The Japanese anti-nuclear movement did not directly address nuclear deterrence policy in its demand to ban nuclear weapons. To do so would have required an in-depth analysis of the causes of the nuclear arms race as well as obstacles to nuclear disarmament. Most activists in the mass movement were unfamiliar with international affairs and national security and had not given any thought toe nuclear deterrence theory. Besides, the Socialist Party and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), competing with each other to influence Gensuikyo,¯ attempted to align the movement’s anti-nuclear cause with their own political agendas, strengthening popular opposition to the government’s defense policy and to Japan’s security alignment with the United States. Furthermore, thanks to the lack of public discussion of the issue, the words commonly used for “nuclear deterrence” did not exist in the Japanese language until the early 1960s. In 1968, the prime minister for the first time declared to the public Japan’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This declaration was a be- lated response to China’s success in conducting its first nuclear test in October 1964. As the fifth nuclear-club member (following the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France), China continued to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. A new nuclear-armed state antagonistic to Japan, as well as the United States, was emerging. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized their common interest in preventing more countries from acquiring nuclear weapons and launched negotiations for a multilateral treaty, leading to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968. Furthermore, because the 10-year Japan-U.S. security treaty would expire in 1970, domestic political debates on Japan’s security and defense were heating up. These developments compelled the Japanese government to review its nuclear policy and explain it to the public. In a speech to the Diet in January 1968, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato¯ announced the four pillars of Japan’s nuclear policy: the

45. Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichi-Bei kankei, pp. 188–199.

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Three Non-Nuclear Principles, facilitation of nuclear disarmament, promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan’s security.46

Disarmament, Nuclear Deterrence, and Pugwash

Worldwide, the late 1950s were a time of mounting public fear of nuclear testing, the nuclear arms race, and nuclear war. Indeed, nuclear testing became a major issue in disarmament negotiations. The exposure of the Marshall Is- lands’ native population and the FukuryuMaru¯ ’s ﬁshermen to radioactive fallout from the U.S. thermonuclear weapon test on 1 March 1954 raised public awareness of nuclear fallout’s hazardous effects on both human health and the natural environment. These effects dramatically demonstrated the dangers of the nuclear arms race and nuclear war. Even as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain continued atmospheric nuclear tests, anti-nuclear movements developed in many parts of the world.47 Pugwash emerged through the initiative of British philosopher Bertrand Russell, who was deeply concerned about weapons of mass destruction that threatened humanity’s survival. In July 1955, Russell issued a statement calling for the abolition of war and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. This statement was signed by eleven scientists—ten of them Nobel laureates, including Albert Einstein, who died shortly after signing the draft, and became known as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto.48 As suggested in the manifesto, Russell decided to convene a conference of scientists, originally planned for New Delhi in January 1957. However, the meeting was canceled because the 1956 Suez crisis made travel to India uncertain for some participants. Eventually, the conference was held in July 1957 in Pugwash, the hometown of a Canadian-born U.S. industrialist, Cyrus Eaton, who offered the venue along with ﬁnancial support. Following this successful meeting, the Continu- ing Committee was established to organize similar conferences.49

46. Ibid. 47. Robert A. Divine, Blowing the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 3–35; and Wittner, Resisting the Bomb. 48. Rotblat, Scientists in the Quest for Peace, p. 2; and Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Origin of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto,” Pugwash History Series, No. 1, Council of the Pugwash Confer- ences on Science and World Affairs, May 2005, online at https://pugwashconferences.ﬁles.wordpress .com/2014/02/2005_history_origins_of_manifesto3.pdf. 49. Rotblat, Scientists in the Quest for Peace, pp. 2–9.

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Thirteen Pugwash conferences were held from 1957 through 1964. Sci- entists invited from around the world discussed problems related to international peace and security, immediate political issues, and the social implications of scientific progress. In organizing these meetings, the Contin- uing Committee had a threefold objective: to influence governments, to open a channel of communication among scientists, and to influence public opinion.50 Closed to the public, the meetings adopted the Chatham House Rule to encourage free discussion among the scientists. Larger conferences held in Vienna in 1958 and in London in 1962 were partly open to the public. The former issued an important Pugwash document, called the Vienna Declara- tion, to the world at large. Each meeting included plenary and working-group sessions. After each conference, a statement drafted by the Continuing Com- mittee was released. These statements were based on plenary-session discussions and working groups’ reports and were approved by meeting participants. In Pugwash’s early days, scientists from the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were highly influential. Until 1962 the Continuing Commit- tee consisted of scientists solely from these three countries. The Continuing Committee deliberately invited more scientists from these major powers, espe- cially those who could influence governmental policies.51 Scientists from the United States and Britain were independent of their governments, although some had contacts with government officials and discussed Pugwash activities. They could speak for themselves, however, and did not take the same position all the time. Soviet scientists, however, were chosen by the Soviet Academy of Sciences under Communist Party control and generally adhered closely to official Soviet policy.52 The scientists who gathered at the first Pugwash meeting considered elimination of nuclear weapons nearly impossible. After the meeting, they issued a public statement acknowledging that although only a strict control system could advance nuclear disarmament, given the strong mutual distrust between East and West, nuclear armaments were so far developed that a completely

50. Ibid., p. 7. 51. Originally, the Continuing Committee consisted of Russell, who assumed the chair, and the other four scientists who participated in the ﬁrst Pugwash meeting. They were Eugene Rabinowitch (United States), Dmitri Skobel’tsyn (USSR), Cecil Powell (United Kingdom), and Rotblat (United Kingdom). In 1958, the committee was reorganized to have nine members, three each from the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Then its membership was further expanded in 1962 to include scientists from other countries. See Rotblat, Pugwash, pp. 17–19; and Rotblat, Scientists in the Quest for Peace, pp. 6–8, 11, 18. 52. Metta Spencer, “Political Scientists,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (BAS), Vol. 50, No. 4 (July- August 1995), p. 62.

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effective, reliable control system no longer appeared feasible.53 A Russian-born U.S. scientist and an original member of the Continuing Committee, Eugene Rabinowitch, reluctantly admitted that humanity would have to live with nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.54 The emerging state of mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union provided a compelling backdrop for discussion about nuclear deterrence at Pugwash. Armed with hydrogen bombs, the United States and the Soviet Union appeared stuck in a nuclear stalemate by the mid-1950s, each no longer able to initiate war against the other without risking mutual suicide. But the advent of ICBMs raised serious concern that the uncontrolled nuclear arms race could eventually destabilize their strategic relations and increase the risk of a surprise attack or accidental war. Each country’s strategic bombers and early land-based ICBMs were considered vulnerable to a ﬁrst strike by the other’s ICBMs.55 Although a certain relaxation of East-West ten- sions followed Iosif Stalin’s death in 1953, U.S.-Soviet relations remained unstable through the late 1950s and early 1960s. International crises entailing a risk of nuclear war recurred. In the late 1950s, how to restrain the nuclear arms race and stabilize mutual deterrence thus became a contentious issue at the Pugwash meetings. At the Second Pugwash Conference, held in Lac Beauport, Quebec, in the spring of 1958, U.S. participants raised the concept of nuclear deterrence. Richard S. Leghorn, invited for his expertise in national security, proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union each possess an invulnerable retaliatory deterrent of 200 thermonuclear missiles to maintain the stability of a world security system.56 Leo Szilard, a Manhattan Project veteran who was actively involved in the early Pugwash meetings, sympathized with Leghorn’s idea and suggested the possibility of maintaining a stable nuclear stalemate.57 At the beginning, however, nuclear deterrence evoked negative reactions at Pugwash. At the second meeting, the vice president of the Soviet Academy

53. Rotblat, Scientists in the Quest for Peace, p. 145. 54. Eugene Rabinowitch, “Living with H-Bombs,” BAS, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1955), pp. 5–8; and Eugene Rabinowitch, “About Disarmament,” BAS, Vol. 13, No. 8 (October 1957), pp. 277–282. 55. Eugene Rabinowitch, “Accidental War, Missiles, and World Community,” BAS,Vol.14,No.6 (June 1958), pp. 202–204; and Richard S. Leghorn, “The Problem of Accidental War,” BAS,Vol.14, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 205–209. 56. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, 3 April 1958, in Documents of Second Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists, Pugwash Conference, 1958, p. 99; and Richard S. Leghorn, “Design of a World Security System,” in Documents of Second Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists, pp. 277–282. 57. Remarks by Leo Szilard, 8 April 1958, in Documents of Second Pugwash Conference of Nuclear Scientists, pp. 271–275.

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of Sciences and leader of the Soviet delegation, A. V. Topchiev, insisted that “our principal aim [is] to reach agreement among powers on the unconditional banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons of all styles.”58 Scientists from the East as well as Australian physicist Mark Oliphant, another Manhattan Project scientist who later became a harsh critic of nuclear weapons, expressed revul- sion toward the concept of deterrence.59 Soviet participants persistently ob- jected to the concept of nuclear deterrence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. On the other hand, many U.S. participants were involved in U.S. arms control and disarmament research, including Donald G. Brennan, Paul Dotty, Bernard T. Feld, Henry Kissinger, Richard Leghorn, Thomas Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, and Jerome Wiesner.60 They shared the notion that maintaining stable mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union was imperative for advancing arms control and disarmament.61 In the hope that Soviet participants would accept such a concept, these participants disseminated U.S. arms control research to scientists from other countries. Some of them—for instance, Wiesner, who became a science adviser to Presidents Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson—had a role in U.S. policymaking on the matter.62 In the meantime, disagreements emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union over how to reconcile nuclear deterrence with disarmament. In Geneva, General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) was treated in 1960 as a major item in multilateral disarmament negotiations at the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC), composed of five Eastern and five West- ern states, and, from 1962, at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), composed of five Eastern, five Western, and eight nonaligned states. At those talks, the United States and the Soviet Union presented third-stage

58. Minutes of Third Meeting, in Proceedings of the Third Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Pugwash Conference, 1959, p. 107. 59. Ibid.; and “Sir Marcus (Mark) Laurence Elwin Oliphant (1901–2001),” The University of Ade- laide, https://www.adelaide.edu.au/library/about/libraries/bsl/history/oliphant/. 60. Rotblat, Scientists in the Quest for Peace, pp. 103–105. 61. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), in 1963, assuming responsibility for coordi- nating American involvement in Pugwash activities, encouraged arms control research and organized a conference on the 1960 Daedalus volume concerning arms control in May 1960 and a Summer Study on Arms Control in summer 1960. Many participants of the AAAS events had already attended or would later attend the Pugwash meetings. “Preliminary Inventory to the Papers of Bernard T. Feld, MC.0167,” n.d., in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Institute Archives and Special Collec- tions (MIT IASC), http://libraries.mit.edu/archives/research/collections/collections-mc/mc167.html; and Jennifer Sims, Icarus Restrained: An Intellectual History of Nuclear Arms Control, 1945–1960 (Boul- der, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 9, 19, 39–40, and Appendix. 62. Judy Rosenblith, ed., Jerry Wiesner, Scientist, Statesman, Humanist: Memories and Memoirs (Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 259–261, 277.

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GCD plans. Believing that stable mutual deterrence must precede the GCD process, the United States insisted that each of the nuclear weapons states should retain a limited nuclear force as assurance against noncompliance by the others, until the third stage of the GCD process. The Soviet Union, for its part, initially rejected the concept of stable mutual deterrence and insisted that nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles should be abolished at the first stage.63 The role of nuclear deterrence in the GCD process was also a contentious issue at the Pugwash meetings. Some U.S. and British scientists suggested that, until the last stage of the GCD process, the two superpowers ought to retain a “minimum deterrent force,” that is, an invulnerable retaliatory force sufficiently large to prevent a nuclear attack by the other but insufficient to eliminate the other’s retaliatory force.64 Soviet scientists, in line with their government’s official position on GCD, rejected the idea.65 This dispute remained unresolved until the mid-1960s. During this time, the Japanese Pug- wash group began criticizing nuclear deterrence theory.

Japanese Scientists Join the Pugwash Movement

In July 1955, Yukawa received a letter from Russell asking him to sign the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. Although Yukawa was not certain why he had been selected as a prospective signatory, he had no reason to decline the request.66 When he was at Princeton in 1948–1949, he had met Einstein and sympathized with his notion of paciﬁsm and world federalism.67 Yukawa then

63. Akira Kurosaki, “Beikoku no kakuyui¯ eno shuchaku¯ to zenmen kanzen gunshuku, 1959–1963: Kakugunbi kyos¯ o¯ ni okeru Beikoku no yakuwari no saiko,”¯ Kokusai Seiji, Vol. 2011, No. 163 (Jan- uary 2011), pp. 42–47; and David Tal, The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945–1963 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008), pp. 154–159, 191–199. 64. Jerome B. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), pp. 169–170; Harrison Brown and Amron Katz, “An Approach to Disarmament,” in Pro- ceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Science and World Affairs, International Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1962, pp. 30–44; P.M. S. Blackett, “The Way Ahead,” in Papers and Reports of the Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1962, pp. 39–53; and Richard S. Leghorn, “The Pursuit of Rational World Security Systems,” in Papers and Reports of the Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, pp. 168–173. 65. W. A. Highbotham, “Report on Pugwash,” F.A.S. Newsletter, February 1961, p. 3; A. V. Topchiev, “The Present State of the Disarmament,” in Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference on Science and World Affairs, pp. 196–197; and A. V. Topchiev, “General and Complete Disarmament,” in Papers and Reports of the Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, pp. 85–103. 66. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai, pp. 5–7. 67. Hideki Yukawa, “Heiwa eno negai,” in Yukawa, Yukawa Chosakushu¯, Vol. 5, pp. 300–301; Sho¯ Tanaka closely examines Yukawa’s philosophy for peace in relation to Einstein’s. See Sho¯ Tanaka,

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became an adviser to the World Association of World Federalists in 1956 and was elected president in 1961, continuing in that position until 1965.68 He did not hesitate to sign the statement Einstein had endorsed in his ﬁnal days.69 After the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was publicized in Japan, Yukawa sought, with Tomonaga’s and Sakata’s assistance, to expand Japanese scientists’ support for the statement. Yukawa, along with President of the Japan Academy Ryoz¯ o¯ Yamada and President of the SCJ Seiji Kaya, appealed to about 500 Japanese scientists to support the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. More than 200 of them replied favorably, but most Japanese scientists were unwilling to take actions more concrete than simple expressions of support. Although all those who supported the manifesto were invited to the Tokyo meeting to discuss future activities, only a few, including Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, attended.70 Nonetheless, the core of the Japanese Pugwash group took shape through approval of the manifesto. Amid growing anti-nuclear sentiment in Japanese society, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata engaged in various anti-nuclear peace activities. They felt compelled to uphold their social responsibility as Japanese scientists, expressing their views through writings and speeches, joining appeals, and supporting statements on peace and nuclear weapons issues. Yukawa, for instance, became a founding member of the Committee of Seven for World Peace Appeal, established in 1955. This committee was proposed by Yasaburo¯ Shimonaka, president of the Japanese publishing house Heibonsha and chief director of a Japanese World Federalist group (Sekai Renpo¯ Kensetsu Domei).¯ The committee comprised seven Japanese intellectuals and academics. The Committee of Seven occasionally issued appeals on peace issues, and Yukawa earnestly participated in its activities.71 Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Yukawa’s nephew Iwao Ogawa, also a physicist, participated by invitation in the First Pugwash Conference in July 1957.

Yukawa Hideki to Einstein: Senso¯ to kagaku no seiki o ikita kagakusha no heiwa shiso¯ (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2008). 68. Low, “Science and Civil Society in Japan,” pp. 214–215; and Joseph Preston Baratta, The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to Global Governance (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), p. 517. 69. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai, pp. 9–10. 70. “Bertrand Russell hoka 8-mei no kagakusha no seimei ni tsuite,” in Sakata Kinen Shiryoshitsu¯ (Sakata Archival Library), Nagoya University, Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi dai 20-kai sokai¯ shiryo¯ tsuzuri, A-6-4-1; Shoichi¯ Sakata, “Genshiryoku ni tsuite no uttae: Stockholm nite,” in Shoichi¯ Sakata, Ka- gakusha to shakai: Ronshu¯, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1972), p. 244; and “Nihyaku nin sudeni shiji,” Asahi Shimbun, 13 March 1956, p. 9. 71. Sekai RenpoKensetsuD¯ omei,¯ ed., Sekai Renpound¯ o¯ 20-nenshi (Tokyo: Sekai Renpo¯ Kensetsu Domei,¯ 1969), p. 210.

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There, Tomonaga and Ogawa joined in working-group discussions on radiation hazards, an opportunity they took very seriously. Tomonaga, no expert on this subject, had heard lectures by Japanese scientists well-informed on radiation problems before his visit to Pugwash.72 Late to the conference, Yukawa arrived with an appeal from the Committee of Seven calling for a nuclear test ban.73 Shimonaka provided ﬁnancial support for Yukawa’s travel to the meeting.74 Focusing on Japanese participants’ activities, the Japanese press covered the international meeting.75 Japanese scientists in general were sympathetic to the international conference. Before the main sessions of the Third World Conference against A and H Bombs held in Tokyo in August 1957, foreign participants and a small number of Japanese held preliminary discussions. At one of these, the Interna- tional Expert Meeting on Radioactivity, the participants—including Ogawa, Tomonaga, and Rotblat, who came straight from the First Pugwash Confer- ence to Tokyo to attend the event—approved the Pugwash meeting’s statement.76 Then in October 1957, the 25th SCJ plenary adopted a resolution expressing support for the same statement.77 Japanese scientists who sympathized with the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and Pugwash began coalescing around Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata.78 The Japanese Pugwash group was spontaneously created. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata did not formally decide to establish it. After the ﬁrst Pugwash meeting, they worked together to promote the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and introduced Pugwash activities to the Japanese public and other Japanese scientists through writings and lectures. Yukawa became the Japanese contact person for the Pugwash Continuing Committee and consulted with

72. Iwao Ogawa, “Paguwottshu kaigi to Tomonaga hakase,” Nihon no kagakusha,Vol.14,No.12 (December 1979), p. 16. 73. “Kakujittken kinshi uttaeru,” Asahi Shimbun, 9 July 1957, Evening Ed., p. 1. 74. Shimonaka Yasaburo-den¯ Kankokai,¯ ed., Shimonaka Yasaburojiten¯ (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1971), p. 338. 75. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai, pp. 77–82; Hideki Yukawa, “Kagakusha no sekinin: Paguwottshu kaigi no kanso,”¯ in Yukawa, Yukawa Chosakushu, Vol. 5, pp. 153–157; and Ogawa, “Paguwottshu kaigi,” pp. 16–18. 76. Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyogikai,¯ “Daisankai gensuibaku kinshi sekaitaikai kokusai yobikaigi gijiyoroku,”¯ in Toru¯ Kobayashi, ed., Gensuibaku kinshi undoshiry¯ osh¯ u¯, Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobo,¯ 1995), p. 262; and Michiji Konuma, “Personal Contacts with Sir Joseph Rotblat,” in Reiner Braun et al., eds., Joseph Rotblat: Visionary for Peace (Weinheim, Germany: Wiley-VHC, 2007), pp. 183–186. 77. Nihon Kagakusha Kaigi, ed., Gendai shakai to kagaku: Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi no 15-nen (Tokyo: Otsuki¯ Shoten, 1980), pp. 78–79. 78. Michiji Konuma, “Wasurerarenai koto,” in Makinosuke Matsui, ed., Kaiso¯ no Tomonaga Sin-Itiro¯ (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo,¯ 1980), pp. 303–304; and “Kokusai kagakusha ate ikensho,” Asahi Shimbun, 5 April 1958, p. 1.

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Tomonaga and Sakata on Japanese scientists’ involvement. Through exist- ing networks of Japanese scientists and other personal connections, scientists, mainly young physicists, concerned with peace and nuclear issues gathered around Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata to assist their activities for peace.79 Tomonaga, who served as president of Tokyo University of Education from 1956 to 1961, played an important role in organizing the Japanese Pug- wash group. Although no Japanese scientists attended the Second Pugwash Conference, sets of meeting documents, including the minutes and papers, were sent to Yukawa and Tomonaga in the spring of 1958. Having decided to attend the Third Pugwash Conference in Kitzbühel and Vienna in September 1958, Tomonaga, who found the second meeting’s documents valuable, began seriously studying them with young physicists in May 1958. His intention, in part, was to educate young scientists concerned about peace and nuclear issues. The so-called Tomonaga seminar was held at universities in Tokyo al- most once a week during the spring and summer of 1958 until just before the third Pugwash conference. At each session, participants read and discussed papers presented to the Pugwash meeting. Sakata occasionally joined the group from Nagoya. After the Third Pugwash Conference, the Tomonaga seminar resumed to study its proceedings.80 Thereafter, some Tomonaga seminar participants remained active members of the Japanese Pugwash group.81 Japanese Pugwash scientists hoped to influence their government, but unlike their U.S. and British counterparts they did not try to do so as insiders or consultants. In an attempt to influence national governments, Pugwash dispatched its second meeting’s statement and other materials to leaders of the participating countries’ governments, including the Japanese government. In response, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, instead of Prime Minister Kishi, sent a brusque letter to Pugwash simply confirming receipt.82 The Japanese Pug- wash group took this as a sign of the Japanese government’s dismissive attitude

79. After the FukuryuMaru¯ incident, many Japanese physicists became aware of their social responsibilities and were seriously concerned about nuclear dangers. According to Morris Low, the Elementary Particle Theory Group, of which Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata were leading members, “has been one of the most active groups in the movement against atomic and hydrogen weapons.” Several young physicists in the group voluntarily assisted Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata’s peace activities and became core members of the Japanese Pugwash movement. See Low, Science and the Building of a New Japan, p. 101. 80. “Paguwottshu Kaigi nitsuite,” Pugwash Japan, online at http://www.riise.hiroshima-u.ac.jp /pugwash/about.html. 81. Iwao Ogawa, “Kaisetsu,” in Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, Tomonaga Sin-Itiro¯ chosakushu¯,Vol.5,Kagakusha no shakaiteki sekinin (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo,¯ 1982), pp. 363–364; and Konuma, “Wasurerarenai koto,” pp. 305–307. 82. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai, p. 85; and F. 320 Letter, Miyazaki to Eaton, 30 April 1958, in MIT IASC, MC 167, Bernard T. Feld Papers, Box 32.

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toward the scientists’ peace efforts, an impression reinforced by Japanese officials’ lack of interest in contacting the Pugwash participants.83 The Japanese group thus had to press on privately with activities such as the Tomonaga seminar, concentrating on educating other Japanese scientists and the general population about the dangers of the nuclear arms race and the necessity of eliminating war. Five Japanese scientists—Yukawa, Tomonaga, Sakata, Ogawa, and Yasuo Miyake, a geochemist—participated in the Third Pugwash Conference, but no Japanese scientists attended the next three conferences, mainly because of difficulty in securing travel funds. Shimonaka’s generous support was only for the first conference. The Japanese Pugwash group sought to maintain its independence by eschewing regular financial support from any governmental or private organizations. The individual scientists had to depend on their own financial resources to sustain their activities, and the lack of funding limited Japanese participation and, consequently, the Japanese voice within Pugwash. Nevertheless, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata consistently supported the Pug- wash organization. Meanwhile, revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty surfaced as the most contentious issue related to Japan’s peace and security. From the time the treaty was signed in 1951, it had been the most divisive issue between conservatives and leftists. Under the 1955 system, the Japanese government and the LDP considered the treaty the cornerstone of Japan’s security and steadfastly worked to maintain it. The JSP,however, claimed that Japan should be a nonaligned, neutral country, and should avoid unnecessary involvement in Cold War conflicts. The Socialists therefore proposed denunciation of the treaty. Reflecting the political divide, popular discontent with the treaty’s unequal nature was rising when Kishi became prime minister in 1957. The Japanese and U.S. governments thus came to agree that revising the treaty was necessary to reliably sustain the Cold War alliance. Although leftists strongly opposed the treaty revision, the two governments signed the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in January 1960.84 The revision had divisive effects on the Japanese anti-nuclear peace movement. In the late 1950s, various groups rallied under Gensuikyotooppose¯ nuclear weapons. Although the umbrella organization was strongly influenced by Sohy¯ o¯ (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan), the JSP, and the JCP,

83. Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga and Toshiyuki Toyoda, “Taidan kiki no naka no Paguwottshu kaigi: Koko kara nani o hikidasu bekika,” in Tomonaga, Tomonaga Chosakushu¯, Vol. 5, pp. 134–135. 84. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Ox- ford University Press, 1997), ch. 8.

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it initially refrained from taking partisan actions. In March 1958, however, Gensuikyo,¯ together with Sohy¯ o,¯ JSP, and ten other organizations, began a campaign against the security treaty revision and faced criticism about en- gaging in political activities. After that, the LDP did not hesitate to show its hostility to Gensuikyo,¯ and conservative groups began distancing themselves from it. Moreover, some socialists, dissatisﬁed with the JSP’s handling of the treaty revision and other matters, seceded from the party and founded the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) in 1960. The DSP then formed a new anti- nuclear peace organization, Kakukin Kaigi (National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons) in August 1961.85 In response to the treaty revision, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata pursued the possibility of holding a Pugwash-like meeting of scientists in Japan. Like many Japanese liberal intellectuals, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata were deeply disturbed by the treaty revision. In April, they asked the SCJ to organize a conference similar to Pugwash meetings, fearing that people still embraced “the illusion of peace by force.”86 Because the SCJ would not accept any proposal critical of or contrary to government policy, the three scientists probably did not explicitly criticize the treaty revision in their appeal. But in the subsequent political turmoil, the scientists’ request to the SCJ was shelved. In May, the Kishi government pushed the treaty-ratiﬁcation bill through the Lower House of the Diet, but this produced anti-Kishi sentiment in Japanese society. Many people took to the streets to protest Kishi and champion democracy in Japan, and the anti-treaty revision movement developed into the largest mass movement of the postwar period. The bill, however, received Diet approval on 18 June, and Kishi then resigned.87

Japanese Critiques of Nuclear Deterrence Emerge

After the Third Pugwash Conference, there were some positive developments in international discussions on disarmament. The United States, Britain, and

85. Seiji Imahori, Gensuibaku jidai [Ge] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo,¯ 1960), pp. 111–129; and Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kokumin Kaigi and 21-seiki no Gensuikin Undo¯ o Kangaeru Kai, eds., Hirakareta “pandora no hako” to kaku haizetsu eno tatakai: Gensiryoku kaihatsu to Nihon no hikaku undo¯ (Tokyo: Nanatsumori Shokan, 2002), pp. 86–93. 86. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai, pp. 122–123; Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi Nenpo¯ Showa 35-nen 4-gatsu ∼ Showa 36-nen 3-gatsu (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi, 1962), p. 45; and “Paguwottshu kagakusha kara Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi eno yob¯ osho,”¯ in Sakata Kinen Shiryoshitsu,¯ Nihon Gakujutsu Kaigi dai 31-kai sokai¯ shiryo¯ tsuzuri, A-6-6-1. 87. Schaller, Altered States,ch.9.

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the Soviet Union each declared a moratorium on nuclear testing ahead of trilateral negotiations in Geneva in October 1958 to discuss a nuclear test ban. Then, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate GCD. There were setbacks too. France conducted its first nuclear test in February 1960, and the Soviet downing of a U.S. U-2 spy plane in May 1960 halted an incipient détente. Nonetheless, the group of Japanese Pugwash scientists remained optimistic about the prospect of disarmament. Their optimism did not last long. When Japanese physicist Toshiyuki Toyoda attended the Seventh and Eighth Pugwash Conferences in Septem- ber 1961 in Stowe, Vermont, the Japanese group was forced to deal with a major disappointment. On 31 August 1961, the Soviet Union had suddenly announced resumption of nuclear testing and conducted a test the next day. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata were deeply dismayed by this unilateral So- viet action, having regarded the nuclear test ban as a major step toward GCD and the abolition of war. Hence, they issued a public statement protesting nuclear testing and disseminated it to the Eighth Pugwash Conference.88 De- spite protests, the United States and the United Kingdom followed the Soviet Union’s action and resumed nuclear testing. In Japan, however, political parties and the government responded to popular concern about nuclear testing. In October 1961, the Lower and Up- per Houses of the Diet adopted, with supra-partisan support, resolutions that demanded every county to suspend nuclear testing immediately and requested the concerned countries to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban with effective international control. In response to these resolutions, the Japanese government protested to the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union against the resumption of nuclear testing and urged them to reach an agreement on a nuclear test ban.89 The Soviet Union’s resumption of nuclear testing also deepened internal division within the Japanese anti-nuclear movement. As a result, Gensuikyo¯ took on an increasingly leftwing coloration. Yet, even then, it was far from monolithic. The power struggle between the nonaligned circle, under the influence of Sohy¯ o¯ and the JSP, and the Communist-led circle, under the influence of the JCP, intensified within Gensuikyo.¯ The JSP claimed Gensuikyo¯ should oppose nuclear testing by any country, but the JCP defended the

88. Shoichi¯ Sakata, “Hoshano¯ no moto de kagakusha wa nani o subekika,” in Sakata, Kagaku, pp. 259– 260; and “Kakujittken yameyo,” Asahi Shimbun, 4 September 1961, p. 11. 89. Toshihiro Higuchi, “Kakujittken mondai to Ikeda gaiko:‘SengoNihonzonokyojitsuto‘hibaku¯ keiken,’” in Sumio Hatano, ed., Ikeda–Sato¯ seikenki no Nihon gaiko¯ (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo,¯ 2004), pp. 210–224.

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Soviet Union’s resumption of testing, opposing the Diet resolutions against it. This “any country” question caused severe strife within Gensuikyo,¯ further splitting the Japanese anti-nuclear peace movement.90 The Japanese government supported a nuclear disarmament measure in- compatible with nuclear deterrence, a policy whose effectiveness rests on the credible threat of the use of nuclear weapons. In November 1961, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on nuclear weapons proposed by twelve Asian and African member-states. Although the resolution did not explicitly prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it declared that their use was “contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity.”91 Considering the negative implications for Western defense strategy, the United States and its Western allies—except Japan—opposed the resolution. The Japanese government had reluctantly decided to vote for the UN resolution because of public opinion and the October Diet resolutions, which had also demanded an international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.92 Nevertheless, the concept of nuclear deterrence did not become a subject of disarmament discussion in Japan. The JCP championed nuclear weapons in the hands of Communist states as a deterrent to war after the Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing in September 1961.93 Those who opposed nuclear testing by “any country,” however, did not question the nuclear deterrence theory on which the JCP’s exculpation was based. Even when the Diet resolution of October 1961 was adopted, the political parties did not discuss the contradiction between nuclear deterrence and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in connection with Japan’s security alignment with the United States. Nuclear disarmament debates in Japan centered on what Japan should demand and stopped short of questioning obstacles to nuclear disarmament and strategies to overcome them. Eschewing the disorder of Japan’s anti-nuclear peace movement, Tomon- aga published articles in the fall of 1961 questioning nuclear deterrence. He was not naïve enough to expect that progress in disarmament could be eas- ily achieved. But, convinced that any policies obstructing disarmament were

90. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, pp. 241–246; Stockwin, The Japanese Socialist Party, pp. 100–101; and Seiji Imahori, Gensuibaku kinshi undo¯ (Tokyo: Ushio Shuppansha, 1974), pp. 176–191. 91. Hisashi Maeda, Gunshuku kosh¯ oshi¯ 1945-nen-1967-nen (Tokyo: Toky¯ o¯ Daigaku Shuttpankai, 1968), pp. 464–465. 92. Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nnichi-Bei kankei, p. 190. 93. Yuichi¯ Yoshikawa, ed., Komentaru¯ Sengo 50-nen: Hansen heiwa no shisotound¯ o,¯ dai 4-kan (Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha,¯ 1995), pp. 117–119.

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inadvisable, he concluded that a nuclear deterrence policy inherently risked promoting the arms race. Therefore, he felt compelled to critically examine it.94 Tomonaga’s subsequent comprehensive critique can be summarized as follows: 1. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that the balance of power could be dangerous because it could create temptation to launch a first strike. 2. Although the United States and the Soviet Union might individu- ally establish an infrastructure for instant retaliation against the op- ponent’s attack to prevent such an assault, such a system of mutual deterrence would increase the danger of accidental warfare resulting from mishaps or misperceptions. 3. The world would become stable and war would be deterred once the two nuclear powers built invulnerable bases for launching nuclear retaliation, reaching a state of nuclear saturation. But it is questionable whether reaching such a state was financially feasible and whether the concerned parties could resist the temptation to launch a first strike before they created such a condition. 4. The concept of deterrence was based on a paradox of preventing war by the possibility of causing war. Therefore, states adopting the policy of deterrence would deepen mutual distrust, and the arms race between them would be accelerated. 5. The idea of stable mutual deterrence might function between the United States and Soviet Union. But the number of states possessing nuclear weapons could increase, multiplying the chance of various dangers.95 In retrospect, it is remarkable that a Japanese physicist could have formulated this series of arguments against nuclear deterrence at that time. Tomonaga’s critique was rooted in the antiwar and anti-nuclear sentiments he shared with the Japanese public. But the influence of these sentiments alone cannot explain why Tomonaga paid attention to the problems of nuclear deterrence. The Japanese government had refrained from publicly explaining the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent for Japan’s security, and nuclear deterrence did not enter policy discussions until the late 1960s.

94. Shinjiro¯ Tanaka et al., “Zadan Kakujittken saikai to zenmen gunshuku,” in Tomonaga, Tomonaga Chosakushu¯, Vol. 5, pp. 103–104. 95. Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, “Kaku bakuhatsu jittken no saikai ni omou,” in Tomonaga, Tomonaga Chosakushu¯, Vol. 5, pp. 72–83; Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, “Jinrui no metsubo¯ o sukuu tameni,” in Tomon- aga, Tomonaga Chosakushu¯, Vol. 5, pp. 84–86; and Tanaka et al., “Zadan,” pp. 103–104.

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Transnational dissemination of ideas, including nuclear deterrence through Pugwash, helped to shape Tomonaga’s critique. Although participants in the Tomonaga seminar were not trained arms control specialists, they could grasp various concepts related to arms control and disarmament, including nuclear deterrence, by reading Pugwash materials. They could have accepted the concept of nuclear deterrence as many U.S. Pugwash scientists did. But, with strong antiwar and anti-nuclear sentiments in mind, Tomonaga could sufﬁciently grasp the problems of nuclear deterrence to examine the concept critically. Tomonaga’s critique of nuclear deterrence thus had both domestic and transnational sources. According to Ogawa, who regularly participated in the Tomonaga seminar, the study group was “the leading forum for studying and criticizing theories of nuclear strategy in Japan.” Ogawa recalled that Tomonaga’s critique originated from the study group.96 In addition, Tomonaga’s style of thinking inﬂuenced his approach to nuclear deterrence. His colleague Yukawa, for instance, was a man of vision pursuing a lofty goal and tackling essential problems for peace. Embracing world federalism, Yukawa directed his attention to problems of national sovereignty, a basic principle of the modern international system. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of morality in thinking about peace and nuclear issues, de- nouncing nuclear weapons as “absolute evil.”97 In contrast, Tomonaga was a pragmatic problem solver. He focused on a more concrete and manage- able problem: nuclear deterrence. He also recognized the morality involved but tried to examine nuclear deterrence critically through logical thinking based on facts. Thus, he questioned the policy’s assumptions and highlighted its possible negative consequences. By doing so, he laid the groundwork for the Japanese group’s critique of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, Yukawa’s and Tomonaga’s different approaches to peace and nuclear disarmament comple- mentarily enriched the Japanese Pugwash group’s analyses and visions for peace.

First Kyoto Conference of Scientists

In early 1962, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata decided to organize a Pugwash- like gathering of Japanese scientists. They wanted to reexamine how the

96. Ogawa, “Kaisetsu,” pp. 363–364. 97. Hideki Yukawa, “Waku kara hamidashita kagakusha: Dai 9-kai, dai 10-kai Paguwottshu kaigi ni shuttseki shite,” Sekai, No. 204 (December 1962), p. 43; and Hideki Yukawa, “The Absolute Evil,” BAS, Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 1981), p. 37.

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Japanese group could contribute to the Pugwash organization before the Tenth Pugwash Conference (London, September 1962), to which Yukawa had been invited. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata thus assumed co-organizing duties, calling for Japanese scholars and intellectuals who supported the Russell- Einstein Manifesto’s spirit to attend the small private meeting. They dared not collect donations for the meeting, asking attendees to pay their own expenses. Ogawa, Toyoda, and other young physicists in the Japanese group assisted them in arranging the meeting. Originally, the venue was a private ﬁrm’s dormitory at Katada in Shiga Prefecture. But just before the meeting, the ﬁrm’s president ordered the dormitory be made unavailable. He likely suspected the meeting would be a politically colored event. The Japanese Pugwash scientists hastily looked for a new meeting place, choosing Kyoto for logistical reasons, and securing space at Tenryuji, a Zen temple in Arashiyama. Therefore, the meeting was named KCS. In May 1962, twelve Japanese scientists and intellectuals gathered at the tranquil Zen temple. The meeting, closed to the public, as were the Pugwash meetings, lasted for three days. The four major topics of discussion were (1) banning nuclear weapons and disarmament, (2) morality in the age of science, (3) world peace and the constitution of Japan, and (4) disarmament and eco- nomics. The participants discussed these issues under the principle, “[T]he objective of avoiding total destruction must have priority over any other objective.” The philosopher Tetsuzo¯ Tanikawa called this paraphrase of Einstein’s words the “Einstein Principle.” After the conference, the participants issued a public statement prepared for discussion by Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata and signed by 21 well-known Japanese scientists and intellectuals, including some who had been unable to attend the KCS meeting.98 Following the example of Pugwash, Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata then formed a continuing committee to organize the KCS seminars and conferences, which became a major activity of the Japanese Pugwash group.99 The initial KCS statement illuminates the Japanese group’s thinking on nuclear deterrence. The statement begins with a warning about the dangers of a war that would bring about humankind’s total destruction. Yukawa and

98. “Kagakusha Kyoto¯ Kaigi no kiroku,” Sekai, No. 200 (August 1962), pp. 125–205; and Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, eds., Heiwa jidai, pp. 121–171. The signatories of the statement were Fujio Egami, Yoichi¯ Fukushima, Raicho¯ Hiratsuka, Yasunari Kawabata, Seiji Kaya, Seishi Kikuchi, Takeo Kuwabara, Yoshitaka Mimura, Yasuo Miyake, Toshiyoshi Miyasawa, Shigeru Nanbara, Jiro¯ Osaragi, Hyoe¯ Ouchi,¯ Shoichi¯ Sakata, Eizo¯ Tajima, Shinjiro¯ Tanaka, Tetsuzo¯ Tanikawa, Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, Shigeto Tsuru, Sakae Wagatsuma, and Hideki Yukawa. 99. On the Japanese group’s activities in the 1960s, see Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, Kakujidai, pp. 138–166; and Yukawa, Tomonaga and Toyoda, Kakugunshuku, pp. 310–339.

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the other signatories emphasized the significance of the Japanese constitution’s Article 9, which stipulates the renunciation of war: “As the country which has experienced the disastrous effects of nuclear weapons, and which has openly renounced war in its constitution,” they claimed, “Japan is in a position to make a special contribution to world peace.”100 They then affirmed, “today, when the danger of the destruction of the human race by nuclear warfare is growing ever more serious, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has a new significance, even greater than when the Constitution was first adopted.”101 The leftwing intellectuals at the KCS meeting naturally referred to the Peace Constitution, which served as a philosophical source for peace activism in postwar Japan. As scientists of the country that had suffered nuclear bombings and subsequently enshrined the Peace Constitution, the KCS participants had a strong incentive to seek abolition of war and elimination of nuclear weapons. The Japanese group thus regarded the Russell-Einstein Manifesto as the Pugwash Movement’s most important guiding principle. In the next part of the statement, Yukawa and others reported their agree- ments on the KCS topics and express their opposition to nuclear deterrence. According to the statement, “the view that the ‘deterrent’ effect of the continued possession of nuclear weapons helps to preserve peace . . . is exceedingly dangerous.”102 It then explained why.

As long as policies relying for the suppression of war on weapons of mass murder continue to be followed, the rival nations will inevitably do their utmost to hold on to the maximum power of retaliation, and in consequence their war potential will continue to grow. The result will be an increasingly unstable military situation, which in turn will increase the danger of war being started—leaving aside the possibility of an ‘accidental’ outbreak—though an incorrect appraisal of the situation, or through a mistaken judgment of the military strength of the enemy. In the KCS participants’ view, “the policy of depending on nuclear weapons for the prevention of war is in direct contradiction to our objective, the abolition of war. We are therefore compelled to oppose this policy.”103 Evidently, their argument rested on Tomonaga’s critical analysis of nuclear deterrence. The statement criticizing nuclear deterrence became a public KCS document, and with it the Japanese group deﬁned its position.

100. Hideki Yukawa, “Activities of the Japanese Pugwash Group,” in Proceedings of the Tenth Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1962, p. 74. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid., p. 75. 103. Ibid.

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Their view of how to implement the GCD process reflected their ob- jection to nuclear deterrence. The KCS statement expressed satisfaction that numerous concrete plans, which appeared to provide effective means of preventing war, had been advanced at the ENDC. They were “most impressed by the proposals for the abolition of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and withdrawal of military bases from foreign territory.” They expected “both measures to be carried out at the earliest possible moment under strict and effective international control.”104 This meant that KCS participants favored the nuclear disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union but rejected those by the United States. Nevertheless, they favored the Soviet measures not because they were particularly sympathetic to the former or antagonistic to the latter but because they sincerely hoped for swift progress in nuclear disarmament. The KCS statement also criticized traditional thinking and practices of international politics based on the concept of national sovereignty. It claimed, “Confronted as we are by many pressing problems, our thinking must advance to a new dimension, transcending the current habit of looking upon national sovereignty as the highest of all values.”105 The statement then affirmed, “the narrow concept of national self-interest” shows “itself so clearly in the present nuclear arms race.”106 This line of argument, which reflected Yukawa’s belief in world federalism, implies their view of nuclear deterrence as the very embodiment of an entrenched, destructive habit in the name of national security. The critique was consistent with the KCS participants’ esteem for Arti- cle 9 of the Japanese constitution, and it explains why they assumed Japan was uniquely positioned to contribute to world peace. Although Yukawa did not demand that other KCS participants approve his world federalism, they accepted his critique of traditional thinking and practices based on national sovereignty without resistance: in fact, his critique lay beneath their critique of nuclear deterrence. After the Kyoto conference, the Japanese Pugwash group promoted its achievements in Japan. Yukawa, Tomonaga, Sakata, and other participants contributed feature articles on the meeting to a Japanese monthly magazine, Sekai (The World).107 The Japanese group had close cooperative relations with

104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., p. 76. 106. Ibid. 107. “Kagakusha Kyoto¯ Kaigi no kiroku,” pp. 125–205.

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Sekai’s publishing company, Iwanami Shoten, and the liberal magazine served as a major medium for reporting on Pugwash and KCS’s activities. Moreover, the Japanese Pugwash group organized public meetings. In July 1962, the SCJ special committee on atomic energy, under the chairmanship of Sakata, hosted a symposium on Pugwash in Tokyo. Three KCS participants, Tomon- aga, Tanikawa, and Shigeto Tsuru, spoke on their presentation topics from the Kyoto meeting, and Yukawa reported on the Ninth and Tenth Pugwash conferences.108 Then, in October, a public meeting on Pugwash was held at the SCJ lecture hall in Tokyo. The speakers were Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Ogawa.109 The Japanese group concurrently forwarded the Kyoto conference’s mes- sage to concerned authorities and individuals globally and initiated its critique of nuclear deterrence at Pugwash. The Japanese government disregarded the KCS statement.110 So the group translated it into English and sent it to the ENDC member-states, the UN Secretary General, the scientiﬁc academy of each country, the Japanese ambassador to the UN, and peace activists.111 At the Tenth Pugwash Conference, Yukawa reported on the Japanese group’s activities, distributing the Kyoto conference statement, which became the ﬁrst comprehensive critique of nuclear deterrence presented at Pugwash.112 Thus, the Japanese group embarked on its long struggle against the nuclear deterrence policy at Pugwash.

Japanese Scientists’ Challenge to the Nuclear Deterrence Theory Continues

In Geneva, the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union over nuclear deterrence in the GCD process narrowed. The U.S. government insisted that, until the GCD process’s third and ﬁnal stage, both sides should

108. “Kagakusha Kyoto¯ Kaigi no ‘kokai,’”¯ Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 June 1962, Evening Ed., p. 9. 109. Toshiyuki Toyoda, “Kagakusha no heiwa undo,”¯ Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 September 1962, Evening Ed., p. 7. 110. Major Japanese newspapers reported on the KCS conference and its statement, whereas in an exchange at the National Diet on 22 August 1962 the head of the Science and Technology Agency, Tsuruyo Kondo,¯ admitted she had neither heard of the KCS meeting nor read its statement. “Kaku kinshi kyotei¯ ga kyumu,”¯ Asahi Shimbun, 10 May 1962, p. 1; “‘Shuti¯ atsumete kanzen gunshuku,’” Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 May 1962, p. 1; and Dai 41-kai Kottkai Shugiin¯ Kagaku Gijutsu ShinkoTaisaku¯ Tokubetsuiin Kaigiroku, dai 3-go, 22 August 1962, p. 16. 111. “Seimeibun o sekai kattkoku ni hattso,”¯ Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 July 1962. 112. Yukawa, “Activities of the Japanese Pugwash Group,” pp. 72–77.

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retain a limited nuclear force. The Soviet government moved toward the U.S. position after the Tenth Pugwash Conference in September 1962, proposing that both sides retain a limited number of strategic nuclear missiles as a “nuclear umbrella” until the second stage. In September 1963 the Soviet authorities accepted the U.S. position of maintaining nuclear deterrence until the third stage.113 In between the two Soviet proposals, the superpowers went through the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, and then in August 1963, the U.S., Soviet, and British governments signed the Limited Test Ban Trea t y. Meanwhile, the Japanese Pugwash group continued to warn that nuclear deterrence was an ultimate danger. In May 1963, the Second Kyoto Confer- ence was held in Takehara, Hiroshima Prefecture. The participants discussed topics such as the world situation after the Cuban missile crisis, Japan in Asia, and the social responsibilities of scientists. After the meeting, they issued a statement.114 At that time, the U.S. government requested a port call in Japan for a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine that was allegedly carrying no nuclear weapons. The request provoked strong opposition from leftists and scientists concerned about military implications and safety problems in Japan.115 The statement approved after the second KCS by eleven Japanese intellectuals and scholars noted that “[d]eterrence policy is taking the shape of nuclear strategy mainly composed of nuclear submarines assuming the character of mobile nuclear missile bases” and claimed, “It is not an exaggeration to say that all the people around the world are ‘hostages’ of a few world policymakers.”116 The statement also suggested that Japan’s role in

[m]aintaining the principle of non-nuclear armaments to deny the introduction of any nuclear weapons into Japan shall not just reduce the risk of involvement of Japan in war, but be effective to prevent the establishment of the system of nuclear strategy in Asia and be a great contribution of Japan to world peace.117

113. Kurosaki, “Kakuheiki tono kyozon,”¯ p. 47; and Tal, The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, pp. 212–221. 114. Shuz¯ o¯ Takagi, Shuz¯ o¯ Ogawa, and Shoichir¯ o¯ Otsuki,¯ “Kagakusha no sekinin to kaku hibusono¯ gensoku: Dai 2-kai Kagakusha Kyoto¯ Kaigi no toron¯ kara,” Sekai, No. 211 (July 1963), pp. 43–51. 115. Boei¯ Nenkan Kanko¯ Kai, ed., Boei¯ nenkan 1964 (Tokyo: Boei¯ Nenkan Kanko Kai, 1964), pp. 107–108. 116. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, Kakujidai, pp. 181–182. The signatories of the second KCS statement included Bokuro¯ Eguchi, Osamu Kuno, Shoichi¯ Sakata, Sumi Sakuma, Hiroshi Suekawa, Shinjiro¯ Tanaka, Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, Mokichiro¯ Nogami, Yoshitaka Mimura, Yasuo Miyake, and Hideki Yukawa. 117. Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, Kakujidai, p. 183.

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Disregarding Japanese scientists’ warnings, the Japanese government decided to accept the U.S. request in October 1964, and the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine Seadragon visited Sasebo soon thereafter.118 At Pugwash the gap between the main group and the Japanese group over nuclear deterrence widened further. As a result of Soviet concessions in Geneva, Soviet scientists ﬁnally accepted the concept of a minimum deterrent force at the Twelfth Pugwash Conference held in Udaipur, India, in early 1964. According to the meeting’s statement, the participants “welcome[d] the proposal of the USSR to extend it [a minimum deterrent force] to the end of the disarmament process” and “regard[ed] the possibility of agreement on the principles of a nuclear umbrella, or minimum deterrence force, to offer one of the most helpful avenues to reach agreement on comprehensive disarmament under effective controls.”119 A Japanese delegate, Yasuo Miyake, who did not participate in the working group that dealt with GCD but had attended the conference’s last plenary session at which all participants discussed the statement, did not refer to objections to minimum deterrence raised at the session or on any other occasions in his conference report published in Sekai.120 At Pugwash, scientists from nuclear powers largely accepted nuclear deterrence by the mid-1960s, and the Japanese group became a clear minority challenging the intellectual hegemony of nuclear deterrence theory. Later, this intellectual hegemony was ﬁrmly established at Pugwash. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals while simultaneously pursuing control measures for nuclear non-proliferation and strategic arms limitation without making any progress in GCD negotiations.121 Pugwash in turn paid much less attention to GCD and instead explored ways to promote nuclear arms control efforts based on stable mutual deterrence; that is, Mutual As- sured Destruction. Pugwash’s support for the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems clearly demonstrated this point.122 Given the Cold War rivalry and mutual U.S.-Soviet distrust, Pugwash gave overriding priority to maintaining stable mutual deterrence and facilitating cooperation between the superpowers to avert nuclear war and halt the nuclear arms race.

118. Boei¯ Nenkan Kanko¯ Kai, Boei¯ nenkan 1965 (Tokyo: Boei¯ Nenkan Kanko Kai, 1965), pp. 130– 131. 119. Statement from the Twelfth Pugwash Conference, in Proceedings of the Twelfth Pugwash Confer- ence on Science and World Affairs, Pugwash Continuing Committee, 1964, p. 8. 120. Yasuo Miyake, “Paguwottshu kaigi yori kaerite,” Sekai, No. 221 (May 1964), pp. 140–149. 121. Powaski, March to Armageddon, ch. 8–11. 122. Evangelista, Unarmed Forces, pp. 131–140, 200–211; and Kubbig, “Communicators.”

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However, the Japanese group continued to preach the fallacies of nuclear deterrence at Pugwash, arguing that abolition of nuclear weapons and war, as called for in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, could not be achieved without rejecting the nuclear deterrence concept and policy. The Japanese group cited the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race to justify their position. The group became increasingly frustrated with Pugwash for deviating from the spirit of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto.123 The Japanese group’s critique of nuclear deterrence came to a climax when a Pugwash symposium was held in Kyoto in August 1975. As proposed by the Japanese group, the theme of the Kyoto symposium, the first official Pugwash event held in Japan, was “A New Design for Nuclear Disar- mament.” The Japanese group was eager to exploit this opportunity to bring Pugwash back to the spirit of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. Yukawa and Tomonaga drafted a statement titled “Beyond Nuclear Deterrence” and asked the participants to sign it during the meeting. The majority endorsed the statement, also known as the Yukawa-Tomonaga Manifesto.124 The Japanese group then asked the Continuing Committee to include the statement in the symposium monograph, but their request was rejected. Because of a Pugwash rule that only papers officially presented to its meetings could be published as Pugwash documents, the manifesto was not treated as an official Pugwash statement.125 Nevertheless, it was printed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- tists, whose editor-in-chief, Bernard T. Feld, was the then secretary general of Pugwash.126 Furthermore, disarmament discussions at subsequent conferences suggest the Japanese group had succeeded in getting Pugwash to reconsider the utility and validity of nuclear deterrence in the late 1970s.127

123. Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, “Kakuyokushi seisaku no mujun,” in Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, Kakujidai, pp. 14–33; and Shoichi¯ Sakata, “Heiwa no ronri no sozo¯ to kagakusha no sekinin,” in Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, Kakujidai, pp. 34–42. See also Yukawa Hideki, “Thoughts on Nu- clear Disarmament: Restructuring the Pugwash Movement,” in William Epstein and Toshiyuki Toy- oda, eds., A New Design for Nuclear Disarmament: Pugwash Symposium, Kyoto, Japan (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1977), pp. 77–82; and Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, “On the Concept of Nuclear Deter- rence,” in Epstein and Toyoda, eds., A New Design for Nuclear Disarmament, pp. 98–100. 124. Toshiyuki Toyoda, “Atarashii hok¯ o¯ o motomete,” Sekai, No. 361 (December 1975), pp. 155– 171; and Iwao Ogawa and Eiji Yamada, “Kyoto¯ shinpojiumu ni tsuite,” in Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Toyoda, Kakugunshuku, pp. 310–339. 125. F 378, Notes on the 43th Pugwash Council Meeting, Madras, India, 11, 12, 14, and 16 January 1976, in MIT IASC, MC 167, Feld Papers, Box 37. 126. Hideki Yukawa and Sin-Itiro¯ Tomonaga, “Beyond Nuclear Deterrence,” BAS,Vol.31,No.10 (December 1975), p. 9. 127. The Statement of Principles for the Pugwash Movement adopted at the 27th Pugwash conference acknowledges that “[a]n alternative must be found to reliance on nuclear deterrence, based on the concept of assured mutual destruction, as the means of preserving peace.” “Statement of Principles

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The Japanese group’s critique persisted throughout the Cold War, but as a small dissenting voice within Pugwash. Although the group relentlessly challenged the intellectual hegemony of nuclear deterrence, Pugwash still had not undertaken a thorough reexamination of its validity when the Cold War ended. Until then, the foremost priorities for Pugwash had been to prevent nuclear war, curb the nuclear arms race, and provide the United States and the Soviet Union with an informal communications channel to facilitate mutual understanding while opposing measures and actions that could destabilize mutual deterrence; for instance, Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Ini- tiative.128 Although the Japanese group sought an alternative path toward peace by criticizing nuclear deterrence, as demonstrated in KCS statements, Pugwash effectively maintained the bipolar Cold War order based on stable mutual deterrence between the superpowers. In Japan, the conservative government simply ignored the Japanese group’s opposition to nuclear deterrence and Japan’s involvement in the Cold War conﬂict. On the one hand, the LDP government stuck to the Three Non- Nuclear Principles, which came to be called Kokuze (National Policy).129 On the other hand, the conservative government regarded the Japan-U.S. security alignment as the foundation of Japan’s national security. Moreover, the government had declared dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrence a policy in 1968. Confronting neutralist and Communist-oriented opposition parties, the LDP government was determined to maintain this policy. As long as the LDP retained political power, prospects were nil that the Japanese government would alter its Cold War policies in the manner the Japanese Pugwash group desired. Even though the members of the Japanese group had no impact on the Cold War reality, they deserve attention for their innovative, difﬁcult, and unique role, both in the Pugwash organization and in Japanese society. Through their willingness to assume the uncomfortable and unrewarded position of the dissenting minority, the group members repeatedly reminded Pugwash scientists about the spirit of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and stim- ulated disarmament discussions at Pugwash conferences. In Japan, the group presented the public with a logical argument for refusing to live with nuclear

for the Pugwash Movement,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, 1977, pp. 33–34. 128. John P.Holdren and Joseph Rotblat, eds., Strategic Defense and the Future of Arms Race: A Pugwash Symposium (London: Macmillan, 1987). 129. Akihiko Tanaka, Anzenhosho:¯ Sengo 50-nen no mosaku (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997), pp. 224–225.

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weapons. In 1979, Japanese scholar Takehiko Yamamoto acknowledged that the literature produced by the Japanese Pugwash scientists “had a great intellectual impact on the direction of the anti-nuclear peace movement and peace research in Japan.”130 Moreover, despite the end of the Cold War, the Japanese group’s critique of nuclear deterrence has not become completely irrelevant. U.S.-North Korean exchanges of nuclear threats in 2017-2018 are a reminder that the nuclear age continues. Humanity still faces the nuclear threat. For these reasons, an analysis of Japanese scientists’ struggle against nuclear deterrence theory is worthwhile.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP20730121 and JP24730136. I want to thank Holger Nehring, Carola Sachse, and Alison Kraft, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this essay. I am also grateful to Toshihiro Higuchi for meticulously commenting on a draft of this article. Lastly, I express my deepest gratitude to a long-time member of the Japanese Pugwash group, Michiji Konuma, who worked under Yukawa, Tomonaga, and Sakata, for sharing his memories with me and assisting me in obtaining various materials.

130. Takehiko Yamamoto, “Anzenhosho¯ gunshuku,” Kokusai Seiji, Vol. 1979, Nos. 61–62 (May 1979), p. 297.

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