Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 26 Katja Thierjung

Abstract In formulating a critical social theory, Jurgen€ Habermas endeavors to find a framework for evaluating the problems of a modern, globalized society and finding a substantial opportunity to overcome them. That framework also addresses, of course, questions relating to business and problems in business ethics. In this chapter, the building blocks of the critical social theory will be converged with the help of Habermas’s works. As a basis, Habermas developed the Theory of Communicative Action. It serves as the foundation for developing his discourse ethics, which in turn are enhanced and implemented using the legal philosophy in discourse theory. The implementation possibilities of discourse ethics will finally be evaluated with the help of two fundamental paradigms from interaction economics.

Introduction

In formulating a critical social theory, Jurgen€ Habermas endeavors to find a framework for evaluating the problems of a modern, globalized society and finding a substantial opportunity to overcome them. That framework also addresses, of course, questions relating to business and problems in business ethics. In this chapter, the building blocks of the critical social theory will be converged with the help of Habermas’s works: The first section will begin with a reconstruction of the Theory of Communicative Action and the social concept built upon it in order to explore Habermas’s critical approach to social theory. The second section follows with a presentation of discourse ethics. With regard to his moral theory, Habermas views himself as having two tasks: On the one hand, philosophical theory must

K. Thierjung German Academy of Science and Engineering acatech, Gr€afstr. 87, Munchen,€ Germany e-mail: [email protected]

C. Luetge (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, 529 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_87, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013 530 K. Thierjung release its claim to what is, ultimately, metaphysically founded knowledge. Ethics are therefore no longer a matter of strict knowledge that is binding to all. On the other hand, Habermas simultaneously does not want to fall into relativism. In discourse ethics, Habermas believes to have found an alternative to cognitivism and relativism. The third section centers on the implementation of discourse ethics. This concretely deals with the application of norms and with the implementation of norms within a modern social context. Habermas develops for this a two-level society concept, which is intended to be tailored to modern circumstances by linking paradigms of communicative actions and systemic functional relationships. His link is the rule of law intended to mediate between lifeworlds and the social subsystems of capitalism and modern government machinery. In the interest of proposing a solution, he reconstructs the principles of a democratic state with the rule of law using concepts from discourse theory. Finally, the fourth section will make an initial analytical evaluation of the implementation possibilities of discourse ethics with the help of two fundamental paradigms from interaction economics.

The Foundations of Discourse Ethics: Communicative Action

Habermas’s aim is to use the “Theory of Communicative Action” to win a moment of critical unconditionality against relativism without falling into the problems of traditional metaphysics in its continental manifestation. To do so, he hopes to build upon an immanent rationality he sees formed in empirically founded knowledge from contemporary theories. When doing so, Habermas assumes that a significant degree of rationality has already materialized in the world (see [1]). Reconstruction of this rationality is assessed according to coherent viewpoints of coherence and can claim neither exclusivity nor ultimate justification (see [2]). Simultaneously, Habermas disputes the fundamental assumptions of ethical relativism. In order to immanently justify a comprehensive rationality concept, Habermas refers to, above all, Speech Act Theory: What is decisive for him is the experience that argumentative speech has in unifying consensus-creating power without having to revert to physical force. This moment of consensus via discourse and without violence is the fundamental building block of all of his philosophical endeavors. Habermas references the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and his concept of rationality: Every act of speech implies one or multiple claims to validity that have to be justified using arguments. These arguments and their consensus-creating function are, for Habermas, evidence of a rationality that is anchored in the essence of normal speech. The Theory of Communicative Rationality focuses on the nature of this rationality. Also, the Theory of Communicative Rationality investigates the formal properties of methods for justifying claims of validity that agents capable of speech and action use in their speech (see [1], p. 28). Since linguistic processes for agreement are an opportunity for action coordination, Habermas recognizes the ability of subjects to come to an agreement as being a significant element for a society to function (see [2], p. 68). Claims to validity 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 531 made during verbal negotiations are based on an evaluation of the situation. When pertaining to the order of interpersonal relations, statements are made with a claim to correctness. Statements of this kind express a norm, i.e., a certain imperative. The criterion for decidability is acceptance of the validity and/or justification. Statements of this kind are based on the mutual social world as the totality of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations (see [3]). This consent to or denial of the claims of validity presented in the discussion constitutes the basis for an agreement to a situational interpretation and therefore the possibility of cooperative action. Habermas then states that there are two possibilities for attaining consent to claim to validity. There is teleological or “strategic action” (see [1], p. 131): Teleological action is performed by an agent that, above all else, is attempting to realize an objective that has already been sufficiently defined with precision. Thus, agreement motivates the interlocutor, empirically, i.e., with a threat of sanctions or with a perspective for reward, to initiate mutual action toward an objective that has already been indicated. Coordinating action under these circumstances depends merely on the interests of those involved, i.e., on the question of whether the benefit calculations of the individual agents match or not (see [2], p. 144). By contrast, the objective of “communicative action” is an entirely different mechanism of action coordination. The opponent is rationally motivated to con- summate a subsequent action. The objective is rationally based agreement in the assessment of situations and the expected consequences from actions, such that there can be internal coordination of action plans. According to Habermas, this happens due to the force of the illocutionary binding effect of a speech-act offer. Habermas traces this binding force to an internal relationship between claims to validity and grounds. If an agent enters into an agreement and takes a position toward the claims to validity of a speech act offer, then this position will funda- mentally have “a moment of insight”(see [4]) in the eyes of the subject, as claims to validity cannot be accepted or denied in agreement-oriented actions without grounds. Habermas also calls the “moment of insight” the “forceless force of the better argument” or also “affection via grounds” which strongly shows the “rational side” to Habermas’ theory (see [5]). However, this moment, i.e., the rationally motivated acceptance of a speech-act offer, is not based on the actual validity of what was said but rather on the guarantee that the speaker assumes for his statement. In the event of statements with a claim to truth or correctness, the speaker will indicate grounds that will assume a guarantee for the statement. In these two cases, claims to validity can be submitted discursively (see [2], p. 69). Habermas further states that communicative understanding is largely based on having a mutual lifeworld. This makes it possible for participants to revert to mutual background knowledge in their communication. Most arguments intended as a foundation for claims to validity in discourse are generated from this background knowledge. Each communication participant is a member of the lifeworld that is subconsciously present for him for the current setting. If the communication partners share a similar lifeworld, then most of the communication processes will be unproblematic as they can revert to the same patterns of interpretation. Thus, it is 532 K. Thierjung not necessary for each individual situation to be renegotiated in full detail. Should, however, an argument be rejected by an interlocutor as being invalid, then the horizon in which that argument is embedded becomes problematic. This questions the claim to validity, and the grounds for its foundation are requested. In such cases, there is need for agreement with regard to current possibilities for action. However, it is not the entire lifeworld that is questioned here, but rather only a section relevant to the situation. The content of the lifeworld can never be entirely comprehended by the actor anyway. The content is not conscious, but rather, it is merely an unproblematic background that can become relevant in sections depending on the situation. If the same lifeworld is shared, then action coordination will be more successful. Thus, the lifeworld plays a large role when individual subjects are intended to be socially integrated into a society (see [4], p. 189).

Discourse Ethics: The Process of Moral Argumentation

In his works Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action and Remarks on Discourse Ethics, Habermas explains the methodology for transcendental argumentation and the foundations for discourse ethics. In doing so, Habermas assumes that rational agreement is based on certain requisite conditions. These conditions have already been set before any act of communication and must be accepted exactly when a human, a speaking entity, enters into a communication process with another speaking entity in the interest of action coordination. Since this objective is inevitable for every entity capable of speech and action, there is a “transcendental necessity” [6]. Transcendental does not mean that the general pragmatic preconditions for communication represent obligations in the moral sense of natural law: A transcendental argumentation always refers to the requisite conditions for the possibility of something. Thus, Habermas is always searching for the “general preconditions (...) under which our daily communicative practice has always taken place (...)” ([2], p. 141). With transcendental argumentation, Habermas embeds practical discourse as a form of agreement into the interrelations of communicative action. He bases this on communicative reason, which he believes can be easily presupposed to the extent that we, as speaking entities, are reliant upon verbal agreement in general. This transcendental necessity simply does not allow any discourse participant a choice other than to accept the conditions of communicative action a priori. Whether they are actually observed, from an empirical point of view, does not play a role. Indeed, Habermas is not naive in this point and is very critical toward the potential ability to realize a rational agreement process. However, there is a legitimacy in supposing a rational outcome if the conditions are nearly fulfilled (see [2], p. 162, [7]). If one engages in communication, one must assume that there is at least a possibility for rational agreement in order to act coherently. Thus, the argument of transcendental necessity is based on the coherence of a speaking entity with the conditions of its nature. In this manner, Habermas circumvents the burden of proof of ultimate justification for basic ethical norms and avoids the problems that an ethical cognitivist has when 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 533 wanting to deductively justify basic ethical norms. Habermas executes this argumentation chain with reference to Karl-Otto Apel. But in contrast to Habermas, Apel does, however, attempt to maintain a claim to ultimate justification using transcendental pragmatics. While Habermas does build upon Apel’s conception, he wants to liberate the approach from its heavily cognitive content. To do so, he refers to the change from the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language. According to Habermas, one cannot identify statement truths on the analytical level of language pragmatics (see [2], p. 90ff). Habermas relies on the “weaker assumption of a claim to validity analogous to truth (...), ([2], p. 66)” which only inquires about the form of arguments that can claim validity as justifications for norms. Claims to correctness are therefore no longer reduced to claims to truth. With this concept, Habermas can avoid an anticipatory judgment of the credibility of diverse claims to validity and leave judgment to the respective interlocutor. There is no longer a duty to assess the content of good grounds. Habermas does not anticipate the outcome of rational discourse. The discursive submission of claims to validity alone determines the view of the world (see [6], p. 130ff). However, Habermas formulates the legitimacy procedure for testing action norms. These can only claim legitimacy among those affected after submitting the claim to validity in discourse under transcendental rules. The “normative” content of discourse rules may not be equated to the obligatory content of interaction norms. The general pragmatic prerequisites to legitimate discourse are not a part of an ethical program for determining action obligations. Rather, the pragmatic prerequisites merely spell out the exterior framework for an argumentation practice in which the moral rules of human action can be tested. The normative orientation is a matter of the discourse; discourse ethics only explicate the formal rules for the dispute. The results of a practical discourse are therefore rationally motivated and can be suggested as the expression of a justified and well-founded consensus. Thus, Habermas shows himself opposed to the view of relativism. As such, Habermas is skeptical of the view that moral questions can be rationally decided at all. It is not, however, the philosopher who makes the decision, but rather the respective discourse that is governed by rules of argumentation. Habermas’s principle of discourse ethics is as follows: “Every valid norm would meet with the approval of all concerned if they could take part in a practical discourse”([6], p. 12). To spell out rules of discourse, Habermas deliberates the conversational situation that would have to exist in order for the forceless force of the better argument to come into consideration, i.e., in order for communicative action to be conducive. These unavoidable general argumentation prerequisites, which have to be pragmat- ically assumed by the participants prior to entering discourse, are, above all, based on the principle that all participants are viewed as “free and equal in a cooperative search for truth” ([6], p. 61). The underlying concept is based on the symmetry conditions and reciprocity expectations of communicative action in general. This includes, for example, the principles of openness, of equal participation, of truthfulness, and of unconstraint. The path to demonstrating performative self- contradictions shows that each one of these conditions is unavoidable in attaining 534 K. Thierjung the communicative action’s objective of agreement via good grounds and only via the force of the better argument. Thomas McCarthy interprets the discourse preconditions as the exclusion of deception and self-deception, of consciously strategic action and subconscious communication contortions. In any case, those wishing to justify norms must accept these procedural conditions. This means that the unavoidable argumentation perquisites are not met if, firstly, certain participants, topics, or contributions are not admitted or, secondly, when consent or denial is forced due to sanctions or suggestions (see [6], p. 161ff). These rules can be bundled into Habermas’s Universalization Principle:“Every valid norm must satisfy the condition that the consequences and side effects that foreseeably occur from its general compliance can be accepted unforcefully by all who are affected to satisfy the interest of every individual” ([6], p. 12). The Discourse Ethics Principle stipulates that norms can be justified. The universalization principle handles exactly this prerequisite. Therefore, it does not stipulate any normative content for the respective argumentation; rather, it sets the framework conditions for the exchange of claims to validity during discourse (see [2], pp. 76, 103). Habermas characterizes the moral viewpoint of discourse ethics consistently with tradition as being the standpoint from which an especially high degree of impartiality in judgment, and therefore justice, can be guaranteed. However, he contradicts tradition by opposing the construction of a neutral observer and perspective distance. For Habermas, all moral phenomena are allowed into a daily practice to which we only have access as participants. Thus, the philosopher does not have exclusive access to reason. Rational decisions can only be made in discourse through discursive submission of claims to validity. Therefore, it is not possible for an individual to replace discourse with a monolog or with a dialog with an ideal discourse partner. By contrast, discourse opens up the opportunity to test the ability to generalize action norms by truly addressing all conflicting needs and interests of all discourse participants. This makes it possible to make mutual criticisms on interpretation perspectives in action situations and on the appropriateness of articulating needs. According to Habermas, moral conflicts cannot be solved “in everyone’s interest,” i.e., abstractly and without actually integrating the participants. Therefore, discourse transferred to the inside can serve a substitution function but cannot be an equivalent for real discourse. All who are affected must participate in order to rationally decide whether it meets mutual interest. Thus, Habermas also provides his universalization principle with a setting that guarantees the integration of all participants; in this manner, monological application is barred. The impartiality of the judgment is ensured from the viewpoint of the participants themselves (see [2], p. 156, [6], p. 76ff). Habermas justifies this procedure using the lifeworld concept: Moral values are a part of a horizon of subconscious knowledge to which nonparticipating third parties cannot find hermeneutic access. As a result, the construction of a neutral observer falls short of its objective, as the observer does not have access to the lifeworld moral concepts of those affected. In discourse, it is possible for an individual to break through the limits of that individual’s own concrete lifeworld and relate to a mutual “moral point of view” ([2], p. 174) with the others. In the 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 535 general pragmatic prerequisites for argumentative communication, Habermas finds a viewpoint that interaction participants always assume if they act communicatively at all. This is based on the structure of communication itself and not on a contextual principle that could be found independently of the individual communicative process. Therefore, a moral viewpoint can be accepted even if the discourse participants have deviating value concepts. Discourse ethics thus search for a point with precedence over all controversies, and all subjects have to accept this when acting communicatively. Habermas believes to have found this point in the reciprocity arising from free acceptance in coming to an agreement. Habermas supports this line of thought using above all else the works of Theodor W. Adorno on “intact intersubjectivity” and George Herbert Mead’s concept of “ideal role assumption” (see [1], p. 523f). An ideal form of reciprocity requires the concept of a universally imagined, rationally motivated mutual understanding as reference point. The discursive testing of norms therefore continues to correspond to the intuition that moral statements not only claim validity for individual persons but also imply a sense of “self- transgression” ([6], p. 157). In discourse, the limits of a particular lifeworld are penetrated, be it in a family, a city, or a nation. Thus, validity is not put on level with social acceptance. Impartial judgment of the interests of all affected cannot be reduced to an equally distributed chance to assert their own interests. In order to avoid acceptance and power claims becoming identical, norm acceptance may not be robbed of its cognitive meaning. Habermas does not place consideration of this meaning into the hands of philosophers, but rather refers to “a discursively ascer- tainable, i.e., cognitively tangible interest visible from the participant perspective (...)” ([2], p. 84). The “validity” of moral principles is ensured mildly by the respective mutual acceptance of good grounds. The construction of a universal, rationally motivated understanding in turn requires an ideal communication community incorporating all subjects capable of speech and action that aims to attain that understanding in rational discourse. This conceptualized liberalization of restrictions in social space and in historical time is intended to serve as a guide for a discourse that does not exclude any participants, topics, or contributions. If followed, then it can be conjectured that a rational decision will be reached. The meaning of this ideal entirely corresponds to the Kantian “Idee” in the sense of constant convergence. Like Kant, Habermas refers to the example of physics, which also works with a contrafactual assumption that one can come as close as one prefers to ideal sizes. Even if this concept remains purely regulative, the claim to absoluteness in ethical norms in traditional universal ethical theories is ultimately replaced without, however, simultaneously falling into relativism (see [6], p. 155ff). The result can claim the assumption of rationality, but no more than that. Furthermore, a selective, discursive agreement on norms in coexistence implies a time and knowledge index. Even if all argumentation prerequisites could be fulfilled, there can be no certainty that the result will withstand every future criticism. That is why the formulation of rights and obligations cannot claim “absolute validity” as the result of nonviolent discourse. Habermas dubs this the “fallibilism” integrated into discourse theory. 536 K. Thierjung

A further significant element of the ethics conception in Habermas’s discourse theory is the differentiation between ethical and moral questions or norms and values that he lays down in Remarks on Discourse Ethics and then further develops in his work Between Facts and Norms. Habermas differentiates between two potential perspectives. While ethical questions implement the individual answers for attaining a good life, ethics factor this out completely and focus on the aspects of justice. In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas assigns to the two perspectives their own discourse type by applying the discourse principle to the respective subject matter, thereby inferring the matching argumentation rules (see [8]). 1. Values incorporate questions of identity and self-image, i.e., ethical questions cannot generally be answered in a manner that is obligatory to everyone. The self-image of a person or a community as a whole is shaped with the help of strong evaluations. The perspective of ethical questions is egocentric for the single individual or ethnocentric with regard to a culture. The mutual lifeworld constitutes the horizon within which new mutual action possibilities are elicited for the future. Decisions of this kind not only lead to actions but also affirm our identity and form the foundation for the lifestyle shared between agents. This does not, however, mean that rational answers for these questions would be impossible or that they would not be accessible to any kind of objective observation: The conscious decision of who I want to be can be measured against the benchmark of an authentic lifestyle. However, the validity of an ethical statement in relation to the specific life plan must be relativized and can claim binding force only toward persons of a specific origin. While cultural values and ideals do carry a claim to intersubjective validity, they do so only within the same culture group. Feats of abstraction in this area are also not at all possible in their totality. Only individual norms and actions that have become problematic can be questioned within the self-evident context of the respective lifeworld. A socialized subject cannot question the life form in which its identity has been formed in its totality (see [6], p. 35ff). Ethnic-political questions are answered in ethical discourse. Today, in our life form, the respective answers are expressed within the legal framework of a modern life form. In this case, the “democracy principle” intervenes, which above all else is intended to avoid violent conflict by establishing a procedure for legitimate legislation. This principle is based on a viewpoint different than that of ethical discourse. The legality of the rules is inquired. In these discourses, the justification for rules is based on the identity of a surrounded community. This justification needs only to be recognized by the respective members, as they are based on shared traditions and strong valuations (see [8], p. 198). Should these ideals and strong evaluations themselves be questioned, then the arguments brought forth in discourse can only be based on historically derived clarifications from one’s own self-image or on claims to an authentic lifestyle. Uncircum- ventable differences in interests can only fall back on rational equalization, which, however, has to materialize under fair negotiation conditions. These fair compromises should be able to secure “the integrity and equal coexistence of life forms and world interpretations” ([6], p. 166). Here, the democracy 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 537

principle indicates how the formation of opinions and of will should be institu- tionalized, namely, via a system of laws securing equal participation in the process of legislation. To do so, the democracy principle explicates the conditions for equal participation in discursive formation of opinions and will, i.e., the external institutionalization. 2. According to Habermas, the question of norms is categorically different. The universalization principle spares questions of good life and is only applicable to practical questions that can be debated rationally, specifically with a chance for consensus. Moral questions do not concern preference but rather the grounds for the intended validity of action norms. The objective of moral considerations are to think about norms according to which we want to coexist and through which action conflicts can be regulated in the mutual interest of all. This question separates itself from the horizon of an ethical lifestyle and demands a judgment under the viewpoint of what everybody could want mutually. The moral viewpoint is based on impartiality above all else, which should rule in assessing questions of justice. Moral questions are decided using the moral principle as an argumentation rule in moral discourses. Here, the discourse principle assumes the form of a universalization principle: The normative viewpoint expresses itself in the aspiration to have coexistence regulated in the interest of all. While, according to Habermas, moral questions can only be decided upon in a discourse that actually happens, all discourse participants do have to project a communication community without borders if they want to claim validity and rationally justify that claim in discourse. The reference is always humanity and/or “presumed republic of world citizens” ([8], p. 139). This moment, which transcends experience, is decided by the moral justification practice of social conventions. In order to secure an impartial judgment, it can no longer refer solely to the context of the respective life form (see [6], p. 124).

The Implementation of Discourse Ethics

Habermas works in detail on the implementation of discourse ethics in a modern society. As a foundation, Habermas’s statements on the individual implementation difﬁculties in discourse ethics with regard to cognitive and motivational problems should be discussed ﬁrst (see [1], pp. 225–366, [2], p. 127ff). Both problem forms originate from the application of abstract norms on distinct individuals in different situations. Since individuals are overwhelmed with solving the consequential problems alone, they have to be solved via a social order. To do so, the conditions of a modern society according to Habermas are stated. They are decisive for designing a social order with regard to the assertion of moral consensus. Respon- sible for this are rationalization processes, which lead to a redesigning of society and allow the difference between a modern and premodern society to emerge. Finally, Habermas’s ideas on the relationship between ethics and law based on the lifeworld circumstances of a modern society will be presented. 538 K. Thierjung

In a lifeworld in which justice questions are not separated from the questions of good life, moral judgments are only made in concrete contexts. This can be drawn from the certainties of a given life form. This means they have the advantage of a direct action-motivating force. If, however, the questions of justice are separated from the ideas of a good life, then distance from the concrete context is introduced and, therefore, distance from the corresponding lifeworld background. Moral questions aim at general answers distanced from the individual case that can be solved using the background knowledge of the lifeworld. As a result of the practical deficit, a difficult mediation problem generated between general and formal principles on the one side and morality on the other (see [6], p. 42). There are two problems relevant to the implementation question: cognitive and motivational. The cognitive problem originates from the application problem of norms and action forms that have been legitimately grounded according to the procedure of discourse ethics. Here, the limits to discourse ethics can be seen, as they do not directly stipulate what the correct action decision in an individual case under given circumstances. The logical argumentation role of the universalization theorem is restricted to justification discourse. In order to determine the correct form of action in an individual case, it becomes necessary to bar a further argumentation step after the first of the norm justifications, namely, the question of application. To do so, the distance from the context must be reversed again. Even if the universalization principle has already been set aside as an argumentation rule for the results and consequences of general norm compliance for the benefit of each individual, it is impossible for all consequences of potential applications of a norm to be taken into consideration in justification discourse. Neither time nor knowledge is such that all situations could flow into the justification. In order to legitimately apply a norm, another discourse has to be held, namely, application discourse. In it, the norms and obligations, which are initially an unquestioned part of lifeworld knowledge, play the role of grounds. The principle of appropriateness assumes the role of the universalization principle. It cannot be assumed that the idea of impartiality has been satisfied until both discourses have been held, and therefore, both principles have been applied. In application discourse, it is no longer the general validity of the norm that is of significance for each individual and its interests, but rather the effects from general compliance with the norm in a certain situation. The situational circumstances give the norms’ implementation concrete form (see [6], p. 139). In the case of a norm collision, the relationship and, above all, the differences between abstract justification and concrete application discourses become particularly clear. In application discourse, what counts are the circumstances of the situation to which a certain norm is being applied. They determine the consequences of general compliance or noncompliance with the norm in this specific situation. These consequences are then illuminated from the perspective of those affected and their interests. However, the other norms that fall behind the norm being applied to the specific situation do not per se lose their general validity which can only be questioned in justification discourse. Observing the individual situations and application discourse makes it possible to give a certain form to the disordered batch of applicable norms justified during justification discourse. 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 539

By following the principle of appropriateness, Habermas is hoping for a coherent order, which, of course, experiences a change in relations with each new situation. The motivational problem is found when justification questions are detached from context and answers then lose the action-motivating force previously yielded from the self-evidence of the lifeworld. There is merely a chance to generate rational insight into the morally “right” action and to hope that it is followed. Habermas knows that, above all, the question of motivation is a decisive point in moral theory as this motivational problem of anchoring moral insights includes the question of the ability to implement ethics. In order to solve the problem, rationally motivating insights have to be remerged with empirical stances. Habermas attempts to solve this problem by connecting an interest-based perspective with a moral perspective. McCarthy interprets this as locating the objective of discourse in a consensus on the interests that can be generalized. The model does not intend to exclude individual desires, needs, wishes, and interests; rather, it intends to subject them to rational aspects during discourse. Discourse therefore ensures, on the one hand, that all affected interests are integrated. Individual interest is accounted for by the nonreplaceable consent of each individual. On the other hand, the egocentric perspective has to be overcome via discourse and the universalization rule in order to attain violence-free agreement as the objective of agreement. By connecting the consent and integrating the others in the discursive process, it becomes possible to attain agreement reflecting the interests of each individual without renouncing social relationships. A moral that is stipulated abstractly and without a reference to the empirical world cannot emerge at all (see [6], p. 72, [7], p. 372). When an ethical principle has been accepted by all participants in discourse, discourse ethics do not claim that this ethical principle has action-regulating force. Habermas even establishes that the requirements placed on the discourse participants are extremely high. The following question is posed: How might moral insights and empirical interests fit together? With Habermas, the problem of weakness of will refers to a broad field of external conditions that must be fulfilled before it becomes “reasonable” ([6], p. 136) to adhere to valid moral judgments. For Habermas, “ethical” means “generally reasonable” anyway. If a certain situation demands a decision that will have a sacrifice regardless, then that sacrifice is not ethically made according to Habermas, but rather voluntarily provided by the discourse participants. Habermas also bases this on there being no interest in dilemma situations of this kind that could be generalized. Therefore, there is also no corresponding norm that everyone would consent to in rational discourse. That is why the weakness of will should not be understood as a negative attribute in the traditional sense (see [8], p. 148). In this context, he also refers to the relationship with socialization processes, identities, institutions, and normative contexts. For when the social context is such that motivation usually places the actor in opposi- tion to his own interests on good grounds, then it cannot be expected of him to give preference to insight. This reasonability condition ensures that compliance with moral commandments is not only of mutual interest but that they also do not demand an unreasonable sacrifice from the moral actor. Habermas knows about the impossibility of lastingly positioning the force of moral insight against 540 K. Thierjung empirical interests. If the conditions named are not fulfilled, then the procedure of discourse ethics can only ensure that the principle accepted in the discourse can only play the legitimate role of justification for a certain action in an action conflict. The subjects are ultimately overwhelmed alone with the two consequential problems of distancing in reason-based ethics. Therefore, structures must be available in the lifeworld that ensure the social and moral integration of individuals. Habermas therefore drafts a societal concept for implementing discursive ethics in a modern society with the paradigm of rule of law as its objective. In order to justify this, he clarifies the conditions for modern societies. Habermas described the progression from a premodern to a modern society in the “Theory of Communicative Action” as a rationalization procedure. This leads to new conditions under which a mutual understanding of ethics can be developed. Modern societies, namely, show the characteristic that ethical background knowledge is increasingly questioned rationally and negotiated via communicative processes. Individuals, however, are overwhelmed with the resulting tedious communicative coordination work. There- fore, an additional mechanism has formed in modern societies intended to relieve communicative processes. This mechanism ensures the coordination of systemic action consequences. Habermas develops a two-level society concept with that basis. He conceptualizes modern society as a lifeworld and a system simultaneously. The socially integrated lifeworld is responsible for symbolic reproduction, while the functionally coordinated system and its subsystems from capitalism and the modern state apparatus are responsible for material reproduction (see [1], p.198, [4]). As a result of the two different social integration principles, two subsystems stand in irresolvable tension: Democracy is reliant upon legitimization of political objectives by the collective, thereby remaining dependent upon the lifeworld context and agreement-oriented negotiation. The coordination principle for determining aims is built upon the social integration mechanism. Since, however, capitalism can be entirely decoupled from the lifeworld using the symbolic medium of money, action coordination is performed solely via systemic relations and strategic action dominates in order to guarantee the success of indicated objectives. Based on the principles of democracy, modern societies claim primacy of socially integrated action areas over objective system relationships. Lifeworld members confirm or correct values consensus in social discourse. The state should assert this value consensus against business. This task is based on, above all, market failures qualified as such by the lifeworld. The states should hinder or mitigate crises and compensate for undesired side effects on the lifeworld. Here, Habermas refers, above all, to the equalization of economic inequalities and the arrangement of labor and social laws (social safety net and compensation for disadvantages from structurally weaker market positions, such as employees, tenants, and customers). The authorization of functional necessities of systemically integrated action areas should be questioned via agreement-oriented action of lifeworld members. Capitalistic momentum can only be implemented to the extent it is accepted by lifeworld deliberations. Against this background, we can understand Habermas’s description of fundamental tendencies within advanced capitalism and his criticism of the consequential disempowerment of democratic institutions and processes (see [4], p. 505ff, [9]). 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 541

However, Habermas also establishes that systemic structures have an evolution- ary entitlement, particularly when involving material reproduction. Lifeworld considerations therefore should also not intervene in systemic relationships: The economy, for example, may not be controlled via the symbolic medium of power. Above all, Habermas sees the precedence of private investments as an important element in the independence of an economic system. State control should only cover the framework conditions governing economic transactions between private companies. The organizational form of the capitalistic economic system must remain untouched. Furthermore, the structure of this economic form may not be changed: While social policy should compensate the extremely disadvantaged and dampen uncertainties, it may not touch “the structurally unequal property, income, and dependency circumstances (...)” ([4], p. 511). The exchange relationships between system and lifeworld, however, are not, according to Habermas, compromised by the processes of bureaucratization and monetarization’s intervention in the lifeworld. The purely perfunctionary action is no longer limited to subsystems alone but rather stretches to cover public and private areas of life. According to Habermas’ evaluation, the increasing expansion of perfunctionary action orientations beyond the borders of subsystems affects undesirable developments. Pathologies are triggered by replacing communicative action with systemic control mechanisms in symbolic reproduction (socialization, cultural reproduction, and social integration). Speciﬁcally, in relation to the symbolic medium of money, there is a monetary renaming of objectives, relationships, and services. Life areas cannot be “technically reorganized” without consequences, i.e., subjected to perfunctionary action. These functions can, at most, be techno- logically expanded with regard to communication, organizationally mediated or rationalized. The expansion of the “monetary-bureaucratic complex” ([4], p. 516) becomes a hazard for agreement potential and consensus chances in the private and public spheres. Habermas calls the penetration of system-integrative mechanisms into communicative action areas the colonialization of the lifeworld or the Techni- cal Reorganization of the Lifeworld. Habermas takes this concept from Niklas Luhmann who notes that the rational interior structure of agreement cannot be reproduced in an exchange process with symbolic media, as experiences and actions will not be verbalized or understood [4, 10]. Since there is entitlement for both integration mechanisms in a modern society, although they compete with one another, the task arises to assess the balance between the requirements of a lifeworld’s moral consensus and the subsystems’ functionalistic imperatives in a modern society (see [4], p. 350). In order to establish a compromise, Habermas searches for a communication medium that allows mediation between the system’s claims and those of the lifeworld. In his work Between Facts and Norms, he attempts to reconstruct the right to a medium of this kind (see [8]). Resolution of tension becomes possible because this right has a distinct compulsory and simultaneously binding moment. Furthermore, law receives its legitimization via a discursive practice in which the members of a society agree upon the fundamental questions of coexistence. Discourse connects the legal code to the medium of common speech, thereby connecting it to the 542 K. Thierjung lifeworld. The simultaneous threat of external sanctions and the supposed legitimization of a rationally motivated agreement make legitimate implementation possible. This gives law an expectation-stabilizing effect, and it can assume the function of securing social solidarity when social rules can no longer secure integration via communicative processes. On the other hand, law is what makes it possible for the controlling media of money and power to set up markets and organize a state authority, as the operations in these areas are realized in forms of law. As a result of this function, law must place the messages of the lifeworld into a form that remains understandable for the specialized codes of the controlling media of money and power. The historical rationalization process that elevates modern society from premodern society has made rule of law both possible and necessary. With legal discourse, the moral consensus for the legal community can be adjusted and placed into a form for institutionalization. Rule of law is also a model for how humans can legitimately govern their coexistence using law as the foundation.

Critical Appraisal and Suggestions by Interaction Economics

Considering the effects from international functional interconnections, such as international financial and commercial crises, and also global risks, such as climate change, worldwide migration, and epidemics, a justified question poses itself regarding the extent to which discourse ethics represent a theoretical concept that helps to counteract global challenges. This particularly applies with regard to a sustainable future perspective for global business ethics. Karl Homann’s interaction economics should help here to illuminate certain theoretical modules. One significant element of interaction economics is the differentiation between framework rules of action and actions within framework rules. This relationship can be clarified using modern economic processes. The starting point for deliberation is the competition in a market economy. An individual cannot, against the background of competition, be forced to allow himself to be exploited due to his own ethical conduct. If ethical concepts are not (yet) anchored in framework rules, then competitors are not subject to the same action restrictions. In a case like this, it is expected that society finds framework rules under which an individual does not constantly have to infringe upon his own interests in order to maintain ethical norms. Homann expands this concept to the systemic forces of capitalistic rules. For its implementation, ethical norms must be imposed upon all actors via action restrictions. The state must also ensure that ethical behavior does not lead to the economic ruin of a company. Ergo, the implementation of ethical norms should mainly occur by creating mutual (legal) rules. If no tribute is paid to this insight on systemic forces, then the conditions of a modern society are continuously ignored. In this context, Homann calls for the omission of appeals for ethical behavior if that behavior leads to systematic disadvantages for individuals. Ethical rules that “should” be adhered to can only be implemented if action restrictions are adjusted correspondingly. However, actors are called to collaborate in creating the 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 543 framework rules. According to Homann, an individual has a moral responsibility not only to follow the framework rules but also to participate in creating those rules (see [11, 12]). In a second step, Homann applies this concept to social interactions as a whole. The underlying method for this is the prisoner dilemma and, in a more general sense, the concept of dilemma structures. The individual constellations of interests and the resulting outcome are reconstructed from game theory. The prisoner dilemma explicates the situation that interests are such that none of the benefits calculated by the participants could be fulfilled optimally. Under the stipulation of teleological action, the prisoner dilemma cannot be overcome without changing the framework conditions (see among others [13]). With the help of this concept, the structures of interactions can be analyzed. All interactions can be represented in dilemma structures if one assumes that each action situation has mutual and conflicting interests simultaneously. If there are no effective behavior conductions, and therefore no stable behavior expectations, then dilemma structures will lead to a “social trap” [14]. Joint cooperation will not occur due to rational fear of exploitation. The dilemma consists in this event being Pareto efficient for all participants. The sole chance for overcoming or rather suspending these dilemmas is for institutions to create a reliable behavior obligation via incentives and sanctions. Setting up institutions of this kind is a task for policymakers according to Homann. In this manner, dilemma structures can be specifically implemented and resolved. For Homann, these interaction patterns are a decisive instrument for implementing ethics. The question of implementation thereby becomes a decisive moment in the process of justifying norms. The systemic forces in the subsystem of economy constitute a part of the theory of communicative action. Habermas also explicitly emphasizes that the systemic integration mechanism can no longer be circumvented. The material reproduction of a modern society is reliant upon systemic integration. The reconstruction of the medium of law as the mediator between systemic and social integration can be understood as an attempt to move the legal rules of interaction relationships into the foreground. This means that Habermas’s theory has nothing against emphasizing framework rules as a significant component for implementing ethics as long as the claims of ethical action rules are rationally tested via legal discourse in the lifeworld society and then rational consensus is met. Focusing on framework rules even offers an opportunity to deliver a framework for mediating between systemic and social integration. These framework rules should be created using the template of ethical norms that would have to be resolved rationally by life forms in moral and ethical discourse. Implementing rules that “should” be followed and resolved via discourse could therefore focus on creating institutions that can overcome mutual dilemma structures. In this way, ethical action rules could be tailored to the empirical circumstances and the state of international relations of the times. Additionally, there is a chance to integrate concepts of ethics implementation other than criminal law, such as the concepts from institutional economics, which has the objective of placing incentives (see [15]). 544 K. Thierjung

In his definition of legal discourse, Habermas accepts that the question of implementing a norm and its consequences plays a decisive role (see [7]). However, it cannot be overlooked here that Habermas, contrary to Homann, directs discourse ethics toward knowledge of ethical norms. Even if this can never be secured, there is indeed the presumption of a rational result in the foreground. The moment of rational insight differentiates him from the advantage/disadvantage calculations in Homann’s conceptualization. Discourse ethics’ efficiency in relation to opening up future perspectives depends, in any case, on the discourse, on actor integration, on equal participation, and on forceless insight into good grounds. In this context, Habermas himself does not express clear reservations toward the system forces of the capitalistic economic system. Even if there is an indispensable place in material reproduction assigned to systemic integration, Habermas still warns of a “colonization of the lifeworld.” Power and/or economic interests have a falsifying effect on discourse the moment in which an agreement is forced with their help. In cases like this, both the commandments of rational agreement and the demands of a symmetric relationship among discourse participants are broken: Circumventing linguistic consensus processes using the money or power code signifies a contradiction to the reciprocity expectations of transcendental argumentation preconditions and the opposite of rational agreement, according to Habermas. These considerations against falsifying discourse using economic and power interests must be made when dealing with the design of framework rules, particularly in a global context. This is reinforced by the consideration that the pluralism of ethics concepts represents a further set of problems for discourse (see [16]). While discourse ethics do provide the theoretical groundwork for a solution, there are still grave problems for implementation. For Habermas, this partially leads to unnecessary polemics against the modern market economy, which appears to obstruct a perspective for discourse ethics. If the modern economic system truly is uncircumventable, then paths must be found to deal with the demands of the capitalistic system. However, Habermas’s reservations lead him to a “dualism” [17] of business and lifeworld, which makes it many times more difficult to find and implement consensual ethics. If both integration mechanisms of lifeworld and system have authority, then there is “only” the question of in which situation should integration mechanisms have primacy. With Habermas, this question is resolved using the medium of law. Legal discourse decides how law and framework rules should look. It appears to be imperative that actors acting in the subsystems of systemic integration represent and justify their interests in legal discourse. While this primarily implies “force-means- considerations” based on the logic of capitalistic market economics, it does not result in exclusion from legal discourse which shows Homann’s statements on the moral quality of the market economy as an integration mechanism for societies (see [13], p. 49). Economic viewpoints, on the other hand, would be permissible in discourse as grounds even if they are not significant. Their claims and their authorization must be tested in rational discourse. Furthermore, it appears to be counterproductive to rigorously exclude the actors of a market economy from 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 545 designing these rules. The capitalistic economic system is dependent upon the medium of law as a tool for designing market rules, and its actors would therefore have an interest in collaborating in legal discourse. If empirical factors can be presented as grounds in legal discourse, then those participating in the economy must also be authorized to show the significance of systemic forces for material security. The competition between the claims of systemic and those of social integration would have to be contented rationally and discursively. Only in this manner can it be guaranteed that the consequences of implementing ethical norms flow into justification discourse. The potential for integrating business into designing law is therefore not only recommendable but also necessary (see [15]). For this purpose, Ulrich Beck even sketches out a model of shared sovereignty between states and global economic actors [18]. However, discourse ethics does not obey any consequentialistic principle. In contrast to the ethics of conviction, it does allow for orientation toward consequences in discourse, but the rules that indicate the framework for testing claims to validity solely obey the principle of reciprocity. The pragmatic preconditions in communicative action cannot be restricted in the name of considering overall benefit, as the sense behind violence-free argumentation would otherwise be destroyed (see [6]). Thomas McCarthy attributes therefore to discourse the task of accounting for all relevant evidence of ethical action rules. They, in turn, are independent of the consequences of implementation (see [7], p. 355). It becomes clear that the problem with legal discourses is securing reciprocity. Inequalities can appear quite quickly, which undermines the rationality of discourse. A prime example of this is the dominant role that multinational companies have in the process of globalization. When they control politics and are not democratically monitored, it represents an infringement upon the principle of discourse ethics of not decoupling systemic forces from lifeworld apprehensions. Here, discourse ethics at least provide an orientation when it comes to designing discourse. An autonomous public that works for reciprocal discourse and considers grounds rationally is of decisive importance for the success of (nearly) rational discourse. It remains to be seen whether this foundation is sufficient for solving global problems.

Conclusion In conclusion, it can be stated that Habermas awards primacy to (discursive) ethics in the form of communicative action in relation to the subsystem of economy. It ultimately represents the framework for demarcation of the exchange between communicatively structured spheres of life on the one hand and the subsystem on the other. The regulative concept for testing ethical norms consists in undominated discourse emancipated from systemic forces, i.e., a general, unrestricted, and rational discussion between lifeworld members. However, the functional interrelations in the subsystem economy have evolu- tionary authorization, particularly when involving material reproduction for modern society. They must be acknowledged and evince the limits to lifeworld considerations. Habermas endeavors to use law to create the requisite reﬂection 546 K. Thierjung

and controlling potential, which includes not only the lifeworld conditions in legal discourse but also systemic forces. The intention is to create a supplemental relationship between an autonomous public on the one hand and spheres of action controlled via money and power on the other hand. Discourse ethics provides orientation when dealing with processes for creating framework rules for (global) economies. It remains to be seen, however, whether the process indicated by discourse ethics is sufﬁciently robust and forward-looking in order to counter global challenges.

Cross-References

▶ Adam Smith on Morality and Self-Interest ▶ Corporate Human Rights Violations: A Case for Extraterritorial Regulation ▶ Discourse and Normative Business Ethics ▶ Discourse and Tractable Morality ▶ Pro-Market Versus Anti-Market Approaches to Business Ethics ▶ The Idea of a Contractarian Business Ethics

References

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