Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 26 Katja Thierjung Abstract In formulating a critical social theory, Jurgen€ Habermas endeavors to find a framework for evaluating the problems of a modern, globalized society and finding a substantial opportunity to overcome them. That framework also addresses, of course, questions relating to business and problems in business ethics. In this chapter, the building blocks of the critical social theory will be converged with the help of Habermas’s works. As a basis, Habermas developed the Theory of Communicative Action. It serves as the foundation for developing his discourse ethics, which in turn are enhanced and implemented using the legal philosophy in discourse theory. The implementation possibilities of discourse ethics will finally be evaluated with the help of two fundamental paradigms from interaction economics. Introduction In formulating a critical social theory, Jurgen€ Habermas endeavors to find a framework for evaluating the problems of a modern, globalized society and finding a substantial opportunity to overcome them. That framework also addresses, of course, questions relating to business and problems in business ethics. In this chapter, the building blocks of the critical social theory will be converged with the help of Habermas’s works: The first section will begin with a reconstruction of the Theory of Communicative Action and the social concept built upon it in order to explore Habermas’s critical approach to social theory. The second section follows with a presentation of discourse ethics. With regard to his moral theory, Habermas views himself as having two tasks: On the one hand, philosophical theory must K. Thierjung German Academy of Science and Engineering acatech, Gr€afstr. 87, Munchen,€ Germany e-mail: [email protected] C. Luetge (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, 529 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_87, # Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013 530 K. Thierjung release its claim to what is, ultimately, metaphysically founded knowledge. Ethics are therefore no longer a matter of strict knowledge that is binding to all. On the other hand, Habermas simultaneously does not want to fall into relativism. In discourse ethics, Habermas believes to have found an alternative to cognitivism and relativism. The third section centers on the implementation of discourse ethics. This concretely deals with the application of norms and with the implementation of norms within a modern social context. Habermas develops for this a two-level society concept, which is intended to be tailored to modern circumstances by linking paradigms of communicative actions and systemic functional relationships. His link is the rule of law intended to mediate between lifeworlds and the social subsystems of capitalism and modern government machinery. In the interest of proposing a solution, he reconstructs the principles of a democratic state with the rule of law using concepts from discourse theory. Finally, the fourth section will make an initial analytical evaluation of the implementation possibilities of discourse ethics with the help of two fundamental paradigms from interaction economics. The Foundations of Discourse Ethics: Communicative Action Habermas’s aim is to use the “Theory of Communicative Action” to win a moment of critical unconditionality against relativism without falling into the problems of traditional metaphysics in its continental manifestation. To do so, he hopes to build upon an immanent rationality he sees formed in empirically founded knowledge from contemporary theories. When doing so, Habermas assumes that a significant degree of rationality has already materialized in the world (see [1]). Reconstruction of this rationality is assessed according to coherent viewpoints of coherence and can claim neither exclusivity nor ultimate justification (see [2]). Simultaneously, Habermas disputes the fundamental assumptions of ethical relativism. In order to immanently justify a comprehensive rationality concept, Habermas refers to, above all, Speech Act Theory: What is decisive for him is the experience that argumentative speech has in unifying consensus-creating power without having to revert to physical force. This moment of consensus via discourse and without violence is the fundamental building block of all of his philosophical endeavors. Habermas references the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein and his concept of ratio- nality: Every act of speech implies one or multiple claims to validity that have to be justified using arguments. These arguments and their consensus-creating function are, for Habermas, evidence of a rationality that is anchored in the essence of normal speech. The Theory of Communicative Rationality focuses on the nature of this rationality. Also, the Theory of Communicative Rationality investigates the formal properties of methods for justifying claims of validity that agents capable of speech and action use in their speech (see [1], p. 28). Since linguistic processes for agreement are an opportunity for action coordina- tion, Habermas recognizes the ability of subjects to come to an agreement as being a significant element for a society to function (see [2], p. 68). Claims to validity 26 Fundamentals of Discourse Ethics 531 made during verbal negotiations are based on an evaluation of the situation. When pertaining to the order of interpersonal relations, statements are made with a claim to correctness. Statements of this kind express a norm, i.e., a certain imperative. The criterion for decidability is acceptance of the validity and/or justification. Statements of this kind are based on the mutual social world as the totality of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations (see [3]). This consent to or denial of the claims of validity presented in the discussion constitutes the basis for an agreement to a situational interpretation and therefore the possibility of cooperative action. Habermas then states that there are two possibilities for attaining consent to claim to validity. There is teleological or “strategic action” (see [1], p. 131): Teleological action is performed by an agent that, above all else, is attempting to realize an objective that has already been sufficiently defined with precision. Thus, agreement motivates the interlocutor, empirically, i.e., with a threat of sanctions or with a perspective for reward, to initiate mutual action toward an objective that has already been indi- cated. Coordinating action under these circumstances depends merely on the interests of those involved, i.e., on the question of whether the benefit calculations of the individual agents match or not (see [2], p. 144). By contrast, the objective of “communicative action” is an entirely different mechanism of action coordination. The opponent is rationally motivated to con- summate a subsequent action. The objective is rationally based agreement in the assessment of situations and the expected consequences from actions, such that there can be internal coordination of action plans. According to Habermas, this happens due to the force of the illocutionary binding effect of a speech-act offer. Habermas traces this binding force to an internal relationship between claims to validity and grounds. If an agent enters into an agreement and takes a position toward the claims to validity of a speech act offer, then this position will funda- mentally have “a moment of insight”(see [4]) in the eyes of the subject, as claims to validity cannot be accepted or denied in agreement-oriented actions without grounds. Habermas also calls the “moment of insight” the “forceless force of the better argument” or also “affection via grounds” which strongly shows the “rational side” to Habermas’ theory (see [5]). However, this moment, i.e., the rationally motivated acceptance of a speech-act offer, is not based on the actual validity of what was said but rather on the guarantee that the speaker assumes for his state- ment. In the event of statements with a claim to truth or correctness, the speaker will indicate grounds that will assume a guarantee for the statement. In these two cases, claims to validity can be submitted discursively (see [2], p. 69). Habermas further states that communicative understanding is largely based on having a mutual lifeworld. This makes it possible for participants to revert to mutual background knowledge in their communication. Most arguments intended as a foundation for claims to validity in discourse are generated from this back- ground knowledge. Each communication participant is a member of the lifeworld that is subconsciously present for him for the current setting. If the communication partners share a similar lifeworld, then most of the communication processes will be unproblematic as they can revert to the same patterns of interpretation. Thus, it is 532 K. Thierjung not necessary for each individual situation to be renegotiated in full detail. Should, however, an argument be rejected by an interlocutor as being invalid, then the horizon in which that argument is embedded becomes problematic. This questions the claim to validity, and the grounds for its foundation are requested. In such cases, there is need for agreement with regard to current possibilities for action. However, it is not the entire lifeworld that is questioned here, but rather only a section relevant to the situation. The content of the lifeworld can never be entirely comprehended by the actor anyway. The content is not conscious, but rather, it is merely an unproblematic