National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance Valentin Kreilinger Dissertation submitted to the Hertie School of Governance in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.) in the Doctoral Programme in Governance Berlin, 2019 First advisor: Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein Hertie School of Governance Second advisor: Prof. Dr. Olivier Rozenberg Sciences Po Paris Third advisor: Prof. Dr. Ben Crum Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !2 Summary This dissertation provides a comprehensive account of the role of national parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance. It examines national parliaments in the European Semester, in relation to the European Stability Mechanism and the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance and challenges the view that the Euro crisis has only reduced the influence of national parliaments. The analysis moves beyond prerogatives and institutional capacities to actual parliamentary involvement. Scrutinising the different stages of the European Semester remains a challenge for many national parliaments that have been marginalised by this multilevel coordination and surveillance process. In case of the third rescue package for Greece, the overall involvement by national parliaments exceeded what legal provisions would have demanded. But both economic governance domains suffer from asymmetries between those national parliaments that are willing and able to become actually involved and those that are not. One possible remedy against these asymmetries would be to involve national parliaments into economic governance collectively. The provision of Article 13 TSCG and the Interparliamentary Conference established on this basis, however, fall short of collective involvement or joint scrutiny and the experience of negotiating the institutional design of the new Conference even suggests that any kind of joint parliamentary body for the Euro area would be very difficult to realise. As a general overhaul of the Economic and Monetary Union seems indispensable to make the common currency weather-proof, a more symmetric involvement of national parliaments is necessary to strengthen the legitimacy that they supply. In the European Semester this could be achieved via minimum standards for parliamentary involvement, but the tangled web of procedures for ESM rescue packages is likely to persist and interparliamentary cooperation can only be developed incrementally. National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 3! Acknowledgments This dissertation is the result of my doctoral research at the Hertie School of Governance from 2014 to 2018. It has been a great pleasure to focus on this important and evolving topic. The Hertie School’s Doctoral Programme in Governance and the Jacques Delors Institute Berlin have been an ideal place for researching national parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance. I am most grateful to my three PhD advisors. Henrik Enderlein has been an excellent supervisor of my dissertation who supported this project from its very beginning. My second supervisor, Olivier Rozenberg, has always provided very helpful advice for my thesis and we have cooperated fruitfully ever since we first met in Paris. Ben Crum, as third member of my PhD committee, has generously commented on individual chapters on numerous occasions. The Hertie Foundation provided financial support for this project with two short-term grants in 2015 and 2018 and the IPID4all programme of the German Academic Exchange Service allowed me to present my findings at international conferences and workshops, to undertake field trips to European capitals for interviews, and to be an observer of interparliamentary cooperation. I thankfully acknowledge this support and I am highly indebted to Members of Parliament, officials and staff in national parliaments and the European Parliament who shared their insights with me. Last but not least, I want to thank all colleagues and friends with who I have had the privilege to study, work or exchange over the years and who have made invaluable contributions to shaping the ideas behind this project. Without these regular contacts and occasional encouragements, this dissertation would not have emerged in the same way. National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !4 Table of Contents 1 Introduction .......................................................................13 1.1 Democracy and legitimacy beyond the nation-state ............................15 1.2 National parliaments in the European Union .....................................17 1.3 Why Economic Governance is different ................................................22 1.4 Research questions and outline of the thesis .......................................27 2 Assessing parliamentary involvement in Economic Governance .........................................................................31 2.1 Contemporary perspectives on European integration .........................32 2.2 National parliaments as multilevel actors ...........................................38 2.2.1 Executive-legislative relations, principals and agents 38 2.2.2 An overarching analytical framework 42 2.3 Not just involved: Driving factors and ideal-typical models ...............46 2.3.1 Driving factors for actual parliamentary involvement 46 2.3.2 Models of parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs 48 2.3.3 Cross-cutting issues of parliamentary involvement in economic governance 54 2.4 Three comparative studies of national parliaments in the post-crisis economic governance .............................................................................59 3 National parliaments in the European Semester ............65 3.1 Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Semester .............................68 3.2 Driving factors for parliamentary involvement ..................................71 3.2.1 Parliamentary power as a driving factor 72 3.2.2 European Semester-specific driving factors for involvement 76 3.3 Explaining national parliaments’ involvement in France, Germany, Ireland and Portugal .............................................................................79 3.3.1 To scrutinise or not to scrutinise? 80 3.3.2 Raising objections against the European Semester 84 3.4 Opportunities and constraints for scrutinising the European Semester 86 National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance 5! Appendix A (Appendix to Chapter 3): Scrutinising the European Semester in four national parliaments ...........91 A.1 French Assemblée nationale: Adaptation without obligation 95 A.2 German Bundestag: Parliamentary inertia 102 A.3 Irish Dáil: Overall weakness in the budgetary procedure 110 A.4 Portuguese Assembleia: Using and expanding powers 112 4 National parliaments and the European Stability Mechanism .......................................................................115 4.1 Decision-making on ESM rescue packages .......................................118 4.2 Driving factors for national parliaments’ involvement .....................127 4.3 Explaining the involvement of national parliaments ........................132 4.3.1 Institutional path dependency 132 4.3.2 Economic strength 137 4.3.3 Domestic political dynamics 138 4.4 Law and politics of national parliaments’ substantial involvement .142 4.4.1 Trajectories of substantial parliamentary involvement 143 4.4.2 What kind of parliamentary involvement? 149 4.5 Conclusion: The tangled web of the ESM ...........................................153 Appendix B (Appendix to Chapter 4): Voting on the third rescue package for Greece in eight national parliaments ..........................................................................................157 B.1 Austrian Nationalrat: Following the Constitution 158 B.2 Estonian Riigikogu: Involved as usual 160 B.3 Finnish Eduskunta: Mandates for the Minister 161 B.4 French Assemblée nationale: If it suits the government 163 B.5 German Bundestag: Same procedure as every time 167 B.6 Latvian Saeima: A new role 171 B.7 Dutch Tweede Kamer: Opposition mobilisation 173 B.8 Spanish Congreso: Surprise involvement 174 5 The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance .........................................177 5.1 The creation of an Interparliamentary Conference under Article 13 TSCG ....................................................................................................180 National parliaments in Europe’s post-crisis economic governance !6 5.2 Competing models for the relationship between national parliaments and the European Parliament in EU Economic Governance ...........182 5.3 Negotiations about the functioning of the Conference in 2012/13 and 2015 ......................................................................................................187 5.3.1 First discussions in sub-groups of national parliaments 187 5.3.2 Two years of discussions and little progress 190 5.3.3 Final negotiations on the Rules of Procedure 192 5.4 And the winner is…? ...........................................................................194 5.5 An assessment of the SECG Conference on the basis of attendance records ..................................................................................................199 5.5.1 Variation over time 201 5.5.2 Variation across member states 202 5.5.3 Variation across committees 203 5.6 Theory and