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Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned ______ PPrroolliiffeerraattiioonn PPaappeerrss ______________________________________________________________________ Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned ______________________________________________________________________ Keith A. Hansen Summer 2011 Security Studies Center The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN : 978-2-86592-924-5 © Ifri – 2011 – All rights reserved Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Brussels – BELGIUM Tel : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : 32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : 32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : http://www.ifri.org/ Summer 2011 Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned Keith A. Hansen Proliferation Papers Though it has long been a concern for security experts, proliferation has truly become an important political issue with the last decade, marked simultaneously by the nuclearization of South Asia, the weakening of international regimes and the discovery of frauds and traffics, the number and gravity of which have surprised observers and analysts alike (Iraq in 1991, Libya until 2004, North Korean and Iranian programs or the A. Q. Khan networks today). To further the debate on complex issues that involve technical, regional, and strategic aspects, Ifri’s Security Studies Center organizes each year, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), a series of closed seminars dealing with WMD proliferation, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Generally held in English, these seminars are structured around the presentation of an international expert. Proliferation Papers is a collection, in the original version, of selected texts from these presentations. An anonymous peer-review procedure ensures the high academic quality of the contributions. Download notifications are sent to an audience of several hundred international subscribers upon publication. Editorial board Editor: Etienne de Durand Deputy Director: Corentin Brustlein Principal Scientific Adviser: Jean Klein Layout Assistant: Laura Tanase How to cite this publication Keith A Hansen, “Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons Learned”, Proliferation Papers, No. 38, Summer 2011. About the Author Keith A. Hansen served for over three decades with the US Government in both military and civilian assignments. He participated on several strategic arms control delegations (SALT II, INF and CTBT) as an expert on strategic nuclear force issues. In Washington he served in various national security positions, including in the National Intelligence Council, where he supported defense planning, treaty ratification and counter-proliferation efforts of various administrations by producing national intelligence estimates on nuclear and proliferation issues. Hansen retired from government service in 2005 and is a consulting professor of international relations at Stanford University and Sierra Nevada College as well as a guest lecturer at other universities and public groups. He is the author of The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider’s Perspective, Stanford University Press, 2006; coauthor of Spy Satellites and Other Intelligence Technologies that Changed History, University of Washington Press, 2007; and coauthor of Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Stanford University Press, 2009. Hansen earned his BA degree in history from Stanford University where he also earned an MA degree in Russian history and an MS degree in business management. He earned his third masters degree from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, spending one year at the SAIS Bologna Center. Contents Introduction _____________________________________________ 7 What Are the Intelligence Challenges in Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation? _________________________ 9 How Does Intelligence Support Efforts to Prevent Proliferation? _ 15 What Is the Intelligence Track Record in Monitoring Nuclear Proliferation Activities? ________________ 21 What Lessons Have We Learned from the Case of Iraq? ________ 37 Is It Possible to Monitor and Prevent Further Proliferation? _____ 45 Introduction he failure of US intelligence to correctly understand the status of Iraq’s T WMD programs prior to 2003, when combined with the uncertainties that surround Iranian and North Korean nuclear activities, has led some to question the ability of intelligence to monitor small, clandestine proliferation activities. The lessons we have learned from past experience in monitoring are important, but proliferation rarely follows a predictable path as motivations and capabilities of those on the demand and supply side of the problem vary. Thus, the challenges in monitoring the activities of proliferant states and non-state actors are formidable, and unfortunately failures are inevitable. In the 1960s, it appeared as if nuclear weapons might spread all over the world. President Kennedy sincerely believed that by “1970... there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20,” which he regarded “as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”1 Had such proliferation happened, there might have been many more nuclear weapon states today: over forty countries have nuclear reactors, and many of these countries, if sufficiently motivated, could become nuclear-weapon capable were they to gain the expertise and the ability to produce plutonium or enrich uranium to a weapon-grade level.2 With such proliferation it would be increasingly difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists, and every conflict would run the risk of “going nuclear” through escalation, misunderstanding or miscalculation. Countries seek a nuclear weapon capability for a variety of reasons – primarily prestige, influence, and/or security.3 Security issues may be global as with the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or regional. For example, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto is reported to have said after the disastrous Pakistani defeat at the hands of India in 1971, that his country would build nuclear weapons even if the people had to “eat grass.”4 Israel’s nuclear weapon program appears to have been driven entirely by security motivations; the possession of nuclear weapons seemed necessary to ensure its survival. The former white- 1 Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963, Boston, Little, Brown, 2003, p. 615. 2 Keith A. Hansen, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider’s Perspective, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 123, 126-127. 3 Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons, Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 2003, p. 32. 4 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea, New York, W.W. Norton, 2006, p. 328. Hansen / Intelligence and Nuclear Proliferation minority South African government apparently believed that nuclear weapons would protect it against Soviet-inspired large-scale communist invasion from its neighbors. And, North Korea has appeared to be obsessed with its security, indeed its survival. Some countries believe they will be perceived as the dominant state in their region just by possessing nuclear weapons. After the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee announced, “We have a big bomb now. India is a nuclear weapon state.”5 Saddam Hussein thought Iraq could dominate the Middle East and keep Iran in check. Prestige under the Shah, hostility with Israel after the 1979 revolution, and possibly deterrence against US military action have probably motivated Iran’s desire for a nuclear weapon capability. In the case of Libya, motivations seem harder to discern; perhaps Qadhafi was merely a maverick seeking prestige. Brazil once pursued nuclear weapons for prestige, and Argentina was similarly motivated but largely in response to Brazil. With regard to non-state actors, terrorists seek to advance whatever political agenda they may have by sowing terror with the most horrific weapons that can be obtained. Whatever the motivations, it falls upon intelligence to understand the intentions, the inherent technical capabilities, and the relationships among states or non-state entities in order to thwart further nuclear proliferation which continues to be a threat to international security. In an effort to shed light on the role and contribution of intelligence in national and international efforts to halt, if not prevent, further nuclear weapon proliferation, this paper first analyzes the challenges intelligence faces in monitoring small, clandestine proliferation activities
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