Securing the Revolutionary State: The Development of French Counter-Espionage, 1791-1794 By Carlos GARCIA DE LA HUERTA Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Kingston University for the university degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History September 2020 [Page intentionally left blank] i Supervision: Professor Marisa LINTON (First Supervisor) 1 Dr Rachael JOHNSON 2 1 Professor in History Kingston University London Kingston School of Art School of Arts, Culture and Communication Department of Humanities Penrhyn Road Kingston upon Thames KT1 2EE United Kingdom 2 Senior Lecturer in History Kingston University London Kingston School of Art School of Arts, Culture and Communication Department of Humanities Penrhyn Road Kingston upon Thames KT1 2EE United Kingdom ii [Page intentionally left blank] iii Abstract The history of counter-espionage during the early years of the French Revolution has been curiously overlooked by scholars and non-fiction writers alike. Until now, no single study has appeared, or indeed been published, charting the course of its development during the period in discussion. This thesis aims to fill this lacuna, not by offering an episodic account of its activities but by examining the precepts, perceptions and procedures that determined its conduct as it relates to la sûreté de l’état. Its objective, in other words, is to demonstrate how the pursuit and punishment of spies is not a simple cloak and dagger tale of hidden plots and secret agents but a fundamental question of national security. As this thesis will explain, the role that counter-espionage played is actually of central importance to our understanding of how the revolutionaries defended and securitized their embryonic state at a crucial juncture in its existence. Without the existence of a single state organ responsible for overseeing its operations, or a clandestine agency that conducted secret missions on the ground, this thesis will show that the measures to neutralize threats of espionage were not taken in isolation but formed part of a broader process that is otherwise known as securitization. In other words, it will attempt to demonstrate that, for all the overblown discourse of foreign plots and political conspiracies, counter-espionage played a significant role in not just attempting to neutralize the enemy within but also, in military and counter- insurgency operations. With several state and government institutions involved in its operations, from paramilitary organizations such as the gendarmerie and national guard to militant structures such as the comités de surveillance, it should be possible to reveal how counter-espionage played an overarching role in thwarting all threats that compromised the security of the revolutionary state. iv [Page intentionally left blank] v To my mother vi [Page intentionally left blank] vii Acknowledgements I would like to extend my gratitude to my first supervisor, Professor Marisa Linton, for her useful input and advice, Dr Rachael Johnson for her encouragement but most of all, to my mother, Carmen Luz Castellon, George, my devoteful companion and Cathy, my love, without whose continued help and support the completion of this thesis would not have been possible. viii [Page intentionally left blank] ix Abbreviations The following abbreviations have been used in the notes: AM Archives Municipales, Douai, Metz, Alpes-Maritimes, France AN Archives Nationales, Paris APP Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris BL British Library, London PRO Public Record Office, the National Archives, London FO Foreign Office Papers, the National Archives, London MAE Archives des Ministère des Étrangères, Paris See the sources section in the bibliography for precise details of the archival material. x TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ............................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... viii Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................... x TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... xi INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................... 19 Dangerous Times: September 1791- September 1792 CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................... 68 State of Emergency: August 1792- September 1793 CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................... 123 ‘War to the death’: 5 September 1793- 28 July 1794 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 174 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 184 Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 216 xi INTRODUCTION During the revolutionary period, the security of the French state was the prime object of attack from foreign and domestic espionage. Despite the absence of a single, permanent agency officially charged with superintending overall operations, the unprecedented and persistent instability of the interior situation, accentuated by insurrection, defection and foreign invasion led, arguably, to the early modern practice of counter-espionage in France.1 The emergence of this security dispositive did not occur in isolation, however. Whilst the rampant spy-fever, fuelled by the outbreak of war, appears to have accelerated this development, the measures that the revolutionaries introduced to detect and neutralize spies, though sometimes targeted, nevertheless overlapped with the wider security controls which were imposed to consolidate and protect the revolutionary state against all perceived enemies, whether foreign, domestic or collusion of the two.2 Indeed, the perception that the 1 Eric Denécé, ‘French Intelligence and Security Services in 2016: A Short History’, Note Historique, Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement, 47 (2016). The first service in French history officially charged with counter-espionage dates back to the second of the 19th century with the formation of the Statistical Section, a subsection of the Deuxième Bureau created in 1873 following the restructure of the military high command (État-Major Générale). With the failure of intelligence being identified as one of the principal causes of defeat at the hands of Prussia, the President of the Minister of Councils, Adolphe Thiers signed a decree on 8 June 1871, establishing a permanent foreign intelligence service charged with uncovering enemy designs and operations. Although originally subordinated to the army’s EMG, the Deuxième Bureau would, in reality, be more closely tied with the War Ministry, assuming a crucial role in the institutionalization, centralization and professionalization of France’s intelligence services. Yet, it was actually the Section de Statistiques et de Reconnaissances Militaires, together with the gendarmerie, that would from 1886 to 1899 be officially responsible for conducting espionage operations abroad and counter-espionage activities at home before it became a police responsibility with jurisdiction switching to the Ministry of the Interior. However, it was not until the end of World War II, after a series of permutations and increasing delineation of duties, that France’s contemporary intelligence services were formally established with The Service for External Documentation and Counter-espionage (Service de documentation extérieure et de contre-espionnage – SDECE) and the Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory (Direction de la Surveillance du territoire – DST) both formed in 1946, in charge of foreign intelligence and counter-espionage respectively. In 2008, the DST merged with the DCRG to create the Direction central du renseignement intérieur (DCRI). On 30 April 2014, however, responsibility for France’s counter-espionage operations was transferred to La Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure (or DGSI) where it remains to this day. John L Lewis, Etude de guerre: Tactique des renseignements (Paris: L. Baudoin & Ce, 1881), p.117. John Stead, Second Bureau (London: Evans Brothers Ltd, 1959), Jean Paul Mauriat, ‘Le Contre-Espionnage, élément de la défense’, Défense Nationale, (1967), 107. Roger Faligot, Rémy Kauffer, Histoire mondiale du renseignement, 1870-1939, 2 vols (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993), I p.16, Gérard Arboit, Des Services secrets pour la France: Du Dépôt de la Guerre à la DGSE (1856-2013) (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2014). 1 European powers were infiltrating the interior to promote violent counter-revolution from outside created the growing need for practices that were not only increasingly transnational but represented a gradual shift in onus and prioritization from information collection and deterrence to active pursuit and punishment. Although incoherent and imperfectly implemented, this emerging dispositive was not only firmly entrenched by the end of the Terror but the