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The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947-2015

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The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947-2015 Technical Report 17-10 August 2017 The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947 – 2015 Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D. Northrop Grumman Technology Services Approved for Public Distribution Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Office of People Analytics NOTE: For correspondence about this report, please contact [email protected] Technical Report 17-10 August 2017 The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by Americans, 1947 – 2015 Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D.—Northrop Grumman Technology Services Released by—Eric L. Lang, Ph.D. Defense Personnel and Security Research Center Office of People Analytics 400 Gigling Rd. Seaside, CA 93955 NOTE: For correspondence about this report, please contact [email protected] REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 3. DATES COVERED: 2. REPORT TYPE 1. REPORT DATE: Sept. 2014 – Mar. Technical Report 2017 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER: 4. The Expanding Spectrum of Espionage by 5b. GRANT NUMBER: Americans, 1947 – 2015 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER: 5d. PROJECT NUMBER: 6. AUTHOR(S): Katherine L. Herbig, Ph.D. 5e. TASK NUMBER: 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER: 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Defense Personnel and Security Research Center 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Office of People Analytics PERSEREC-TR-17-10 400 Gigling Road Seaside, CA 93955 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) 10. SPONSORING/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 11. SPONSORING/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S): 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT: (A) Distribution Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: ABSTRACT: The report describes characteristics of 209 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses against the U.S. since 1947. Three cohorts are compared based on when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979, 1980- 1989, and 1990-2015. Using data coded from open published sources, analyses are reported on personal attributes of persons across the three cohorts, the employment and levels of clearance, how they committed espionage, the consequences they suffered, and their motivations. The second part of the report explores each of the five types of espionage committed by the 209 persons under study. These include: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. The statutes governing each type are discussed and compared. Classification of national security information is discussed as one element in espionage. In Part 3, revisions to the espionage statutes are recommended in light of findings presented in the report. 14. SUBJECT TERMS: 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE 15. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: UNCLASSIFIED PERSON: Eric L. LIMITATION NUMBER 16. 17. Lang, Director OF OF PAGES: ABSTRACT: 227 19b. TELEPHONE a. REPORT: b. ABSTRACT: c. THIS PAGE: NUMBER (Include UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED area code): 831- 583-2846 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98) Prescribed by ANSI td. Z39.18 PREFACE PREFACE The Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) dates from 1986. It was founded because of the espionage of John Walker and his ring of spies. Part of a record year for spies in 1985 in which 11 Americans were arrested for espionage, Walker’s capture provoked outrage, as did the revelation that for 20 years he had betrayed the trust the U.S. Navy placed in him as a cryptographic radioman. A commission to investigate security practices then formed under General Richard G. Stilwell. Among its recommendations for improvement was the creation of an organization to perform behavioral science research on personnel security policies and practices, and so in 1986, the Department of Defense (DoD) established PERSEREC. For 30 years, PERSEREC has worked to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness of DoD’s personnel and industrial security systems. One consistent research focus has been the phenomenon of trust betrayal in crimes such as espionage. This report is the fourth in a series of unclassified reports based on information collected in the PERSEREC Espionage Database. Materials on espionage and espionage-related offenses, including attempted espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, theft, and illegal collection of closely-held national defense information with the intent to commit espionage, have been coded into the database. A founding goal of PERSEREC is to improve security education and awareness, and so these reports are based on open sources in order to facilitate public access and broad distribution. Eric L. Lang, Ph.D. Director iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is the fourth in the series on espionage by Americans that the Defense Personnel and Security Research Center (PERSEREC) began publishing in 1992. The current report updates earlier work by including recent cases, and it extends the scope by exploring related types of espionage in addition to the classic type. There are three parts to this report. Part 1 presents characteristics of Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1947 based on analyses of data collected from open sources. Part 2 explores the five types of espionage committed by the 209 individuals in this study: classic espionage, leaks, acting as an agent of a foreign government, violations of export control laws, and economic espionage. Each type is described by its legal bases, and examples of cases and comparisons with the other types of espionage are provided. Part 3 considers the impact of the changing context in which espionage takes place, and discusses two important developments: information and communications technologies (ICT) and globalization. Recommendations are offered for revisions to the espionage statutes in response to these accelerating changes in context. Part 1 compares data across three cohorts of persons based on when the individual began espionage: 1947-1979 (the early Cold War), 1980-1989 (the later Cold War), and 1990-2015 (the post-Soviet period). As the Cold War recedes in time, the recent cohort offers the most applicable data for the present. Among the characteristics of the 67 Americans who committed espionage-related offenses since 1990: • They have usually been male and middle-aged. Half were married. • Reflecting changes in the population as a whole, they were more diverse in racial and ethnic composition, and more highly educated than earlier cohorts. • Three-quarters have been civil servants, one-quarter military, and compared to the previous two cohorts, increasing proportions have been contractors, held jobs not related to espionage, and/or not held security clearances. • Three-quarters succeeded in passing information, while one-quarter were intercepted before they could pass anything. • Sixty percent were volunteers and 40% were recruited. Among recruits, 60% were recruited by a foreign intelligence service and 40% by family or friends. Contacting a foreign embassy was the most common way to begin as a volunteer. • Compared to earlier cohorts in which the Soviet Union and Russia predominated as the recipient of American espionage, recent espionage offenders have transmitted information to a greater variety of recipients. • Shorter prison sentences have been the norm in the recent past. • Sixty-eight percent of people received no payment. v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Money is the most common motive for committing espionage-related offenses, but it is less dominant than in the past. In the recent cohort, money was a motive for 28%, down from 41% and 45% in the first and second cohorts, respectively. Divided loyalties is the second most common motive (22%). Disgruntlement and ingratiation are nearly tied for third place, and more people seek recognition as a motive for espionage. Returning to the full population, the majority of the 209 individuals committed classic espionage in which controlled national security information, usually classified, was transmitted to a foreign government. Classic espionage predominates in each cohort, but declined from 94% the first cohort to 78% in the most recent. This reflects authorities’ recent increasing treatment as espionage of the four additional types discussed in Part 2: leaks; acting as an agent of a foreign government; violations of export control laws; and economic espionage. Each of the four additional types is prosecuted under its own subset of statutes, which differs from those used in cases of classic espionage. The various types are usually handled by different federal agencies. They also differ in how involved the information of private companies and corporations is alongside government agencies. The five types of espionage are not mutually exclusive, and a person may be charged with and convicted
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